*EPF306 01/30/2002
Excerpt: Senator Speaks Out Against 2001 Export Administration Act
(Warns China could import more technology to enhance military) (660)

A member of the Senate Intelligence Committee warned his fellow lawmakers that enactment of the Export Administration Act of 2001 would enable China "to import even more sensitive technology than it has in the past" to enhance that country's military capabilities.

The Senate passed S. 149, the Export Administration Act of 2001, in September but the measure has not yet become law.

Senator Jon Kyl (Republican of Arizona), the highest-ranking Republican on the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information, described in a January 29 speech how the United States had approved $15,000 million in "strategically sensitive exports" to the Beijing regime during the 1990s.

"These exports included equipment that can be used to design nuclear weapons, build nuclear weapons components, improve missile designs, and build missile components," said Kyl, the Republican Deputy Whip in the Senate.

Kyl warned that the Export Administration Act of 2001 "would decontrol a number of dual-use technologies, including items used to make nuclear weapons and long-range missiles."

"It is important to remember China's primary objective in acquiring these and other military technologies, to be able to defeat ... Taiwan in a conflict quickly enough to prevent American military intervention," he said.

Following are excerpts from Kyl's January 29 speech from the Congressional Record:

(begin excerpt)

CHINESE MILITARY'S USE OF FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY
Senate
January 29, 2002

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, a recent article in the Far Eastern Economic Review on China's use of foreign technology to modernize its military explains the far-reaching impact of China's purchase of foreign technology on that country's military capabilities. For example, it describes Rolls Royce's recent sale to China of 90 Spey jet engines, some of which will likely be used for the Chinese military's JH-7 fighter-bombers. The technology used in these engines is admittedly dated; but some are concerned that the sale may represent the beginning of a larger relationship between Rolls Royce and China. The article also details China's growing reliance on Russian-designed aircraft, missiles, and navy destroyers and submarines. A February 2001 article in Jane's Intelligence Review described the relationship further, stating:

Between 1991 and 1996 Russia sold China an estimated $1 billion worth of military weapons and related technologies each year. That figure doubled by 1997. In 1999 the two governments increased the military assistance package for a second time. There is now a five-year program (until 2004) planning $20 billion worth of technology transfers.

Perhaps of even greater concern is that, according to the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, the United States approved $15 billion in "strategically sensitive exports" to China during the 1990s. These exports included equipment that can be used to design nuclear weapons, build nuclear weapons components, improve missile designs, and build missile components. And it is important to remember China's primary objective in acquiring these and other military technologies, to be able to defeat our long-standing, democratic ally Taiwan in a conflict quickly enough to prevent American military intervention.

Last September, the Senate passed S. 149, the Export Administration Act of 2001. S. 149 was approved despite serious concerns of some, including myself, that the U.S. export control process is ineffective in stopping the export of militarily sensitive technologies to countries, like China, that pose a potential military threat to the United States or to U.S. interests abroad. S. 149, if enacted into law, would allow China to import even more sensitive technology than it has in the past. It would decontrol a number of dual-use technologies, including items used to make nuclear weapons and long-range missiles.

I urge my colleagues to take a moment ... to consider the impact on China's military capabilities of foreign technology purchases and, more importantly, the potential long-term ramifications of further weakening the U.S. export control process....

(end excerpts)

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(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)

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