28 February 2002

State Department Noon Briefing Transcript

State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher briefed.

Following is the State Department transcript:

IRAQ -- Financing Radio Transmitters in Northern Iraq/INC -- Inspections, Sanctions and UN Requirements/INC Conference -- U.S. Delegation going to Kurdistan

CUBA -- Radio Marti and Bus Crash at Mexican Embassy/VOA -- Hunger Strike by Detainees on Guantanamo

MIDDLE EAST -- Incursion by Israel into Palestinans' Refugee Camps/Arafat -- Sec. Powell's Call to PM Sharon and the Saudi Idea for Peace -- A/S Burns' Trip to Saudi Arabia -- Summit in Lebanon/Clinton Administration/Mitchell Report

BOSNIA -- Radovan Karadzic/SFOR/Warden Message in Sarajevo

WAR CRIMES -- War Crimes Tribunal/Amb. Prosper

CHINA -- Nonproliferation Issues and Cooperation/Conf. on March 4 & 5

BELARUS -- Arms Sales/Sanctions/Training of Iraqi Officers

ARAB GULF STATES -- Conference in Grenada, Spain

CAMBODIA -- Independence of the Judiciary/Freedom Fighters

Mr. Boucher: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I don't have any statements or announcements. I'd be glad to take your questions.

Question: What do you hear about the U.S. being prepared to finance radio transmitters, either in northern Iraq or in Iran?

Mr. Boucher: Let me bring you up to date with the situation there. We have been in discussions for some time with the Iraqi National Congress regarding a proposal to build a radio transmitter in the region for broadcasting inside Iraq. Though we are open to the concept of broadcasting from inside Iran or from Kurdish-controlled areas of Iraq, no decisions have been made on this as yet.

Given our long record of cooperation with the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, we believe that their input is important on any proposal to broadcast from Kurdish-controlled areas.

Question: What about the long-running cooperation between the two Kurdish parties? Do you care to comment on that?

Mr. Boucher: Nothing new on that. As you know, it has been an issue of concern to us -- the cooperation, or sometimes lack thereof. But we have kept in touch with both of these major parties up there. We have at times been out there. I think you'll remember the trip by Ryan Crocker last fall to keep in touch with them, also to work with them on their own cooperation, to encourage them to cooperate with each other. I don't think the state of their particular cooperation is determinant in this matter, but they do need to be heard from as far as their control of the areas.

Question: I guess I wasn't very clear. I meant in terms of what you guys are doing with the -- trying to get them to cooperate more. Is any of that related to this?

Mr. Boucher: No. As I said, I don't think their cooperation is determinant in whether a transmitter goes up up there. But certainly both of them need to have input because, by and large, they control the areas.

Question: And you are seeking such input?

Mr. Boucher: I'm not sure if we are or if the INC is, frankly.

Question: Would it not also need UN approval if you were to go ahead with this plan?

Mr. Boucher: Not that I'm aware of. Oh, you mean like to transfer equipment into Iraq?

Question: If it were to -- I'm sorry, I missed the beginning. But, yeah, exactly.

Mr. Boucher: Yeah, there might be something. It would depend on the state of the list and things like that at the moment that it was done. I don't think we're at that point yet.

Question: In a related development this morning, the United States is being slammed by Cuba for Radio Marti, and apparently some Mexicans have crashed with a bus into the Mexican Embassy in seeking asylum. Any comments?

Mr. Boucher: I always love it when people start out the question with, "In a related development." You never quite know where you're going to end up. (Laughter.)

But let's talk a little bit about the Cuban situation. We've seen these reports, and it does appear that a group of between 10 and 20 Cubans, mostly on a bus, penetrated the Mexican Embassy in an attempt to seek exit from the country. We are sure the Mexican Government will seek a solution which pays due regard to humanitarian concerns and to its international obligations. We note that in a similar case in 1993, the Cubans who had entered the Mexican Embassy were permitted to leave Cuba.

The real solution here, again, as we've said before, is change in Cuba. Cubans would not seek entry to foreign embassies if they had an opportunity to choose their own government, receive independent and accurate information, participate in a more open market, and thereby benefit from the economic advantages that a free society would provide. The bottom line is they wouldn't have to go through the wall if they were allowed to go the front door.

Question: Going back to Iraq --

Mr. Boucher: In a related development, yes.

Question: I haven't had time to analyze this, but looking at what the Secretary said in the interview he gave yesterday on inspections, do you think that partial inspections are better than no inspections? Inside Iraq, weapons inspections?

