*EPF208 02/08/00
Excerpts: JCS Chairman on Challenges Posed by Regional Adversaries
(International security environment is "unpredictable") (7740)

Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Henry Shelton told members of Congress February 8 that although the United States is not currently facing a peer competitor there are still "openly hostile regional adversaries fielding potent forces" that have the ability to present a military challenge.

Although the United States is currently enjoying relative peace and security, he said the international security environment "remains complex, dangerous, and unpredictable." Appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee to defend the Clinton administration's fiscal year 2001 defense budget, Shelton said U.S. military personnel "are committed to peacetime military engagement (PME) as the best way of reducing the sources of conflict, preventing local crises from escalating and shaping" that environment.

Shelton said PME "can help ameliorate potential sources of conflict, promote more efficient operations among participating nations, and ensure access to key infrastructures." At the same time, he said, such engagement does not supplant the core requirement to have a military capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating nearly simultaneous large-scale, cross-border aggression in more than one theater in overlapping time frames.

Singling out global hot spots, Shelton said a great deal of U.S. attention and military resources are devoted to the Korean peninsula, the Balkans, and Southwest Asia where instability and tensions "pose the greatest potential threats to U.S. interests." He also noted that U.S. forces remain involved in peacekeeping in East Timor.

In his annual posture statement, Shelton pointed out that President Clinton's proposed FY 2001 defense budget reflects nearly two percent in real growth compared to last year -- the first time in over eight years that the Defense Department has submitted such a real growth budget.

A portion of Shelton's posture statement was devoted to the subject of missile defense. The new budget, he said, adds $2 billion for the National Missile Defense (NMD) program to continue to develop and maintain the option to deploy an anti-ballistic missile defense to protect the United States "against limited strategic ballistic missile threats from rogue states." He also said it will provide some capability "against a small accidental or unauthorized launch from a nuclear-capable state."

Following are excerpts of Shelton's prepared statement:

(begin excerpts)

POSTURE STATEMENT OF
GENERAL HENRY H. SHELTON, USA
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

BEFORE THE 106TH CONGRESS
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

8 FEBRUARY 2000

SUPPORTING THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

At the beginning of the 21st Century, the United States currently enjoys relative peace and security. The international security environment, however, remains complex, dangerous, and unpredictable. Even as the threat of global war recedes and former enemies now cooperate with us on some issues, very real threats to our citizens and interests remain. Though we currently face no peer competitor, openly hostile regional adversaries fielding potent forces have both the desire and the means to challenge the United States militarily. Transnational organizations and forces threaten our interests, our values, and even our physical security at home and abroad. And, while our military strength remains unmatched, both state and non-state actors may attempt to circumvent our strengths and exploit our weaknesses using methods that differ significantly from our own. Attacks on our information systems, the use of weapons of mass destruction, domestic and international terrorism, and even man-made environmental disasters are all examples of asymmetric threats that could be employed against us. Indeed, some already have.

To deal successfully with these challenges, the 1999 National Security Strategy stresses the fundamental need for US leadership and engagement abroad to shape the international environment and position our military to respond rapidly to a full spectrum of emerging crises. If the United States were to withdraw from international commitments, forsake its leadership responsibilities, or relinquish military superiority, the world would surely become more dangerous and the threats to American citizens and interests would increase. Within their capabilities, therefore, our Armed Forces are committed to peacetime military engagement as the best way of reducing the sources of conflict, preventing local crises from escalating, and shaping the international environment.

The National Security Strategy also recognizes that countering the wide range of threats that we face requires an integrated approach involving both interagency and multinational cooperation. An integrated approach brings to bear all instruments of national power -- military, economic, information, and diplomatic -- to achieve our national objectives, unilaterally if necessary. And, whenever possible, it makes optimum use of the skills, resources, and political support provided by multinational military forces, regional and international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. We will continue to improve our abilities to effectively operate as one element of unified interagency and multinational efforts, while encouraging other organizations to do likewise. At the same time, we are also improving our capabilities to support state and local civil authorities in response to growing threats to the US homeland, such as terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Peacetime military engagement (PME) can help ameliorate potential sources of conflict, promote more efficient operations among participating nations, and ensure access to key infrastructures. Through these means, PME assists in reducing response requirements while supporting the fundamental, overarching purpose of the US military -- to fight and win our Nation's wars.

The Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) process brings this "shaping" element of our National Military Strategy fully into the arena of deliberate planning and national-level oversight. We are continuing to evolve and refine the TEP process and philosophy. A standardized automated database, the Theater Engagement Planning Management Information System (TEPMIS), is being developed to provide a tool for all CINC engagement managers to use in planning, analyzing, executing, and assessing engagement programs and activities. Additionally, the regional engagement and presence joint warfighting capabilities assessment (REPJWCA) team is planning a study that will ultimately be used to identify engagement requirements, shortfalls, and resource implications.

