*EPF305 11/17/2004
Text: Second Bush Administration Must "Inspire" Asia, Leach Says
(Asia panel chairman evaluates Bush Administration policy) (8520)

Many of America's closest allies in the Asia-Pacific region are "uncomfortable with the manner in which the Bush Administration has exercised America's extraordinary primacy in world affairs, so much so that one can imagine a range of scenarios in which even our friends in Asia resist future Washington initiatives," according to Representative James A. Leach.

"To forestall such an eventuality," the chairman of the House International Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific said, "the second Bush Administration needs to be more sensitive to the views of others; it also needs to inspire."

Leach, Republican of Iowa, made his remarks November 9 at a day-long seminar on the Bush Administration policy in the region entitled "George W. Bush and Asia: An Assessment." The event was sponsored by Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars in Washington, D.C.

American leadership in the Asia-Pacific region, Leach said, is challenged less by the unique nature of the issues "than by the spillover effects of our Iraqi policies on Asian consciousness."

According to Leach, the U.S. intervention in Iraq "is widely viewed by Asians as a foreign policy blunder, reflective of an increasingly violent culture [and] has undercut our influence, moral as well as political, throughout the region."

Even so, not all aspects of U.S. post-9/11 involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan have been negative, Leach said. "Given its religious and ethnic diversity, China, for instance, shares our concern for destabilizing religious extremism," he said. "India, while encompassing the second largest Muslim population, has for a variety of reasons moved out of its Cold War umbrella relationship with Russia to a much more American-centric trade and cultural orientation. Pakistan has a government which recognizes the downside of certain fundamentalist and terrorist organizing both in relation to its differences with India over Kashmir and with the U.S. over nuclear policies and the ongoing hunt for Osama Bin Laden."

The challenge now facing the United States, the congressman said, is in crafting policies for each of these countries in a way that seeks "to expand commonality of interests while dealing constructively with areas of difference, such as human rights concerns (China), outsourcing (China and India), and fundamentalist education and politics (Pakistan)."

According to Leach, the most challenging geopolitical problems in the Asia-Pacific region relate to: (1) the spread of terrorism; (2) the North Korean anomaly; (3) tension across the Taiwan Strait; (4) the question of whether China will become one of the most stabilizing or destabilizing forces of this new century; and (5) the manner in which India and Pakistan deal with each other and interrelate with the outside world.

Regarding North Korea, Leach said the Pyongyang regime must not be allowed to drive a wedge between the United States and South Korea. "Respect for the South's vibrant democracy must be our guiding principle. The goal with the North should be to craft a policy of firmness toward leaders but compassion toward the subjected populace."

Regarding Taiwan, Leach cautioned that "political pride and philosophical passion must not blind peoples to the necessity of rational restraint. Peaceful solutions to political differences are the only reasonable framework of future discourse between the mainland and the people of Taiwan."

Leach acknowledged that "while clarity of national identity is psychologically attractive, security for the Taiwanese people comes best with political ambiguity. There is simply nothing to be gained by steps toward independence if such steps precipitate a catastrophic and unwinnable conflict between the mainland and the island."

China, however, remains "the largest issue in Asia," he said. The United States and China, Leach said, "both have enormous vested interests in the success of the 'one country, two systems' model in Hong Kong." Advancing constitutional reform, he said, including universal suffrage without undemocratic power structuring, would contribute to the city's political stability and economic prosperity.

As for the issue of terrorism, Leach said, "America and various other countries will remain in peril unless we are able to eliminate the conditions that gave rise to Al Qaeda and like organizations in the first instance." The great challenge, he said, "is to determine how best to deny terrorist groups legitimacy and hence support among disaffected peoples throughout the world. Accomplishing that objective requires getting our policies right." He emphasized the importance of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian standoff.

Leach said extremist networks in Southeast Asia appear to be larger, more capable and more active than was previously believed, especially in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. But he added: "While the threat is real, most of this dynamic region is at peace. Its large Muslim population is overwhelmingly moderate, tolerant, and opposed to radical Islam."

Following is the text:

(begin text)

Representative James A. Leach
Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
A Congressional Perspective on Asia and the Pacific
Remarks Prepared for Delivery
Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars
November 9, 2004

Thank you Bob, for that thoughtful introduction. Let me also express my appreciation to Lee Hamilton, our former Chairman of the International Relations Committee, and the Wilson Center for hosting such an outstanding conference.

While the United States continues to be focused on the critical tasks of countering global terrorist threats and stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan, it is nevertheless impressive that the greatest challenges of the 21st century are likely to arise in Asia, where the role and policies of the U.S. will have seminal implications for world peace and security.

With half the world's population, including a majority of all Muslims on the planet, a growing share of global GDP, powerful military establishments, as well as several of the world's most dangerous geopolitical flashpoints, Asia demands discerning and constant attention.

As the Administration begins a second term, it is appropriate to review where it has been and where it is headed, to the extent events are controlled or influenced by Washington.

