*EPF306 07/21/2004
Transcript: Armitage Comments on War on Terror, Democratization in Mideast
(Deputy secretary interviewed by Kuwait's Al Rai Al A'am newspaper) (3750)

Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage gave an extensive interview to Kuwait's Al Rai Al A'am July 18 in which he answered questions dealing with a number of Middle Eastern countries.

Armitage's comments dealt with Saudi Arabia's fight against terror, Kuwait's military and economic relations with the United States and its democratization process, Iraq's struggle against insurgents, Syria's sporadic cooperation in the war against terror, Lebanon's constitutional crisis, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the possible duration of the war on terror, and U.S. support for democratization in the Middle East.

Following is the transcript of Armitage's interview:

(begin transcript)

Transcript of Deputy Secretary of State
Richard L. Armitage
Exclusive Interview with Al Rai Al A'am Newspaper
Mr. Jassem Boodai, Editor-in-Chief
U.S. Embassy Kuwait
Kuwait City, Kuwait
July 18, 2004

Begin Text:

MR. BOODAI: Saudi Arabia is a place where everybody is asking the question now, the American forces left two, three years ago, it's still unstable. So I'm asking this question, if you don't mind, sir, what's going on there? Who's fighting against who?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Clearly, terrorist elements who hate the royal family of Saudi Arabia as much as they hate the United States--and perhaps having difficulty in their ability to attack, directly, the United States--are spending their energies on doing damage to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Arabian security forces are working 24-7 to try to root out these criminals. They have done a fairly good job considering the loss of life of their own. From our point of view we support them whole heartedly with our contacts and our cooperation and we will continue to do so, as the stability of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is important to Kuwait, and it's important to us.

MR. BOODAI: Sir, the U.S. administration has nominated Kuwait as a major non-NATO ally. In your opinion, how can that nomination be translated into tangible facts in the fields of economics, political and military cooperation between the two countries?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: I was privileged to be part of the ceremonies surrounding this designation as a major non-NATO ally, and it was both symbolic and practical. In practical terms it raises the status of Kuwait to that of ally, partner, committed to the same security goals as the United States. To put it in another way, we are committed to the same security goals as Kuwait.

It will be translated over time into practical cooperation in terms of military equipment, in terms of military training, doctrine, in terms of political closeness. Now the economic aspects of it I think are interesting. We hope that the designation as major non-NATO ally will further encourage business ties, and give the U.S. companies and corporations the confidence to realize the government of the United States feels quite strongly about Kuwait as an ally, and that businesses themselves will have the confidence to commit themselves financially to joint ventures.

MR. BOODAI: Sir, what is your evaluation of Kuwait's democratic model, in other words, what are the points of strengths and points of weakness?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well I have been in and out of Kuwait now for 27 years, and I have seen an evolution, I think the discussions that you have in the diwaniyas are an example, a means to better air hopes, aspirations, and grievances publicly and see if you can garner public opinion in your own way etc. So I think it's an evolution going on here, which is a good model for the region.

MR. BOODAI: Sir, it is interesting to hear you use the term or word "diwaniya" coming all the way from the United States. Would you like to encourage the diwaniya model all over the Gulf?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: I have learned one thing in 25 years, and that is that one size does not fit all. That the diwaniya model seems to be appropriate here in Kuwait, it seems to be something with which people feel comfortable in airing, as I say, their hopes, their aspirations and their grievances. Whether it fits in another Gulf State or not I'll let them decide. Certainly anyone from the United States shouldn't be speaking on these matters for Bahrain, UAE and Qatar.

MR. BOODAI: There is a widespread feeling in the GCC countries that the U.S. is betting on a new Iraq to be its major ally, which is to replace the current traditional allies in the region. How do you comment on that?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, I don't think that we are that far ahead in our thinking. What we want is a country in the Middle East--Iraq--which is stable, democratic, at peace with its neighbors and not a threat to its neighbors. That's a big difference from being an ally of the United States. So that's our goal: it's not for Iraq to be an ally of the United States, it's to be a peaceful democratic country which is not a threat to the neighbors, that's (inaudible.)