Mr. Boucher: I don't know what you mean by "partial inspections." We think that Iraq should comply with its obligations, and, as the Secretary said, Iraq should allow full and unfettered inspections, as it's required to do under the UN.

Question: Can you -- still on Iraq but not on the sanctions -- explain what the U.S. role is in helping to organize, or whatever it is that you're doing with the INC conferences --

Mr. Boucher: Conferences of military officers?

Question: Exactly.

Mr. Boucher: Yes.

Question: What is the U.S. role for that?

Mr. Boucher: Here's where we are on this. We have had discussions with the Iraqi National Congress and other opposition groups on the idea of a conference of former Iraqi military officers. We do support and encourage the idea of a broad-based conference that would be inclusive of all Iraqi opposition organizations.

We note the Iraqi National Congress has now announced its intention to go forward with organizing such a conference. We have to point out there are indeed some practical difficulties with holding a conference in the United States -- I think their announcement said Washington -- especially the issue of visas for participants on refugee status in other countries.

So we understand they'll keep working on this. They may be in touch, as we understand it, with the Pentagon on logistics and facilities, and we'll have to see if something is worked out by them in terms of organizing that proposal.

But I would say also in this vein, in the near future the Department of State plans to support a broad-based conference that would be attended by a wide variety of Iraqi ��igr��organizations, including both military and political figures. We have made no decisions yet on timing or venue, but we would expect to work on organization of the conference with a nongovernmental organization in another location.

Just to make clear, we believe that such conferences are important, that the meetings with the Iraqi opposition are important, particularly broad-based ones. It's useful to have multiple conferences, if that can be arranged.

Question: But these are two separate things, as far as you --

Mr. Boucher: Yes, these are two separate things at this point.

Question: And so does that mean that you're not prepared to support their conference of military people? Or you will, but you think there might be problems with it?

Mr. Boucher: We've said it's a good idea. We said there are difficulties doing this in the United States. I think in fact they are in touch with the Pentagon about some of the arrangements. You might have to check over there.

Question: Okay. Well, you mentioned one problem might be with visas. Is the State Department not prepared to facilitate the issuance of visas to people to come to this conference?

Mr. Boucher: We are prepared to facilitate the issuance of visas to people who qualify, but there is always the question about people, depending on travel documents and status overseas, if they're in some other country on refugee documents, it might not be easy to let them in here. And so a lot of these people, it might be difficult for us to do that.

Question: Well, have you suggested an alternative venue?

Mr. Boucher: Not for that particular conference. I suppose the INC is probably considering the question because we have put to them that there are these complications with the proposal that they had talked about. When we look at the kind of conference that we were organizing with an NGO, we had looked at doing that outside the United States.

Question: How much money?

Mr. Boucher: Don't have any specific money, timing or venue yet.

Question: Is that visa problem the only practical difficulty on this?

Mr. Boucher: I suppose there's travel and other sort of practical difficulties, but this is the one that we've already pointed out to them, shall we say.

Question: I didn't quite understand the difficulty. Is it that these people, as refugees, once they come into the United States, they could stay indefinitely? Is that what you're --

Mr. Boucher: Making sure that doesn't happen is one of the chief criteria for issuance of a visa. But there are also questions of travel documents and such things. We've pointed out it's very complicated for us to issue visas to some of these people. We might not be able to for certain people who might want to attend this conference; and therefore, in planning conferences, we have looked at doing it with a nongovernmental organization overseas, for example.

Question: What is (inaudible) purpose of --

Mr. Boucher: I think the purpose of getting together the Iraqi opposition is to help marshal the support, look at ideas, demonstrate that there are Iraqis who want a different future for their country; and make clear that these people come from a variety of backgrounds, a variety of ethnic groups, a variety of experiences; and to have them be able to compare notes and look at what kind of activities can further the goal of eventually changing the regime in Baghdad.

Question: The Israeli incursion, military incursions --

Question: Can we stay on Iraq, please?

Question: Yes.

Question: Yes, sure.

Question: Were these always going to be two different conferences, or was it just sort of recently when the INC started going ahead with announcements on this that the State Department decided the interests of this faction didn't coincide with their interests in this meeting?

Mr. Boucher: This is sort of the evolution of a discussion. The original idea of having such a conference involving military officers, I think was probably put forward by the INC. We thought it was a good one. But as we looked at what is the best way to organize it, host it, locations, who ought to do it, how do you get the best possible broad-based attendance, we felt it was important to obviously let the INC do what they can, but also to think that we might as well have a broader conference held by an NGO somewhere. And that sort of evolved into two separate tracks. That's fine. The more the opposition gets together, the more useful it is.