Peacetime military engagement, however, does not supplant the core requirement to have a military capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating nearly simultaneous large-scale, cross-border aggression in more than one theater, in overlapping time frames. The defense of America's lives, territories, and interests is, and must remain, a cornerstone mission of our Armed Forces. This capability defines the US as a global power, ensuring that our Nation will be able to protect its vital interests or fulfill its international commitments with military power when confronted with more than one crisis. It also deters opportunistic aggression against our interests or those of our friends elsewhere in the world if we become involved in a major conflict. Furthermore, this capability provides needed flexibility and responsiveness against the possibility that we might encounter unknown threats, or threats larger or more difficult than expected.

Overall Readiness Assessment

The starting point for any assessment of the readiness of the Armed Forces must be our ability to execute this National Security Strategy, including the most demanding scenario -- fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous major theater wars in overlapping time frames.

Though military readiness has been challenged in many ways over the past year, our Armed Forces remain capable of executing our military strategy. The combat operations conducted against the Milosevic regime in Serbia last year -- Operation ALLIED FORCE -- demonstrated once again that our deployed and first-to-fight units remain very capable. Well-trained and armed with the best equipment in the world, our forward-deployed forces in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, and the Western Pacific executed a demanding range of missions superbly. Although we remain capable of executing our current strategy, the risks associated with the most demanding scenario have increased. We assess the risk factors for fighting and winning the 1st Major Theater War as moderate, but lower readiness levels of later-deploying forces combined with capability shortfalls in our lift and other critical force enablers result in high risk for the 2nd MTW.

As I have explained in the past, this does not mean that US forces would not prevail in either contingency. We eventually would win, but longer timelines increases the potential for higher casualties.

Readiness of the Force

In my prior testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, I spoke of the difficulties we experienced maintaining current readiness. At that time, we identified problems that, if left unchecked, would have eroded the readiness of our Armed Forces.

We also identified a number of reasons for these readiness problems including the higher than anticipated OPTEMPO, increased wear and tear on our aging and overused equipment, as well as personnel and quality of life issues.

Thanks to the great support of the Congress and the Administration, the readiness picture is starting to move in the right direction. The $112 billion increase in the FY00 President's Budget (PB) across the FYDP, and the additional funding support from Congress, arrested the steep decline in purchasing power we had experienced over the last several years. This increased buying power enabled us to fund military compensation improvements, operations in Bosnia, our most critical readiness requirements, and our efforts to increase recapitalization of our equipment and facilities.

The FY01 PB protects this $112 billion commitment to current and future readiness. Specifically, it provides $1.4 billion in FY01 for increases in fuel prices above those in last year's request ($3.3 billion total in FY01-05). It also provides $2.2 billion more for on-going operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Southwest Asia ($6.2 billion of new funding in FY01-05).

The FY01 PB also builds on last year's substantial quality of life initiatives. It fully funds a military base pay raise of 3.7 percent (ECI plus 0.5%) in FY01, as well as the Congressional changes to our military retirement reform initiative. Equally important, it requests and adds resources necessary to reduce off-base housing out-of-pocket costs for our soldiers, airmen, sailors, and marines from 18.8 to 15 percent in FY01. By FY05, these housing-related out-of-pocket expenses should be eliminated. Finally, the importance of military health care is reflected in significant increases to the Defense Health Program (DHP) in FY01. Although this budget addresses most of our health care problems, there is more that we need to do in this area, as I have discussed earlier. I look forward to working with you as we tackle these problems over the next year.

Notwithstanding all these funding increases, we still face challenges primarily due to excess infrastructure, unbudgeted contingency operations, and higher than expected maintenance costs for our aging equipment and infrastructure.

We continue to have excess infrastructure, and any funds applied toward maintaining unneeded facilities diminishes our capacity to redirect those funds toward higher priority modernization programs. Closing bases is painful, but it provides the opportunity to significantly reduce excess capacity and reinvest the resultant savings in modernization and readiness accounts. Accordingly, our FY01 PB proposes and funds new base closure and realignment (BRAC) rounds in FY03 and FY05. We look forward to the Congressional support essential for BRAC to achieve needed savings.

Continued timely funding for contingency operations is also crucial to preserving the readiness of our Armed Forces. Almost a year ago, we embarked on a major buildup of forces in the Balkans in support of Operation ALLIED FORCE. The cost of this response totaled nearly $2 billion in unforeseen FY99 expenses.

Additionally, the follow-on mission sending US forces into Kosovo as part of KFOR resulted in an additional $1 billion of unprogrammed FY99 expenses. These costs could not have been met within the existing defense budget without impacting readiness. However, thanks to Congress' timely approval in of an emergency supplemental appropriations in May 1999, we avoided having a negative impact on other programs.

