*EPF102 08/18/2003
Transcript: State Department Briefing, August 18
(State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher briefed.Following is a transcript of the briefing:) (6140)

White powder incident, North Korea, Libya/sanctions, Hambali arrest, Saudi terror financing law, Bremer/Iraqi Governing Council, Liberia/Nigeria/peacekeepers, Iceland/whaling

(begin transcript)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Daily Press Briefing
Tuesday, August 18, 2003
1:05 p.m. EDT
BRIEFER: Richard Boucher, Spokesman
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

Index:

DEPARTMENT
White Powder Incident in Office of Public Liaison
Cooperation with Other Countries on Issues of Terrorism

NORTH KOREA
Multilateral Talks on North Korea's Nuclear Program
Interagency Team Headed by Assistant Secretary James Kelly

LIBYA
Preparation for Lifting UN Sanctions on Libya
Pan Am 103 Settlement

THAILAND
Hambali Arrest/Efforts to Combat Terrorism

SAUDI ARABIA
Terror Financing Law Reform Legislation

IRAQ
Ambassador Bremer's Work With Iraqi Governing Council

NIGERIA
Moving In Peacekeeping Forces/Support for West Africans

ICELAND
Lethal Research Whaling Program

1:10 p.m. EDT

MR. BOUCHER: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Sorry I'm late. It took me a little while to catch up, and probably not completely, but I'll do my best.

I think everybody wants to know about the white powder across the hall, so let me just start with that and tell you what I can about what we know.

The Office of Public Liaison in my Bureau of Public Affairs received a piece of mail this morning with powder in it. The mail had been irradiated, thus rendering it harmless to -- harmless prior to its arrival at the Department's mail facility. The area, as you know, was locked down for much of the morning and now employees have been released. There is still an area that is cordoned off, quarantined off.

Preliminary onsite tests are not showing any positive indications of hazardous materials, but there are further tests to be done with samples, and that initial testing should be completed within 12 hours and then the final and definitive culture results will take two to three days.

The personnel in the building responded very quickly. The air handling system was shut down. Appropriate higher-level people were notified. We had the area cordoned off. We got an FBI team down here, hazardous materials team down here. And so it looks like we've contained the problem quickly. As I said, initial testing has not revealed any positive indications of hazardous materials, and we'll continue to investigate as we go forward.

QUESTION: Was anybody feeling badly or --

MR. BOUCHER: No.

QUESTION: Any symptoms or --

MR. BOUCHER: No.

QUESTION: When you say, "secured," did people remain in the --

MR. BOUCHER: People remained in the area until the -- until the response teams had arrived, until the testing was done.

QUESTION: Richard.

MR. BOUCHER: Yeah.

QUESTION: If it had been irradiated, would preliminary tests show that it was hazardous?

MR. BOUCHER: I am not absolutely certain of that. It depends -- would depend on the kind of material that it was, whether it would have shown up positive, even if it had been killed by the radiation. So I couldn't --

QUESTION: Do you know what it's been tested for?

MR. BOUCHER: No. There is a standard series of tests for hazardous materials that they put these things through.

QUESTION: Okay. But I just want to make sure because you said that the mail had been irradiated, and therefore would have rendered anything that had been hazardous --

MR. BOUCHER: -- harmless.

QUESTION: -- harmless.

MR. BOUCHER: Yeah.

QUESTION: So I don't understand how -- what it means if the preliminary tests show that it wasn't -- don't show --

MR. BOUCHER: Shows that it wasn't hazardous.

QUESTION: As far as it being an indication --

MR. BOUCHER: Well, it's part of the --

QUESTION: But is that before or after the irradiation process?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, after the irradiation process. The building -- the mail doesn't get to this building, doesn't get to the mail facility until after it's been irradiated.

QUESTION: In other words, what you're saying is that it could have been something dangerous, but it's --

MR. BOUCHER: It could have been something dangerous. It was checked out carefully. And I would say that we have to start with the assumption that it could be something dangerous. We add to that the assumption that, if it's been irradiated, it's probably not. But we have to test it and check it out thoroughly to make sure it isn't.

Terri.

QUESTION: To whom was it addressed and where had it come from?

MR. BOUCHER: The mail was addressed to the Secretary. As far as where it came from, I don't -- I don't know at this point. All that will be under investigation.