Question: You mean broad in terms of not being just military oriented people invited, or broad in terms of topics that would be discussed?

Mr. Boucher: Broad in terms of military and political figures, and probably broad in terms of the kind of people or the number of people, number of different people who would be able to attend, because you wouldn't have some of the constraints or difficulties that might apply to a conference hosted in the US.

Question: How do you feel about the INC announcing this slightly prematurely and saying that it had your approval?

Mr. Boucher: As I said, we've endorsed the idea of having conferences with Iraqi military figures. They announced that they wanted to organize one. As we've said, these are useful things to have. If there end up being two conferences in different places, different times, that's good.

Question: But you said this is an evolution of a discussion. Do you see the INC putting out information that kind of forces your hand on the evolution of where the discussion is going?

Mr. Boucher: They can announce. If they want to hold a conference, they can announce it.

Question: Richard, I'm sorry, can I follow up? Would you be prepared to support their idea of the conference with any kind of money, or you're only interested in --

Mr. Boucher: At this point, I don't have anything on our funding of that conference. But as I said, I do understand they've been in touch with the Pentagon, and they may have been able to work something with them.

Question: That's just for their military-only one?

Mr. Boucher: Yeah, for their military only.

Question: Okay. So, at this point, you are prepared to say that you are prepared to support the second, your idea, with money, as well as logistics?

Mr. Boucher: Yes, that would be something that we would help fund and organize --

Question: Okay, but if --

Mr. Boucher: We would help fund and organize, but look for an NGO who might want to actually implement it.

Question: Right, but right now, if they want money for their military conference --

Mr. Boucher: At this point, I don't think we ourselves have committed any money to the first one, because they've been talking to the Pentagon about it.

Question: So the Pentagon would have to give them money for that? Not you?

Mr. Boucher: Yeah, there's different ways of doing these things, and this happens to be the route that they've discussed.

Question: On the military incursion by Israel into the Palestinians' refugee camps in Balata and Jenin has resurrected images of Sabra and Shatila in many people's minds in the Middle East. What is your position on the new trend of going into refugee camps?

Mr. Boucher: Well, we do have a situation today, and I'll talk about it. But to go back to the overall principles that we come at this from, first of all, we respect Israel's right to self-defense. There's no question about that. We have continued to call on Chairman Arafat and the Palestinian Authority to undertake maximum efforts to confront violence and terror. We have also said it's important that the Israeli Government take steps that both facilitate Palestinian efforts on security and help promote a more positive environment on the ground.

We do believe it's extremely important that every possible effort be made to avoid harm to civilians. The United States is concerned about the present situation on the ground, especially in the Balata refugee camp near Nablus. We have been in touch with the Israeli Government to urge that utmost restraint be exercised in order to avoid harm to the civilian population.

At the same time, we are pleased that the two sides met on Tuesday for a trilateral security meeting, and that they met bilaterally in a meeting in Gaza today. This kind of cooperation is extremely important, and the parties' commitment to continue that cooperation is a very positive step, one that will help both sides confront the violence and terror, and we strongly urge them to continue that cooperation.

Question: Richard, can you elaborate a little bit about the US's concern about Israel apropos the refugee camp? Are you concerned? I can think of lots of possibilities: that it be provocative; that it will set off a tit-for-tat; or that maybe the questioner is right, that you think maybe they'll act violently against the people there. What is the concern?

Mr. Boucher: The concern, as I said, is that every effort be made to avoid harm to civilians. These are very heavily populated areas. We understand that Israel needs to take steps to provide for its own security, but, at the same time, they need to avoid harm to civilians, particularly in areas like this. They need to exercise restraint and they need to look to create an environment that is conducive to further steps towards peace.

Question: Richard, I have seen a report that the Secretary spoke to Prime Minister Sharon and told him that his forces shouldn't stay in Balata and Jenin for long. Is that correct? And did he call and what did he say?

Mr. Boucher: The Secretary spoke to Prime Minister Sharon this morning. He also talked to the UN Secretary General this morning about the situation in the Middle East. When he spoke to Prime Minister Sharon this morning, they talked about the need for continuing steps to stop the violence; stressed the importance of continuing security cooperation, as I just did; talked a little bit about the Saudi Arabian ideas. But this situation in the refugee camp hadn't really developed extensively at that moment -- it was early this morning -- so our getting in touch with the Israeli Government was subsequent to that, as the situation developed further.