It is notable that the new Bush team got off to a bit of an ideological start in Asia as well as in the Middle East but the Asia policy rudder has been generally righted. Issues in the region are large and varied but American leadership is challenged less by their unique nature than by the spillover effects of our Iraqi policies on Asian consciousness. Our intervention in Iraq - which is widely viewed by Asians as a foreign policy blunder, reflective of an increasingly violent culture - has undercut our influence, moral as well as political, throughout the region.

Not all aspects of our post-9/11 involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan have been negative. Given its religious and ethnic diversity, China, for instance, shares our concern for destabilizing religious extremism. India, while encompassing the second largest Muslim population, has for a variety of reasons moved out of its Cold War umbrella relationship with Russia to a much more American-centric trade and cultural orientation. Pakistan has a government which recognizes the downside of certain fundamentalist and terrorist organizing both in relation to its differences with India over Kashmir and with the U.S. over nuclear policies and the ongoing hunt for Osama Bin Laden. The challenge for the U.S. in crafting policies for each of these countries is to seek ways to expand commonality of interests while dealing constructively with areas of difference, such as human rights concerns (China), outsourcing (China and India), and fundamentalist education and politics (Pakistan).

To the extent the Asian landscape contains obvious points of instability as well as the seeds of far-reaching change and transition, it is important that the region be directly engaged on its own as well as within the context of larger global issues.

The most challenging geopolitical problems in the Asia-Pacific region relate to: (1) the spread of terrorism; (2) the North Korean anomaly; (3) tension across the Taiwan Strait; (4) the question of whether China will become one of the most stabilizing or destabilizing forces of this new century; and (5) the manner in which India and Pakistan deal with each other and interrelate with the outside world. These issues will be the primary focus of my remarks.

Terrorism

There are many lessons of 9/11, but one that stands out is that it is relatively easy to destroy. A few can inflict havoc on the many, with advanced economies more vulnerable than less advanced ones to terrorist acts.

Anarchy is terrorism's fellow traveler. But as we've only begun to contemplate, unleashing weapons of mass destruction could make even Hobbesian anarchy look civilized.

In the most profound observation of the 20th century, Einstein noted that splitting the atom had changed everything save our mode of thinking. Now we are confronted with the even more sobering prospect of splicing genes and manufacturing diseases.

For the first time in history weapons exist that jeopardize life itself on the planet. Access to these weapons is becoming wider, not only between nation states, but potentially by terrorist organizations accountable to no government.

The Administration has sought and largely secured contributions or support from a number of our allies, including Australia, South Korea, Japan, Thailand and Singapore for our policies in Iraq. Americans are divided on the wisdom of our Iraqi intervention, but all are appreciative of the support we have received from our friends in Asia. The tragedy is that our decision to go to war in Iraq and seek outside support for our policies has come at a cost, both in a weakening of our ability to advance other aspects of our national interests, and in the loss of goodwill of peoples, even in countries whose governments have been supportive of our policies.

As we think through the long-term nature of the terrorist challenge in Asia, policymakers would be wise to keep in mind Jefferson's commitment in the Declaration of Independence to a "decent respect for the opinions of mankind," and Teddy Roosevelt's admonition that America should speak softly as it carries a big stick. The greater any country's power, the more important it is to use it with restraint.

And the greater our power, the more important it is to understand the values as well as the economic and political interests of others.
Civilized values whether of the East or West are rooted in just behavior and fundamentals of faith. Indeed, human communities are structured by religious thought and institutions. History has shown how the individual spirit can be uplifted by faith and the sense of community it engenders. History has also shown how individuals of faith who lack respect for individuals of other faiths can precipitate catastrophic events that subvert the most basic of human values.
The September 11 attack on New York and Washington raised troubling questions about the relationship between Islam and terrorism. From a U.S. perspective terrorism - not Islam - is the enemy. We respect Islam and Islamic nations. The only brief we hold is against parties that manipulate hatred and employ tactics of terror.

In this context, it is incumbent on the U.S. to recognize that there are elements of Islamic radicalism in Asia and these could in quick order mushroom. But Islam in Asia has generally been of a moderate character, integral to national development and even democratization - as was impressively demonstrated in recent elections in Muslim majority countries as diverse as Indonesia, Malaysia and Bangladesh.
It would be a mistake of historical proportions if respectful relations between America and the Muslim world were to rupture. We are all obligated to see that they don't.

The Korean Peninsula

Perhaps the clearest policy departure of the Bush Administration from its predecessor came with respect to the Korean peninsula. In a realpolitik change of attitude the administration recognized there was too much wishfulness in Clinton Administration initiatives, but it initially underestimated President Kim Dae Jung and appeared to disparage South Korea's policy of engagement toward the North. Our North Korean policy was put on hold, pending an ambiguous, if not inconclusive, policy review. In the process, U.S.-ROK relations became strained, and many South Koreans, particularly the younger generation, have come to view the U.S. as an obstacle to North-South reconciliation.

Ironically, our "Axis of Evil" rhetoric which specifically encompassed North Korea angered many in the South. When the appellative of "evil" is applied to countries instead of leaders, it too easily offends whole populations, in this case Koreans on both sides of the 38th parallel.

