*EPF110 05/24/2004
Transcript: New U.S. BSE Testing Program Expected To Begin in June
(System expected to be fully operational in July) (7900)

The United States is on track to implement an enhanced plan to test cattle for bovine spoingiform encephalopathy (BSE) by June 1, according to senior officials of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).

Briefing reporters May 21, Ron DeHaven said that the system should be fully operational by early July. Under the plan, approximately 200,000 "high-risk" cows and 20,000 "normal" animals will be tested annually. Animals considered to be at high risk are those age 30 months or older. DeHaven is administrator of the Agriculture Department's Animal Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS).

More than 15,500 samples had been collected from October 1 through April, he said.

Test results will be posted on the USDA web site at www.aphis.usda.gov, DeHaven said.

The plans for expanded testing were announced in January, following the recommendation of an international panel of experts convened by Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman after a single case of BSE was discovered in Washington state in December 2003. Agriculture officials determined the cow had been born in Alberta, Canada, and it and other cows that it could have come in contact with were destroyed.

As part of the expanded surveillance system, USDA has identified 12 state testing laboratories that will provide "ample capacity" to do the increased volume of testing. Samples from animals tested at any of these laboratories that result in inconclusive results will immediately be sent to USDA's National Veterinary Services Laboratory in Iowa for confirmatory testing, he said. Results from these second tests would be expected in four to eight days, he said.

No part of the cow will be allowed to enter the food system until a negative BSE result can be confirmed, DeHaven empahsized. BSE is also known as mad cow disease.

DeHaven said "we anticipate we'll have some inconclusive screening results ... that's to be expected, and it's the nature of any kind of screening test."

Regarding news reports that 33 million pounds of beef entered the United States from Canada on April 19, Elsa Murano, under secretary of agriculture for food safety, said any beef that has entered from Canada "would have been enterable under regulations related to low-risk materials." Murano also said the actual amount of beef that entered from Canada was much lower than 33 million pounds and that some of it -- particularly tongue, lips, kidneys and hearts -- simply moved through the United States bound for sale in Mexico.

DeHaven did say that USDA's process of announcing what types of beef products from Canada are allowable "was flawed" and that corrections to the system are being made.

He added that decisions of what to allow in the country "were all scientifically sound and didn't represent any additional risk to the U.S. public."

Following is a transcript of the briefing:

(begin transcript)

U.S. Department of Agriculture Transcript (USDA)

Technical Briefing with
Bill Hawks, Under Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Services,
Dr. Elsa Murano, Under Secretary for Food Safety,
Dr. Ron DeHaven, Administrator, Animal Plant Health Inspection Service,
Dr. Barbara Masters, Acting Administrator, Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS)

Washington D.C. -- May 21, 2004

HAWKS: Thank you very much. I appreciate the opportunity to be with you today to talk about our enhanced surveillance plan that we are moving forward with. As you know, we announced on March 15, expanded BSE surveillance plan and I'd just like to reiterate that this is one component that we have taken since the discovery of BSE in the animal in Washington State last December. We have been working very fervently to move this surveillance forward and we've been working very closely over the last few weeks with FSIS, with my counterpart Dr. Murano, to make sure that we get all of our employees ready to start this surveillance package. And we have been working with our lab networks and Ron Dehaven will go into more detail there. But the point is that we are headed for June 1, which we had been saying that we would be ready to go with our enhanced surveillance plan. And so we are moving toward that as I said working very closely with our counterparts in USDA and the rest of the industry. So with that, I will turn it to Dr. Murano.

MURANO: Thank you, Mr. Hawks. A pleasure to be here with you and to tell you, to reiterate what Mr. Hawks said, certainly the food safety mission here at the USDA, specifically with the Food Safety Inspection Service staff and Dr. Masters who is our acting administrator, have been working with APHIS to be ready to assist in their new enhanced surveillance program which will begin in the next few weeks.

And certainly regarding food safety, which is what is our mission, it is necessary for me to emphasize to all of you, remind you all that since we discovered the positive cow on December 23rd, we took immediately, as immediately as we could, steps to protect public health. January 12th we published some regulations and notice, interim final regulations, that were in effect immediately upon publication, designed specifically to protect public health.