Question: Are you saying that they have had subsequent --

Mr. Boucher: Subsequent phone calls so that -- no. The U.S. contact -- our Embassy in Israel has been in touch with the Israeli Government on this message of utmost restraint that I mentioned. It wasn't in the phone call this morning because the situation hadn't developed then.

Question: And did the Embassy say to the Israelis that they hoped they wouldn't stay very long in the camp?

Mr. Boucher: We have always said that any incursions shouldn't be made permanent or lengthy.

Question: So, yes?

Mr. Boucher: I don't know specifically if those words were used. That's always been our position. I think the Israelis understand that.

Question: What can you tell us about Bill Burns' trip to Saudi Arabia, his sudden trip there?

Mr. Boucher: Bill Burns is -- I'm not sure if he's in Saudi Arabia or if he's already on his way back. He went out to Saudi Arabia to talk with Crown Prince Abdullah. As you know, we've been keeping in touch with the Saudis on this idea of theirs about full normalization in the context of a negotiated settlement. We've said we think it's a significant and positive step, not only the content but also the fact that it was made. We wanted to keep in touch with them.

Assistant Secretary Burns had some discussions earlier this week with the national security advisor to the Crown Prince, and he went out to talk directly with the Crown Prince about this, about regional developments, about bilateral relationships, and also in context of preparing for Vice President Cheney's trip. So he went out, had some quick meetings, and is probably on his way back.

Question: (Inaudible.)

Mr. Boucher: I think yesterday.

Question: Richard, one assumes that Mr. Burns asked the Crown Prince for some more details of his vision, including, for example, his vision on flexibility on borders, on refugees and so on. Did he get any answers on these subjects, and what were they?

Mr. Boucher: Don't know. The meetings will just have concluded not very long ago. And again, it's not going to be for us to provide more details. I think if the Saudis want to do that, then it would be up to them.

Question: The Saudis seem to be saying it's not up to them; they're not in the zoning business, as they said; that they've laid down a vision and it's up to the parties to negotiate, to pick up on it. But they also say it's consistent with your two aces -- you know, your two vehicles, the Tenet cease-fire and the Mitchell Report. So, really, I wonder if --

Mr. Boucher: I think they must have read my briefing a bit more closely than some of you did. That's what we've said as well.

Question: Well, they actually talked to some -- no, no, there seemed to be --

Mr. Boucher: That they've laid out a vision, which we think is important both for what it is and for the fact they did it; that it's consistent with the vision that President Bush and Secretary Powell laid out last fall; that we think it's an important part of the process to make clear what's down the road. But we've also said the parties need to negotiate all these issues.

Question: Yeah -- no, but -- all right, it's hard to -- it's a hard hair to split, whether you're going there to show that you appreciate the gesture, or you're really working on details. I suspect there are no details in the Saudi plan to work on, but you like what they've said and you want to make sure that it sinks in.

Mr. Boucher: I don't think it's completely the one or the other. There has been a lot of support for the basic ideas. We want to hear it directly, talk directly to the Crown Prince, hear it from him, see if he has more to say. We all recognize -- they recognize -- we do, and I think people in the region recognize as well, this is about what lies down the road, but you still need to go down the road. You need to go down the road of stopping violence and restoring trust and getting to negotiation, and that these big issues need to be negotiated.

Question: Richard, can you explain what the thinking was behind sending him out there at such short notice and for such a short time? I mean, this is an administration, at least in this building, where the head of this building has said often that telephone calls are just as good as meeting in person, and that in fact the --

Mr. Boucher: No, he hasn't.

Question: Yes, he has. And, in fact, the --

Mr. Boucher: The battle of the transcripts.

Question: In fact, the President and the Secretary have both spoken in person to Crown Prince Abdullah about this. Why the face-to-face visit?

Mr. Boucher: As I said, there are a number of subjects that we want to discuss, a number of subjects that Mr. Burns wanted to discuss in his trip, including this idea, but also regional issues, bilateral issues, and preparations for the Vice President's trip. He thought it was useful to sit down face to face with the Crown Prince and have a somewhat longer discussion than one might have on the telephone.

Question: It now seems that the Saudis can officially announce this plan in the next coming Arab summit in Lebanon, and the presence of Arafat in such a case will be very vital. Are you going to do anything to assure that Arafat can break the siege and leave and attend the summit?

Mr. Boucher: I don't have anything new on that one way or the other at this point.