Washington can prudently agree with Seoul that there is no alternative to a policy of "sunshine," provided that we all recognize that the North Korean dictatorship is capable not only of casting dark shadows in its domestic policies but exploding the darkest of bombs abroad.

After all, the basis of the North Korean economy is the sale of military hardware, counterfeit currency, and addictive drugs, and the continuous effort to blackmail various nation-states. It is not only a rogue state; it is a criminal one.

There are few parallels in history in which the U.S. has found itself with a less appealing menu of options than with North Korea. Pyongyang's ongoing nuclear program and the potential export of weapons of mass destruction have particularly profound implications for regional stability, the international nonproliferation regime, and terrorist threats to the United States.

Here it should be noted that the mission of Assistant Secretary James A. Kelly to Pyongyang in October 2002 - which led to the unraveling of the 1994 Agreed Framework when North Korea's representative acknowledged the validity of our intelligence assessment of their clandestine highly enriched uranium program - was intended as a high-level American effort to advance a bettering of relations, not a worsening of tension. Understandably, Kelly did not have very flexible talking points from the National Security Council, but the goal of his visit to Pyongyang was to institute a constructive dialogue. Diplomacy like all human pursuits can sometimes be counterproductive, even when advanced by estimable professionals.

The judgment call of the day on the Korean Peninsula is the question of time. Whose side is it on? With each passing month, North Korea increases its nuclear weapons capacities. On the other hand, the history of the 20th century has shown that governments which lack democratic legitimacy and fail to give their people the opportunity for a decent life are vulnerable to rapid internal implosion. Military might is simply no substitute for societal attention to human concerns.

America should be prepared at all times for sober dialogue with the North. We also have an obligation to redouble our efforts to define and reaffirm a mature, respectful, and value-based partnership with Seoul that is supportive of the Korean people's desire for national unification.

In the presidential campaign Senator Kerry attempted to differentiate himself from the President by suggesting he would initiate a bilateral dialogue with North Korea. The irony that he attacked the Bush Administration for too much unilateralism in the Middle East and too much multilateralism on the Korean Peninsula wasn't lost on the foreign policy establishment. And for the record, it should be noted that in the framework of the six-party talks bilateral discussions between the U.S. and the DPRK also take place, as they do in New York at the United Nations.

One of the issues of the last several years that has caught Washington off-balance is the growth in negative South Korean attitudes toward the United States. We should have been more cognizant that when a country or people might be expected to be appreciative of another country or people for past acts, friction sometimes occurs. Gratitude too frequently implies embarrassment and, as it works out, is seldom cross-generational. On the other hand, umbrages, real or perceived, often are. With respect to both Koreas, there is an historical concern for big-power chauvinism, whether from its neighbors China, Russia and Japan, or as is increasingly the case from across the Pacific. Ironically, attitudes about American policy may be more generous today among the youth of former enemies, Japan and Vietnam, than among historical allies, South Korea and France.

Nevertheless, America's commitment to South Korea has to be steadfast and our alliance unquestioned as the unpredictable unification process with the North proceeds. The North must not be allowed to drive a wedge between the U.S. and South Korea. Respect for the South's vibrant democracy must be our guiding principle.

In this setting the only prudent approach is to maintain wariness and concomitant preparededness while seeking to de-escalate tension. There is no alternative to attentive engagement.

While progress has been minimal to date, the Administration's multilateral approach to the North has had undeniable benefits. A more respectful and balanced harmony of views has been established with the governments of Russia, Japan and South Korea. And China, while attempting to play a neutral role as the facilitator of the six-party talks, shares many of our common, vested interests.

It is entirely conceivable that North Korea is determined to maintain a nuclear weapons capacity. But as abhorrent and untrustworthy as the regime is, it is nevertheless clearly in our interest to maintain the six-party process and use the next round of talks, whenever they occur, to offer a clear vision of the advantages to all of a diplomatic solution. We have no choice except to continue to test whether Pyongyang is willing to abandon its march toward nuclearization and at the same time be prepared to discuss a panoply of associated and unassociated issues.

The goal with the North should be to craft a policy of firmness toward leaders but compassion toward the subjected populace. Here I am pleased to report that legislation introduced by Senator Sam Brownback and me, the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, was recently passed by Congress and signed into law by President Bush.

During the past two and a half years, the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific has received testimony from a number of North Koreans who have survived some of the gravest rigors of the human condition - wrenching famine, a vast and brutal gulag, and for refugees, repatriation at the hands of the Chinese, sexual trafficking and exploitation. Their accounts buttress the growing awareness that the people of North Korea have endured some of the most acute humanitarian traumas of our time.

Provoked by these crises, this broadly bipartisan legislation aims to promote international cooperation on human rights and refugee protection, and increased transparency in the provision of humanitarian assistance to the people of North Korea.

Sino-American Relations

Let me turn for a moment to the largest issue in Asia: the future of China and the challenge of Sino-American relations. Here we must begin with the basics.

At the root of the basics are theories of revolution, theories of the individual, theories of economics, and questions of the adaptability of abstract systems to the culture and heritage of people in varying circumstances.