QUESTION: U.S. or overseas? You still don't -- you don't know even that much?

MR. BOUCHER: Don't know, no.

QUESTION: Did it look like a mass mailing? I mean, in other words --

MR. BOUCHER: Again, I --

QUESTION: -- do you happen to know if it was a handwritten address?

MR. BOUCHER: No, I don't. I don't know.

QUESTION: Oh.

QUESTION: Was the Secretary notified?

MR. BOUCHER: Sorry?

QUESTION: Was the Secretary notified?

MR. BOUCHER: The Acting Secretary was certainly notified very shortly after the event. Deputy Secretary Armitage was notified. I don't know if he passed word on to the Secretary or not.

QUESTION: Were people administered Cipro or anything prophylactically?

MR. BOUCHER: No, no. At this point, you know, all people's contact information has been taken, they've been briefed by the doctors on what might transpire, but until we have some positive results of a hazard there's no medical treatment being prescribed.

Pat, you had something, or not?

QUESTION: I understand that some letter similar to this had been sent to other government buildings and had been -- and turned up negative, to the best of --

MR. BOUCHER: Don't know about that, no.

Carol.

QUESTION: It was just the powder? Was there any written message in it?

MR. BOUCHER: Again, don't know yet full details of the piece of mail itself, but there was powder and that's what set off the --

QUESTION: How did they discover it? Was it opened?

MR. BOUCHER: Let me finish. There was powder in it when it was opened, as they were opening the mail. So I don't know yet. All that will be looked at in terms of origin and what was inside and where it might have come from.

Sir.

QUESTION: Okay. I just wanted to clarify that you are saying that the mail came addressed to Colin Powell.

MR. BOUCHER: Yes.

QUESTION: And obviously he is on some seventh, eighth floor. But what were they doing exactly outside in this corridor that it was blocked and we were not allowed to come from that direction?

MR. BOUCHER: This is our Office of Public Liaison, where part of their function is to receive mail for the Secretary. Mail from the public for the Secretary, e-mails, telephone calls, go into the Office of Public Liaison that's located across the hall. And if there are things -- a lot of times just people want to register their views and we have ways of reflecting that in bulk to the Secretary. If he needs to see the letter in particular, we'll take it up. This is not at that stage.

QUESTION: Was there any news or was there a letter or just the powder?

MR. BOUCHER: Same question I've been asked five times. Don't know yet. Don't have that answer yet.

Yeah.

QUESTION: It was three times.

MR. BOUCHER: Okay. Three times. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Can you tell us, what was -- do you know anything about what the reaction was in the room when they opened the letter and found there was powder? Were people alarmed? Was there any sense of panic? Tell us what you can.

MR. BOUCHER: Well, there was obviously surprise, a certain sense of alarm, but they reported immediately up through the chains, notified the appropriate people in the building and then, frankly, began to wait. They were sort of under lockdown conditions for several hours and so there was great relief when the preliminary testing didn't show anything positive and they were able to leave the office space.

QUESTION: How long did that take -- the preliminary testing -- before you knew?

MR. BOUCHER: Oh, it was about two hours, I think, maybe three. Two and half, three.

QUESTION: May we move on?

MR. BOUCHER: Okay.

QUESTION: Richard, was it just loose powder that spilled out when this package or envelope was opened or was it in something else inside the envelope?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't know, frankly. I don't have the full details on that.

QUESTION: What time did (inaudible)?

MR. BOUCHER: It was a little before 10 o'clock. Anybody know exactly?

A PARTICIPANT: About 9:40-ish.

MR. BOUCHER: About 9:40-ish.

QUESTION: How will it impact the Middle East peace process?

(Laughter.)

MR. BOUCHER: Good question.

QUESTION: Can I ask you about something else?

MR. BOUCHER: Yeah.

QUESTION: Korea? This, in a sense, isn't fair because you were away, but the North Koreans are kicking up a fuss over Japan's intention to introduce the abduction issue in the Beijing talks, that it could harm the talks.

Last week, when, you know preliminary talks were held here with the Japanese and South Koreans, the Japanese had a briefing afterward and they said that, indeed, it would be raised, and the State Department people didn't steer some of us away from that.