We are currently involved in contingency operations in Kosovo and East Timor, and will soon be forwarding an FY00 supplemental request seeking additional funding to meet these requirements. Prompt Congressional approval of this supplemental is needed to protect readiness in the latter half of this fiscal year.

Current Readiness vs. Modernizing the Force

The FY01 PB has nearly a 2 percent real growth compared to the FY00 appropriated level. This is the first time in over eight years that we have submitted a budget request with real growth.

This forward-looking budget continues us on the path of achieving our Quadrennial Defense Review procurement goals. Specifically, our FY01 procurement request is $6.1 billion above the FY00 appropriated level. This funding allowed us to achieve the QDR procurement goal of $60 billion in FY01. This is now the fourth year of significant real growth in our procurement funding. Ultimately, these funding increases will go a long way toward fielding replacements for aging systems and gaining the new capabilities essential to continued US battlefield supremacy.

The FY01 budget seeks to reshape our forces to reflect changing threats and lessons learned. It supports the Army's new vision that stresses lighter, more lethal/agile/deployable forces that have a smaller logistical footprint. It funds a broad array of programs to protect U.S. forces and interests against terrorism, chemical-biological attack, and other asymmetric threats. It adds over $2 billion for National Missile Defense.

The FY01 PB also funds Kosovo lessons learned. Specifically, the budget supports the formation of an additional squadron of EA-6B electronic warfare aircraft to be operational in FY03. It also provides strong funding for munitions, UAVs, and communications-intelligence-surveillance capabilities.

The budget reflects the Department's expanding efforts to improve and streamline its support activities so they function better and cost less. Under the umbrella of the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI), our efforts are showing positive results, and the substantial savings achieved or identified are being allocated to readiness, modernization, and other priorities.

In a nutshell, the FY01 PB funds key readiness indicators, supports quality of life initiatives, meets the procurement goal of $60 billion in FY01, supports the reshaping of U.S. forces to reflect changing threats and lessons learned, and continues streamlining and reform initiatives.

Despite these efforts, I am not convinced that we have turned the corner yet. History tells us that readiness is fragile and that, once it starts down, it requires considerable resources, time, and attention to regain. There is still much that needs to be done in order to sustain the momentum. To avoid mortgaging future readiness, we must have sustained funding to meet the competing demands of maintaining current readiness, sustaining the quality force, and funding modernization.

We look forward to Fiscal Year 2001 Defense Authorization and Appropriations Bills that are a powerful endorsement on behalf of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, and their families, and sustains the readiness enhancements provided in the Fiscal Year 2000 bills. Doing so will allow us to keep our current readiness posture high while preparing for tomorrow's challenges.

OPTEMPO Concerns and Readiness Reporting Improvements

It is clear that the current tempo of operations, or OPTEMPO, continues to have a significant impact on service members and, their families, and therefore remains a concern for the Joint Chiefs and the CINCs. Frequent, often unexpected, and persistent deployments stress the force and stretch scarce mobility assets, ultimately degrading readiness and increasing the risk to our ability to execute the most demanding MTW scenarios. In the long run, too many protracted deployments will inevitably disrupt operating budgets, cause lost training opportunities, and accelerate wear and tear on equipment. Most importantly, unchecked OPTEMPO impacts quality of life and could jeopardize our ability to retain the high-quality people we need for tomorrow's force.

Measuring readiness is an ongoing process and we continue to assess how Operation ALLIED FORCE and the long-term deployments to both Bosnia and Kosovo affect the force. In the aggregate, ALLIED FORCE may delay readiness improvements we sought through the emergency supplemental and top line increases. For example, though the supplemental budget request was fully funded this year, it will take up to two years to manufacture replacements for certain types of munitions. In addition, long-term deployments to the region represent a major force commitment that will be with us for some time to come.

Our experience in the Balkans underscores the reality that multiple, persistent commitments place a significant strain on our people and can erode warfighting readiness. Rapidly withdrawing from a commitment like Bosnia or Kosovo to support a major theater war would require a quick decision by the National Command Authorities to allow time for units to withdraw, retrain, redeploy, and be used effectively. This could mean the late arrival of some forces for MTW employment.

While operational tempo is often a function of unpredictable world events and our global commitments, the Services, Joint Staff and CINCs are all taking steps to reduce its impact on the force.

First, we have increased our global sourcing of units to fill deployment commitments, and more equitably distribute the workload across the force. This includes substituting units with similar capabilities and increasing the use of the Reserve Component, contractor support, and coalition or host nation support.

Second, we have expanded our Global Military Force Policy, or GMFP, to improve worldwide management of Low Density/High Demand (LD/HD) assets. These include U-2 and RC-135 surveillance aircraft and crews, Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) and Civil Affairs specialists, EA-6B electronic warfare aircraft, and other units and platforms with unique or preferred capabilities. GMFP ensures senior level visibility into LD/HD allocation and provides top-down direction to prioritize requirements and balance them against available resources in order to preserve the long-term readiness of these critical assets. The Joint Staff, in conjunction with the Services, is assessing each of our LD/HD capabilities to determine which force structure increases will best meet CINCs' requirements. For some of our most overworked assets, we have already acted through the POM process to increase our numbers.

