06 February 2002

CIA's Tenet Says Islam Neither Enemy Nor Threat

CIA Director George Tenet reaffirmed President Bush's longstanding message that the United States does not view Islam as an enemy, but expressed concern over religious schools, or madrasas, in the Muslim world that teach "intolerance and hatred."

"Islam itself is neither an enemy nor a threat to the United States. But the increasing anger toward the West -- and toward governments friendly to us -- among Islamic extremists and their sympathizers clearly is a threat to us," said Tenet in his February 6 testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

Tenet called attention to Pakistani President Musharraf's January 12 speech in which he discussed Islam and distinguished between "a narrow, intolerant, and conflict-ridden vision of the past and an inclusive, tolerant, and peace-oriented vision of the future."

Tenet also applauded Musharraf's distinction between a violent jihad, and the "greater jihad" that calls upon Muslims to practice charity.

"The speech is energizing debate across the Muslim world about which vision of Islam is the right one for the future of the Islamic community," said Tenet.

Tenet warned the committee that the chance of war between Pakistan and India is now "higher than at any point since 1971," and said that the U.S. was concerned that a conventional war could become a nuclear confrontation.

The CIA director said other security threats to the United States were posed by Iraq and Iran, as well as the violence between Israelis and Palestinians.

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, said Tenet, remains a threat as he seeks to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and return the Iraqi military to its pre-1991 force levels. Tenet said the Iraqi military "remains capable of defeating more poorly armed internal opposition groups and threatening Iraq's neighbors."

He added that the Iraqi leader has been carefully cultivating relationships in the region in an effort to erode support for the U.N. sanctions.

"The profits he gains from these relationships provide him the means to reward key supporters and, more importantly, to fund his pursuit of WMD. His calculus is never about bettering or helping the Iraqi people," said Tenet.

With regard to Iran, Tenet said there was little sign that the government has reduced its support for terrorism in the past year. He mentioned Iranian involvement in attempting to smuggle arms to the Palestinian Authority, and actions by its security forces to gain influence in Afghanistan.

Tenet voiced concern that the Iranian reform movement of President Khatami was losing its momentum, due to strong opposition by hardliners led by Supreme Leader Khamenei.

"The hardliners have systematically used the unelected institutions they control -- the security forces, the judiciary, and the Guardian's Council -- to block reforms that challenge their entrenched interests. They have closed newspapers, forced members of Khatami's cabinet from office, and arrested those who have dared to speak out against their tactics," said Tenet.

Tenet warned that due to widespread domestic discontent, the equilibrium of power in Iran was fragile and "could be upset by a miscalculation by either the reformers or the hardline clerics."

In the Middle East, Tenet said that the lack of security cooperation between the Israelis and Palestinians, combined with the actions of terrorist organizations, made progress towards ending the violence "extremely difficult."

He said the situation created opportunities for countries like Iran to escalate the violence, and posed a dilemma for Arab regimes that are friendly towards the United States.

"[T]he continued violence threatens to weaken the political center in the Arab world, and increases the challenge for our Arab allies to balance their support for us against the demands of their publics," said Tenet.

Following is an excerpt of Tenet's remarks:

THE MUSLIM WORLD

All of these challenges come together in parts of the Muslim world, and let me give you just one example. One of the places where they converge that has the greatest long-term impact on any society is its educational system. Primary and secondary education in parts of the Muslim world is often dominated by an interpretation of Islam that teaches intolerance and hatred. The graduates of these schools -- "madrasas" -- provide the foot soldiers for many of the Islamic militant groups that operate throughout the Muslim world.

Let me underscore what the President has affirmed: Islam itself is neither an enemy nor a threat to the United States. But the increasing anger toward the West -- and toward governments friendly to us -- among Islamic extremists and their sympathizers clearly is a threat to us. We have seen -- and continue to see -- these dynamics play out across the Muslim world. Let me briefly address their manifestation in several key countries.

Our campaign in Afghanistan has made great progress, but the road ahead is fraught with challenges. The Afghan people, with international assistance, are working to overcome a traditionally weak central government, a devastated infrastructure, a grave humanitarian crisis, and ethnic divisions that deepened over the last 20 years of conflict. The next few months will be an especially fragile period.

• Interim authority chief Hamid Karzai will have to play a delicate balancing game domestically. Remaining al-Qai'da fighters in the eastern provinces, and ongoing power struggles among Pashtun leaders there underscore the volatility of tribal and personal relations that Karzai must navigate.

• Taliban elements still at large and remaining pockets of Arab fighters could also threaten the security of those involved in reconstruction and humanitarian operations. Some leaders in the new political order may allow the continuation of opium cultivation to secure advantages against their rivals for power.

Let me move next to Pakistan. September 11 and the U.S. response to it were the most profound external events for Pakistan since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the U.S. response to that. The Musharraf government's alignment with the United States -- and its abandonment of nearly a decade of support for the Taliban -- represent a fundamental political shift with inherent political risks because of the militant Islamic and anti-American sentiments that exist within Pakistan.

President Musharraf's intention to establish a moderate, tolerant Islamic state -- as outlined in his 12 January speech -- is being welcomed by most Pakistanis, but he will still have to confront major vested interests. The speech is energizing debate across the Muslim world about which vision of Islam is the right one for the future of the Islamic community.