Question: A couple hours ago, your colleague over at the White House appears to have put his foot in his mouth, at least from what he's saying now, for the last 20 minutes, been trying to go back on that. He said earlier at the gaggle at the White House that an attempt to push the parties beyond where they were willing to go led to expectations that were raised to such a high level that it turned into violence. He was referring, of course, to the efforts last year, I believe at -- well, I know, at Camp David, between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

Given that you were actually there and an integral part of Camp David, and the previous administration, Richard, I'm wondering what you would like to say about Mr. Fleischer's comments, or if you're content to let him stew in his own juices, as he's doing -- or was doing as we came in here?

Mr. Boucher: Phil? (Laughter.)

You've put me in an untenable position. I either have to turn my back on Ari Fleischer, or I have to get into some long discussion that I don't think is merited. Because I read Ari's comments this morning. I have no problem with them, based on my experience, based on what we have said previously in this building. To the extent that people over there want to hear more, I'm sure Ari has been glad to provide it for the last 20 minutes, and probably going on a half hour now.

But, at the same time, I didn't find anything surprising in his remarks. We read the transcript this morning. There has always been this question about do you need political vision in negotiations in order to stop the violence, or do you need to stop the violence in order to have political vision and negotiations? And that was the subject that came up.

We've always said you need both. And our actions, our policy, have always included both, laying out -- as the President did, the Secretary did, and others have -- the kind of vision of what's down the road, but also saying we're not going to get there until we stop the violence, give people back their lives, rebuild some modicum of trust to get the parties back to negotiations.

And so I'll leave the historians to write the exact relationship between these factors over the last couple of years. But to the extent that question is being discussed in these questions, I think the answer is what we've actually done is to make sure that there is both the vision of the political negotiation, but also the real steps to give people better lives, to rebuild some trust, and get to those negotiations.

Question: Richard, you laid the two -- not that they're exactly black and white alternatives, but there are two strategies, two tactics. I don't think there's any question that the Clinton Administration accused -- when there was violence, they called those folks "enemies of peace" and they went full-blast on the theory the only way you deal with violence is to provide some incentives for people to stop fighting, serious incentives, like major incentives. And this administration's approach seems to be you've got to get the violence down before you can jump in and start jumping around the Middle East and getting it to show diplomacy, and using the President of the United States. You see, you're doing both.

Isn't that contrast evident, that they went for political before ending violence, and you're going for ending violence before providing a framework?

Mr. Boucher: As I think I said and Ari discussed, that there are various aspects of this, but I don't really think this kind of theoretical discussion gets us anywhere. It's neither the one nor the other.

Question: Why does Arafat seem to think that you're not pushing hard enough in support of the initiative? What can you say to him? He wants you to come out stronger in support of the Saudi initiative, so to speak.

Mr. Boucher: We have said what we have said. We have been quite clear that we think this is a significant and positive step. But we have been as clear that it's not the answer to all the questions, and that a maximum effort by Chairman Arafat and the Palestinian Authority is still required to get to those elements that can be negotiated, to get to those elements that can be resolved, and can only be resolved by negotiation. The issue at hand is stopping the violence. That remains the issue.

Question: Can I ask you one detail on this?

Mr. Boucher: Sure.

Question: All right. The Saudi proposal, which encompasses the U.S. approach, does say don't wait ten days, don't wait for a period of calm. This is particularly apropos today because of what's been said at the White House and here.

Is the administration's view still that, for one thing, that's what the Israeli Government would like, a period of calm? And is it the administration's view there has to be some -- I know you don't want to count days -- but some reasonable period of time where there's calm before you can move ahead with Mitchell, or hope to move ahead?

Mr. Boucher: The administration has made clear since the Mitchell Committee came up with its recommendations -- and I think the Secretary repeated it in his interview with a newspaper yesterday -- that you need to reduce the violence to get down this path, that the Mitchell Report says you've got to stop the violence and get on with these other things. That was the point of the Tenet recommendations was to look at the specific steps that can be taken to reduce the violence. So, yes, you need to reduce the violence to get down that path. That path remains the important way to get back to talks based on the UN resolutions and the principles that have to be negotiated.

Question: Would the Saudi proposal in any way -- or is the State Department considering making the Saudi proposal part of a broader, kind of revamped peace initiative at this point that would involve the steps of implementing Mitchell and Tenet but, at the same time, maybe including some of the ideas that are talked about by Crown Prince Abdullah as a longer term part of it?

Mr. Boucher: I take it that's some kind of suggestion? I don't --

Question: It's not a suggestion. I'm just -- I'm asking, is this factoring into the peace -- to your peace planning?

