*EPF306 10/22/2003
Report Finds Massive Failures of U.N. Security in Iraq
(Special panel says U.N. security management "dysfunctional") (1130)

By Judy Aita
Washington File United Nations Correspondent

United Nations -- The U.N. security management system failed in its mission to provide adequate security to U.N. staff in Iraq, a special panel investigating the bombing of U.N. headquarters in Baghdad reported October 22.

The panel was commissioned after a massive suicide truck bomb attack at U.N. headquarters in the Canal Hotel in Baghdad August 19 killed 22 U.N. staff and visitors, including U.N. special envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello.

The panel concluded that the current U.N. security management system is "dysfunctional" and said that "it provides little guarantee of security to U.N. staff in Iraq or other high risk environments and needs to be reformed."

It also concluded that the breaches in U.N. security rules and procedures in the field and at U.N. headquarters in New York are so serious that a separate and independent audit process should be undertaken. Personal accountability in the security system should be paramount, it said.

The failure of U.N. management and staff to comply with standard security regulations and directions left the U.N. open and vulnerable to the attack, the report said.

The "Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of U.N. Personnel in Iraq" was appointed by Secretary General Kofi Annan on September 22 and was headed by former Finish President Martti Ahtisaari. Other members of the panel were Peter Fitzgerald, deputy commissioner of the Irish National Police; Brigadier-General Jaako Oksanen of the Finnish Army; and Claude Bruderlein, director of the program on humanitarian policy and conflict research at Harvard University.

The panel was asked to examine all relevant facts about the situation before the attack, the circumstances of the attack itself, and the actions taken by different parties in the immediate aftermath. The panel was also asked to identify key lessons on security arrangements and make recommendations on measures that would help prevent or mitigate future incidents in Iraq or other high risk missions.

"Adequate security arrangements may not have been able to prevent the attack against the Canal Hotel perimeter, but would certainly have minimized the vulnerability of the staff and premises and reduced the number of causalities caused by the attack," Ahtisaari said at a press conference releasing the report.

The major reason for the problem is that the dramatic change in the security environment in Iraq was not recognized, Ahtisaari said. If it were, he said, that would definitely have heightened the awareness of the pieces of information coming from different sources. "The U.N. has a system of how staff members have to behave, management has to be responsible for training the people," he said. "This didn't happen in all the cases. We have to be much more strict with the staff."

Observance of security regulations and procedures were "sloppy" and did not comply with common security rules, the panel said in its report.

The panel said that the security challenge in crises zones requires the highest level of professionalism and expertise from security management, and the current system is not able to provide such expertise. Any new system should have a clear chain of command, an audit trail, extensive information management capabilities, a clear division of labor and coordination, and adequate financing, it said.

Resolution 1511, adopted by the Security Council on October 16, gives the United Nations a greater role in assisting Iraq in the political process and other areas such as human rights, humanitarian aid, and development projects. However, since the bombing the U.N. has been maintaining a skeletal staff of about 36 international personnel in the country and the secretary general has said that he will not increase staff until security circumstances improve.

In its report the panel said that "before the decision to resume the activities in Iraq is made, a thorough and professional security assessment should be undertaken in order to determine whether the return of international staff is possible and, if so, under what kind of security arrangements. These arrangements should be set in place prior to the return of U.N. staff."

"There is no place without risk in Iraq. A new security approach is needed in order to ensure staff security in such a high-risk environment," it said.

The panel reported that information available to U.N. security personnel in August indicated that there was a possibility of an imminent bomb attack in the Canal Road area, that fighters from Ansar al-Islam were in Iraq and planning large-scale attacks, and that the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad was under threat from a group loyal to the former Ba'athist regime.

The U.N. security update for August 19 referred specifically to the danger of attacks with improvised explosive devices by means of car or truck bombs, the report said. "However, U.N. management did not interpret the information in this way and did not take adequate increased measures to protect its staff and premises."

The panel noted that the U.N. asked Coalition Forces to withdraw the heavy equipment from the front of the U.N. compound, dismantle an observation outpost set up on the roof, and remove the barriers placed to prevent traffic on the access road that was eventually used by the attackers to approach and target the building.

U.N. senior management in Baghdad was uneasy with the "highly visible military presence," the panel said.

The inner perimeter of the Canal Hotel complex was guarded by locally recruited unarmed U.N. security guards whose main task was to check incoming traffic and maintain a night watch on the premises, the panel reported.

The panel also said that many staff members in Baghdad at the time of the attack were not adequately trained or prepared for deployment in a combat zone. It is also apparent that before the attack some staff ignored basic security instructions in relation to communications, travel, and attending security briefings. Several agencies paid scant regard to basic security issues such as completely familiarizing themselves with the basic security manuals.

The panel identified several security deficiencies including: lack of proper threat assessments at both headquarters and the field; lack of proper supervision of U.N. security staff; lack of qualified professional expertise in the setting up of protective measures such as the perimeter wall; and the absence of proper disciplinary measures to ensure the implementation of essential security procedures.

The panel faulted the U.N. for not conducting a risk or threat assessment before sending staff back into Iraq; failing to prepare a proper security plan; and continuing to issue security clearances for new staff in a deteriorating environment.

(The Washington File is a product of the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)

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