*EPF315 06/18/2003
Text: U.S. Government Watchdog Finds Problems in Visa Revocation
(General Accounting Office recommends reforms) (1510)

The General Accounting Office (GAO) presented a report to a congressional committee June 18 finding that the U.S. government doesn't have good procedures in place to find a suspected terrorist who is already in the United States on a revoked visa.

In an earlier report conducted in the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks, the GAO had discovered that more than 100 foreign nationals suspected of terrorist involvement had received visas through some lapse in the process of conducting background checks. The House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations asked the GAO, often considered a watchdog of government performance, to investigate further.

GAO reported that, "The U.S. government has no specific written policy on the use of visa revocations as an antiterrorism tool and no written procedures to guide State in notifying the relevant agencies of visa revocations on terrorism grounds." The lack of such policies, GAO says, may "increase the probability of a suspected terrorist entering or remaining in the United States."

GAO is recommending that the Attorney General and the Secretaries of Homeland Security and the State Department develop better procedures to inform each other and react in a situation when a visa is revoked because of terrorism concerns.

The full GAO report is available at www.gao.gov

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U.S. General Accounting Office
BORDER SECURITY
Report to Congressional Requesters

New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation Process

Results in Brief

Our analysis indicates that the U.S. government has no specific written policy on the use of visa revocations as an antiterrorism tool and no written procedures to guide State in notifying the relevant agencies of visa revocations on terrorism grounds. State and INS have written procedures that guide some types of visa revocations; however, neither they nor the FBI have written internal procedures for notifying their appropriate personnel to take specific actions on visas revoked by the State Department. State and INS officials could articulate their informal policies and procedures for how and for what purpose their agencies have used the process to keep terrorists out of the United States, but neither they nor FBI officials had policies or procedures that covered investigating, locating, and taking appropriate action in cases where the visa holder had already entered the country.

The lack of formal, written policies and procedures may have contributed to systemic weaknesses in the visa revocation process that increase the probability of a suspected terrorist entering or remaining in the United States. In our review of the 240 visa revocations, we found that (a) appropriate units within INS and the FBI did not always receive notification of the revocations; (b) lookouts were not consistently posted to the agencies' watch lists of suspected terrorists; (c) 30 individuals whose visas were revoked on terrorism grounds entered the United States either before or after revocation and may still remain in the country;[7] and (d) INS and the FBI were not routinely taking actions to investigate,[8] locate, or resolve the cases of individuals who remained in the United States after their visas were revoked. For instance:

����In a number of cases, notification between State and the appropriate units within INS and the FBI did not take place or was not completed in a timely manner.[9] For example, INS officials said they did not receive any notice of the revocations from State in 43 of the 240 cases. In another 47 cases, the INS Lookout Unit received the revocation notice only via a cable, State's backup method of notification. However, these cables took, on average, 12 days to reach the Lookout Unit. Although State generally sent information cables to the FBI's main communications center to notify it of the revocations, FBI officials could not provide us with evidence that the communications center sent these cables to the appropriate counterterrorism units.

����In cases where the INS Lookout Unit could document that it received a notification, it generally posted information on these revocations in its lookout database within 1 day of receiving the notice. When the Lookout Unit did not receive notification, it could not post information on these individuals in its lookout database, precluding INS inspectors at ports of entry from knowing that these individuals had had their visas revoked. Moreover, the State Department neglected to enter the revocation action for 64 of the 240 cases into its own watch list. As a result, these individuals could apply at an overseas post for a new visa, and consular officers would not necessarily know that their previous visas had been revoked for terrorism concerns. FBI officials in mid-May 2003 had not determined whether the agency's Terrorist Watch and Warning Unit had received any notice of visa revocations.

����Twenty-nine individuals entered the United States before their visas were revoked and may still remain in the country. INS inspectors admitted at least 4 other people after the visa revocation, 1 of whom may still remain in the country. However, INS inspectors prevented at least 14 others from entering the country because the INS watch list included information on the revocation action or had another lookout on them.

����INS and the FBI did not routinely attempt to investigate or locate any of the individuals who entered the United States either before or after their visas were revoked and who may still remain in the country. Due to congressional interest in specific cases, INS investigators located 4 individuals in the United States; however, they did not attempt to locate other revoked visa holders who may have entered the country. INS officials told us that they generally do not investigate these cases because it would be challenging to remove these individuals unless they were in violation of their immigration status even if the agency could locate them. A visa revocation by itself is not a stated grounds for removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).[10] FBI officials told us that they were not being alerted by State that persons with revoked visas could be "possible terrorists." As a result, the FBI did not routinely attempt to investigate and locate individuals with revoked visas who may have entered the United States.

On March 1, 2003, the Secretary of Homeland Security became responsible for issuing regulations and administering and enforcing provisions of U.S. immigration law relating to visa issuance.[11] Therefore, we are making recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security, in conjunction with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, to ensure that when State revokes a visa because of terrorism concerns, the appropriate units within State, Homeland Security, and the FBI are notified immediately and that the appropriate actions are taken. We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland Security, State, and Justice for their comment. Homeland Security agreed that the visa revocation process should be strengthened as an antiterrorism tool and said that it looked forward to working with State and Justice to develop and revise current policies and procedures that affect the interagency visa revocation process. State and Justice did not comment on our recommendations.

Footnotes:

7 This number is based on our analysis of data we received from INS as of May 19, 2003. On May 20 and 21, INS and the FBI, respectively, provided additional information related to this matter. We were not able to complete anlaysis of the data prior to the release of this report due to the nature and volume of the data. The data could show that the actual number of persons is higher or lower than 30.
8 The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations provide for graduated levels of investigative activity by the FBI, allowing the bureau to act well in advance of the commission of planned terrorist acts or other federal crimes. The three levels of investigative activity defined in the guidelines are (1) the prompt and extremely limited checking of initial leads, (2) preliminary inquiries, and (3) full investigations. In this report, we are not prescribing which level of investigative activity is appropriate for persons with revoked visas who may be in the United States.
9 We found no evidence of written procedures that define timeliness, but State officials told us that they try to send notification to the Lookout Unit the same day the revocation certificate is signed.
10 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act has been amended several times, more recently by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-208), the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-56), the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-173), and the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296).
11 See section 428 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.

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(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)

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