If one assumes that abstract systems of government must fit historical frameworks and the accident of social challenges at given points in time, what is so interesting about China today is that the communist model, which convulsed the country for such an important part of the 20th Century, is so alien to China's heritage. While the radicalism implicit in Marxism-Leninism may have been useful in galvanizing nationalist sentiment, particularly as an oppressed and impoverished Chinese people faced Japanese aggression during the Second World War, few theories either of revolution or governmental management have been more troubling for those who have experimented with them.

Just as Americans would be wise to learn from older elements of Chinese civilization, particularly as we contend with modern problems of family break-down and urban violence, the Chinese might want to review the possibility that the decentralized American model of democratic government fits their society better than it fits smaller, more homogenous countries, including those in Europe.

In the context of China, the economic reforms which Deng Xiaoping initiated in the late 1970s have produced certain regional and other inequities, but also unprecedented economic dynamism. In international affairs, China has begun to wield influence in the Security Council and to assert its authority as a regional power, laying the groundwork for an expanded involvement on the Korean peninsula, in Southeast Asia, and the Middle East as well as the oil-rich but undeveloped Central Asian republics.

But problems loom ahead - including unemployment, rampant corruption, a frail public health system and environmental abuse, to name just a few - that may yet undo some or all of the progress that has been made. Meanwhile, China's policy of seeking to press Beijing's norms on Hong Kong and greater authority over Taiwan are unacceptable to the populations concerned, while the "autonomy" guaranteed by China's nationalities laws is undercut by oppressive state security policies.

Whether the 21st Century is peaceful and prosperous will depend on whether China can live with itself and become open to the world in a fair and respectful manner. Hong Kong is central to that possibility. As such, Hong Kong's affairs and people deserve our greatest attention, respect, and good will.

America and China both have enormous vested interests in the success of the "one country, two systems" model in Hong Kong. From a Congressional perspective, it seems self-evident that advancing constitutional reform -- including universal suffrage without undemocratic power structuring -- would contribute to the city's political stability and economic prosperity.

In this context, the September 12 elections had both good and bad news. A record number of Hong Kong's voters turned out and voted heavily for candidates favoring continued reform, but the process was constrained by rules under which the Hong Kong people could not enjoy full democratic autonomy. Hence, we continue to be concerned that while the recent decisions by Beijing that set limits on constitutional development in Hong Kong implicitly acknowledge a degree of autonomy for Hong Kong, they do not represent a forthright commitment to the "high" degree of autonomy that was promised by the central authorities in the 1984 Joint Declaration and the 1990 Basic Law.

The recent election is a step forward, but democratic frustration continues to build. There is simply no credible reason to thwart the pace of democratic transformation in Hong Kong.

Hong Kong is important unto itself; it is also a model for others. What happens there is watched particularly closely by Taiwan, where in May I had the honor of leading the American delegation to the second inauguration of President Chen Shui-bian and carrying a letter from the President making clear the Administration's concerns about the danger of independence rhetoric on Taiwan.

In addition to Taiwan's presidential election, this year also marked the 25th Anniversary of the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). As one who was a proponent of the Act, I am proud of a small provision I authored relating to human rights and democratization. And as a lead member of a small band of Senators and House members known on Taiwan as the American "Gang of Four" who advocated greater democratization on the island in opposition to the Kuomintang-centric policies then in vigor, I came to know many of the political dissidents who are now the current leaders of Taiwan. It is with the greatest respect that I observed the courage and sacrifices of those who challenged their government to open up to democracy. It is therefore with the humility of a legislator who never had to face, as they did, the prospect of imprisonment for holding views different than that of authorities in power that I feel so obligated to underscore the President's message of restraint for Taiwanese leaders today.

All of us are acutely conscious that the 20th Century was the bloodiest century in world history. It was marred by wars, ethnic hatreds, clashes of ideology, and desire for conquest. Compounding these antagonisms has been the prideful miscalculation of various parties. Hence it is in the vital interests of potential antagonists in the world, in this case those on each side of the Taiwan Strait, to recognize that caution must be the watchword in today's turbulent times. Political pride and philosophical passion must not blind peoples to the necessity of rational restraint. Peaceful solutions to political differences are the only reasonable framework of future discourse between the mainland and the people of Taiwan.

Here, it is critical to review the history both of the breakthrough in U.S.-China relations that occurred during the Nixon Administration and the philosophical aspects of American history which relate to issues of a nature similar to mainland-Taiwan divisions today.

United States recognition of China was formally ensconced in a carefully negotiated communiqué and two subsequent understandings. The U.S. accepted a "One China" framework for our relations with the most populous country in the world. At the same time, the three Executive Branch initiatives were complemented by the Taiwan Relations Act, which establishes a commitment of the United States that no change in the status of Taiwan be coercively accomplished through the use of force.

While anti-communist, the party of Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan had certain organizational attributes similar to the Communist Party on the mainland. And in one circumstance of philosophical consistency, both the Kuomintang of Chiang Kai-shek and the Communist Party of Mao Zedong claimed to be the governing party of all of China, including Taiwan. Hence, the Nixon "one China" approach did not contradict the nationalistic positions of the Kuomintang or the Chinese Communist Party.