We essentially defined what "specified risk materials" were and eliminated them from meat and poultry products, as those materials that are found in animals over 30 months of age and cattle over 30 months of age were summarily taken out of beef products and also the small intestines from all animals of all ages.

So by taking those measures, including the ban on the nonambulatory, disabled cattle that Secretary Veneman announced on December 30th, we moved as quickly as possible to protect public health even more than the measures that had been already put in place by USDA and FDA [Food and Drug Administration] since 1997 regarding the feed ban and some other measures that I think you're all very familiar with.

So I want to reiterate that that certainly was, those measures on January 12th continue to be in my estimation the most important firewall really in public health protection that we have taken, because we took those potentially infectious materials, brain and spinal cord etcetera, out of the food supply. And that's really what protects people from this agent.

I would also like to add that in enacting those regulations on January 12, we require that our trading partners, other countries that export beef into the United States, have to have equivalent systems in order to be able to export to the United States. So that means that they have to abide by these same regulations.

And so regardless of where the products come in, what countries they come in from, because we have these regulations in place they must as well. So these materials are not coming in from our trading partners either.

ROGERS: Dr. DeHaven?

DEHAVEN: Thank you, Jim.

I appreciate the opportunity to give you an update on the aggressive and very expanded surveillance plan that we announced on March 15th and where we are in terms of actually implementing that plan. Just as a reminder, our objective in that enhanced surveillance program is to test as many animals as we can in what we're referring to as the target or high risk population -- "high risk" meaning that if we have the disease in the United States this would be the group of animals that we would most likely find the disease.

So that target population would include those animals exhibiting some central nervous system disorder, animals that are nonambulatory, or those animals that are dead for reasons that are unknown or for reasons that are not inconsistent with being infected with BSE.

So again, the goal is during the next 12 to 18 months to test as many of those animals as we possibly can. And at the end of that time period, we will be far more better able to determine whether or not we have the disease in this country and, if so, what the prevalence of the disease would be in the United States.

We also as part of this expanded surveillance program will be testing 20,000 normal but aged slaughter cattle for identifying these older animals because, one, we'd like to target our testing at animals that were born before the feed ban, which went into place in August of '97, but also because this is a disease with a very long incubation period. And so the older the animal you test, the more likely if they are infected that they would have gone through an incubation period and be more likely to test positive.

So again, we are making every effort through targeting this surveillance program to find out if we have the disease and, again, if so, at what prevalence we think that it exists in the United States.

We are also going to do an enhancement to that program that we announced on March 15th that I'll let my colleague, Dr. Barb Masters, go into in terms of testing antemortem, condemned animals at slaughter. And I would just at this point say that we are working very closely between APHIS and FSIS at all levels holding joint conference calls, putting out joint memos of instruction to our respective field force and so on. So there is a lot of cooperation in this overall effort between the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and Food Safety Inspection Service.

Let me also say that the enhanced or expanded surveillance program is consistent with the recommendations that came out of the International Review Team Report. This is the group that operated as a subcommittee of the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Foreign Animal and Poultry Diseases, and in fact the plan that we put in place in response to that was reviewed both by this international review group as well as the Harvard Center for Risk Assessment.

And both concur with the concept and the basic plan that we put in place.

Obviously, if we are going to test that number of samples, and we in fact hope to test somewhere in excess of 200,000 samples as part of this overall effort, we'll need a lot of laboratory capacity. And so to that end we've identified seven high through-put laboratories that will have robotic equipment that will allow them to test a large number of samples.

We've also identified five other laboratories that will be coming online to assist in that overall effort. But we think between the 12 laboratories we will have ample laboratory capacity to meet the testing demands. If we get into it and find that we need more laboratory capacity or need closer proximity to a laboratory to some of the areas where we're doing testing, we can certainly add additional laboratories as needed.

We have five rapid-screening tests that have been approved for use by these laboratories. And so each of those laboratories will be using one or more of those rapid screening tests, and it's the goal that we would have results from a screening test available 24 to 72 hours after the samples are collected.

Any of the results on a screening test that are inconclusive -- and we're referring to these screening tests that would be any of the results that would be anything other than non-negative or anything other than negative -- we're referring to them as inconclusive -- to emphasize the point that in fact we do expect some positive results on rapid screening tests. That's the nature of screening tests, and I'll go into that more in a minute.