Is there a problem here? Do they indeed have U.S. support in trying to resolve this issue of family members not being able to leave, and, you know, should that imperil the talks, you think?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, I mean, first of all, they certainly have had and continue to have U.S. support in terms of dealing with the issue of abductions. It's been one of the many issues that we have raised repeatedly in terms of our own discussions with the North Koreans, over years, to make clear that they need to solve the issues that are a problem for other countries, and this is one that's a problem for Japan.

Whether it will come up directly in these discussions, I don't know. Whether the Japanese might raise it on the side or not, I don't know. But at this point I think we have to proceed to the discussions.

There are a great many things that North Korea has done that have affronted the international community. Developing programs for nuclear weapons is certainly the most obvious and difficult of these. But if one is to try to deal with North Korea's relations with other countries, North Korea's relations with the world, North Korea is going to have to deal with some of these issues.

QUESTION: But in terms of these talks, it's not the position of the U.S. that it should be focused solely on North Korea's nuclear program?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't think we've ever said that. We have said that our goal is to get North Korea to verifiably and visibly dismantle its nuclear weapons programs. But there may be other things that arrive at these discussions.

Matt.

QUESTION: North Korea. Can you say how much of the conversation the Deputy Secretary -- the Deputy Secretary intends to have this morning with one of the many deputy Russian foreign ministers? Is it going to focus on North Korea, and how much will be on the upcoming Bush-Putin --

MR. BOUCHER: I don't -- I don't think I could sort of give you a percentage breakdown. There are obviously a variety of issues that we're discussing with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak at the Department. The Deputy Secretary will actually meet with him tomorrow. They rescheduled that meeting.

But Deputy Foreign Minister Kislyak is having discussions with several other State Department officials during a three-day visit. He'll meet with Under Secretary John Bolton, Under Secretary Marc Grossman, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Beth Jones. They'll talk about bilateral issues. But they're also here -- he's also coming to discuss details for the upcoming visit of President Vladimir Putin, so that will be the principal topic.

QUESTION: So it's North Korea, then? Not the six-party talks?

MR. BOUCHER: It's not specifically about North Korea, although I expect North Korea will certainly be one of the subjects to be discussed.

QUESTION: Can I ask about this story this morning that the U.S. is going to go ahead with military exercises north of Australia, and one purpose of which would be to send the North Koreans a signal about their possible exports or imports of sensitive materials of military value?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, the Proliferation Security Initiative, as you know, has been a rapidly developing and I think very positive initiative that we have taken that the President announced. If I remember correctly, it was in Krakow. But the goal of the initiative is to give the countries of the world who are most concerned about proliferation some better legal and other tools for dealing with the problem of proliferation, and, when necessary, being able to interdict proliferation when it occurs.

So there are upcoming a series of interdiction training exercises that the United States and other countries will participate in. The first such exercise will focus on maritime interdiction. It is scheduled for September in the Western Pacific. It will be hosted by Australia. We expect this to be followed with others in the Mediterranean and the Arabian Sea. An air and ground interdiction exercise will be planned as well.

Interdiction training exercises and the Proliferation Security Initiative overall are not focused on North Korea. It's a global initiative with global reach. It's aimed at stopping the flow of weapons of mass destruction, missiles and related materials to and from state and non-state actors of proliferation concern. However, if North Korea wants to continue to aggressively proliferate missiles and related technologies, it might find itself affected by this initiative.

The training exercises are intended to enhance the collective capabilities of participants to conduct actual sea, air and ground interdiction operations in cooperation and partnership. It will involve both civilian law enforcement and military assets and all the core countries of the initiative are expected to participated in some way.

QUESTION: A couple of things. You say it's not focused on North Korea, and yet the last time the group met, which was in Australia, its statement, their statement specifically mentioned North Korea and Iran. So, at least on paper, there is --

MR. BOUCHER: Well, I don't think there is any contradiction saying it's not solely focused on North Korea. Obviously, any country that's proliferating missiles could be affected by this. And North Korea and Iran are two of the greatest proliferators in the world, or potential proliferators.

So whether it affects them or not I guess is a decision that they make on the basis of what they try to export. The effort is underway to give these countries a global capability to interdict proliferation wherever it comes from and wherever it might be going.

QUESTION: And is it -- in the first exercise, is it only the United States and Australia? And, if so, why just those two countries?

