11 April 2002

U.S. Southern Command Chief Discusses Security Needs for Colombia

U.S. support for Colombia must move beyond the confines of fighting narco-trafficking in order to help address the large anti-government terrorist threat in that Andean nation, says Gary Speer, acting commander-in-chief of the U.S. Southern Command.

In April 11 congressional testimony, Speer said U.S. support to the Colombian military is currently restricted to aid for counterdrug operations, and further hampered by restrictions on sharing non-counterdrug information with Colombian authorities. In addition, the Colombians are limited in their use of U.S.-provided counterdrug-funded equipment, Speer told the House International Relations Committee's Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere.

"As we look to the future," Speer said, "we need to ensure that our efforts are focused on fighting terrorism" throughout the Western Hemisphere while also "expanding our efforts to preserve and stabilize Colombia's democracy."

These efforts, he said, "require that we move beyond a counterdrug-focused strategy." He cited "policy reviews, additional assistance for infrastructure security and combating terrorism, intelligence sharing, and increased security assistance" as "examples of expanded support for the government of Colombia that should be considered."

Speer said that although in the past few years the Colombian military has emerged as a much more capable and professional force to fight anti-government guerrillas, "they lack the resources, manpower, airlift and mobility to re-establish a safe and secure environment throughout the country."

To help Colombia win the war against the guerrillas, Speer said, the United States "must provide Colombians with the assistance necessary" to bring a secure peace, safe from terrorism, to the country.

Following are excerpts from the text of Speer's testimony, as prepared for delivery:

[Note: In the text, "billion" equals "thousand million."]

Statement Of Major General Gary D. Speer, United States Army, Acting Commander-in-chief United States Southern Command Before The 107th Congress House Appropriations Committee On International Relations Subcommittee On The Western Hemisphere Subcommittee On Foreign Operations

11 April 2002

Mr. Chairman, Representatives Lowey, Menendez, and distinguished Members of the Committee: I am honored to appear before you to discuss United States Southern Command's role in assisting Colombia. The men and women of United States Southern Command deeply appreciate the hard work by the Members of this Subcommittee and we thank you, and your colleagues in Congress, for your commitment and steadfast support.

I have served as the Acting Commander in Chief of United States Southern Command since October 1, 2001 when General Pace assumed the position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the past ten months, I have traveled to Colombia eight times in the past ten months. I have met key leaders in Colombia and here in the United States, both military and civilian. I appreciate and understand their challenges, and am convinced that the Colombian military is led by experienced and principled officers.

During the past twenty-five years, nations of our hemisphere have made substantial progress toward achieving peace through democratically elected governments, economic development, and the subordination of the military to civilian authority. However, some of our hemispheric neighbors are recoiling from the effects of political instability, faltering economic growth, and institutional weakness. High unemployment, endemic poverty, corruption, and crime combined with the effects of terrorism, drug trafficking, and other illicit transnational activities challenge and threaten the legitimacy of many of these governments and consequently threatening U.S. hemispheric interests.

Again, I am grateful for the opportunity to provide an overview of the regional security environment [and] the threats to U.S. interests, followed by a more detailed description of the problems facing Colombia and its Andean neighbors, and I will also detail what we have done to date to address these threats and [to] enhance security and stability, which are the underpinnings of economic growth and legitimate governance. Without security and stability, virtually all other programs of assistance remain in jeopardy.

Security Environment

During the past 25 years, nations of our hemisphere have made substantial progress toward achieving peace through democratically elected governments, economic development, and the subordination of the military to civilian authority. All countries, except for Cuba, have democratically elected governments. Without a clear or imminent external threat, Latin American and Caribbean nations essentially appear to be at peace with their neighbors.

