*EPF206 02/25/2003
Excerpt: Food Program Chief Urges More Monitoring of Aid to N. Korea
(Feb. 25 remarks to Senate Foreign Relations Committee) (1290)
The distribution of food aid in North Korea needs closer monitoring, says James Morris, executive director of the World Food Program (WFP).
Testifying February 25 before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Morris said that during the eight years the WFP has been operating in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), WFP staff "have literally spent thousands of hours trying to convince North Korean officials of the wisdom of a more transparent monitoring regime."
"Monitoring has been a concern of all our major contributors, not just the United States," he said. "There has been progress, but it has only been in the last few months that a very clear signal has gone out to the DPRK Government from the United States, as the principal donor, that meeting WFP's normal monitoring standards is essential. We hope that signal will produce more movement because the humanitarian situation remains grave."
Despite the need for closer monitoring, Morris said, "[w]e have reasons to believe that most food is getting through to the women and children who need it."
The most compelling reason for continuing food aid to North Korea, he said, is that a follow-up nutrition study completed last year by UNICEF (originally known as the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, now called the United Nations Children's Fund) shows significant improvement in the nutritional status of children there since the first study was done in 1998.
According to the follow-up nutrition study, the proportion of children underweight (weight-for-age) has fallen from 61 percent to 21 percent since 1998. Wasting, or acute malnutrition (weight-for-height), has fallen from 16 percent to 9 percent; stunting, or chronic malnutrition (height-for-age), has dropped from 62 percent to 42 percent.
Following is an excerpt on North Korea from Morris' testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee February 25:
(begin excerpt)
TESTIMONY OF JAMES T. MORRIS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR WORLD FOOD PROGRAM
HEARING ON "THE STATE OF THE WORLD REPORT ON HUNGER, FROM AFRICA TO NORTH KOREA"
FEBRUARY 25, 2003
BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Submission to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on North Korea
North Korea presents the most politically troubling and frustrating food crisis in the world today. On the one hand there is continuing, desperate need. But, on the other, no government in history has ever made normal food aid monitoring so very difficult. Hungry people who cannot help themselves have a right to food; but donors providing that food have a right to know it is getting to those hungry people.
Over the eight years of the food aid program in the DPRK, WFP staff have literally spent thousands of hours trying to convince North Korean officials of the wisdom of a more transparent monitoring regime. Monitoring has been a concern of all our major contributors, not just the United States. There has been progress, but it has only been in the last few months that a very clear signal has gone out to the DPRK Government from the United States, as the principal donor, that meeting WFP's normal monitoring standards is essential. We hope that signal will produce more movement because the humanitarian situation remains grave.
Last fall, lack of resources led WFP to cut the rations of 3 million North Koreans, mostly children and the elderly. In 2002 some 37 percent of planned distributions had to be suspended. Reviving donations will not be easy. Japan remains averse to contributing food aid because of the issue of kidnappings and the targeting of North Korean missiles. The United States has pulled back in response to reports of diversions it found credible began to surface. South Korea will likely remain committed to food aid, but perhaps most will continue to be unmonitored and outside the scope of the United Nations.
Where do we go from here? Well, first, it is critical for the Committee and the Bush Administration to understand precisely where we are with the North Koreans on monitoring. It would be wrong for me to depict the regime in Pyongyang as totally uncooperative. Over the years the number of WFP staff permitted has steadily risen and monitoring site visits were up 25 percent last year. Nevertheless, there remain serious problems:
-- We have received approval for satellite communications from Pyongyang and our sub-offices, but not permission to use the sat phones we imported;
-- We have access only to 85 percent of the population, even though we are quite certain there are needy people in counties where we are not permitted to enter;
-- We do not have random access to feeding sites, though the notice time we must give for visits has been reduced;
-- We are not permitted to have native Korean speakers, though some WFP staff are studying the language,
-- And finally, we do not have a complete list of beneficiary institutions, though one was promised in August of 2001.
So you will get no argument from WFP that the Government of North Korea has given us the same level of monitoring access we have in our other food aid operations. They clearly have not. I raised these issues personally and forcefully with North Korean officials, as did my predecessor on numerous occasions.
Under these circumstances, why have we continued to provide food there? While we cannot guarantee there have not been food aid diversions -- we have reasons to believe that most food is getting through to the women and children who need it. The most compelling is the recently released follow-up nutrition study. The first nutrition study done by UNICEF, WFP and the North Korean Government in 1998 showed catastrophic damage, especially to children. The nutrition survey released last week shows notable progress, though I would caution that the stunting rate is still extremely high.
-- The proportion of children underweight (weight-for-age) has fallen from 61 percent in 1998 to 21 percent in 2002
-- Wasting, or acute malnutrition (weight-for-height), has fallen from 16 percent to 9 percent 12
-- Stunting, or chronic malnutrition (height-for-age), has dropped from 62 percent to 42 percent.
Our emergency operation for 2003 calls for 512,000 mt of food at a cost of $200 million. As in the past, we will continue to target those most at risk -- the youngest children, pregnant and nursing women, caregivers in children's institutions, some of the elderly. These total more than 4 million people. We also plan to reach another 2.2 million North Koreans, for shorter periods of time in the agricultural lean season, through food-for work projects.
While the size of our intervention this year is about 15% smaller than last year's plan in part because of a better harvest, it is vitally important we continue or we risk losing many of the nutritional gains made in past years -- there will surely be more stunting and malnutrition among child bearing women and children.
I visited our operations in DPRK late last year. I traveled to food insecure regions far from Pyongyang, talked to our staff and the people we assist, and observed how our programs have really made a difference. I would only put forward my personal appeal -- if millions of young children are to avoid lasting mental and physical damage from chronic hunger, we have to ensure that food aid continues. But we must all work together hard on accessibility, accountability and transparency -- even if the political climate warms. The problems are too great for us to throw up our arms and go home, as a few aid agencies have, abandoning some of the most malnourished women and children in the world.
(end excerpt)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
Return to Public File Main Page
Return to Public Table of Contents