But any that are inconclusive on a screening test, those samples will be immediately forwarded to our National Veterinary Services Laboratory [NVSL] in Ames, Iowa, for confirmatory testing.

As I mentioned, we as part of this overall effort hope to test somewhere in excess of 200,000 animals. And so within the national framework and overall plan, we have requested state-by-state plans and provided them target populations. We recognize that because the cattle populations in each state vary tremendously, as does the industry and the concentration points of samples that we might be collecting in each state, vary tremendously by state, that we have asked each state to come up with a specific plan.

This is a plan that's been worked out by our APHIS area veterinarian in charge and the state veterinarians to come up with a state-by-state plan.

In reviewing those plans and the targeted numbers that they hope to reach in each state, there is at least reason for optimism that we'll be able to reach the target number.

Having said that, we recognize that logistically this is a huge effort. But we're optimistic that in the next 12 to 18 months we'll be able to accomplish what we set out to do.

Let me talk a little bit more now about the testing. As I mentioned, we've got state laboratories that we certify to do the testing. They will be running one or more of the rapid screening tests, and any results that are inconclusive those samples will immediately be forwarded to our NVSL, National Veterinary Services Laboratory, in Ames for confirmatory testing.

I think it's important to say from the start, or as the case is even before we get started, that we anticipate that we will have some inconclusive screening results, that we would have some indication of a positive sample on a screening test. That's to be expected, and it's the nature of any kind of screening test. Screening tests are designed to identify, to be very, very sensitive to identify any positive animals. But naturally as you increase that sensitivity you also increase the possibility that you will have samples that show positive on a screening test which in fact are not positive.

So just as has been the case in Europe and in Japan and other countries that are doing high levels of testing using these screening tests, they do encounter on a regular basis screening test results that require confirmatory testing.

We certainly anticipate that, and when we have the first inconclusive screening test result we will let you know that, recognizing that at that point in time those samples will be going to NVSL for confirmatory testing, and we would anticipate about a four to eight-day turnaround time before we would have those confirmatory testing results available from Ames, Iowa.

They will be running a battery of tests -- most importantly, the immunohistochemistry test, which is recognized as the gold standard internationally. And again, that time period, from the time that we would have a screening test result that needed further testing, to when we would have the confirmatory test results available would probably be in the four to eight-day time period.

We will be posting on a periodic basis the numbers of tests that have run, so we'll be posting cumulative test results which of course would include the total number of animals tested, those numbers of the tests conducted that were inconclusive on a screening test result, and then of course, the number that have been confirmed from a screening test result that had been confirmed on immunohistochemistry at the laboratory.

I think it's also important to acknowledge that in fact it is possible that we will find an additional BSE-positive cow. If this weren't a concern, we obviously would not be undertaking the huge surveillance effort that we are.

That I think goes without saying as well, and let me just emphasize again that the purpose of this effort is, one, to determine with a degree of certainty whether or not we have the disease and if so at what prevalence.

With that, let me pause and introduce my friend and colleague from the Food Safety Inspection Service, Dr. Barb Masters, who's the acting administrator of FSIS.

MASTERS: Thanks, Ron. I appreciate that.

And I will step back where Dr. Murano started and remind folks that the primary role of the field employees in FSIS up until this point had been implementing and verifying the interim final rules related to the nonambulatory ban as well as the removal of the specified risk material from animals. And that's been our role out in the plants to protect the public health.

More recently, our employees have begun working with our sister agency APHIS on their BSE Surveillance Implementation Plan. We've been working with them in two ways. We've been working with them in how we are going to be testing the 20,000 normal, healthy, 30-month-plus animals that Dr. DeHaven talked about; and more recently we've been talking with them on how we can ensure that antemortem animals that have been condemned that need to be tested can be tested. We need to ensure those animals are tested and there's no ambiguity as to whether or not the samples should be taken.

So we have made a determination that when FSIS veterinarians condemn an animal for which there needs to be a sample taken at the slaughter facility, that FSIS employees will in fact take those samples.