Underlying this perception of tranquility are the multiple transnational threats of terrorism, drug and arms trafficking, illegal migration, and organized crime, all of which threaten the security and stability in the region. As a result, some of our hemispheric neighbors are suffering from the effects of political instability, faltering economic growth, and institutional weakness. High unemployment, endemic poverty, corruption, and crime combined with the effects of terrorism, drug trafficking, and other illicit transnational activities challenge and threaten the legitimacy of many of these governments and consequently threatening U.S. hemispheric interests. Without a clear or imminent external threat, Latin American and Caribbean nations essentially appear to be at peace with their neighbors. All countries, except for Cuba, have democratically elected governments. However, underlying this perception of tranquility are the multiple transnational threats of terrorism, drug and arms trafficking, illegal migration, and internal organized crime, all of which threaten the security and stability in the region. Governments are feeling the strain of weak economies, rampant corruption, ineffective judicial systems, and growing discontent of the people as democratic and economic reforms fall short of expectations.

Transnational threats in the region are increasingly linked, as they share common infrastructure, transit patterns, corrupting means, and illicit mechanisms. These threats transcend borders and seriously affect the security interests of the United States.

Illegal Migration

Latin America and the Caribbean are major avenues for worldwide illegal migration. This migration creates economic and social imbalances that strain the effective rule of governments in the region. Illegal migration and human smuggling operations are linked to drugs and arms trafficking, corruption, organized crime, and the possibility for the movement of members of terrorist organizations.

According to the Census Bureau's latest figures, more than eight million illegal immigrants reside in the United States; nearly two million of them are from the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility. The United States Immigration and Naturalization Service estimates more than 300,000 illegal immigrants annually originate in, or transit through Central American countries destined for the United States. Also, many Chinese illegal immigrants destined for the U.S. transit through Suriname. Human trafficking is highly profitable and provides revenue of more than $1 billion annually to smuggling organizations within the region. Further, human trafficking provides the potential means of entry into the U.S. for criminals and terrorists.

Arms Trafficking

Although Latin America and the Caribbean spend less than any other region on legal arms purchases, illegal arms sales pose a significant threat to the stability of the region. Of particular concern is the rising trend in which drug-trafficking organizations exchange drugs for arms, which are then provided to terrorist organizations such as the FARC, ELN, and AUC in Colombia. Illegal arms originate from throughout the world and transit through the porous borders of Colombia's neighbors. Arms traffickers use a variety of land, maritime, and air routes that often mirror drug- and human-trafficking networks.

Drug Trafficking

Illegal drugs inflict an enormous toll on the people and economy of the United States and our hemispheric neighbors, and appropriately, have often been characterized as a weapon of mass destruction. According to the latest Office of National Drug Control Policy figures, Americans spent more than $64 billion on illegal drugs while drug abuse killed more than 19,000 Americans and accounted for $160 billion in expenses and lost revenue. The majority of cocaine and heroin entering the United States is produced in the Andean Region.

Drug trafficking persists as a corrosive threat to the democracy, stability, and prosperity of nations within the region, especially in the Andean Ridge, adversely affecting societies and economies as scarce resources are diverted to rehabilitation, interdiction, and crime prevention efforts. Drug trafficking generates violence, fosters crime, and corrupts public institutions. Increasingly, terrorist organizations support themselves through drug trafficking. This trend is particularly troubling in Colombia where we find clear connections between drug trafficking, guerrillas, and terrorist activities.

Illegal drugs, often characterized as weapons of mass destruction, inflict an enormous toll on the people and economy of the United States. According to the latest Office of National Drug Control Policy figures, Americans spent over $64 billion on illegal drugs in 2000 and drug abuse killed 19,102 Americans in 1999. The majority of cocaine entering the United States is produced in the Andean Ridge.

It is not only the drug-producing countries that suffer. No country in this hemisphere in which drugs transit escapes the violence and corrupting influences of drug trafficking. Additionally, as traffickers exchange drugs for arms and services in the transit countries, transit nations are now becoming drug consumers as well.

