19 April 2002

State Dept. Official Cites U.S. Non-Proliferation Challenges

"Weapons of mass destruction [WMD] and missiles constitute a clear and direct threat to U.S. forces deployed around the world, as well as to our allies and friends," according to Assistant Secretary of State for Non-Proliferation John Wolf.

Speaking April 19 at the 12th Annual International Arms Control Conference at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico, Wolf added, "It is a threat we will not ignore."

Wolf said that President Bush's characterization of Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an "axis of evil ... describes a real phenomenon. There is cooperation among countries trying to acquire WMD."

Furthermore, he said this cooperation goes beyond those three regimes: "other countries also have clandestine programs to develop weapons of mass destruction; several of the WMD 'wannabes' now are exporting technology, making the risk they pose that much greater.'"

Wolf's speech focused on the following U.S. non-proliferation "challenges:"

• Securing fissile materials and stopping their production in the former Soviet Union [FSU];

• Stopping the spread of WMD and missiles;

• Protecting dangerous BW [biological weapons] pathogens in the FSU and destroying CW [chemical weapons] stockpiles in Russia;

• Capping nuclear and missile proliferation in South Asia and preventing any outward leakage;

• Reinforcing export controls, including on Iraq; and

• Strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA].

(Note: In the text, billion equals 1,000 million.)

Following is the text of Wolf's remarks, as prepared for delivery:

John S. Wolf, State Department Nonproliferation Bureau Sandia National Laboratories 12th Annual International Arms Control Conference April 19, 2002 Albuquerque, New Mexico

U.S. Approaches to Nonproliferation

I would like to thank Sandia Laboratories' Dr. C. Paul Robinson [President and Laboratories Director], Dr. Roger Hagengruber [Senior Vice President, National Security Programs], Ms. Dori Ellis [Director, International Security Center], and Dr. James Brown [Organizer and Conference Chair] for organizing and supporting this conference. Nonproliferation is an international problem that can only be solved through international cooperation, so I am pleased to see representatives from some 30 countries here today. I would like to extend a special welcome to all of you.

As President Bush said on the six-month anniversary of the September 11 attacks:

"Every nation ... must take seriously the growing threat of terror on a catastrophic scale -- terror armed with biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons. ... Some states that sponsor terror are seeking or already possess weapons of mass destruction; terrorist groups are hungry for these weapons, and would use them without a hint of conscience. These facts cannot be denied, and must be confronted. There is no margin for error, and no chance to learn from mistakes. (We) must act deliberately, but inaction is not an option."

It is no longer simply the threat that states pose, but also the threat that terrorists will acquire, and use, weapons of mass destruction. The discovery effort that has taken place in Afghanistan, for instance, shows how intent al-Qaida was on acquiring WMD [weapons of mass destruction] capabilities. This should worry us all.

We should be concerned also by the ratcheting up in regional instability that comes from the spread of such weapons and their delivery systems. That's true in the Middle East; it's true in East Asia; and it's most clearly true today in South Asia. Weapons of mass destruction and missiles constitute a clear and direct threat to U.S. forces deployed around the world, as well as to our allies and friends. It is a threat we will not ignore.

President Bush in January [and again this week] spoke about the "axis of evil." There was an unstinting effort in the weeks following to parse his words and their implications. Let's be clear: the phrase describes a real phenomenon. There is cooperation among countries trying to acquire WMD. North Korea is prepared to sell missiles to any country with money to buy them. Iran is developing weapons of mass destruction and missiles - but it could not do it without help foreign help. Iraq is clandestinely diverting Oil for Food commodities, and smuggling in components that are helping it to reconstitute its weapons and missile capabilities, all in defiance of Resolution 687 and successor resolutions of the United Nations.

And it's not just North Korea, Iran and Iraq; other countries also have clandestine programs to develop weapons of mass destruction; several of the WMD "wannabes" now are exporting technology, making the risk they pose that much greater.

This is why the President has made it clear that halting proliferation is not just one among many objectives of U.S. foreign policy; it is a central framing element.

As a practical matter, for us, it means first we and our partners and friends need to step forward to strengthen, broaden and enforce the nonproliferation regimes and treaties that protect us all. The President has said countries must chose sides in this war; fence sitting isn't an option. Each of us must reconsider our cooperative activities in WMD-related areas and apply a higher standard of security against WMD first and foremost. Political accommodation, and commercial gains, cannot be overriding priorities.