Mr. Boucher: It's factored into the vision. It's an Arab vision of full normalization, and that's in the context of a negotiated settlement on these key issues. That is sort of factored into the whole equation. But it's not a peace plan. It's not a specific proposal to end the violence. We still have to end the violence and get back to a negotiation that's based on a little bit of confidence and trust.

Question: Do you have anything on an attempt this morning to snatch Radovan Karadzic?

Mr. Boucher: The details would come out of SFOR and our military, but I can give you the context, if I can find it.

Question: The context or the contents?

Mr. Boucher: The contents of the context. A multinational stabilization force contingent today conducted a search near the Bosnian town of Celebici in the ongoing effort to locate and detain fugitive war criminal Radovan Karadzic. Although Karadzic was not found, the operation found and seized three sizeable and significant weapons caches, located in several buildings on the compounds.

Mr. Karadzic, and all persons indicted for war crimes, should be apprehended and brought to trial for their serious crimes against humanity. The operation today demonstrates NATO's strong commitment to bringing all persons indicted for war crimes to justice. It highlights our resolve to use a broader range of allied capabilities against all war criminals that do not voluntarily surrender.

Question: Richard, you said that there were compounds that these weapons were located on?

Mr. Boucher: Yeah, they went into a village, and I think a specific compound with several buildings that they went into.

Question: So do they believe that he was there at some time?

Mr. Boucher: They were looking for him there. I think, again, more details, if they can be provided, would have to be done by the people who were on the scene, and therefore more able to judge what we're able to divulge or not.

Question: Do you think that there is a policy now of more aggressively going after him?

Mr. Boucher: As I said, we've had a policy of looking to apprehend these people, especially people like Karadzic. We'll be using all of the tools at our disposal. And as I said, we are committed to using a broad range of allied capabilities to go after war criminals who don't voluntarily surrender.

Question: So just because he got away this time, it doesn't mean he should rest easy? You're still --

Mr. Boucher: Definitely, he should not rest easy, unless he wants to go to The Hague, and we can provide a bed there.

Question: Okay. I understand that the Embassy in Sarajevo has put out a Warden Message telling Americans to avoid the area where this raid took place altogether. What exactly -- is the concern that Karadzic supporters and Mladic and supporters are going to come after --

Mr. Boucher: I don't know. I haven't seen a Warden Message. I would have to check on it for you.

Question: Back on Cuba. The Cubans are blaming a Radio Marti broadcast for the events of last night, and the Mexican Foreign Minister was quoted by Radio Marti as saying the Cubans are welcome to visit the Mexican Embassy any time. And I don't know whether this is your call or not, but do you know whether Radio Marti quoted the Mexican Foreign Minister accurately?

Mr. Boucher: Apparently, there were a number of Miami media outlets, including Radio Marti, that ran stories yesterday with recordings of Foreign Minister Castaneda's comment in answer to a question that the Embassy of Mexico in Havana was open to all Cubans who wish to visit Mexico. If the Cubans who entered the Mexican Embassy did so because of these remarks, it is a reflection of the desperate circumstances that lead them to grasp at any straw that is put in front of them.

Once again, I would say embassies can be open to people if the Cubans will let them go to the front door. And the problem here, people need to go -- people try to go through the wall if they can't make it to the front door.

Question: Is it your understanding that Radio Marti is able to be received in Cuba?

Mr. Boucher: I know the Cuban Government has said that it's not being listened to; but, on the other hand, now they're blaming a broadcast on Radio Marti --

Question: Well, are they not --

Mr. Boucher: So it's kind of -- there's a contradiction there. I don't know what the audience statistics are for it. I would expect that Radio Marti would have some for you.

Question: Can you -- just in terms of policy-wise or direction, content-wise, what's role does the State Department play in the programming that they air?

Mr. Boucher: In the programming that they air?

Question: Well, the content of their programming. Is it similar to VOA?

Mr. Boucher: Well, they are under the Broadcasting Board of Governors, similar to VOA. I don't really know. I don't know if they, like VOA, run the sort of editorials and policy of the United States Government or not. You could probably check with them as to what their content is. But they are not directly under us; they are under the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

Question: Right, but the idea was that it is independent, yes, of the U.S. Government, even though it's U.S. funded?

Mr. Boucher: Yes.

Question: Right.

Question: Do you care to comment on the hunger strike that is taking place right now in Guantanamo by the detainees?

Mr. Boucher: No, I don't have anything on that. You might check with the military.

Question: Change of subject. Can you tell us why this administration is pressing to end the War Crimes Tribunals?