Despite extensive eradication in the source zone and successful interdiction in the transit zone, supply continues to exceed demand. Partner nations are willing to work with us to counter the production and trafficking of illegal drugs. U.S. counterdrug assistance to security forces assists Colombia and other nations in the region develop more effective counterdrug capabilities. However, effective and sustainable counterdrug operations are beyond the capabilities of their thinly stretched resources. Drug trafficking organizations have shown considerable flexibility in adjusting their operations in reaction to counterdrug efforts. These small, efficient, and well-financed drug trafficking organizations rapidly change the place of production, transport routes, points of transshipment, and markets when eradication and interdiction programs achieve success. In fact, new estimates indicate a 16 percent increase in cultivation in Colombia (170,000 hectares), and no change in Peru (34,000 hectares) and Bolivia (20,000 hectares). One could have predicted at the outset of Plan Colombia that it would not be easy or quick to break the economy of the drug producers and traffickers in Colombia. We have much yet to do and a plan to accomplish it.

Terrorism

Southern Command recognized a viable terrorist threat in Latin America long before September 11. If not further exposed and removed, that threat potentially poses a serious threat to both our national security and that of our neighbors. We in Southern Command have monitored terrorist activities for years with such incidents as the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in 1992 and Jewish-Argentine Cultural Center in Argentina in 1992 and 1994 attributed to Hizballah.

Recently, international terrorist groups have turned to some Latin American countries as safe havens from which they sustain worldwide operations. As an example, the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay serves as a base of support for Islamic Radical Groups, such as Hizballah, HAMAS, and Al Gama'at al-Islamiayya al Gama'at. These organizations generate revenue through illicit activities that include drug and arms trafficking, counterfeiting, money laundering, forged travel documents, and even software and music piracy.

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army of Colombia (ELN) and the United Self Defense Group of Colombia (AUC) are all on the State Department's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The FARC has been implicated in kidnappings and attacks against United States citizens and interests, to including the murder of three U.S. citizens in 1998. According to the Department of State's most recent "Patterns of Global Terrorism" report, 86 percent of all terrorist acts against U.S. interests throughout the world in 2000 occurred in Latin America, predominately in Colombia.

According to the Department of State's most recent human-rights report, 44 percent of all terrorist acts against U.S. interests throughout the world occurred in Colombia and most were committed by the FARC.

Notwithstanding the Government of Colombia's eleventh-hour extension of the FARC's "safe haven" on January 20 of this year, the FARC initiated a national terror campaign with more than eighty-five attacks since January 20 120 attacks against the nation's infrastructure, security forces, and cities. These attacks ultimately prompted President Pastrana on February 20 to suspend the despeje or "safe haven," and initiate operations to occupy the area.

The recent bombing outside the U.S Embassy in Peru preceding President Bush's visit is indicative that other domestic terrorist groups pose threats to the United States elsewhere in the hemisphere. These include, but are not limited to, the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) in Peru and the Jama'at al Muslimeen (JAM) in Trinidad and Tobago.

Colombia

No other region is suffering the destabilizing effects of transnational threats more than the Andean Ridge countries. In Colombia, the FARC, ELN, and AUC have created an environment of instability in which. The Government of Colombia, through its military and police forces, does not control portions of the country. In the areas where military and police that they are not present and do not have control, there is lack of a safe and secure environment, which undermines the ability to govern and permits terrorism and crime to flourish.

The violence in Colombia remains a significant threat to the region as the combination and links among guerrillas, terrorists, drug-traffickers, and illegal self-defense forces have severely stressed the government's ability to exercise sovereignty and maintain security. We have seen movements by the FARC and other illegal groups cross into neighboring countries at will. In addition, neighboring countries remain transshipment points for arms and drugs entering and exiting Colombia.

Colombia is critically important to the United States. With over 40 million people, it is the second oldest democracy in the hemisphere, and it is an important trading partner, notably especially for resources such as oil. More importantly, it is the linchpin of the Andean Region; as such, it is critical for the United States that Colombia re-establish a safe and secure environment within its borders and survive as an effective democracy. Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador are certainly at risk to some degree based on what happens in Colombia.