Third, as we closely monitor current overall readiness, we continue to refine the tools and procedures to improve our readiness reporting and assessment process. We have developed, in conjunction with the Services, an improved Tempo Management process that provides senior level visibility into how we are using the force. Tempo thresholds and metrics are regularly briefed within our Joint Monthly Readiness Review JMRR) forum. The focus of our readiness reporting system remains assessing and managing risk in executing the National Military Strategy by placing resources where they are needed most. We have increased the level of detail available within our readiness assessment systems and reports to Congress to ensure problem areas are highlighted to senior leadership within the Services, my staff, OSD, and Congress.

In the future, and in consonance with Congressional reporting requirements, we will assess readiness over three broad areas: unit readiness, institutional training, and defense installations. We will do this by enhancing the current Global Status of Resources and Training System or GSORTS computer reporting system. Our aim is to leverage emerging technologies to make reporting more timely, accurate, and user-friendly. Although new reporting requirements as outlined in the FY 2000 Defense Authorization Act may not be complete in every detail, the Department expects to meet the required implementation date of April 2000.

Capability Concerns

Joint Staff, CINC, and Service assessments have confirmed that much of the risk in executing MTW scenarios is driven by significant capability shortfalls. These fall into six areas: (1) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; (2) logistics sustainment; (3) command, control, communications and computers; (4) mobility and en route infrastructure; (5) defense against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction; and (6) information vulnerabilities.

For each of these areas, where possible, we have implemented measures that will reduce the impact of these capability shortfalls. For the most part, long-term fixes in these areas are funded within the FYDP, but will not be fully implemented until FY09. A continued commitment to increased resourcing will help alleviate these capability deficiencies. While recent funding increases should prevent further deterioration of current readiness, they will not guarantee the levels of readiness needed to significantly reduce risk in executing the National Military Strategy.

Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance (ISR)

Over the past year, many theater CINCs have consistently raised concerns about ISR asset shortages, specifically, the availability of airborne reconnaissance platforms, trained aircrews, pilots, linguists, and sensors.

Many ISR assets are categorized as Low Density/High Demand (LD/HD) because demands for these assets continue to outpace the current inventory. To more efficiently and effectively use current airborne ISR assets, the Joint Staff developed a peacetime airborne ISR reallocation plan that responded to CINC peacetime requirements. In addition, a more detailed requirements-based request process was put in place to better assess and prioritize CINC needs. This new process should ensure the most critical CINC information needs are met while managing tasking on limited ISR resources. We are also evaluating alternate collection means such as allied or non-airborne ISR capabilities to reduce demand on LD/HD ISR systems. Finally, an ongoing effort to increase the numbers of airborne ISR assets will increase their availability.

For the longer-term, my staff is assessing ISR deficiencies as the basis for my recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. We will continue to closely monitor and manage these crucial warfighting enhancement assets to ensure we can meet our most pressing needs.

CJCS Exercise Program Reductions

An important component of joint readiness and the CINCs' theater engagement strategies is the CJCS Exercise Program. This is my principal vehicle for achieving joint and multinational training. It provides combatant commanders with their primary means to train battle staffs and forces in joint and combined operations, to evaluate war plans, and to execute their engagement strategies. This critical program also provides a vehicle for DOD to assess the military's ability to satisfy joint national security requirements and to enhance and evaluate interoperability between the Services.

To reduce the impact of OPTEMPO on people, I directed an overall 30 percent reduction in joint exercise man-days between FY96 and FY01 -- a goal that has already been met. Additionally, this directive resulted in reducing the number of joint exercises from 277 in FY96 to 189 in FY00.

The additional FY00 Congressional reductions in the CJCS Exercise Program Service Incremental Funding make it more difficult for this important program to match essential training with the need to reduce OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO. The CINCs are unanimous in their concerns about the impact that these further reductions will have on the readiness of the first-to-fight forces. We seek Congressional support in restoring this program to its former level.

Force Protection

Whether the units deployed are Reserve or Active, wherever our troops go force protection is a top priority for commanders. The tragic bombings of our embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 reminded us again that terrorists can strike anywhere, at any time. During my testimony last year, I noted that our adversaries -- unable to confront or compete with the United States militarily -- spend millions of dollars each year to finance terrorist organizations that target US citizens, property, and interests. Consequently, our Combatant Commanders and the Services continue to focus on force protection issues as a first order priority.

Six important force protection initiatives have increased our antiterrorism efforts. First, the Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment Teams and CINC and Service Vulnerability Assessment Teams assist installation commanders and force protection officers in refining existing plans and providing assessment lessons learned which are made available to all commands.