The dilemma which comes to be accentuated with the passage of time is the question of whether Taiwan can legally seek today de jure independence on the basis of a referendum of the people. Here, there are contrasting models in American philosophy and history as well as security concerns for all parties to a potential rupture that must be prudently thought through.

Philosophically, Americans respect Jeffersonian revolutionary approaches. We also respect Lincolnesque concerns for national unity. It is in this context that America delivered a split judgment. The three Executive initiatives affirmed "one China" and the Taiwan Relations Act affirmed de facto, but not de jure, relations with a government of a non-state, one which was authoritarian in the 1970's but democratic today.

From the perspective of the American government, there should be no doubt of the consistency of American policy. Under this President, as each of his predecessors - Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton - the governing American position is the acknowledgment of the Chinese position that there is but one China of which Taiwan is a part. For U.S. or Taiwanese leaders to assert any other position would create an earthquake in world affairs.

The issue of Taiwan is unique but anything except abstract. It is conceivable that missteps of political judgment could, more readily than many suppose, lead to a catastrophe for Asia, the United States, and the world.

The precepts of "self-determination" and "independence" may in most political and historical contexts be conceptually almost synonymous. But these two precepts are juxtaposed on one place on the planet. Taiwan can have defacto self-determination - meaning the ability of a people to maintain a government accountable to its populace - only if it does not attempt to be recognized with de jure sovereignty by the international community. To be precise, the Taiwanese people can have self-determination as long as they do not seek independence; if they assert independence, their capacity for self-determination will collapse. Hence, for the sake of peace and security for peoples of the island and the broader Asia-Pacific region, there is no credible option except to emphasize restraint.

While clarity of national identity is psychologically attractive, security for the Taiwanese people comes best with political ambiguity. There is simply nothing to be gained by steps toward independence if such steps precipitate a catastrophic and unwinnable conflict between the mainland and the island.

Any unilateral attempt by either side to change the status quo across the Taiwan Strait is fraught with danger of the highest order.

As we make it clear to China that the U.S. is steadfastly committed to ensuring that the status of Taiwan not be altered by force, we also have an obligation not to entice Taiwan through ill-chosen rhetoric of "ours" or "theirs" into a sovereignty clash with China. Substantial Taiwanese self-determination can be maintained only if sovereign nationalist identity is not trumpeted.

Together with our historic "One China" policy, the Taiwan Relations Act has to date made an enduring contribution to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. It provides a sturdy framework to help ensure Taiwan's security. There should be no doubt that Congress stands with the Administration in a common determination to fulfill obligations under the TRA. However, these obligations presuppose that Taiwanese leaders must understand the realities of mainland resolve and refrain from capricious actions that invite conflict or make constructive dialogue impossible.

Beijing also has implicit obligations to the international order. Yet it is amazing how so-called realists in government circles in so many capitals underestimate the "soft power" of people-to-people and cultural relations.

While recent years have witnessed a new maturity and sophistication in Chinese foreign policy, more nuanced and pragmatic policy approaches have not generally been applied to Taiwan.
For instance, instead of seeking to isolate Taiwan, isn't it in Beijing's interest to be magnanimous toward the people of the island?

Shouldn't it shepherd Taiwanese membership in international organizations that do not imply sovereignty-such as helping Taiwan gain observer status in the World Health Organization?

Rather than setting deadlines for unification or continuing a counterproductive military buildup, wouldn't Beijing be well-advised to emphasize culture and economics in its relations with Taipei?

And, on the military front, wouldn't it be in both side's interests to upgrade communications, widen professional exchanges, and engage in confidence building measures to reduce the likelihood of accidental conflict?

There is an assumption among students of Beijing politics, particularly in Singapore, that no one in or aspiring to power in China can afford to be "soft" on Taiwan. Hence, particularly given the proclivity for independence rhetoric within the governing DPP party on Taiwan, the risk that an escalation of rhetoric could trigger an irrational confrontation is high. Likewise, mainland leadership may choose to precipitate a crisis. Singapore's leaders, who follow trends closely in Beijing, even suggest that China may be prepared to precipitate conflict over Taiwan in the next several years.

The greatest geo-strategic irony in world affairs is that the U.S. and China have a commonality of interest and are working well together to resolve or at least constrain challenges associated with North Korea where the economics and politics of an isolated, rogue regime may ultimately deteriorate to the point of potential implosion. By contrast, it is Taiwan, a severely isolated island on which economics and politics have conjoined to take more progressive strides than any place on earth over the past generation, where the greatest prospect of great power conflict may exist in Asia.

At the risk of over-statement, an alarming build-up of polarizing attitudes is occurring on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Whether prospects of conflict are 50% or only 5%, they are too high. The human toll could be great; the rupture in trade relations devastating, causing impacts that could last decades after any conflict concluded.

Here, a footnote about the recent Presidential campaign. For all the domestic fireworks, Taiwan was not an issue. Neither Presidential candidate wanted a repeat of "Quemoy and Matsu" argumentation. The fact that neither campaign broached the issue this year, however, doesn't mean that sometime in some future campaign Taiwanese politics might not be injected in American politics in a way destabilizing to world order and our national interest.