The current political and security situation in Colombia is at a critical juncture. Notwithstanding the Government of Colombia's eleventh hour extension of the despeje, the FARC's "safe haven," on January 20 of this year, the FARC initiated a countrywide terror campaign with more than 120 attacks against the nation's infrastructure and cities. These attacks ultimately prompted President Pastrana on February 20 to eliminate the despeje on February 20, and [to] initiate operations to occupy the area. From a military perspective, President Pastrana's decision to eliminate the FARC's "safe haven," after the FARC initiated its intensive terrorist campaign, was the right move. Simply put, the FARC is nothing less than a terrorist organization that conducts violent terrorist attacks to undermine the security and stability of Colombia, funded by its involvement in every aspect of drug cultivation, production and trafficking, as well as kidnapping and extortion.

U.S. Southern Command's Support to Plan Colombia

We continue to execute the Department of Defense's counterdrug support to Plan Colombia, Colombia President Pastrana's long-term national security plan. Colombia is just beginning the second year of this six-year plan. The initial phase of operations focused in the Putumayo and Caqueta Departments of Southern Colombia where approximately half of Colombia's coca cultivation takes place. In implementing U.S. Support to Plan Colombia initiated by the FY 2000 Emergency Supplemental, Southern Command has been responsible for training and equipping a Counter Narcotics Brigade, riverine units, fielding Blackhawk and Huey II helicopters, training pilots and crews, infrastructure upgrades, and providing counterdrug intelligence support. Southern Command is responsible for military training and support missions as well as providing continual support to the Department of State's military-related programs. We are beginning the second year of our support to this six-year plan. Operations have focused in southern Colombia, particularly in the Putumayo and Caqueta Departments, where approximately half of Colombia's coca cultivation takes place. We are seeing positive results from our support.

Professionalism of the Colombian Military

We have witnessed a steady improvement in the professionalism and respect for human rights by the Colombian military, accompanied by increased effectiveness in counterdrug operations. Our legal assistance projects in Colombia, which include developing a Judge Advocate General (JAG) school as well as legal and human rights reform, continue on track. We have worked closely with the Colombian military to establish and build a Military Penal Justice Corps. The initial JAG school courses began in February 2002 for 60 judge advocates and clerks in temporary facilities. The Department of State recently approved the construction of a permanent JAG facility and we expect completion in July 2003.

Counter Narcotics Brigade

The United States-trained Counter Narcotics Brigade (CN Brigade) and its three battalions are now fully trained and equipped. United States trainers performed staff and light infantry training for almost 2,300 troops. The brigade headquarters and the second battalion of the brigade completed training and began operations in December 2000; we completed training of the third battalion last May. We continue to provide sustainment training to the CN Brigade.

We appreciate the support of the United States Congress in providing us the necessary resources to effectively train and equip the CN Brigade.

The CN Brigade is the best-trained and -equipped unit in the Colombian Army. It has made impressive results during drug interdiction operations by destroying coca-processing labs, providing security to eradication operations, and seizing chemical precursors and coca leaf in southern Colombia. Since operations began in December 2000, over 890 drug labs have been destroyed and 119 people detained for judicial processing. The CN Brigade has also provided the ground security for the spraying of 59,000 hectares of coca in the Putumayo and Caqueta regions. The government of Colombia's success in its spraying effort in Putumayo last year would not have been possible without the CN Brigade's aggressive ground support to spray aircraft. If the government had not suspended spraying operations for over eight months in 2001, gains against cultivation in the Putumayo and Caqueta regions could have been even greater.