MR. BOUCHER: No, I am told that, in some capacity, all the countries of the initiative would be expected to participate. That's Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the UK and the U.S. For the United States, we'll have Coast Guard and military services both participating.

QUESTION: Yeah. I just want to make sure that I am not -- that I'm on track because I was a bit surprised by this story. Wasn't, in fact, this entire exercise and initiative, the practice run here, announced at the last meeting in Brisbane in June?

MR. BOUCHER: My recollection of the exact text of that announcement, I don't remember. But I think --

QUESTION: Said that there would be a military exercise --

MR. BOUCHER: I am pretty sure it was announced.

QUESTION: -- in the Coral Sea in September?

MR. BOUCHER: Yeah, something like that.

QUESTION: Okay. So, in other words, from your reading of the story this morning, was there anything new in it?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't make judgments like that. Editors make judgments like that.

QUESTION: Well, did you see anything in there that surprised you that you hadn't known before?

MR. BOUCHER: Matt, I'm not --

QUESTION: I just want to know -- was it --?

MR. BOUCHER: I am not trying to render judgments on people's stories.

QUESTION: Am I missing something here?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm not trying to render judgments on people's stories.

QUESTION: I'm not -- I don't want to know that. It's not to denigrate the story. I just to know if I'm missing something because I couldn't find anything in it.

MR. BOUCHER: Well, somebody did. Somebody found enough to put it in a newspaper. That's all I can say.

QUESTION: On a little broader approach, has the United States decided exactly what it's going to say when it sits down with the North Koreans? Or are you still -- is that still being decided?

MR. BOUCHER: These discussions generally continue as we prepare for talks like this. As you know, as one of your colleagues referred to, we had some informal discussions with the Japanese and South Koreans last week. So we will continue to prepare, I'm sure, right up to the meeting.

Vicki.

QUESTION: Richard, haven't the -- this whole issue of interdiction must get pretty complicated in terms of international law. Have you worked out the parameters for when you will, you know, interdict a shipment and -- or -- and when you will not, and what the ground rules are?

MR. BOUCHER: There has been a lot of work going on, not only on the sort of training and exercise and capabilities aspect of this, but also on the legal aspects of this. I think, you know, I'm not an expert in it. I can't really give you the whole detail at this point. But all those things are being looked at, and many of them were, in fact, addressed in a fairly comprehensive statement in Brisbane at the time of the last meeting.

QUESTION: Can I just follow up on that? Can you -- I think I know the answer to this, but hasn't the State Department, since right after September 11, been seeking agreements with countries on terms of being able to go in their territorial waters, sort of related to the interdiction question?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't know if I'd describe it that way, no.

QUESTION: Well, I mean, you've been working out bilateral agreements with countries that are not in this group about -- in terms of allowing --

MR. BOUCHER: We have an awful lot of bilateral cooperation with a large number of countries on issues of terrorism, and that is a cooperative approach. Sometimes it involves joint use of assets. Sometimes it involves actions by the United States, and with the permission of other governments. Sometimes, many times, it involves action by other governments. So it really depends on the country that you might be thinking of to say what could occur in various territorial waters.

Elise? No?

QUESTION: Well, yeah, I was going to ask, you said you're not an expert, but maybe you know. Are all -- are the rules for the interdiction the same for shipments coming from any country, or are there specific and stricter rules for if they're coming from North Korea, as opposed to Iran? I mean, there was some talk about, perhaps, all countries are in agreement on the rules, the parameters for interdiction from any specific country?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't think I quite understand the question. The goal is to prevent terrorists and terrorist-supporting states from acquiring missiles, from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and the materials to make them. So the country of origin is obviously important, but destination is much more important. And obviously, if there is information that a terrorist group is getting weapons of mass destruction or materials to make them, then we would all want to interdict such a shipment to prevent it, no matter where it originated.

Okay.

QUESTION: I have question on China first. The Chinese Foreign Ministry --

QUESTION: I have another question.

QUESTION: It's about North Korea.

QUESTION: Oh, sorry.

QUESTION: -- said China will not allow any North Korea WMD bypass China to the third country. Do you have any comment on that?

MR. BOUCHER: No particular comment except for that's the responsible and correct thing to do.