• Musharraf established a clear and forceful distinction between a narrow, intolerant, and conflict-ridden vision of the past and an inclusive, tolerant, and peace-oriented vision of the future.

• The speech also addressed the jihad issue by citing the distinction the Prophet Muhammad made between the "smaller jihad" involving violence and the "greater jihad" that focuses on eliminating poverty and helping the needy.

Although September 11 highlighted the challenges that India-Pakistan relations pose for U.S. policy, the attack on the Indian parliament on December 13 was even more destabilizing -- resulting as it did in new calls for military action against Pakistan, and subsequent mobilization on both sides. The chance of war between these two nuclear-armed states is higher than at any point since 1971. If India were to conduct large-scale offensive operations into Pakistani Kashmir, Pakistan might retaliate with strikes of its own in the belief that its nuclear deterrent would limit the scope of an Indian counterattack.

• Both India and Pakistan are publicly downplaying the risks of nuclear conflict in the current crisis. We are deeply concerned, however, that a conventional war -- once begun -- could escalate into a nuclear confrontation.

Let me turn now to Iraq. Saddam has responded to our progress in Afghanistan with a political and diplomatic charm offensive to make it appear that Baghdad is becoming more flexible on U.N. sanctions and inspections issues. Last month he sent Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz to Moscow and Beijing to profess Iraq's new openness to meet its U.N. obligations and to seek their support.

Baghdad's international isolation is also decreasing as support for the sanctions regime erodes among other states in the region. Saddam has carefully cultivated neighboring states, drawing them into economically dependent relationships in hopes of further undermining their support for the sanctions. The profits he gains from these relationships provide him the means to reward key supporters and, more importantly, to fund his pursuit of WMD. His calculus is never about bettering or helping the Iraqi people.

Let me be clear: Saddam remains a threat. He is determined to thwart U.N. sanctions, press ahead with weapons of mass destruction, and resurrect the military force he had before the Gulf war. Today, he maintains his vise grip on the levers of power through a pervasive intelligence and security apparatus, and even his reduced military force -- which is less than half its pre-war size -- remains capable of defeating more poorly armed internal opposition groups and threatening Iraq's neighbors.

As I said earlier, we continue to watch Iraq's involvement in terrorist activities. Baghdad has a long history of supporting terrorism, altering its targets to reflect changing priorities and goals. It has also had contacts with al-Qa'ida. Their ties may be limited by divergent ideologies, but the two sides' mutual antipathy toward the United States and the Saudi royal family suggests that tactical cooperation between them is possible -- even though Saddam is well aware that such activity would carry serious consequences.

In Iran, we are concerned that the reform movement may be losing its momentum. For almost five years, President Khatami and his reformist supporters have been stymied by Supreme Leader Khamenei and the hardliners.

• The hardliners have systematically used the unelected institutions they control -- the security forces, the judiciary, and the Guardian's Council -- to block reforms that challenge their entrenched interests. They have closed newspapers, forced members of Khatami's cabinet from office, and arrested those who have dared to speak out against their tactics.

• Discontent with the current domestic situation is widespread and cuts across the social spectrum. Complaints focus on the lack of pluralism and government accountability, social restrictions, and poor economic performance. Frustrations are growing as the populace sees elected institutions such as the Majles and the Presidency unable to break the hardliners' hold on power.

The hardline regime appears secure for now because security forces have easily contained dissenters and arrested potential opposition leaders. No one has emerged to rally reformers into a forceful movement for change, and the Iranian public appears to prefer gradual reform to another revolution. But the equilibrium is fragile and could be upset by a miscalculation by either the reformers or the hardline clerics.

For all of this, reform is not dead. We must remember that the people of Iran have demonstrated in four national elections since 1997 that they want change and have grown disillusioned with the promises of the revolution. Social, intellectual, and political developments are proceeding, civil institutions are growing, and new newspapers open as others are closed.

The initial signs of Tehran's cooperation and common cause with us in Afghanistan are being eclipsed by Iranian efforts to undermine U.S. influence there. While Iran's officials express a shared interest in a stable government in Afghanistan, its security forces appear bent on countering the U.S. presence. This seeming contradiction in behavior reflects deep-seated suspicions among Tehran's clerics that the United States is committed to encircling and overthrowing them -- a fear that could quickly erupt in attacks against our interests.

• We have seen little sign of a reduction in Iran's support for terrorism in the past year. Its participation in the attempt to transfer arms to the Palestinian Authority via the Karine-A probably was intended to escalate the violence of the intifada and strengthen the position of Palestinian elements that prefer armed conflict with Israel.

The current conflict between Israel and the Palestinians has been raging for almost a year and a half, and it continues to deteriorate. The violence has hardened the public's positions on both sides and increased the longstanding animosity between Israeli Prime Minister Sharon and Palestinian leader Arafat. Although many Israelis and Palestinians say they believe that ultimately the conflict can only be resolved through negotiations, the absence of any meaningful security cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority -- and the escalating and uncontrolled activities of the Palestine Islamic Jihad and HAMAS -- make any progress extremely difficult.

• We are concerned that this environment creates opportunities for any number of players -- most notably Iran -- to take steps that will result in further escalation of violence by radical Palestinian groups.

• At the same time, the continued violence threatens to weaken the political center in the Arab world, and increases the challenge for our Arab allies to balance their spport for us against the demands of their publics.