In addition, further indications are that the Colombian military's concerted interdiction efforts -- combined with aerial spraying -- are having an effect on the narcotraffickers. Cocaine labs are being established further away from the Putumayo and Caqueta cultivation areas; in fact, large-scale industrial-sized labs were discovered in the former despeje. Most importantly, the FARC now avoids head-on engagements against the Colombian military in Putumayo and Caqueta Departments because of the training and capabilities of the CN Brigade. No longer does the FARC own the military initiative in Putumayo and Caqueta Departments, but it is no longer strategically effective for them to attack Colombian bases and forces in the field. This increased security in the coca-growing areas means a better environment for interdiction efforts by the first CN Brigade and the Colombian National Police.

Based on the success of the first CN Brigade, the Administration is supporting Colombia's request to train and equip a second CN Brigade in FY03 for employment elsewhere within the country. The formation of a second CN Brigade would include training, equipping and infrastructure support. We must support the Colombians in their effort to broaden the counternarcotics fight by forming the second CN Brigade, which will enable them to further pursue those HCL labs which have left the Putumayo and Caqueta Departments and attack the other main coca-growing areas to the east of the Andean Ridge.

Using the first CN Brigade as a baseline, we will profit from our lessons learning in order to train, equip and provide infrastructure for the second CN Brigade. The second CN Brigade will be made up of four battalions of approximately 1,700 troops. U.S. Special Operations Forces Detachment Alphas made up of approximately 60 personnel per deployment will train one battalion per quarter. If resourced, the second CN Brigade Staff will be trained during the first quarter. All of this training will continue to emphasize professionalism and human rights requirements. Estimated training cost is about $12 million. The State Department will provide weapons, ammunition, communications and sustainment equipment. The estimated cost for equipment and sustainment is approximately $18 million. Infrastructure requirements and cost will be determined once training and operational sites are identified.

Helicopters

Since December 2000, the United States has provided air mobility to the first CN Brigade using 33 UH-1Ns and a combination of Colombian and Department of State contracted and Colombian pilots. The UH1N aircraft are based in Tolemaida with the Colombian Army Aviation Battalion and are forward deployed to Larandia for operations.

Our training and logistics programs are on track to provide greatly enhanced air mobility capability to the Colombian Army.

All fourteen UH-60L Blackhawk helicopters procured under Plan Colombia for the Colombian military have been delivered by December 2001. The first 6 of the 25 Plan Colombia Huey II aircraft arrived in March 2002. Under the current delivery schedule, we expect the remaining 19 Huey II helicopters to be delivered by the end of September 2002.

Department of Defense training programs specifically designed to fulfill the requirement for trained Colombian Army pilots, crew chiefs, and maintenance personnel for to crew and maintain the Blackhawk and Huey II helicopters are currently underway and progressing well in Colombia and in the United States. In addition to training pilots, crew chiefs and maintenance personnel will also be trained.

This has been a real success story: Colombian Air Force Instructor Pilots under the quality control of an U.S. Army Technical Assistance Field Team are training Colombian Army pilots in the Blackhawk transition and the Initial Entry Rotary Wing (IERW) courses. The night vision training, advanced or readiness level progression training, and the Huey II transition are being executed through a DOD contract in Colombia. Crew chiefs are being trained in Spanish, both in the United States and Colombia. The various special aviation and avionics maintenance training is conducted in Army schools in the United States. The Plan Colombia Blackhawk pilot and crew training will be complete in July.

Our training and logistics programs are on track to provide greatly enhanced air mobility capability to the Colombian Army. We must continue to follow through with support toward the end goal of full operation of this capability.

Riverine Capability

For much of Colombia, the rivers are the highways. Consequently, a critical element of our support to Colombia has been the training of the Colombian Riverine units. Through the funding provided under Section 1033 authority, the Department of Defense has been able to resource and train to an ever-expanding capability to assist in their the Colombian Marines as they attempt to control the vast amount of waterways throughout Colombia. The main objective of creating this capability has been to interdict the precursor chemicals used in cocaine production that have traditionally been moved along Colombia's rivers. It is estimated that 60 to 70 percent of these precursors reach the coca-growing areas by the rivers. The Colombian Marines have had some success in this endeavor, while demonstrating the capability to transport the first CN Brigade to riverside labs and also protecting river convoys carrying building materials to Tres Esquinas.