We've been working with APHIS in that regard to get that implemented for June 1st. As Dr. DeHaven mentioned, we've had some joint conference calls with our district managers. And in fact I'm sitting in Cincinnati, Ohio, with our district managers to reaffirm our commitment to work with APHIS and to ensure that this implementation process works well on June 1st.

We also have put out a written instruction to our field employees to ensure they understand their responsibility on June 1st in collecting these samples. Next week in Omaha, Nebraska, APHIS employees will be training 75 to 90 of our FSIS veterinarians in sample collection to submit samples from antemortem condemned animals to these APHIS laboratories, that Dr. DeHaven talked about, across the country for these screening samples.

We believe this is a significant step to ensure that there's no question that if an FSIS veterinarian feels a sample needs to be taken based on their condemnation, that the sample will be taken without question as to whether or not someone else might say, should there be a sample, shouldn't there be a sample, can someone get there? The FSIS veterinarian is on site and will be prepared to take those samples.

So FSIS is very committed to working with APHIS in this regard. We recognize that it's a small piece of the overall surveillance program, but we're very committed to working with them to the success of their overall expanded surveillance program. With that, I'll turn it back over to the group in Washington.

ROGERS: Dr. DeHaven, if you'd like to say something?

DEHAVEN: Just a couple of points to fill in and expand on what Dr. Masters has indicated.

I mentioned that there will be this four to eight-day period for any inconclusive screening test results before we have confirmatory test results available. I should have mentioned at that point that all of those carcasses that have an inconclusive screening test result will indeed be held pending that confirmatory testing.

So I didn't want anyone to think that we wouldn't have control of those carcasses. And so we will keep them from going into, certainly into the human food chain.

To carry off and implement a project of this magnitude obviously we are involved in a lot of training. The training will involve everyone from our middle managers to the collectors in the field, and we have a series of training programs that have taken place and are scheduled for in the future. And as Dr. Masters indicated, where appropriate that is joint training between APHIS personnel as well as FSIS personnel. So there's an extensive training program.

There's also a lot of outreach that will reach everyone from state agencies and state veterinarians to producers to the general public so that there will be a general recognition of our overall effort.

And certainly as we start the implementation process I intend to personally get out to the field, hear from the field folks in terms of what is happening, what problems or issues they're encountering, so that as we are implementing and progressing if there are obstacles or hurdles that are coming our way that we do whatever it takes to overcome those.

With that, Jim, I'll turn it back to you and we'll take questions.

QUESTION: Thank you. A question for anybody on the panel. Were any of you aware of the 33 million pounds of beef that came over from Canada? In your -- was Secretary of Agriculture Veneman aware of it and how does that, doesn't that fly in the face of what she had said publicly in terms of what the policy of the USDA was?

HAWKS: This is Bill Hawks. I think I should probably start with that question, and we will get Dr. Murano up to fill in with some actual numbers.

I think the issue of the 33 million pounds is certainly in question, and Elsa will speak to that.

As with regard to what Secretary Veneman knew and what she didn't know I would just like to say upfront that there were some errors made in process. But I would also like to say that all of the product that came across the border, with particular regard to the processed product, came from product that would have been enterable under the other regulations, the trim. And also with regard to the other, some other products, some also that came across this was very low-risk materials. This was put on our website on October 22.

So with regard to public health and with regard to animal health, I would like to say that there was absolutely no additional exposure to risk there.

To say that we erred in process is correct. To also say that we have taken stock of those errors, we are taking the measures to ensure that that does not happen again.

So, Elsa, would you like to add anything?

MURANO: Thank you, Bill. This is Elsa Murano.

I want to first do a little bit of explanation in terms of what FSIS's role is in terms of our inspection of imported meat and poultry products. We have import inspectors at specific sites across the country, and as products come into the United States they must be reinspected by our inspectors, and we reinspect every shipment of product visually, etcetera, so that we are the ones to look at the records and see what is actually coming in from a particular country.

And so we make note then of the product that comes in and how much product is coming in, and our figures then as a result are the most accurate regarding what is the actual product and amount that is coming in from a particular country -- since we have those inspectors at those import stations doing that job.

So according to our import inspection records, what has come in from Canada that is not part of what was eligible on August the 8th of last year, that's up to about 7.3 million pounds. And let me explain to you how we have those figures.