For over a decade, the bulk of financial support for critical nonproliferation programs around the world has been provided by the United States. Between 1992 and 2001, for example, the U.S. spent $6.2 billion on cooperative programs with the countries of the former Soviet Union. During the same period the EU and EU member states spent $500 million, and Japan spent $200 million, on similar programs. All of us need to increase our efforts, and we, for one, are doing that. For FY 2002 Congress appropriated $1.1 billion; the Administration is requesting over a $1.3 billion for FY 2003.

A myth has grown up over the last two years that this is a unilateralist administration. The facts belie that. The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) remains the bedrock of our nonproliferation policy. We want much more active enforcement of the Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC] and the Biological Weapons Convention [BWC]. We are working in a whole host of multilateral export control regimes. We seek early signature of an international code of conduct against the spread of ballistic missiles. We are working bilaterally with our friends to try to halt the spread of technologies and components that would aid the development of weapons of mass destruction.

But let me be clear -- we are prepared to act unilaterally to defend our interests when they are directly threatened.

Looking at some of the specifics, we see a number of key global nonproliferation challenges including:

• Securing fissile materials and stop their production in the former Soviet Union [FSU];

• Stopping the spread of WMD and missiles;

• Protecting dangerous BW pathogens in the FSU and destroy CW stockpiles in Russia;

• Capping nuclear and missile proliferation in South Asia and preventing any outward leakage;

• Reinforcing export controls, including on Iraq;

• Strengthening the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency].

Secure fissile materials and stop their production in the Former Soviet Union

The United States is pursuing a wide array of cooperative programs in Russia and the new Eurasian republics to help safeguard the large quantities of excess WMD materials, systems and technology in Russia and the former Soviet republics. Our objective is not only to help them meet their arms control obligations, but also to control and dispose of excess WMD materials -- in particular excess fissile materials -- and to ensure that nuclear, biological and chemical weapon and missile expertise does not leak to states of concern and terrorist organizations.

The United States is also now speeding up Material Protection, Control and Accounting programs at up to 40 sites in the former Soviet Union. We want to reduce quantities and vulnerabilities of fissile materials, dispose of materials declared excess to defense needs, and secure material in fewer, consolidated sites. To further help prevent theft and diversion of the most proliferation-prone plutonium -- the weapon-grade material -- we are working to shut permanently Russia's three remaining production reactors. We are also seeking Russian and allied support for a more cost-efficient plutonium disposition program for excess stockpiles, and we are working with Kazakhstan to secure 300 metric tons of spent fuel -- containing three tons of weapons-grade plutonium -- from its BN-350 breeder reactor. We have an active program to return highly enriched uranium [HEU] to Russia, and convert HEU reactors to lower more proliferation resistant fuels.

Stop the spread of WMD and missiles

We are working actively to curb Iran's ambitious nuclear weapons program, longstanding chemical/biological programs, and a rapidly increasing ballistic missile force. Its clandestine effort to produce fissile material is a particular worry. We should be under no illusions: Iran is intent on acquiring nuclear weapons; it cannot do this without foreign help.

In 1997 China agreed to curtail nuclear cooperation with Iran. That principled stance is of great international significance. We have had an active but regrettably so far inconclusive dialogue with Russia on this issue. Enlisting the full cooperation of the Russian government in countering Iran's WMD efforts would lead to significant enhancements in the new long-term partnership Presidents Bush and Putin envisioned during meetings last year in Washington and Crawford. Stopping North Korea's exports to Iran and other proliferators is a key part of the agenda we wish to pursue with Pyongyang.

Secure dangerous BW pathogens in the FSU and destroy CW stockpiles in Russia

Another priority is securing dangerous biological pathogens in the former Soviet Union and resuming assistance to destroy chemical weapon stockpiles in Russia. We are concerned about the rate at which Russia moving to comply with its obligations under the BWC and CWC. We need to find common ground on this issue.

We are also committed to the scientist redirection programs, which are designed to prevent former Soviet weapons experts from providing WMD and missile expertise to proliferators and terrorists, at the Science Centers in Moscow and Kiev. Let me express my thanks to the many Sandia scientists who have participated in science center projects and activities. Your contributions are important to the eventual redirection of the former Soviet weapon scientists participating in this program, as well as in its sister programs in DOE [Department of Energy] and DOD [Department of Defense].