Second, we continue to improve our Antiterrorism Force Protection Training Program which provides antiterrorism awareness training to all DOD military and civilian personnel and their families, specialized training to Antiterrorism Force Protection Officers, "pre-command training" to prospective Commanders, and operational level seminars to our most senior officers.

Third, the Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund provides an important means for our Combatant Commanders to fund time-critical, emergent requirements that cannot wait for the normal budget or acquisition processes.

Fourth, the Operations and Intelligence Fusion Initiative recognizes the importance of timely dissemination of terrorist threat information from the intelligence community to the operators in the field. We are making progress toward the goal of having fully coordinated Joint Operations and Intelligence Fusion Cells at all levels.

Fifth, we have embarked on a major effort to provide minimum force protection standards for Military Construction (MILCON) projects. DOD has recently approved prescriptive standards for construction of new high occupancy buildings, including barracks, dining halls, and recreation facilities. The additional cost involved depends upon such things as construction location, required vehicle standoff distance, and the threat level, but is not expected to significantly increase the overall construction cost.

Finally, during the past year we completed an Antiterrorism Best Practices Study that examined some of our allies' best efforts to combat terrorism at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. We discovered several different approaches that merit closer evaluation. For example, several of our allies' antiterrorism strategies include more proactive engagement with local communities in higher threat areas. They found that gaining the trust and confidence of local citizens makes it far more difficult for terrorist organizations to effectively operate within their communities. As we consider the lessons from this study, we must continue to carefully balance any potential increased risk to our men and women against expected force protection benefits.

Key technology enablers, such as threat analysis and warning, explosive device detection, and early detection of WMD, also enhance our ability to counter terrorism.

Our best efforts notwithstanding, we know that terrorism will remain a serious threat as we move further into the 21st century. We cannot afford to subscribe to a "zero casualty" mentality. Our enemies will continue to test our resolve, both at home and abroad. While we cannot prevent every attack, we can lower both the threat and the consequences of terrorist incidents. Therefore, it is imperative that we have the resources and training needed to put appropriate procedures in place.

Counterdrug Forward Operating Locations

Progress continues on US Southern Command's Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) to replace counterdrug aerial detection and monitoring missions formerly flown by DOD and interagency aircraft from Howard Air Force Base in Panama. Since the first of May, we have staged air operations from Curacao and Aruba, and Manta, Ecuador. Additionally, plans for a third FOL in Central America are under way. Thus far, our total numbers of hours on station are equal to or greater than when we flew from Howard. However, we need to increase our operations in the "source zone" (SZ): Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia.

The SZ is our number one counterdrug (CD) priority and we are taking several steps to increase our presence there. Our detection and monitoring coverage shortfall is mainly driven by the physical condition of FOL Manta, Ecuador, which restricts our forces to single plane, Day Visual Flight Rules operations. The result has been fewer hours flown over southern Colombia and the rest of the SZ than desired. USCINCSO has directed his Air Force component commander to develop a plan to increase the capability of the airfield as soon as possible. By 31 March of this year, we expect to have the capability to fly 3 aircraft from Manta at night and in any weather. This will go a long way toward overcoming the current coverage shortfall. Longer-term, we will need to address some other infrastructure deficiencies at the FOLs, such as ramp space and support, operations, and maintenance facilities.

USCINCSO's implementation concept is a phased approach. He recognizes the requirement to operate from the FOLs in an expeditionary manner, but also believes that such operations are not sustainable in the long term. Certain safety and infrastructure improvements will need to be completed before commencing full-scale operations to maximize our use of these airfields, but construction is planned only where existing host-nation facilities are unavailable. For example, we are planning for "expeditionary construction" of structures using concrete foundations and metal skin siding exteriors. All of this is designed to meet minimum requirements while minimizing costs. When the projects are completed, we fully expect to replicate the level of detection and monitoring flown from Howard Air Force Base, without increasing costs or OPTEMPO of the Services.

The Department of State (DOS), which has the lead on securing long-term access agreements, concluded a 10-year agreement with Ecuador in November, 1999 and they are close to a Curacao/Aruba agreement with the Dutch. Official negotiations have not begun for the Central American FOL.

FOLs are not bases, but staging airfields, owned and operated by the host nation as part of our collective efforts to stem the flow of illegal narcotics into the United States. Without these FOLs, we would be unable to effectively carry out our detection and monitoring mission and would fall well short -- 50 percent -- of the historical coverage provided from Howard AFB. Coverage in the deep source zone, the area identified as "critical" in the President's National Drug Control Strategy, would be severely degraded.

Personnel Recovery

Recovery of our personnel behind enemy lines, or in the vicinity of enemy forces, is one of our most important tasks. And it is one we take very seriously. To consolidate personnel recovery responsibilities under one agency, the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency was established as an entity under US Joint Forces Command on 1 October 1999.