Basically we're talking about bone-in cuts that began to be shipped in from Canada after April 19th, 139,298 pounds of that. And I'm not going to go into every poundage here for all the products but just to give you an example of that.

Ground beef, 475 pounds. Organs and offals, which what we mean by that is we're talking about lips and tongue and hearts and kidneys. So these are all organs that are not, that are safe products. That's about 1.5 million pounds. So when you add those together, it's 1.6 or so million pounds.

And added to that is about 5.6 million pounds of what we're calling further processed beef product. These are the fermented sausages and the beef jerky and the hotdogs, deli meats and frozen dinners and so forth. So when you add those together, we're talking about 7.3 million pounds of products that were allowed from Canada that were not included in the August 8 announcement of what would be eligible by Secretary Veneman.

So to address the question of the 33 million pounds, we really don't, we can't speak to where those, where that data came from that appeared in The Washington Post article that you all are referring to. So our records are the ones that we rely on because they are the ones that are obtained by our import inspectors that are there on-site not only looking at the records but also visually seeing what's actually coming in -- not relying on what a broker might have as their records or exporter records but actually the stuff that we see coming in that has to go through our inspectors to do so.

Having said that, I want to reiterate what Mr. Hawks said in terms of these products that came in from Canada that were not included in what was announced August 8 of 2003. We're talking about products that are safe products. These are not products that were derived from anything that was not permitted in terms of our food safety measures. All these products came from animals that were younger than 30 months of age. Therefore, it's not; we're not talking about a food safety issue.

However, certainly as Mr. Hawks said, obviously products came in after August 8 that were not included in that August 8 announcement, and that certainly is something that Mr. Hawks and his folks have dealt with in terms of putting into place measures to prevent this from occurring without the transparency that I think we all agree should have taken place.

DEHAVEN: This is Ron DeHaven. If I can just clarify a bit too from a process standpoint on the APHIS side and provide some detail to what Under Secretary Murano and Under Secretary Hawks have said.

Especially with regard to the ground beef and other processed products, nothing that was allowed in in the form of ground beef or other processed product came from raw materials that would not have otherwise been enterable. In other words, all of those items were included in our list of products that we put on the website August 8 as enterable products. The only thing that changed was our allowing those products, those very same enterable products, to be processed before they entered the United States.

Part of that overall process was to include a verification and certification by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency that during that processing there would be no opportunity for that enterable product to have been commingled with, cross-contaminated by, or otherwise adulterated by anything other than an enterable product.

So again, we didn't add anything to the list that was already coming into the country. We simply allowed it to be processed under controlled circumstances, and that was the change.

With regard to the offal, specifically the lips, tongues, hearts and kidneys that Dr. Murano mentioned, most of that product since there is not a market for those products in the United States, most of it was simply transiting the United States going from Canada to Mexico. We allowed that to happen simply because those products represent no public health risk.

There wasn't a market for those products in the United States; and therefore they weren't included in our August 8 announcement. But we did post those on our website October 22 but, again, primarily for transiting the United States.

So of the 1.5 plus-or-minus pounds that did come into the United States, the vast majority of it would have been exported to Mexico and again represented no public health risk.

So clearly the process and our failure to announce some of these actions was flawed. From a scientific basis they were all scientifically sound and didn't represent any additional risk to the U.S. public.

Q: Yeah, hi. Dr. DeHaven, Dan Goldstein, Bloomberg.

You had said that condemned cattle would be now part -- I just want to confirm -- would now be part of test and hold if they show signs of CNS symptoms. Am I correct?

DEHAVEN: Let me clarify that what we are saying is that all antemortem condemned cattle, cattle that are condemned by FSIS antemortem, will be tested whether they are condemned for CNS reasons or otherwise. The only exception to that is veal calves that are not showing CNS signs, central nervous system problems. Simply because veal calves, because of the incubation period, are not going to have the disease, or even if they do they wouldn't test positive.

So not just antemortem condemned animals with CNS signs but in fact all antemortem condemned cattle will be tested.

Q: Yeah, hi. Actually it's Oster Dow Jones.