More broadly we are discussing with allies an updated package to impede BW terrorism. It focuses on improved domestic regulations, storage and handling of pathogens nationally and in international trade.

Stop nuclear and missile proliferation in and from South Asia

I spoke earlier about how WMD is regionally destabilizing. Nowhere is this more evident than in South Asia, where one million troops face off on the India-Pakistan border. The presence of WMD and missiles in the region has dramatically increased the danger of miscalculation during times of crisis, and the resulting regional instability magnifies the risk of these weapons falling into the hands of terrorists.

While the recent sharp escalation in tension between India and Pakistan has reminded us all of the pressing danger of unchecked proliferation, it is not clear that Pakistan and India have yet drawn the right conclusions from this crisis about the danger their WMD and missiles pose. We hope that confidence-building measures like keeping weapons and delivery systems separated, halting fissile material production, and restraining nuclear and missile programs can be implemented. Tightened export controls are also vital to ensure that India and Pakistan do not become a source for sensitive materials and technology.

Strengthen export controls, including on Iraq

All efforts to secure existing WMD-related items will be futile if we are not able to cut off the flow of arms and sensitive WMD/missile technologies through strengthened export control.

We urgently need to strengthen the administration and effective enforcement of export controls on a multilateral basis. Without broad cooperation among export and transit countries, sensitive dual-use items and technologies cannot be effectively controlled. Foreign purchasers denied a critical item by one country can purchase it from another country that does not control its exports as stringently. Adherence to the guidelines and control lists of the multilateral export control regimes is vital to the success of our nonproliferation efforts.

Domestically, the Bush Administration is working with Congress on a new, comprehensive Export Administration Act that will be more responsive to the rapid pace of technological change and enhance our own export control enforcement authority. The U.S. is also expanding its Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance cooperation with other countries, particularly those in Central Asia, to help them strengthen their export control systems through improved laws, regulations, and licensing and enforcement efforts.

Strengthening and enforcement of export controls is particularly important in the case of Iraq. Iraq flaunts its hostility to the world; remains in violation of its U.N. and NPT obligations; supports terrorism; and is reconstituting its ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction, and conventional military in contravention of UNSC [United Nations Security Council] resolutions.

We are working in the U.N. Security Council even as we meet to sharpen the U.N. efforts to deny Iraq the wherewithal to reconstitute its weapons programs. In UNSC Resolution 1382 the Security Council agreed to implement by May 30 a new export control system. This system will free up trade in goods for purely civilian use, but reinforce controls on militarily useful items. We expect a resolution embracing the new system to be voted in the Council this month.

Strengthen the IAEA

Mindful of the world's near miss with Iraq, and new risks from countries like Iran and North Korea, we must improve and fund effective safeguards on nuclear power users and the ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency to ferret out covert weapons efforts. The Additional Safeguards Protocol sets an important new nonproliferation norm that every country should accept. The IAEA also has a central role in verifying the Agreed Framework.

But carrying out new tasks requires more resources. We need to ensure that the IAEA gets the financial, technical, and political support that it needs. The Board of Governors endorsed proposals to strengthen and expand IAEA programs for the worldwide protection of nuclear materials, radioactive sources and nuclear facilities against acts of terrorism. The United States strongly supports those initiatives and will urge member states to ensure that the IAEA has the resources needed to put them into practice.

Conclusion

September 11 has given a new sense of urgency to a danger that we all have been concerned about for some time, and in that sense it provides an opportunity. The scope of these attacks has underlined the need to take vigorous action now to end the possibility that terrorist groups or rogue states could launch even more devastating attacks in the future. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is an urgent and profound threat to the security of all states and requires urgent action.

The United States appreciates the cooperation and assistance the world community has shown in the campaign against the al-Qaida perpetrators of the September 11 attack and the Taliban regime that abetted the terrorists. But destroying al-Qaida will not end the threats to world security. We need to build on today's cooperation to move forward in strengthening nonproliferation efforts across the board. We have had clear warning of the enormous danger posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Repeating again President Bush's injunction -- "there is no margin for error. We will be deliberate, but inaction is not an option."