In addition to organizational changes, we are working to accelerate the fielding of new-generation handheld survival radios with integrated communications and GPS capability to increase the probability of survival and successful recovery. Additionally, the V-22 Osprey holds great potential for combat search and rescue operations, and the Air Force is exploring its utility in this area. Finally, we are looking into some areas that merit increasing interaction between DoD and the interagency, such as standardized survival, evasion, resistance and escape training for non-DOD personnel at risk of capture.

Global Hot Spots

While there are many areas of interest around the world, three specific regions continue to occupy much of our attention and resources: the Korean peninsula, the Balkans, and Southwest Asia. Instability and tension in these areas pose the greatest potential threats to US interests, and consume more energy and resources than any others. Additionally, East Timor bears some discussion, since US forces remain involved in the peacekeeping effort there.

Korea

Despite a collapsed economy and an ongoing struggle to feed its own population, the North Korean government continues to pour its limited resources into the military and to pursue a policy of confrontation with South Korea and neighbors in the region. Additionally, it represents a nation capable of launching a significant conventional attack on US forces with minimal warning.

More than one million North Korean troops serve on active duty, the vast majority deployed within hours of the DMZ and South Korea's capital city, Seoul. Infiltration by North Korean special forces and provocations such as last year's Yellow Sea clash over fishing rights continue to exacerbate tensions between the two governments, while ongoing development of long-range ballistic missile technology worries all countries in the region. Finally, North Korea's repeated threats to walk away from the Agreed Framework that curtailed their nuclear production program have been unsettling to the international community.

The North Korean challenge remains one that we must -- and do -- take very seriously. We have pursued a number of initiatives in recent years to enhance the capabilities of both our forces forward deployed on the peninsula and our reinforcing elements, as well as the forces of our South Korean Allies. As I testified last year, we now have better US tanks, better infantry fighting vehicles and better artillery, as well as improved attack helicopters and aircraft, on hand in Korea. We have also deployed Patriot missile defense systems, improved surveillance capabilities, and assisted with a number of upgrades to South Korean forces. Our naval forces have greatly stepped up their anti-SOF activities, while forward-deployed Marine forces stand ready to reinforce the peninsula on short notice. We have upgraded our prepositioned stocks as well, substantially improving our ability to reinforce the peninsula with ground troops from the continental United States.

These measures are particularly important to support the dramatic shift in US policy toward Pyongyang proposed by former Secretary of Defense William Perry following his visit to North Korea in May of last year. He concluded that North Korea's development of long-range missiles and the capability to build nuclear weapons created an instability that compromised previous policies. Mr. Perry advocated a new, dual-track strategy: a positive path, called Mutual Threat Reduction, designed to improve relations leading ultimately to normalization; and a negative path, called Threat Containment, consisting of increasing containment, isolation, and military readiness. The US is currently pursuing the Mutual Threat Reduction path, which promises improved bilateral relations in exchange for a Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea commitment to continue negotiations to eliminate their long-range missile program and enter into discussions about their nuclear weapons program. If this approach fails, then the Threat Containment path will be pursued.

While this strategy holds promise, our defensive posture in Korea must remain both viable and strong as long as the threat remains. North Korea's substantial chemical and biological weapons capability, coupled with its continued pursuit of ballistic missile technology, will demand our attention for the foreseeable future.

Southwest Asia

Long-term US interests and the potential for instability combine to focus our attention and concern in Southwest Asia as well. Saddam Hussein's continuing disregard for the United Nations and the agreements he previously signed, his belligerent actions to challenge enforcement of UN sanctions, and the military threat he poses to the neighboring states all require that the US and our allies maintain a substantial, capable, and ready military force in Southwest Asia. Additionally, powerful reinforcing units in the US are prepared to move quickly should conditions warrant a rapid deployment of any additional assets.

Our resolve and the ability of our forces in Southwest Asia have been tested throughout 1999. In the wake of Operation DESERT FOX at the end of 1998, Saddam Hussein has increased his belligerence against US and coalition forces enforcing the Iraqi No-Fly-Zones. On a regular basis, Iraqi forces fire anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles against US and coalition aircraft, forcing them to act in self-defense.

The US military presence in the region includes land-based fighter and bomber forces, an aircraft carrier battle group with strike aircraft and cruise missiles, and substantial ground forces that can be reinforced within days. In recent years we have built up our pre-positioned stocks of weapons and supplies, considerably improved our strategic lift, and developed a crisis response force in the United States that can deploy to the Gulf region on very short notice.

The current posture of our deployed forces in the Persian Gulf is one example of our efforts to reduce the number of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines deployed overseas on contingency operations, while still maintaining sufficient capability to meet our security responsibilities and commitments around the world.

Balkans

The Balkan region continues to be a key area of interest and involvement, and US forces remain committed throughout the area. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, up to 6,200 US servicemen and women are supporting the NATO multi-national Stabilization Force, or SFOR. Approximately 5500 personnel are deployed to Kosovo, and another 1500 are deployed to Macedonia, Greece, and Albania, all in support of NATO's Kosovo Force, or KFOR.