MR. BOODAI: In the wake of the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqis, there are some critics who argue that it was only a pro forma step, and that the final word in Iraq will remain in the hands of the United States. What would you say to those critics?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: I say baloney. It's not so, and if opinion polls are to be believed, 70 percent of the Iraqi people realize that sovereignty has been turned over, the decisions that are made in Iraq are made by Iraqis. The decisions on how to use the proceeds from Iraqi oil are made by the sovereign Iraqi Government and not by the United States. We are an important player in Iraq, obviously, with almost 140,000 troops, but we're not calling the shots.

MR. BOODAI: Do you think that the current security situation in Iraq will be suitable for holding the general elections on time next year, or that the security challenge will force the Iraqis to postpone the elections?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Right now the UN and interim Iraqi government are intent on forging ahead for elections by December or January, at the latest. The security situation is a challenge. If I didn't say that, you'd think I was a fool. But we are intent on forging ahead, on trying to establish the security environment to be docile enough to allow these elections to happen.

MR. BOODAI: Do you expect Saddam's prosecution to be similar to the Nuremberg prosecutions or to the current Milosevic prosecution? In other words, do you expect Saddam's prosecution to be swift and decisive or long and troublesome?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: This is a question that you have to ask the sovereign Iraqi government. Don't ask the United States. They'll make the decision on just how to handle this. Our view is it ought to be transparent, subject to visibility, but beyond that this is an Iraqi decision. Now, I know that our friends in Kuwait have very high equities in this, grievously sinned against by Saddam Hussein and the leading members of the regime, and I'm sure that you would express your views to the government in Iraq. And I saw that Prime Minister Alawi will be coming to Kuwait in the not too distant future. I'm sure this will be one of the things that you'll want to talk about.

MR. BOODAI: Do you think that Saddam's defiance during his first appearance before the court boosted the morale of his supporters?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: I think it boosted the morale of the people of Iraq to realize that the dictator was in jail and he appeared at times, as you said, defiant, but at other times he appeared confused and diminished and I think that is the overwhelming view that the Iraqis had of him.

MR. BOODAI: Some lawyers of Saddam say that (especially the Jordanians) they will unveil very sensitive documents proving previous U.S. cooperation with Saddam to develop his military arsenal. Does not the U.S. administration fear that the Saddam prosecutions will expand to include current and former U.S. officials?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: I have no reason to think so. I think that our cooperation with Saddam Hussein during the Iran war is well documented. We had a big scandal about it, the Iran-Contra Affair, so I would be very surprised if there's anything more to be found.

MR. BOODAI: Well, continuing about hot spots in the area, I'll move a bit further north than Iraq. In an interview with our newspaper you said that Syria had helped saved the lives of U.S. citizens through its intelligence cooperation with the U.S. in the wake of the September 11 attacks. Later on, the U.S. administration started accusing Syria of sending fighters into Iraq and harboring Palestinian terrorists, moreover some U.S. administration officials accused Syria of possessing weapons of mass destruction. Is not that a double standard policy? Is Syria cooperative with U.S. in its war against terror or not?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Syria was picking and choosing on what cooperation she wanted to have. Initially after 9/11 Syria was helpful on the question of Al-Qaeda, but at the same time was encouraging Hizballah and Hamas, etc., to conduct terrorist attacks against Israel. From my point of view you can't pick and choose. If you are against terrorism, you are against all terrorism. And laterally, immediately after the fall of Saddam, the porous border between Syria and Iraq became a conduit for foreign fighters, who want to conduct Jihad, no longer against coalition forces, now against Iraqis. My view, sir, is that this is becoming increasingly controversial in Iraq, and that Iraqi citizens are deciding that all foreigners should be out of Iraq, not just coalition forces. So, I think the tide is turning a wee bit against foreign Jihadists.

MR. BOODAI: Are there any U.S. efforts to reactivate the peace negotiations between Syria and Israel?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: At present, I don't think the situation is conducive. At some point in time the whole question of the Golan is going to have to be addressed, but I think the situation in Israel where the government is thinking about reforming, and the situation in Syria where the young Assad doesn't seem to be willing yet-- if he is able, I don't know, but willing--to make any meaningful move. So I think it's not the right time.