I just wanted to clear up something on the test and hold policy. I understand right now the policy is the animal if it's being tested won't be, will be held from the food supply but it will be allowed to go into rendering. Will that still be the case? Or will USDA forcibly require that prior part not to go anywhere into commerce?

DEHAVEN: This is Dr. DeHaven. What we've said is that for those 20,000 normal aged slaughter animals that we're going to test, before they can be released to go into the human food chain they have to have a negative screening test. If any of those animals have an inconclusive screening test result, then that carcass will continue to be held pending confirmatory test results.

For animals not going into the human food chain, we certainly will provide a response to the appropriate entity, whether that be a rendering plant or a plant processing these carcasses for other than human consumption. We will provide then a rapid turnaround on the test results and would encourage those samples to be held pending a negative test.

Should they go into a rendered product for animal feed, for example, before we have the results then in fact we have a mechanism in place through our relationship and actually through the Food and Drug Administration to recall any of that product. But I would remind everyone that even so we still have an effective feed ban in place.

Q: I think I just got my question answered. It was regard to holding the carcasses, and I understand that we're holding only those carcasses that might enter the food chain. Those that are condemned anyway that go to rendering will recover the product if we need to. Is that correct, Dr. DeHaven?

DEHAVEN: Dr. Teagarden, that is correct. The other entities have the option of holding a carcass pending a negative test not required at this point. The only ones that would be required to be held pending a negative test are any that would be going into the human food chain, and that would be those 20,000 normal but aged animals.

ROGERS: At this time I would like to clarify that this call is a media call. Please, reporters ask your questions. If everyone else would refrain, we would appreciate that. Operator, next question, please?

Q: I wanted to get clarification from the first question. Did Secretary Veneman herself make the decision to allow some processed beef products to be imported from Canada? And if not, when was she notified that this was now the practice?

HAWKS: This is Bill Hawks here. As to whether Secretary Veneman knew the process that was going on, I can say that I do not think she did. But I do not have a definitive answer to that. What we had done -- Ron may want to address this a little bit further -- was a technical working group that was evaluating risk and then looking at the permit process. You had a technical working group and then a permitting process that was going on to affect these permits.

With regard to the April 19th expansion of the permitting process, I can definitively say that Secretary Veneman did not know anything about that with allowing of the bone-in product or I did not know anything about it myself either.

But Ron, you may want to go into the process with the TSE [transmissible spongiform encephalopathy] working group and then the permitting process as well.

HARRISON: Before we go to Ron, this is Alisa Harrison. Secretary Veneman was not aware of the additional process product coming into the United States.

DEHAVEN: Let me just clarify. This is Dr. DeHaven. From the APHIS perspective, we as Secretary Hawks mentioned, we had two groups involved in this whole effort. One was our technical scientific working group that provided the recommendations based on the science in terms of what would be appropriate products to allow in in terms of what we know about the disease and what constitutes a safe product to be entering.

And so anything that was or is being allowed into the United States passed muster with that group in terms of it being an appropriate product to bring in from a safety standpoint.

The other group is our import/export group that is involved in issuing these permits. That was the group that, once we decide to allow a product in, ensures that the appropriate processes are in place. So for example when we started allowing in processed product, this was the group that put in place the mechanisms to ensure that appropriate procedures were in place so that only product that was enterable would have been included in a processed product, ensured that we had appropriate mechanisms in place to ensure that those products then weren't contaminated or commingled with other products.

So those were the two working groups that were overseeing this. And again, it just goes to the point of, the fact that while the process and the transparency in the announcement process may have been flawed the decisions were scientifically sound.

Q: Yes. This is a question I guess for Dr. DeHaven. There has been a lot of skepticism expressed as I've heard from producers about whether they are going to, whether -- of course other producers are going to cooperate and have animals tested because no one wants to have an inconclusive or a positive. What are you doing to get those animals? Are you going to rely exclusively on rendering?

And second of all, how many false positives out of 200,000 you're doing or so, how many false positives would you expect or inclusive results?

DEHAVEN: This is Ron DeHaven. In terms of producer cooperation to provide us access to the animals on the farm, we've got a couple of things underway. First of all, part of the plan is to provide for transportation and disposal of carcasses on the farm that would be part of this group so that faced with an option of burying or otherwise leaving a dead animal on the farm or having that same carcass removed from the farm at no cost to the producer we think will encourage many producers to provide us samples.