In Bosnia, while NATO military units continue to maintain a safe and secure environment, progress in civil implementation remains slow. A restructuring of SFOR will reduce the US contribution by about 25 percent to 4600 this year.

The KFOR mission in Kosovo has significantly increased the US presence in the region, not just in Kosovo, but in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania as well. While some violence continues, US forces -- along with NATO allies and coalition partners -- have contributed to establishing a safe and secure environment in Kosovo, and enhanced regional stability. To create a lasting and durable solution, however, a host of civil, political, and economic tasks still must be accomplished to build a better future. The United Nations Mission in Kosovo is helping in this recovery process and one of the next challenges for the international community will be to properly fund, organize, equip, and train the new Kosovo Protection Corps.

The Milosevic regime in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia remains a source of tension throughout Southeastern Europe. The ability of the United States to use all the instruments of national power -- political, economic, as well as military -- while convincing our Allies to do the same, may help prevent another conflict in the region. Positive developments in regional stability, democratization, and economic revitalization include NATO's Southeastern Europe Initiative -- initiated at the Washington Summit -- and the European Union-sponsored Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe. Both initiatives look toward regional integration and cooperation in finding regional solutions to the challenges in the Balkans.

East Timor

Following cessation of open hostilities in East Timor, the challenge for the international community is to help rebuild a civil structure, essentially from scratch. The United Nations Transitional Authority for East Timor (UNTAET) has this responsibility. The UN mandate for the peacekeeping component of UNTAET calls for a force of up to 8950 troops plus 200 military observers. We supported the transition from the International Peacekeeping Force (INTERFET), currently in East Timor, to the UN-led UNTAET with civilian-contractor heavy-lift helicopters and military communications support. The UN anticipates a transfer of authority from INTERFET to UNTAET later this month. The final form of the US contribution to the UNTAET peacekeeping force is being evaluated.

The central security issue for East Timor remains the maintenance and security of the border with West Timor. We remain cautiously optimistic of eventual stability in light of the Wahid government of Indonesia's expressed intentions to disarm and sever relations with the militias.

Ballistic Missile Proliferation

The global proliferation of technology and the ballistic missile programs underway in many nations mean that we must take steps now to counter emerging threats to the US, our forward deployed forces, and our allies. Future strategic and regional threats are characterized by the increasing potential for an opponent's use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) across the spectrum of conflict. Counterproliferation (CP) refers to DOD efforts to combat proliferation, including: (1) the application of military power to protect US forces and interests; (2) intelligence collection and analysis; and (3) support to diplomacy, arms control, and export controls. We must be fully prepared to counter the military threats posed by WMD. CP helps shape the international environment by deterring proliferation and use of WMD. Nuclear capabilities serve as a hedge against an uncertain future, a guarantee of security commitments to allies, and a disincentive to those who would contemplate employment of WMD. While the US may not be successful in preventing proliferation all the time and in all places, when proliferation does occur and national interests and commitments are threatened, we must be in a position to respond and prevail during a crisis or on the battlefield.

To prepare now for an uncertain future, our CP strategy focuses on: (1) preventing proliferation from occurring; (2) protecting US forces, interests, and citizens against WMD; and, (3) being able to respond against those who would use WMD against the US or its allies. This strategy is characterized by a set of mutually supporting capabilities: counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management.

Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and National Missile Defense (NMD) are important components of the active defense capability mentioned above. TMD is designed to protect US and allied forces against ballistic missile threats within theaters. The CINCs require a family of systems for Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) consisting of a mix of interoperable air, land, and sea-based capabilities. This architecture is both complementary and flexible, allowing the CINCs to adequately defend assets across the continuum of peacetime operations, through crisis response to a major theater conflict. The Department's priorities for TBMD remain unchanged -- lower tier capability (Patriot Advanced Capability-3 and Navy Area Defense System) is still our highest priority, followed by upper tier capability (Theater High Altitude Area Defense System and Navy Theater Wide Defense System). However, the development and deployment of an upper tier capability by FY07 is operationally critical to ensure protection against the projected Medium Range Ballistic Missile threat, to provide wide-area coverage, and to enhance theater air and missile defense protection.

Moreover, TMD enhances regional stability. As part of broader efforts, the US is actively engaged in cooperative programs with Japan, NATO, Israel, and Russia. Cooperation with Japan is presently limited to Shared Early Warning (SEW) information on theater ballistic missile launches and the Navy Theater Wide Block II cooperative research effort. NATO and Israeli cooperation includes SEW. Additional cooperative programs include the co-development of the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) with Germany and Italy, and the ARROW weapons system with Israel. Finally, cooperation with Russia includes a TMD exercise program and discussions on strategic and theater SEW.