Mr. Boucher: We're not "pressing to end the War Crimes Tribunals." If you look at the testimony that Ambassador Prosper gave this morning on the Hill, and I'm sure he has explained -- you know, he's been up there -- was up there for full testimony, so I'm sure he talked about this more than I can. These tribunals were originally set up with a limited duration. That's as it should be. That doesn't detract from the very, very important work that they have been doing; from our very, very strong support for the work that they have been doing. And Pierre Prosper stated that again in his testimony on the Hill.

Question: What is the alternative? What is the U.S. plan for that, then? If you're calling for an end eventually, what's the timetable and what's the alternative? Mr. Boucher: Well, the timetable is to be set by the Tribunal, but the goal is to take care of the cases that they have to take care of. If you look back in history, there have been tribunals that have been established, done their work, done very important work, and then finish. So the goal is to finish. It's to prosecute everybody who needs to be prosecuted for war crimes in these situations. They'll have to look at the schedule, and it has to do with apprehension and trials of people. But the work that they do is very, very important, and we have been very strong supporters in many different ways.

Question: Does the United States (inaudible) end to it or (inaudible)? Mr. Boucher: I don't know if there is one, frankly. I just don't know if we've talked about that with them. I suspect we have, but I don't know if it's come down to dates.

Question: Well, but surely you're not suggesting that the Tribunal shut down before all those indicted are processed by --

Mr. Boucher: The goal is to have them prosecute everybody who needs to be prosecuted.

Question: Before they shut down?

Mr. Boucher: Yes. Again, the timetable is for them to be set. Have we discussed -- have we heard from them dates? Have we discussed with them dates when they think they might be able to finish their work? I don't know. But Ambassador Prosper was up there for lengthy testimony. He may have answered that question because he is the one who does know.

Question: But that goes in -- some -- kind of goes in with your efforts to -- the effort to get Karadzic. I mean, this presumably is being done not simply because you want to get him in and get him to the court before you want to yank your funding for it, right? I mean, this is being done because you want him to face justice.

Mr. Boucher: Justice, yes. That's what's going on here. We're not --

Question: But you're saying -- but now you're leaving open the possibility that you might be in favor of closing the tribunal down before -- or might be in favor of having it close itself down before these people are tried, no?

Mr. Boucher: I don't think I said that in any way, shape or form. The goal is to have them get the people who have committed crimes and prosecute them, and then be able to finish their work and shut down.

Question: But there are lots of goals, though, Richard, that go unmet in the end for financial or other practical reasons.

Question: Okay, let me put it this way. Do you expect the ICTY to stay open as long as Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Mladic are on the run?

Mr. Boucher: I don't expect Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Mladic to be able to stay on the run long enough to avoid justice.

Question: In the ICTY?

Mr. Boucher: In the ICTY.

Question: Why is it necessary to state that the War Crimes Tribunal must come to an end? Isn't it -- I don't know, maybe I'm not seeing something, but it seems to be stating the obvious, that after they've finished prosecuting various suspects, that they would wrap it up. Is it that you feel that the pace is too slow?

Mr. Boucher: I'm stating it because you're asking me. It was set up that way right from the start. It shouldn't be news to anybody that these were not set up as a permanent organ of the United Nations. They have had target dates. They have been set up with limited duration. I think actually they are looking, if I can, I do have here that they are looking to reach a successful conclusion by 2007-2008.

So they do have a target date. But that's a fact that has really been known from the start, that they were limited duration, they were set up to do a job, finish a job, and then they wouldn't be needed anymore because we will have prosecuted all the people that need to be prosecuted.

Question: The Chinese Foreign Ministry said this morning that it was prepared to cooperate more fully on nonproliferation issues with you guys, and that they're sending a team over here, I guess March. Is this kind of -- your reaction to this? Is this kind of this is very nice, but we'll see, the proof's in the pudding kind of thing?

Mr. Boucher: There is going to be a conference at the Brookings Institute on March 4 and 5, the Fourth US-China Conference on Arms Control Disarmament and Nonproliferation, and we understand that the Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in China, Mr. Liu Jieyi, will come to Washington for that conference. It's a conference co-sponsored by the Monterey Institute of International Studies and the China Institute of International Studies. Our Nonproliferation Assistant Secretary John Wolf will be the senior U.S. Government participant in the conference.

While he is in town, we understand that Director General Liu will be able to meet with Assistant Secretary John Wolf, and they'll have a chance then to discuss the nonproliferation issues. We look forward to that meeting.

Question: Okay. But you don't have anything specific on them saying that they will -- that they are prepared to cooperate more fully than perhaps they might have been in the past?