QUESTION: Okay. If you could share some details on the Beijing talks, will there be bilateral talks within the multilateral? Maybe Japan and North Korea can talk about abduction issue?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't know whether Japan and North Korea will talk about anything bilateral either or not.

QUESTION: But you don't know any, if any --

MR. BOUCHER: What we have said is that there's an opportunity in any multilateral setting for parties to say what they want to other parties, whether it's in small groups or across the table or in other ways. So I am sure there are opportunities for countries to raise issues that they want to raise with whomever they want to raise them.

QUESTION: Including the U.S. and North Korea, maybe?

MR. BOUCHER: Again, I can't go beyond what we've said before.

QUESTION: Okay. If you could share the makeup of the U.S. team, will there be other agencies, for instance, in --

MR. BOUCHER: I'm sure there will be other agencies. The team will be headed by Assistant Secretary James Kelly. It normally would be a interagency delegation. I don't have a full list yet, though.

QUESTION: Specifically from the DOD?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm sure they'll be there, but I don't have a full list yet.

QUESTION: I have another question about the irradiated mail. The building was not evacuated this morning --

MR. BOUCHER: No.

QUESTION: -- when the letter was opened. Was that because of the knowledge that the mail had been irradiated?

MR. BOUCHER: I think it's because we think we have procedures that can contain any possible hazard that there might be. We were able to shut down the air-handling system very quickly. We were able to quarantine the particular area where the powder was discovered, and therefore you don't need to evacuate the entire building.

QUESTION: Is this also a pretty good test about the effectiveness now of dealing with this sort of thing? Is this a pretty good example?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm sure there will be appropriate after-action reports and things like that, but we always want to make sure that we're capable of dealing with whatever incidents might arise, and this shows, to some extent, that we are.

Yeah.

Vicki.

QUESTION: Back on interdiction. The agreement among the 11 countries that are involved so far, does it just call for searching vessels that are in the territorial waters of the countries that are participating?

MR. BOUCHER: Again, I'd refer you back to the statements that had been issued. No, it's -- but it's not limited to that. It's an attempt to give us a capability to interdict missiles, weapons of mass destruction, materials for them, on a global basis.

QUESTION: On where?

MR. BOUCHER: On a global basis.

QUESTION: Can I change the subject? The Lockerbie -- the Libya resolution at the UN, two things. One, have you guys moved at all on a decision for how you're going to vote or if you're going to vote? Is it -- are you going to abstain, or are you thinking that maybe you'll vote in favor? And two, can you bring us -- give us a bit more detail, if you can, about the phone call that the Secretary had over the weekend with the French Foreign Minister about this?

MR. BOUCHER: We expect the United Kingdom to circulate a draft resolution today that would lift the sanctions on Libya that were suspended in 1999. Consultations with other members of the Council will take place tomorrow, and we would expect a vote soon thereafter.

This follows Friday's notification by the UK and the United States to the United Nations Security Council that when the necessary sums have been deposited into the agreed escrow account, we're prepared to allow the lifting of UN sanctions. That means we won't oppose the resolution, but I'm not prepared to comment any further at this moment on our specific intentions regarding votes.

We have been in touch with the French Government at various levels, including senior levels. The Secretary spoke with Foreign Minister de Villepin on Saturday. I would say that, you know, we're quite aware of the fact that French nationals and other suffered from the attack on the UTA flight. The French are very concerned about this and I think they, themselves, have made public comments about how they would also seek to pursue that issue.

The Secretary wanted to coordinate with the Foreign Minister to make sure that this was -- that we are working together, that we are coordinating together, as we move forward on this particular issue of Pan Am 103. We would not wish to see anything that would impede the Pan Am 103 settlement, but, of course, we have great sympathy with the French families and others who lost people on the UTA flight.

QUESTION: Do you expect the French to try and veto it?

MR. BOUCHER: That's a question for the French. We would not want to see anything that would impede the Pan Am 103 settlement.

QUESTION: Did the Secretary indicate that United States would be willing to cooperate with the French on their issue if the French didn't veto this one?

MR. BOUCHER: The goal for the two of them to talk was to try to work this in coordination so that the French could pursue what they want to pursue, but so that we can also move forward at the UN.

QUESTION: Was it successful? Was it a successful offer?

MR. BOUCHER: I think we'll have to see. We'll have to see how the things proceed.