The NMD program will continue to develop and maintain the option to deploy an anti-ballistic missile defense to protect all 50 states against limited strategic ballistic missile threats from rogue states. This will also provide some capability against a small accidental or unauthorized launch from a nuclear-capable state. The objectives of the NMD program are threefold: (1) to develop and demonstrate a system capable of protecting against small-scale ballistic missile attacks; (2) to complete system development and, if directed, field an initial capability system by 2005; and (3) to maintain a system development path that allows evolutionary upgrading of system capabilities commensurate with the threat. The NMD program is progressing toward the Jun 00 Deployment Readiness Review and a subsequent deployment decision by the President. The decision to deploy will be based on an assessment of the system's technical maturity, status of the threat, operational effectiveness, cost, and international security considerations.

Integrating Interagency Planning

In the ten years since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been engaged in planning and executing a series of Complex Contingency Operations (CCOs). During these operations, it has become increasingly clear that an integrated approach for the application of USG policy and assets must be made to optimize scarce resources and ensure success. Several initiatives are currently being coordinated and developed that will better integrate DOD with other agencies in conducting complex, and small-scale contingencies, as well as Major Theater War (MTW).

The first step in establishing dedicated mechanisms and integrated planning processes needed to ensure rapid, effective, well-structured, multi-agency efforts in response to crises was the publication of Presidential Decision Directive -- 56 (PDD-56) -- Managing Complex Contingency Operations -- in 1997.

Since then there have been four PDD-56 training events to link the Interagency with the CINC. The most recent was done in conjunction with EUCOM's "Brave Knight" exercise last spring. This event was exercised at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level, and addressed a WMD crisis in Europe. We have learned many lessons from these exercises, but among the most important may be the need to have senior officials routinely participate.

In November 1999, the President directed the Secretary of Defense to forward to the National Security Council those politico-military issues deemed necessary for interagency review and appropriate action. This will be accomplished by the development of an Interagency Coordination Annex (Annex V) to all CJCS-approved plans. Annex V does not duplicate operations covered in other annexes, appendices, or tabs, but, rather, provides a single source reference for the CINCs to identify Interagency requirements and lays the groundwork for potential coordination with international civilian organizations and private voluntary organizations. These Annex Vs, when approved, will be repackaged into politico-military strategic concepts and forwarded through OSD to the NSC.

These politico-military strategic concepts are the mechanism to facilitate the development of contingency politico-military plans. Spelling out the CINCs' Interagency requirements enables other agencies to conduct detailed advanced planning in concert with DoD. These contingency politico-military plans can be maintained for use in a future crisis. At the onset of a crisis, the PDD-56 process is initiated. The starting point to conduct PDD-56 planning will be these politico-military contingency plans. This advance planning will greatly enhance our ability to rapidly resolve crises as they emerge.

In December 1999, the National Security Advisor established a new standing Contingency Planning Interagency Working Group (CP IWG), chaired by the NSC staff, whose goal is to improve the PDD-56 process and receive these politico-military strategic concepts in order to do advance interagency planning. This CP IWG will include Assistant Secretary level representation from Departments within the Interagency. The CP IWG will meet regularly to:

-- Assess potential contingencies and make recommendations for the development of political-military plans to manage them.

-- Oversee political-military contingency planning and provide reaction and comment to DOD regarding Interagency involvement contained in CINC plans.

-- Review and provide advice and recommendations to senior leaders on possible follow-on efforts.

-- Provide policy guidance on the implementation of the interagency training and after-action review components of PDD-56.

Our experiences in Kosovo and elsewhere have demonstrated the necessity to ensure that all concerned government agencies conduct comprehensive planning to encompass the full range of instruments available to decision-makers. We all must move forward with our efforts to achieve increased levels of integrated interagency planning now. To better support other agencies, DoD needs to give greater consideration to political, diplomatic, humanitarian, economic, information, and other non-military activities in defense planning. In addition, the US government must establish dedicated mechanisms and integrated planning processes to ensure rapid, effective, well-structured, multi-agency efforts in response to crises. Finally, we must continue to emphasize that our senior officials routinely participate in rehearsals, gaming, exercises, and simulations, as well as the CP/IWG -- which has become a genuine leap forward in the effort to establish a sound system to incorporate crisis and deliberate planning across the interagency.

Conclusion

The US armed forces remain fundamentally sound and capable of fulfilling their role in executing our national security strategy. However, the combination of multiple, competing missions, recruiting and retention shortfalls, aging equipment, and fixed defense budgets has frayed the force. With the support of this Committee and the Congress as a whole, we can continue to apply the right kind of corrective action now and avoid a downward spiral that could take years to overcome. As I have outlined above, we have a clear vision and a plan for achieving that vision. Together with the Congress and the Administration, the Department will transform our military forces to ensure that we meet all threats to America's security in the 21st Century -- just as we have for the past two centuries.

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(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State.)
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