Mr. Boucher: We'll see. These are issues we have discussed in the past, and we look forward to discussing with them again in the hopes of reaching a conclusion.

Question: Something very brief on that. Do you expect that Wolf and the Chinese Director General will be meeting -- was it going to be there, or would it be a more formal kind of thing here at the building?

Mr. Boucher: I don't know that there's a location yet, but they'll have more formal meetings than just sitting together at the same conference.

Question: I was wondering if you could elaborate on the statement you put out about Belarus and arms sales yesterday? It appears that it means that the U.S. is considering sanctions against Belarus for arms sales to rogue nations.

Mr. Boucher: Let me see if we have anything more on that. I think at this point I would say that Deputy Assistant Secretary Pifer put the question very clearly to the Belarusian Government. They should not be in the business of selling arms to countries with histories of supporting terrorism or fomenting regional conflict. We use a variety of means to prevent such transfers. Sanctions are a possible tool, but they're only one possible tool to address them.

So, at this point, we have made quite clear what we think the responsibilities of the Belarusian Government are.

Question: So you are considering sanctions?

Mr. Boucher: It's one possible tool, but, at this point, I would say that's where we are as we make quite clear to them what we think their obligations are. We'll see what they do.

Question: Can you say (inaudible) other options, hypothetically, since sanctions are one tool?

Mr. Boucher: Hypothetically? Me?

Question: Not hypothetically. But what else -- I'm just curious. I mean, what else -- how else do we tell countries we don't like them to not sell weapons to terrorists?

Mr. Boucher: Well, first of all we tell them.

Question: Right. (Laughter.)

Mr. Boucher: Second of all, we try to get them to control sales. Third of all, we monitor such sales, and where they are occurring we try to stop them. Third of all, we try to stop recipient countries. Fourth of all, in various places we have patrols, interdiction regimes, customs inspectors, and a variety of other things that try to implement UN sanctions. And fifth, we have other ways. (Laughter.)

Question: Well, Richard, those would be the sanctions. The bilateral -- you know, unilateral U.S. sanctions you're talking about.

Mr. Boucher: The point here is --

Question: Option five -- I just want to get you to narrow option five, that you're not talking about what a lot of people might think you're talking about when you say "we have ways."

Let me put it this way. You're not talking about some kind of military action against Belarus?

Mr. Boucher: No, I'm not.

Question: All right. Thank you. Because if --

Mr. Boucher: I'm not. We have sanctions, and probably a number of other things I just haven't thought of, but the one that I have specifically not thought of and not included is military options.

Question: There's a conference today in Grenada, Spain --

Question: Can I ask one more Belarus question?

Mr. Boucher: Okay. Let's go back to Belarus.

Question: I understand that Pifer spoke about Belarusian training of Iraqi military offers; is that correct?

Mr. Boucher: I'm not in a position to go into any particular instances that we might have cited.

Question: There's a conference today in Grenada, Spain, with the Arab Gulf States representatives in the European Union. Are we sending, or do we have representatives there? Any chance to enlarge that conference to --

Mr. Boucher: I don't know. I hadn't heard about it. If it's a European Union conference, we normally wouldn't participate, but we might have people keeping in touch with the various parties there.

Question: In the past, you guys have expressed concern about the independence of the judiciary in Cambodia. And I understand that this morning the court convicted an American citizen, along with several others, for allegedly trying to overthrow the government. I wonder what you make of the trial.

Mr. Boucher: I don't have a complete readout of it yet, so I'm not able to comment on the trial that much, other than to say the facts as we understand them, that the U.S. citizen Gilbert Sao was among the 20 individuals sentenced by a Cambodian court today for alleged participation in the Cambodian Freedom Fighters, an antigovernment organization. Mr. Sao was sentenced to ten years in prison.

Attorneys for the defendants are preparing appeals. We have followed this case very closely. We will continue to do so. Consular officers have visited Mr. Sao in prison, and a consular officer attended all sessions of the trial. We are also in contact with his family here in the United States. So we will continue to follow that situation as they prepare their appeals.

Question: On Iraq. Is there a U.S. delegation going Iraqi Kurdistan in the near future?

Mr. Boucher: I don't know. I haven't heard of any. Are we checking on a specific one, or you just want to know?

Question: No, but my colleague asked me. I'm not sure I know --

Mr. Boucher: I'll check and see if there's anything to say. If there's not, we won't.

Question: Thank you.

(The briefing was concluded at 1:40 p.m. EST.)