The issue that did surface but was better understood abroad than at home is the tendency of the Democratic Party to be protectionist on economic issues as the Republicans tend toward political unilateralism. In some countries in Asia, the Democratic tendencies are more consternating than the Republican one, although interestingly, perhaps based on an electoral miscalculation, or perhaps related simply to a newspaper desire for emotional headlines, the Chinese chose to blast President Bush for his political interventionism the day before the vote commenced.

One of my favorite anecdotes about a Chinese leader relates to a group of French journalists who interviewed Zhou Enlai a little over a generation ago. At the end of their discussion they asked him what he thought was the meaning of the French Revolution. Zhou Enlai hesitated and then said, "It is too early to tell."

From a Chinese perspective, Zhou may have been right to reserve judgment. It is too early to assess the meaning of the French Revolution in an Asian context. Thirty years ago, many western educated Asians were Franco-Jeffersonian democrats. Jefferson's emphasis on individual rights-life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness -- and the revolutionary French call for "liberte, egalite, fraternite" appeared to be compelling universalist notions vastly preferable to Marxist jargon. Today, however, Asian intellectuals accept the market economy and recognize the coercive nature or, at best, irrelevance of Marxism. But they look at the interventionist nature of contemporary American foreign policy in the Middle East and the violence of American culture at home and many have concluded that unconstrained power and unmitigated freedom can sometimes produce negative consequences. They believe that rights should be tempered by a concomitant emphasis on responsibilities and that a cohesive society requires a greater neo-Confucian family and, by implication, governmental discipline.

So while the future of the Chinese-American relationship may primarily relate to the direction of change in China, it also relates to the direction of change in American governance and culture. America sees issues between our countries reflected in the balance of trade, in the sharing of global obligations, in the defusing of tensions in countries like North Korea, in Chinese belligerency, or lack thereof, in relations with its neighbors. But, at the same time, China is apprehensive about the possible development of an American enemy-oriented mindset and about the potential dissolution of traditional American family values. They would like us to become more Confucian as we would wish them to become more Jeffersonian.

With Zhou's restraint in mind, it may also be too early to tell the political ramifications of a quarter century of economic reform in China. But it is certain that the ramifications are deep and profound. Whether political change will occur this week, next year, or next decade, change is inevitable. The only question is whether that change will be principally for the good.

In the years since the tragedy at Tiananmen Square, pundits at several points have declared U.S.-China relations to be at a confrontational crossroads. Each time, the leadership of both countries chose to exercise restraint and find ways to pragmatically address the issues of concern. These action-reaction incidents suggest Beijing's leadership is prepared to moderate decisions based on overriding economic and other pragmatic priorities and that Washington is prepared to maintain its focus on the long-term and endeavor to build a cooperative, mutually beneficial framework for Sino-American relations, one that welcomes greater Chinese participation in the rules-based international system, and encourages progress by China toward a more open, accountable, and democratic political system.

Here, the role of Secretary Powell in resolving the EP-3 incident should not be underestimated. There are times and places where countries, even when right, have to demonstrate patience and some humility. Powell managed both, largely because he came at the issue without ideological blinkers or neo-con machismo.

The nature of politics is that pride plays a disproportionately large role relative to its role in other human enterprises. The human factor-foibles in particular-can never be underestimated in governmental decision-making. As two obscure 19th century Italian political theorists - Vito and Paretto - noted: whatever the political system, at critical times a few at the top have the authority to make decisions for a nation. In times like these, leaders, no matter how democratic and well intended (or the reverse), can advance the common good or make mistakes that carry monumental consequences.

It is in this sobering context that the most important bilateral relationship of the 21st Century will be between China and the United States. If that relationship is ill-managed, the likelihood of conflict and economic trauma will be great. But if the relationship is managed well, the benefits in terms of economic prosperity and world peace will be commensurate.

Issues for a Second Term

As an instrument of envy and fanatical hatred, terrorism in Asia and elsewhere cannot be guarded against simply by maintaining a strong army. The reasons people of the world lash out must be understood and dealt with at their roots. As the ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu wrote, "Know thy enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."

America and various other countries will remain in peril unless we are able to eliminate the conditions that gave rise to Al Qaeda and like organizations in the first instance. While current proposals by Lee Hamilton and others to reorganize our intelligence agencies are eminently sensible, the great challenge is to determine how best to deny terrorist groups legitimacy and hence support among disaffected peoples throughout the world. Accomplishing that objective requires getting our policies right.

The issues are self-evident. The importance of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian standoff cannot be underestimated. We know from attitudinal surveys that Muslims do not generally dislike Americans or American culture. Many have chosen to immigrate to the United States. They do not, however, trust our government. Many ask how America can square support for authoritarian regimes which protect American interests with our professed desire to reform and democratize systems of governance in the Middle East and beyond.