MR. BOODAI: The tenure of the Lebanese president Mr. Emile Lahoud is to expire by the end of the summer. However there are some reports talking about introducing amendments to the Lebanese constitution to allow the extension of Mr. Lahoud's tenure. What is the U.S. Administration stance regarding this matter? Or let's say directly speaking are you for a) a very limited extension of Mr. Lahoud's tenure b) an extension for a full new tenure or c) electing a new President as stipulated by the Lebanese Constitution?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: My own view is constitutions matter. And when you have a constitution you should follow it and the constitution should be amended only carefully and after due deliberation and full participation by the citizens. But having said that, this is a matter for the people of Lebanon to decide, and their views and their feelings are the ones that matter and not Rich Armitage's.

MR. BOODAI: Do you think, sir, frankly speaking, that the Lebanese can really take such a decision?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Of course not.

MR. BOODAI: So, in that case, how would you?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Our view of this whole thing--the Syrian involvement in Lebanon--has been consistent for years. There were activities surrounding the Taif Accords, which spoke to this matter, and yet nothing has happened. And I think this is detrimental to the reputation of Syria and it certainly is harmful to the national prestige and sovereignty of Lebanon. So these are things we've spoken about for fifteen years--longer now since the Taif Accords.

MR. BOODAI: What is your evaluation of the efforts exerted by the Lebanese existing Prime Minister Mr. Rafiq Al-Hariri to recover the Lebanese economy amid the current political, security and regional difficulties? Is the U.S. Administration willing to provide more economic support to help Lebanon?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: The long view is--and we appreciate the efforts of Prime Minister Al-Hariri for trying to reverse the course of Lebanese economic fortunes--we do have a program of assistance for Lebanon and of course we have a very robust Lebanese-American population to keep our attention on these matters back in the United States. But I don't think there is any enthusiasm for the increase in assistance.

MR. BOODAI: Given your political realism, is the target date of 2005 for the establishment of a Palestinian State, as repeatedly asserted by Mr. Bush, as well as in the road map, viable?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, the road map is certainly alive but I have to acknowledge that we set a target date of 2005 two years ago so I would say that the date is slipping a little bit. But the road map and what it envisions is still our policy. Even our president has acknowledged that it's become difficult to reach the 2005 time now because of this slippage.

MR. BOODAI: I'm not going to repeat, sir, the question you've probably heard so many times, especially in this part of the world, regarding the U.S. double standard policy regarding the Arab-Israeli Conflict. What I want to ask you is the following: What are Israel's faults in that conflict and what should it do to revive the peace process?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well, I think they have to resolve their internal political difficulties first. They tried to gain a national consensus. The Gaza withdrawal of Mr. Sharon was something that most of us backed pretty strongly because we thought it was very significant, the first time that the Palestinians would be recovering settlements--taking them over, having sovereignty returned, with the turnover of Gaza,--and I hope the Israeli government will hold true to that. Right now of course we have a different situation, where the Palestinian Authority seems to be in some disarray and they've clearly got to get their house in order, so the Israelis can have a partner.

MR. BOODAI: That said sir, do you support Israel's wall of separation, Israel's violations, assassinations in Gaza, its house-demolishing policy?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: We've been very clear about this: the wall is problematic when it prejudges the outcome of final status negotiations, or when it inconveniences Palestinians, or when it encroaches on Palestinian land. And we've been very clear about this both publicly and privately.

MR. BOODAI: From your own point of view sir, what are the necessary steps that should be taken by the Israelis and Palestinians in order to implement the roadmap?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: First of all, we have to get organized to implement the roadmap. As I've said, Mr. Sharon is thinking about his own governmental setup, and the Palestinian Authority right now seems to be in some disarray, and I don't see practically how either of them can make their moves. From our point of view, from the Quartet's point of view, we're going to stay engaged, we're going to stay trying to marshal the two sides to sit down and deal with each other.

MR. BOODAI: Given the fact, sir, that Osama bin Laden is still at large and that al Qaeda attacks are still active, can we conclude that the war on terror has failed?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: No, you can conclude that the war on terror, as our president stated, is one that will continue for a long time. And the war on terror is not simply a function of Osama bin Laden. Though we would love to get him, and we will, the fact of the matter is there are many people that are involved as terrorists and we're going to have to come to work each morning prepared to rip them out root and branch. And whether it's in the United States, whether it's in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Morocco, Spain or anywhere in Europe, it's going to continue for some time.