And in fact, it's a win/win/win in those cases in that we're taking the animal off the hands of the farmer so he doesn't have to worry about disposal. Second, we get a sample for our surveillance program. And third, we're going to ensure that the carcass is eventually disposed of in an environmentally sound way.

So it's a win/win/win in all respects.

We anticipate that there will be for lack of a better phrase "dead wagon haulers," those that are in the business of transporting carcasses from the farm to rendering. And it's those individuals that we would compensate for the cost of hauling the animals away.

Another important part of what we're doing is just outreach to the producers. And I mentioned this earlier. And what I mean by that specifically is, educating them as to what might happen if in fact one of their animals does test positive. I think the producer in the state of Washington where the December 23rd cow left before she went to slaughter and tested positive is an excellent example and one that we can use to our advantage in terms of outreach to other producers -- in that certainly while it was not a good thing for that individual, and he has publicly stated the effect that the response and impact on him was minimal -- he's in business and its pretty much business as normal for him today.

Recognizing that there was indeed a difficult time for him in the middle of that, but in fact because of the nature of this disease we don't have to destroy entire herds. We can surgically take out those animals that might represent some risk and not have to shut down a dairy that's producing milk or otherwise tremendously disrupt an individual.

In terms of numbers of false positives, we can provide more specific information based on the European and Japanese experience, but just as a general response to that, I know that in Japan where they have conducted at one point in time when they had conducted 1.5 million tests, the numbers of false positives were somewhere in the neighborhood of 100 samples.

So that may be one measure. It has also been the experience in both Europe and Japan that the numbers of false positives or inconclusive results that end up being confirmed negative decreases as the laboratory technicians get experience with whatever tests that they have. So we may see more initially than we will later on in the program.

Q: Yes, thank you. My question is, the expanded surveillance program was announced March 15 as I recall. So it will be about 10 weeks from the announcement to the startup of the program. Can you tell us approximately how many cows, particularly older cows, have been tested in that interim period? And compared to how many have been sold?

DEHAVEN: This is Ron DeHaven. I'm looking for those numbers, and while we get them let me just provide a little further clarification. We certainly want to have the infrastructure in place by June 1 for implementing the entire program. As we begin collecting, we would anticipate that sometime hopefully around first part of July we would be reaching full capacity.

We also recognize that if we want to collect somewhere in excess of 200,000 samples that that means that we're going to collect somewhere in excess in on average 20,000 samples per month. But there's also some seasonal variation, and so we would actually expect in the summer months for that number to be lower than what it would be in other times of the year.

Until we get this program kicked off of course we have been operating under our previous target goal which was 40,000 during Fiscal Year of 2004. And with the Secretary's announcement that we will no longer allow nonambulatory animals to go into the human food chain, and that announcement was made at the end of December, we have been restructuring even that surveillance program to gain access to those nonambulatory animals elsewhere in the system since most of them are now not going to slaughter plants.

And so that has been a major shift in refocusing and retooling of our effort in the meantime.

So in the context that our goal has been and continues to be until June 1 to shoot for a collection of 40,000 samples in a year's time, as of end of April we had collected 15,513 samples -- again, under what we would straight-line project to reach 40,000 by the end of the year but also recognizing that since most of our samples were coming from slaughter and nonambulatory animals, and we changed that system on December 30th, that it's not too surprising that we were off that mark.

And we can only speculate whether or not we would have reached it had we not implemented this new, enhanced program that will start June 1 -- where of course we have an entirely new target.

Q: Hi. Actually, it's a couple of questions, one fairly easy one. Are you on-target on the money, or do you expect that this program's going to cost more than you think?

The other is, when the folks at RCALF [Ranchers-Cattlemen Action Legal Fund] were talking about their 33 million, they were also talking about Census Bureau records. And so I'm wondering if the numbers that Dr. Murano was talking about include the same figure, the same bases, the same documentation that these guys were talking about?

DEHAVEN: This is Dr. DeHaven. Let me address the money issue and then defer to Dr. Murano for the second question.

