*EPF304 11/13/2002
Former U.N. Weapons Inspectors Describe Iraq's Concealment Tactics
(Say new inspectors will face difficult task of proving weapons development) (870)

By Vicki Silverman
Washington File Staff Writer

Washington -- Two former United Nations weapons inspectors interviewed in September by the Washington File voiced concern at that time that the Iraqi regime would try to undermine the capabilities of any new U.N. weapons inspection team by restricting access to Iraq's most sensitive sites and personnel.

U.N. Security Council resolution 1441, unanimously adopted on November 8, addresses some of the inspectors' concerns. The resolution establishes an enhanced inspection regime for Iraq's disarmament, which is to be carried out by the U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Resolution 1441 says UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors are to have unrestricted rights of entry and travel into and throughout Iraq, U.N. security for themselves, and the right to conduct interviews inside or outside the country without the presence of Iraqi officials. Most importantly, it says the inspectors are to have immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to all sites in Iraq.

But proving that the Iraqis still have prohibited weapons "is very, very difficult," former U.N. inspections official Charles Duelfer explained to the Washington File September 20.

Duelfer, deputy executive chairman of UNSCOM from 1993-2000, and Richard Spertzel, UNSCOM's specialist in biological warfare 1994-1999, described what they witnessed in Iraq -- the extraordinary efforts of the Iraqi regime to hide its secret weapons programs.

Both Duelfer and Spertzel said that Iraq has a well-developed structure for concealing its prohibited weapons programs.

Duelfer explained that the concealment efforts appear to be run by the Iraqi security services linked to President Saddam Hussein's inner circle. "Other than protecting the president, these security organizations had no higher priority than protecting these [nuclear, biological and chemical weapons] programs," he said.

"They had a very elaborate system and they applied different techniques as they bore fruit. But the primary objective was to understand how we operated ... the inspections activity and to calibrate their responses," Duelfer told the Washington File.

These included developing detailed profiles of the inspectors and their expertise, monitoring their travel long before they arrived in Iraq, and gathering intelligence on inspection planning.

Iraqi escorts routinely diverted inspectors from reaching sites of interest. "Sometimes convoys would be split or disrupted by other Iraqi vehicles, even to where there is serious risk of having an accident. ... Sometimes teams were simply delayed when our Iraqi minders did not arrive. After calls to the national monitoring authority we'd get off not at 7:30 a.m. It would be 9:30 a.m. by then," Spertzel recalled.

In their effort to analyze information related to research or procurement, inspectors would be flooded by falsified documents or they would lose time in investigating dummy purchasing companies. "Good analysis of documents takes time and experience," Spertzel said.

Interviews were riddled with inconsistencies. "Then there was the lying," Spertzel said. "At a university there was a person of interest involved in the ricin program [Ricin is a poisonous protein extracted from castor beans. Iraq has produced at least 10 liters of ricin and tested it for use in artillery shells.] We sent someone in to do a document search. We made a point of blocking the stairways and a guy came tearing down the stairway with documents under his arm. Our people intercepted him and he claimed these were his wife's personal medical records. There were not -- they turned out to be some rather critical documents on the ricin program."

Spertzel recalled a moment during an interview with Dr. Rihab Rashida Taha, a key facilitator of the biological program. "I said, ����Dr. Taha, you know that we know that you're lying, so why are you doing it?' She drew herself up and replied ����Dr. Spertzel, it is not a lie when you are ordered to lie.'"

Subtle intimidation, including harassing phone calls, was also used, according to both Duelfer and Spertzel. Spertzel recalled the case of an Iraq official who coyly asked a new member of his team, "How far is it from Salt Lake City to Minneapolis?" Having moved from Salt Lake City to Minneapolis just days prior to her arrival in Iraq, she was unnerved by the comment, according to Spertzel.

Duelfer recalls the stress: "The entire environment is oppressive, as journalists will tell you. People are just terrified to speak."

"Always being on the alert takes a toll." Spertzel said.

Duelfer believes the Iraqi regime is well prepared to re-admit inspectors. "They took the decision (to admit inspectors) back in February, according to Iraqis with whom I have indirect contact. They know they can buy time. They certainly have had many years to prepare for inspectors to come back in." Furthermore, Duelfer suspects the regime also knows how long it will have to wait before creating a confrontation.

"There is a mismatch between inspectors and the tools that can be applied against them by a nation state with one of the most extensive security and intelligence apparatuses in the world." Duelfer told the Washington file.

Despite the many obstacles faced by the previous inspection teams, Duelfer believes that the presence of inspectors "did have the effect of reducing the scope of what Iraq could do, but it clearly could not eliminate it."

(The Washington File is a product of the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)

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