MR. BOODAI: The Broader Middle East and North Africa Reforms [GMEI] will eventually lead to a more democratic Middle East, if implemented, and will lead to a safer world, a more relaxed world. My question: where would you like to see such reforms starting in the Middle East, and especially which countries?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Well I believe in every country they're starting to some degree. For instance I've already extolled the virtues of what you do here in Kuwait with the diwaniya, that's a public airing of questions and comments. In Saudi Arabia there's preparation for some municipal elections, in other Gulf States there have been great strides in education, particularly for women.

So the whole question of democracy is not simply a matter of a ballot, of making a vote-- its a matter of education, it's a matter of opportunity, it's a matter of transparency in governance, it's a matter of being open and above board in business practices. And each state in the region is at a different point along that spectrum. So I think the key is, in my observation, every nation in the Middle East and North Africa is yearning for some change.

And it's coming from within their own society, not because the United States or Great Britain desires it but because the people of each state desire it. The reason I concentrate on each state is because I don't think it's possible to have a model that fits everyone, because each nation has its own unique cultural attributes, and national character, and national identity. So the type of democracy must be in line with that national identity and that national character. It can't be something that's imposed from the United States or Great Britain or France or anyone else.

MR. BOODAI: You expect it to happen from within, from the people of each and every country?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: That's right.

MR. BOODAI: To what extent sir, will the United States go and help the people of any given country in the Middle East who seek help in implementing reforms?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: If you're talking about help in terms if the development of civil society, NGOs, things of that nature, we're delighted to respond to requests from individuals or from states themselves. But the implication of your question, "would we be willing to help?" seems to be, would we do something under the table����

MR. BOODAI: No, no����

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: We're delighted to be involved if a nation wants it. Particularly in civil society.

MR. BOODAI: What I meant sir, was, would you go to the extent of...such reforms will not be implemented if there is a dictator, or a dictatorship, at that place. Would you go that step?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: I don't think that that serves anyone's interests. We've learned over many years that just to cut ourselves off from someone, it might make you feel good for one day, but in the longer run it doesn't do anything, either to help the nation or to help ourselves. So we're going to stay engaged with people, and try to urge reform -- you can't demand it --because as I say, it has to come from within.

I just saw something interesting in Afghanistan four days ago. Here, a nation which is under some threat, is registering for a vote on October 9. 7.4 million people have already registered. Forty percent of them women. And the most interesting thing is, the women who are registering are registering in higher percentages in the countryside than in the cities, which seems to be kind of backwards to normal thinking. And what it proves to me is there's a yearning in the heart of every man and woman in the world to be in charge of their own fate. To be able to drive their own car, if you will. At least to be able to have a hand on the wheel. And I think that's just as true in Afghanistan as it is in the United States and frankly it's as true in Kuwait as it is anywhere else.

MR. BOODAI: Coming back to Kuwait, sir, your visit today, will there be anything in particular you will discuss?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: Sure. I'm very interested in getting the views of our colleagues here, how they see things in Iraq, particularly since the turnover. I will discuss our relations, I'll talk about counter-terrorism a bit, and I'll give a very short overview of my trip thus far. I will have completed nine nations in nine days. Which proves I have to get a better travel agent.

MR. BOODAI: Sir, my last question. Being in Kuwait today with the Prime Minister, Sheikh Sabah being out of the country, along with Sheikh Mohammed Al-Sabah, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and his deputies, we might look at it that, you are here, this country's democratic, so you don't have to talk to one guy to take decisions. Whoever is here will do the job. Or, you feel at home. Which one is it?

DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE: I certainly feel at home. And let's be clear, whether it's in my government, your government or any government, when we have these conversations, it's a matter of record. And the conversation spreads throughout the government, and it does in mine. We'll be taking notes so we'll be able to spread the conversation. So, it's less important that we meet just with the head. It's more important that we be able to put our views on the record. And it's equally important to receive the views of our friends here in Kuwait. Do I feel at home here? I've felt at home here in Kuwait for the 20 or 21 years I've been coming in and out.

MR. BOODAI: That's something the Kuwaitis would like always to hear. Thank you very much.

End text

(end transcript)

(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)

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