In terms of money, we did have apportioned $69.9 million for this surveillance effort. Obviously we're just now getting kicked off, so we're very early. And it would be a bit premature to speculate. But at this point we have no reason to think that that amount of money won't be sufficient to carry it out.

But again, we're very, very early. We really haven't kicked off the whole program yet but would anticipate based on our overall plan and the projections that we have no reason to think that that won't be enough money at this point.

MURANO: Okay. This is Elsa Murano to address your question really to compare our figures at the Food Safety Inspection Service import inspectors compared to the figures that were used from the supposed census or some other source.

As I said before, our figures come from our import inspectors who are there verifying each and every shipment visually and otherwise as to where it's coming from and the volume. As we understand it, the figures that come from the Census, in addition to what I quoted you, apparently they also may contain, may not really distinguish between veal and all other bovine.

Our figures on fresh and frozen veal that has come in from Canada is about 17.5 million pounds. So I'm not sure at this point really if those figures that were used to come up with the 33 million, if they did include veal plus all other bovine. You know, it would explain to a certain extent the differences.

Also, they quote the idea that these are processed beef product, and we're not sure what their definition of "processed" is because one could think that processing is the act of grinding and certainly then production of other products such as sausage products and jerky and hotdogs and so forth and so on, which is a definition we use. But perhaps one could think of processed beef, beef that is cut from the carcass. And that in itself requires a process, a process of cutting. And that, if that's also included in those Census figures that would certainly be different as well.

And as I said, the idea that our figures come from direct visual inspection of every shipment compared to figures that may have been obtained by Census from the broker firms and from other entities that may not be accurate at all is something that I really don't know what the case is there.

But perhaps these may be some reasons. We certainly will provide the data that I quoted to you after this call so that you have the data that we, Food Safety Inspection Service, have from our import inspectors so that you have that data.

And as far as tracking down where the 33 million came that's quoted by The Washington Post, that would be for somebody else to track down.

Q: First of all, could someone tell us when Secretary Veneman did become aware of the additional processed products coming in? Was it at the time that the RCALF case was taken since I understand this really came out when a USDA lawyer told the judge about it?

And the second question is, twice in this conversation Dr. DeHaven said that during this increased surveillance we will determine whether we have this disease in the country. But since we've already found the cow in Washington State, don't we already have the disease, that being BSE?

HARRISON: Well, this is Alisa Harrison again. I'll answer your first question. The Secretary was not aware that APHIS was issuing permits for these additional processed products. I think that while following the proper food safety procedures, you know, APHIS did fail to obtain the approval for their actions from the appropriate USDA policy and legal representative. And as Bill Hawks said earlier, we have put in place protocols by how any future determinations will be, any future determinations will be made and will be communicated to the public.

Dr. DeHaven?

DEHAVEN: Thank you. The issue of whether or not we've had a case in this country is probably more academic than anything else. Technically and consistent with the international standards as put forth by the World Animal Health Organization we have not had an indigenous case in the United States.

We've had two North American native-born cases. Both were born and presumably infected in Canada. So from a technical standpoint and by international standards, we have not had an indigenous case in the United States.

Having said that, I would be the first to say that given the integration of our cattle industries and beef markets in North America, that in fact one would argue that we really shouldn't be talking in the context of Canada or the U.S. but rather be talking in the context of North America. And clearly we now have had two North American indigenous cases that have been identified.

Let me also clarify your statement about what we will be able to determine or not determine with this surveillance program. We will not be able to say with an absolute, 100 percent accuracy whether or not we have indigenous cases in this country or not through this surveillance program.

What we can say though is, the more samples we test the greater accuracy we will have in terms of whether or not we have the disease and if so what that prevalence would be.

So I guess nothing in this world is absolute including surveillance testing. But certainly for our own purposes as we look at our overall BSE program and any changes we might need to make to our program, certainly in the context of communicating with our trading partners in terms of the prevalence or lack of prevalence of the disease in this country, this surveillance program is of paramount importance.

And so the bottom line is, the more samples we test, the greater accuracy and the more confidence we can say whether or not we have the disease and at what prevalence.

ROGERS: That concludes today's technical briefing. As always, if you have further questions you can check out our website at www.aphis.usda.gov.

Thank you, and have a nice day.

(end transcript)

(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)

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