QUESTION: Just to put a final point on Carol's question. Did the Secretary tell the French Foreign Minister that the United States would be prepared to intervene with the Libyans to get them to renegotiate the UTA deal?

MR. BOUCHER: I think our effort has been to pursue what we need to pursue, to proceed how we need to proceed, and to let the French proceed how they need to proceed, but to do so with some coordination so that we don't harm or impede each other's efforts. We have said, the Secretary General has said, it's time to move ahead on the Pan Am 103 issue, and that's what we're doing.

QUESTION: So, in other words, you're not prepared to help the French get what they want out of Libya?

MR. BOUCHER: Again, this matter that we're taking up in the Security Council now involves Pan Am 103. We don't want to see this complicated or impeded by other actions.

QUESTION: You do not believe, then, what the French believe, that the UTA bombing was also covered by the resolution, by the resolutions that imposed the sanctions in the first place?

MR. BOUCHER: Once again, I think we're dealing with a particular resolution that has -- that deals with Pan Am 103.

QUESTION: This morning a report showed up on the Al-Hayat website that said al-Qaida was taking -- I don't know if they called it credit or responsibility for the power blackout. Have you heard anything like this? Is this --

MR. BOUCHER: In New York?

QUESTION: Yeah. Not kidding. Do they -- is this -- this apparently is not under active --

MR. BOUCHER: I think I was reading less amusing press reports this morning. I'm sorry I didn't hit that one. But no, I've not heard anything like that.

QUESTION: Yeah, also on al-Qaida. Last week when Hambali was captured in Thailand, a Thai Government official said that he had crossed from Laos with a Spanish passport. Has anybody determined whether he did, in fact, cross from Laos, and is the U.S. Government satisfied with the Laos Government's participation in the war on terror?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't think I'm prepared at this point to provide any more details than we already have about the arrest and taking him into custody. So I think all those matters obviously would need to be looked into, but I'm not in a position to give you any more detail at this point.

QUESTION: On Hambali. The Indonesians say that they would like him sent back to them. Is that something that they've already given you a formal request for?

MR. BOUCHER: Again, we've been working with other governments on these questions of terrorism in Southeast Asia, but we just don't have anything more to add on it at this moment.

QUESTION: -- continue to discuss Hambali's situation with the Indonesian Government specifically?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm sure we remain in touch with all the governments concerned.

QUESTION: Deputy Secretary Armitage, I guess just before he left Australia, gave an interview on Channel 9. Are you familiar with the transcript of that?

MR. BOUCHER: Yeah, the excerpts that I saw today.

QUESTION: Okay. But specifically pertaining to Hambali and threats to -- the threat that he may have posed in Thailand at the upcoming APEC?

MR. BOUCHER: No, I don't think so. I've reviewed the transcript and he did not talk about threats to a particular event or a particular country. He said the threats from these groups generally remain, even if the individual is found.

QUESTION: He was asked specifically about that, and he said, yes, he thought the threat was general. But what I'm getting to is the Thais themselves that said that this was -- that what he was plotting was directed at the APEC meeting --

MR. BOUCHER: Again, we'll leave that to the Thai Government to talk about that if they want --

QUESTION: Okay, well, wait, let me -- I'll let you finish answering the question.

MR. BOUCHER: Okay.

QUESTION: Let me finish asking it. But now I've forgotten what it was. (Laughter.) Well done. I'm serious, I forgot.

MR. BOUCHER: All right. Well, we've managed to bring a number of facts to light, nonetheless.

Elise.

QUESTION: Do you have any comment on the Saudis passing this terror financing law reform legislation?

MR. BOUCHER: We've worked very closely with the Saudis on terror financing. I wasn't aware of new legislation. I'll check and see if we have anything to say.

QUESTION: Can I -- since you don't have anything on that, can I ask one more?

MR. BOUCHER: Sure.

QUESTION: On -- can you talk about any plans or offers that the U.S. has made to the British Government to move the U.S. Embassy to Kensington?

MR. BOUCHER: We haven't.

QUESTION: But an offer was never made to (inaudible) the building?

MR. BOUCHER: No. The U.S. Embassy in London has no plans to move from its location on Grosvenor Square. I am told we have a 1,000-year lease that's valid until 2953. (Laughter.) Obviously, security and accessibility of diplomatic missions remain crucial for us. We constantly seek to enhance embassy safety while ensure maximum possible openness for U.S. and host country nationals doing business with our missions.