The war on terrorism has required the Administration to make a number of foreign policy trade-offs. For example, there is little question that the rising importance of securing Beijing's cooperation on a range of international security concerns has lessened our ability to object to our deteriorating terms of trade. Last year merchandise imports from China were $125 billion, while exports to China were $22 billion, resulting in a trade deficit of $103 billion - by far the largest with any country in the world.

Reasonably balanced and mutually beneficial trade is a cornerstone of good Sino-American relations. Likewise, unbalanced trade - particularly in periods of economic weakness - contains the smoldering prospect of diplomatic rupture. Normal trade relations are all about reciprocity. It is self-evident that an almost two billion dollar a week trade deficit is politically and economically unsustainable. In this context the case for China's pegging the renminbi to a fixed relationship with the dollar is indefensible. Flexible exchange rate systems which allow for market driven trade balancing are more stabilizing and equitable than governmentally managed currency relationships.

On the Korean peninsula, the U.S. deserves credit for constructing a multilateral process that holds out some, albeit limited, prospect for a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. Nonetheless, there are a number of pressing uncertainties, including the size and sophistication of the North's nuclear arsenal, Pyongyang's ability to manage multiple internal crises, whether China's interest in stability trumps concerns about nuclear dominoes in Northeast Asia, and possibly awkward endgames should the North ultimately fail to dismantle its nuclear weapons.

In part because of the Administration's global review of U.S. military deployments, our alliances with Japan and South Korea are in the process of transition. Over the last decade Japan has slowly but steadily begun to transform both its institutions of governance and outlook on world affairs in ways that permit more cooperation with the U.S. as well as a greater degree of activism in international security affairs. It is vital as Tokyo and Washington strategize about alliance management issues that the U.S. recognize and support the evolving constitutional framework within which the Japanese operate internationally.

Likewise, as we reinvigorate the U.S.-ROK alliance through emphasis on mutual respect, common democratic values and shared interests in regional stability, Washington needs to become more understanding of the rapid economic, demographic, and political change taking place in Korean society.

The United States has deep and abiding economic, political, and security interests in Southeast Asia, a region that has often been labeled a "second front" in the campaign on terrorism. Extremist networks in Southeast Asia appear to be larger, more capable and more active than was previously believed. The challenge is especially acute for our Philippine allies, as well as in Indonesia, while in Thailand the mishandling of a violent upsurge in separatist unrest could create fertile ground for Islamic militancy to take root.

While the threat is real, most of this dynamic region is at peace. Its large Muslim population is overwhelmingly moderate, tolerant, and opposed to radical Islam. The region is also hallmarked by stunning diversity, with the principal commonality being a desire for economic progress under accountable governance. Accordingly, Washington's dialogue with Southeast Asia cannot simply be a one-note affair.

Indonesia remains the single largest country in the world where the U.S. remains only tangentially involved. The nature of our policies in the Muslim world would make certain initiatives difficult, but if we are serious about democracy we must be serious about doing everything we can to see that the extraordinarily positive democratic elections held this year in Indonesia produce effective governance.

Indonesia is poised to play an important role in world affairs and everything conceivable should be done to improve U.S. relations with this nascent democracy.

This has been a pivotal year for democratic institutions in Indonesia, the giant of Southeast Asia. That nation conducted three complex national elections in 2004 -- the largest single-day elections in the world, involving hundreds of millions of ballots. While Indonesia by populace is the third largest democracy in the world, by turnout it is now the second largest, behind India but ahead of America.

The magnitude of this enthrallment with democracy becomes apparent when we recall that Indonesia emerged from authoritarianism only six years ago, during an extended period of acute economic and social turmoil. Only time will tell whether the elections will cause the creation of a mature and responsive government, but they are very welcome developments that were unforeseeable a decade ago.

Many observers (myself included) have high hopes for the new administration of President Yudhoyono. At the same time, it must be recognized that he has inherited a number of daunting challenges, which include promoting economic growth, peacefully resolving separatist and communal conflicts, combating terrorism, improving the implementation of decentralization and regional autonomy, and ensuring that the institutions that wield public power are fully accountable to the people. To this end, we should support efforts by the Indonesian Government to expand and deepen the process of "reformasi" - the reformation of public institutions away from the corruption, collusion, and nepotism that have weakened them in years past. Such reforms are integral to the future vitality of Indonesia, which is, in turn, integral to the vitality of Southeast Asia as a whole.

As this group well understands, for many decades the Philippines have been challenged by multiple domestic insurgencies. The challenge for the Arroyo government as well as the Bush Administration is to keep these insurgencies localized, immune from outside influences. Hopefully over time these indigenous revolutionary movements can be contained to such an extent that dissidents can be integrated into democratic processes.

America's military involvement with Vietnam may have left certain scars on both countries, but the prospect of improving relations with Hanoi may be stronger than anywhere else in Asia, for economic as well as geostrategic reasons.

It is in Burma where the government is most problematic and where the dissidents demand the most respect. The long train of abuses perpetrated by the military regime has left the U.S. and other countries with few ethical alternatives except to embrace an array of policy options designed to isolate the regime until democratic processes are restored.