To date, five riverine battalions, composed of thirty riverine combat elements, have been deployed and are operating throughout Colombia. These riverine combat elements have successfully supported the operations of the first CN brigade in destroying riverside labs and by providing convoy security for building material used to construct the Tres Esquinas airbase. Furthermore, these riverine units have established the first continuous presence of the Colombian government in areas previously abandoned to control of narco-terrorist organizations. Continued support to complete the fielding of the remaining riverine combat elements and establishment of a self-sustaining training capability are high priorities in our strategy for the future.

Professionalism and Human Rights

We have witnessed a steady improvement in the professionalism and respect for human rights and the rule of law by the Colombian military, accompanied by increased effectiveness in counterdrug operations. The increase in professionalism starts with the continued professional military education, and the confidence gained by technical proficiency, through training and resources available for operations.

Our legal-assistance projects in Colombia, which include developing a Judge Advocate General (JAG) school as well as legal and human-rights reform, continue on track. We have worked closely with the Colombian military to establish and build a Military Penal Justice Corps. The initial JAG school courses began in February 2002 for 60 judge advocates and clerks in temporary facilities. The Department of State recently approved funding for the construction of a permanent JAG facility, and we expect completion in July 2003.

Human Rights

In the area of human rights, United States Southern Command and international human-rights organizations have has supported Colombian efforts to extend human-rights training throughout its ranks. Additionally, we sponsor opportunities for the continued exchange of information on human-rights issues, such as: We recently held a Human Rights Seminar with 60 Colombian media and international representatives. We also began conducting bimonthly human-rights roundtables involving representatives from various sectors of Colombian society, incorporating human rights in every training initiative. Moreover, we have begun to sponsor advanced education programs. This summer, twenty students from the Armed Forces, National Police, Ministry of Defense, and Commanding General's office will receive specialty degrees in International Humanitarian Law.

I am convinced the military leadership in Colombia is firmly committed to human rights and is taking action on any reports of wrongdoing. They have suspended officers and noncommissioned officers for acts of wrongdoing and have stepped up their operations against illegal defense forces.

In fact, in a short period of time, the Colombian military has emerged as one of the most respected and trusted organizations in Colombian society. Less than three percent of complaints of human rights abuses last year were attributed to the Colombian Security Forces, down from a high of 60 percent just a few years ago. There have been zero allegations of human rights abuses against the U.S.-trained counternarcotics drug brigade.

However, there is more work to be done throughout the Colombian military and we have shown in the first counternarcotics brigade that our training has made a difference. We would expect a second counternarcotics brigade to follow this human-rights record.

Further, President Pastrana's decision on February 23 to suspend the FARC's "safe haven" and reoccupy the area was the right move from a military perspective. The FARC was using the "safe haven" as an area to support their drug-trafficking operations, launch terrorist attacks, and recruit and train their forces. The Colombian military has aggressively initiated operations to occupy the area. We have also received increased requests of support from the Government of Colombia.

This is a success story that often gets overlooked. The Colombian military should tell the story about what the military is doing and take credit for the accomplishments they have attained. This progress reflects a strong and principled leadership and the genuine desire of the Colombian military to honor and promote democratic principles in their country.

Current Initiatives

Fiscal Year (FY) 2002 Andean Counterdrug Initiative

The Department of State's Andean Counterdrug Initiative is designed to sustain and expand programs funded by the FY 20002 emergency supplemental. It addresses potential production, processing, and distribution spillover due to successful Plan Colombia execution. Since the beginning of 2001, we have been working with the Department of State to help develop, prioritize, and validate requirements for partner-nation militaries. In each case, although still counterdrug-focused, we are seeking to sustain the military contacts focused on professionalization of the armed forces and the specific challenges and security needs within available resources.