I suppose there is always the option of moving. I am not sure what the lease says about early termination. But when we look at security and other issues, it's one option that may be considered at some point, but not now, not -- no specific plans regarding Kensington Palace at this point, no plans to move from Grosvenor Square at this point.

QUESTION: -- several generations. What is the rent that you guys pay there?

MR. BOUCHER: Don't know.

QUESTION: So this lease was signed in 1953 for 1,000 years?

MR. BOUCHER: Yeah. We have certain faith that certain institutions will remain around and that they'll be able to guarantee the contract.

Joel.

QUESTION: Will you bring us up to date on the statements coming out of Baghdad, I guess by Paul Bremer and others, that the Iraqi Council may come up with a workable constitution within six months?

MR. BOUCHER: I can't -- I can't provide any more detail than Ambassador Bremer already has. He is out there on the scene. They're working this process. The Governing Council itself is working this process.

And so all I would say is I think his statements and the work that's going on do reflect the statements that we made a couple of months ago saying that this political process was underway, that Iraqis were taking more and more responsibility, that the Governing Council is going to up and running in July, that the Constitutional Council was being formed. The process of Iraqis writing their own constitution, deciding on their own government, deciding on their own future is well underway.

QUESTION: Richard.

MR. BOUCHER: We have got one more in the back, and one more up here.

QUESTION: Last week, the friends and the fiancé of Charles Lee began driving from California to Washington, D.C., because they are extremely concerned with the situation of Charles Lee. Do you have any updates on that?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't have any update for you right now. I'll try to get you something, if not today, then tomorrow.

Paul.

QUESTION: Over the weekend, the ranking Nigerian officer in Monrovia said he would like the U.S. to send in more troops, he thought the number of West African peacekeepers there was inadequate. Any plans to do so?

MR. BOUCHER: I think, first of all, our military would have to answer questions like that. There have been no other decisions at this point regarding deployment of U.S. forces. We are playing a major supporting role for the peacekeepers with the 26th Expeditionary Unit and in other ways. We have provided the $10 million of support, logistic support. We have got, I think, 150-some Marines on the ground already. We have got the ships offshore. We're coordinating very closely with the Nigerians. Nigerian troops continue to arrive and secure some of these areas that the General was concerned about. So we're working very closely with them, but the Pentagon would have to account for any increases or decreases in the troops onshore.

QUESTION: If you can comment generally on how the U.S. sees the situation there. Does it see -- does it believe that the number of troops there is satisfactory for the moment?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, as you know, there's a plan to put this initial Nigerian force in, to move additional forces in for a West African force, and then have it replaced with peacekeepers over time. So I wouldn't say that this is the current situation; that's the way it'll be forever.

What we want to do is make sure that we play an effective role in support of that process, in support of the West Africans, and that we do what's necessary and appropriate for the United States. The President has addressed that several times, I think, in the last week or two, and the Pentagon can, as well.

QUESTION: Richard, while you were gone, the -- your -- Phil made -- twice in two days came out very strongly in opposition to the renewal of Iceland's whaling program. That program actually began over the weekend again. I'm wondering if you have any update on that, whether or not the hunt has triggered a review under the Pelly Amendment, even though it's my understanding that the first ships came back without any whales -- if an unsuccessful hunt also triggers a review?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, first, let me make clear that we're extremely disappointed with Iceland's decisions to begin a lethal research whaling program, which anticipates taking 38 minke whales.

Although the program is technically legal under the Whaling Convention, we've said many times that lethal research on whales is not necessary and the needed scientific data can be established -- can be obtained by well-established, non-lethal means.

The taking of whales by Iceland will likely trigger a review by the Department of Commerce of Iceland's lethal scientific whaling process program for possible certification under the Pelly Amendment. So I can't say it's started at this point. We'll obviously keep the situation under review.

QUESTION: Do you know that if them just going out and searching for whales to kill is enough to trigger the review or would they have to be successful?

MR. BOUCHER: I would have to look at the law carefully to see if it's written in those terms, "taking of whales," or whether it's the attempt to do so.

Thank you.

(The briefing was concluded at 1:45 p.m.)

(end transcript)

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