A note about the Western Pacific. Our nation has shared a close and mutually beneficial relationship with the peoples of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands for the past half-century. This is particularly apparent in the unique relationship of Free Association that both the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) entered into with the U.S. shortly after becoming independent. Because key provisions of the original Compact of Free Association were set to expire, the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific held extensive hearings early this Congress and worked with the Administration and other Committees to craft the Compact of Free Association Amendments Act, which became public law. By extending and refining the original Compact agreements, the legislation advances relations with our stalwart friends in the FSM and RMI, promotes their economic development, and protects key U.S. strategic interests in the Western Pacific for the next twenty years, and beyond.

In South Asia, while India and Pakistan may have traditionally considered themselves engaged in a long-term rivalry that involved certain enmity, the goal of the U.S. should be one of friendship to each. The only vested interest we have is to work with the parties to deescalate tension and help precipitate dispute resolution on all fronts, particularly Kashmir. In this regard, the U.S. should continue to be prepared, if necessary, to lend discrete support to sustain the promising Indo-Pakistani peace process.

Meanwhile, the ongoing development of a strategic partnership between democratic India and the United States is in the interests of the region and the world, and must remain bedrock American policy. Likewise, America is also committed to deepening its bilateral ties with Pakistan, which remains a linchpin in any viable campaign against terrorism. As Islamabad works with Washington to constrain Al Qaeda, it is vital that Pakistani authorities permanently shut down various Kashmiri terrorist groups and erect safeguards to ensure that the nuclear proliferation activities associated with Dr. A.Q. Khan are not repeated. Over the longer term, it is critical that the U.S. become a constructive partner in helping Pakistan evolve into a modern, tolerant and democratic state.

Elsewhere in the region, one can only express deep dismay at the ongoing Maoist insurgency in Nepal. An early return to multi-party democracy within the framework of Nepal's constitutional monarchy will be essential to any successful counterinsurgency strategy.
In Sri Lanka, it is imperative that all parties take steps to work to rebuild trust and schedule the promised reconciliation talks as soon as possible. In particular, it is incumbent on the LTTE to end political killings and otherwise demonstrate that it is committed to a political solution and to peace.

Likewise, the United States supports a stable, prosperous and democratic Bangladesh. As the Department of State has emphasized, however, in order to realize the country's potential, "urgent and substantial efforts" should be taken to strengthen its democratic institutions and deal with the endemic problem of corruption.

As we all understand, discussions about international affairs today tend to revolve around far-reaching questions about the threat of terrorism, the use of force, weapons of mass destruction, the nature of sovereignty and the right to intervene.

Yet it is also important to understand that the scope of national security has expanded to include not only the traditional concerns of protecting and promoting American well-being from direct threats abroad, but the new challenges of a globalized world, including the threat of diseases like HIV/AIDS, sustainable development and hunger, environmental degradation, population growth and migration, as well as economic competitiveness.

In particular, AIDS is the biggest public challenge and foreign policy issue of our time. On the plus side, on a bipartisan and bi-institutional basis the U.S. government has provided more than one half of AIDS assistance to the world; on the minus side, it is probably one tenth of what is necessary. With the rate of infections rising in heavily populated Asia, complacency is not an option.

Out of a sense of self-preservation for mankind itself, if not simply a humanitarian concern for those currently affected, this disease must be eradicated, whatever the cost.

Perhaps it is the dreadfulness of disease that holds the clue for making it clear and the glue for making it possible to come to a universal understanding that despite our differences the many nations of the earth are composed of individuals with the same vulnerabilities. Working together simply provides more hope than going it alone.

In this context, the fundamental basis for American engagement in international affairs demands reassessment in the second term of this Presidency in transition. For a number of reasons, principally relating to the galvanizing attack on our shores, the first term has been characterized by national security decisions which have flown in the face of world opinion. But presidencies are difficult to assess before they fully unfold.

Many of our closest allies in the region are uncomfortable with the manner in which the Administration has exercised America's extraordinary primacy in world affairs, so much so that one can imagine a range of scenarios in which even our friends in Asia resist future Washington initiatives. To forestall such an eventuality, the second Bush Administration needs to be more sensitive to the views of others; it also needs to inspire.

Good policy demands good timing and America has seldom been in such an important race with time. The kind of second term Presidency about to commence will in part be determined by events outside of Washington's control. If the Israeli-Palestinian peace process can be put back on track; if Iraq can be stabilized this winter and elections held in January, troop draw-downs may commence as early as this Spring. If, on the other hand, Al Qaeda-led violence continues to escalate and spread to other parts of the world, including again in the United States, the nature of America's response and thus of the second term of this President is likely to be quite assertive.

But, as an optimist, I do not rule out the possibility that just as Ronald Reagan shifted gears after his reelection from antagonism to arms control to advocacy of steep nuclear warhead cuts, the second term foreign policy approach of George Bush 43 could come to more closely resemble that of George Bush 41. While the neo-cons suggest that a bully-boy Teddy Roosevelt model is in order, my sense is that the country and the world are crying out for a return to Eisenhower - an emphasis on atoms for peace and peace itself in the Middle and Far East.

Thank you.

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(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)

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