In FY 2002, approximately $100 million of the Andean Counterdrug Initiative will be allocated to support the Colombian military. This funding will be used to sustain the capabilities initiated under the FY-2000 supplemental appropriation, particularly in the areas of training and aviation support for the first CN Brigade, riverine programs, and the Colombia military legal-reform program. Additionally, the Department of State's FY-2003 request includes funding to continue sustainment of the existing CN Brigade and funding for the training and equipping of a second CD Brigade.

Challenges

Despite extensive eradication in the source zone and successful interdiction in the transit zone, cocaine supply continues to exceed demand. Although Colombia and other partner nations are willing to work with us to counter the production and trafficking of illegal drugs, effective and sustainable counterdrug operations are beyond the capabilities of their thinly stretched security forces.

U.S. counterdrug assistance to security forces helps Colombia and other nations in the region develop more effective counterdrug capabilities; however, drug-trafficking organizations have shown considerable flexibility in adjusting their operations in reaction to counterdrug efforts. These small, efficient, and well-financed drug-trafficking organizations will rapidly change the place of production, transport routes, points of transshipment, and markets when eradication or interdiction programs achieve success.

Although in the past few years the Colombian military has emerged as a much more capable and professional force, they lack the resources, manpower, and mobility to re-establish a safe and secure environment throughout the country. With Colombia's narco-terrorists increasingly supporting themselves through drug trafficking, it is increasingly more difficult for the security forces to establish a secure environment that allows protection of U.S. national security interests, for democratic institutions to fully function, and for political, economic, and social reforms to take hold.

In addition to combating the FARC and its current terror campaign, the Colombian military must contend on a daily basis with the conventional and terrorist attacks by the ELN and AUC, as well as the drug-trafficking organizations. This requires not only the continuous conduct of military and counterdrug operations, but the protection of population centers and of critical infrastructure, including electrical towers and power gridplants, communication towers and facilities, the oil pipelines, dams, roads and bridges.

Way Ahead

Although we have seen great progress through the military portion of the first year of Plan Colombia, the Colombian military still lacks the wherewithal to create a safe and secure environment in Colombia. As mentioned previously, fundamental security and stability are necessary for the government of Colombia to remain a viable, legitimate government and for other supporting programs to succeed. The extent of support and the conditions under which we are willing to provide it is a necessary next step in determining what we can do.

U.S. support to the Colombian military is currently restricted to support for counterdrug operations. We are restricted in providing counterterrorism support with our counterdrug-funded assets. We are further hampered by restrictions on sharing non-counterdrug information [with] the Colombians. The Colombians are also limited in their use of U.S.-provided counterdrug-funded equipment, such as the Plan Colombia helicopters. If enacted, the Administration's FY-2002 supplemental request to expand our authorities in Colombia will provide some relief by lifting these restriction for future United States-funded equipment, assets, and programs for Colombia.

We support reinstating the Air Bridge Denial Program in Colombia and Peru as an effective means to interdict the flow of drugs, arms and contraband. In the past, this program was very successful in breaking down a critical network of conveyance for the drug traffickers. Furthermore, we know that arms traffickers smuggle weapons to the FARC by the airways. By incorporating the recommendations of the Beers and Busby reports, we can safely resume U.S. support to the air bridge denial operations and reinforce our commitment to partner nations.

As we look to the future, we need to ensure that our efforts are focused on fighting terrorism throughout this hemisphere and expanding our efforts to preserve and stabilize Colombia's democracy. These efforts require that we move beyond a counterdrug-focused strategy. Policy reviews, additional assistance for infrastructure security and combating terrorism, intelligence sharing, and increased security assistance are examples of expanded support for the government of Colombia that should be considered. The Administration's Infrastructure Security Strategy allows us to step beyond our counterdrug assistance and I fully support its execution.