*EPF414 07/25/2002
Text: Top U.S. Military Official Highlights Moscow Treaty Benefits
(Myers cites accord's flexibility while allowing strategic cuts) (1180)

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told key senators that the new Moscow Treaty will enable the United States "to make deep reductions in strategic nuclear warheads while preserving our flexibility to meet unpredictable strategic changes."

Air Force General Richard Myers said the Treaty, which will be implemented by the United States and Russia over a period of 10 years and will reduce the number of deployable nuclear warheads on each side to a level of 1,700 to 2,200, "finally puts to rest the Cold War legacy of superpower suspicion."

The Bush administration submitted the Treaty June 20 to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. In testimony July 25 before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Myers said the U.S.-Russian accord "reflects the new relationship of trust, cooperation, and friendship with an important U.S. partner."

Myers explained that, for purposes of the Treaty, the United States will include only those warheads that are "operationally deployed." As such, he said, "we will derive the total number of warheads from the number of warheads on Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) deployed in their launchers, the number of warheads on Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) in their launch tubes onboard submarines, and nuclear weapons loaded on heavy bombers or stored in weapons storage areas at heavy bomber bases."

Refining it further, he said small numbers of spare strategic nuclear warheads at heavy bomber bases are not included in the agreed upon definition. "We also will not include the warheads associated with strategic systems that are non-operational for maintenance actions, those warheads downloaded from SLBMs or ICBMs, or those warheads associated with the deactivated Peacekeeper ICBMs," Myers added.

Following is the text of Myers prepared statement:

(begin text)

STATEMENT ON MOSCOW TREATY BY GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, BEFORE THE 107TH CONGRESS, SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

It is an honor to appear before this committee and share with you the implications of the Moscow Treaty on our Nation's defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff maintain that this treaty enhances the security of our country, and that of the world, by making a dramatic reduction in the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads while allowing the U.S. to retain the flexibility to hedge against future uncertainty. While the requirements of this treaty are fewer and more direct than previous arms control agreements, there are a number of key provisions to highlight.

The Treaty requires the U.S. to reduce its strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads. From current levels, this number reflects almost a two-thirds cut in our strategic arsenal. This reduction is consistent with our conclusions in the recent Nuclear Posture Review.

Furthermore, as we implement the Treaty, the U.S. will include only those warheads that are "operationally deployed." As such, we will derive the total number of warheads from the number of warheads on Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) deployed in their launchers, the number of warheads on Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) in their launch tubes onboard submarines, and nuclear weapons loaded on heavy bombers or stored in weapons storage areas at heavy bomber bases. We will not include the small number of spare strategic nuclear warheads located at heavy bomber bases. We also will not include the warheads associated with strategic systems that are non-operational for maintenance actions, those warheads downloaded from SLBMs or ICBMs, or those warheads nominally associated with the deactivated Peacekeeper ICBMs. As a result, under the Moscow Treaty, we can reduce the operationally deployed warheads, rather than weapon systems, allowing us to make deep reductions in our strategic warheads while maintaining conventional capabilities.

The U.S. also benefits from the Moscow Treaty's flexibility because it allows the U.S. to store spare warheads rather than destroy them. There are key benefits the U.S. gains from storing the removed nuclear warheads. The U.S. cannot replace nuclear warheads in the near- or mid-term as we are currently not manufacturing new nuclear warheads. As a result, the storage of warheads will provide the U.S. a hedge against future strategic changes. In addition, storing nuclear warheads provides a hedge in case warhead safety or reliability becomes a concern.

It is also important to note that the Moscow Treaty recognizes that the START (Strategic Arms Reduction) Treaty remains in effect. The START Treaty methodology attributes a specific number of warheads to each type of delivery system. The START methodology "counts" warheads even if the delivery platform is in maintenance. The START methodology also counts warheads even if there is not a warhead deployed in the delivery platform. Under the Moscow Treaty, the U.S. will only count operationally deployed warheads. The U.S. may remove a warhead to comply with the Moscow Treaty but a "notional" warhead may still be counted under the START Treaty as we fulfill our obligations under both treaties.

The Moscow Treaty also requires that the U.S. and Russia meet the lowered force levels by December 31, 2012. This 10-year implementation deadline maximizes flexibility for both parties and provides a mid-term hedge against unforeseen events. If the strategic environment dictated, we could temporarily raise the number of deployed warheads to address an immediate concern while later still meeting the December 2012 deadline. Should such a temporary increase be necessary, however, U.S. actions would remain within the START Treaty obligations.

Finally, the Moscow Treaty allows the U.S. to withdraw with three months notification. This provision allows the U.S. to exercise its national sovereignty and respond to a more dramatic change in the strategic environment.

The Moscow Treaty does not, however, include a number of protocols common to previous arms control agreements. This lack of protocols enhances our flexibility in implementing this accord. For example, the Moscow Treaty will not limit delivery platforms nor does it require delivery platforms to be destroyed. As a result, the U.S. will maintain a significant flexibility to adjust future force structure. This approach will allow us to remove all 50 Peacekeeper missiles. Likewise, we may modify some Trident submarines from their strategic missions and assign them to transformational missions that are more relevant to the asymmetric threats we now face. Finally, this approach will allow the U.S. to retain heavy bombers for their conventional role. Our operations in Afghanistan demonstrated the vital capability that conventional bombers provide our Combatant Commanders.

The Moscow Treaty has no requirement for an additional inspection regime. START's comprehensive verification regime will provide the foundation
for confidence, transparency and predictability in further strategic offensive reduction. And, the Moscow Treaty will not subject the U.S. to intrusive inspections in some of our most sensitive military areas.

The Moscow Treaty allows the U.S. to make deep reductions in strategic nuclear warheads while preserving our flexibility to meet unpredictable strategic changes. The Treaty finally puts to rest the Cold War legacy of superpower suspicion. It reflects the new relationship of trust, cooperation and friendship with an important U.S. partner.

(end text)

(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)

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