*EPF111 11/20/00
Text: Ambassador Foley November 20 Remarks on U.S.-Japan Relations
(Bush or Gore, Japan to remain America's key ally in Asia) (2740)
The U.S.-Japan relationship in an administration headed by Texas Governor George Bush, or in one headed by Vice President Al Gore, would have much of the character it has today, according to U.S. Ambassador to Japan Tom Foley.
According to Foley, the current state of relations between the United States and Japan, the world's two largest economies, are arguably "better than they have ever been" and are unlikely to be affected by domestic political change within either country.
"Japan would be regarded by a Bush Administration or a Gore Administration as our strongest ally in the region and as a global partner for addressing our common challenges," Foley said in remarks prepared for a November 20 discussion on U.S.-Japan relations sponsored by the Japan America Society of Washington D.C. and the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS).
The new U.S. administration, whether Republican or Democratic, Foley said, would maintain "the same fundamental goals" that the Clinton Administration has pursued with Japan.
Those goals on the economic side include improved market and investment access for American firms in the Japanese domestic market and further progress in deregulation and structural reform of the Japanese economy, Foley said.
The new administration, he added, would continue the Clinton Administration's efforts at strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance as "the mainstay of a continuing forward-deployed presence in the region."
A new U.S. administration, Foley said, also would follow the path of the Clinton Administration in seeking to work with Japan to ensure "effective management of changing circumstances on the Korean Peninsula."
Calling the U.S.-Japan "partnership" one that requires "constant and close attention," Foley said there are sound reasons for this, "ranging from geography to the differences in our political systems."
The bilateral dialogue between the two allies, he added, gets more attention from senior officials in both countries than any other bilateral relation they may have.
During a brief question and answer period, Foley praised the contributions of the Japanese to the security alliance, citing the generous financial and logistical support that they provide to U.S. bases in Japan, but he also discussed the need for Japan to play a greater role in peacekeeping activities in the field.
Foley also emphasized that the United States fully supports Japan having a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council and said "the U.S. will do whatever it can to see that this happens."
Following is the text of Foley's remarks, as prepared for delivery:
(begin text)
U.S.-Japan: The State of the Relationship
By Ambassador Thomas S. Foley
Japan America Society of Washington D.C.
CSIS/Japan Chair
November 20, 2000
I would like to thank Bill Breer, CSIS, and the Japan America Society of Washington, D.C. for giving me this opportunity to take stock of the relationship between the United States and Japan at the close of the Clinton presidency. Some observers like to claim that nothing ever really changes in our ties with Japan. My years in Japan suggest otherwise.
At the time President Clinton took office, our bilateral ties faced two broad, and very fundamental, challenges. On the economic front, the perception had taken hold in the United States that Japan was unwilling to engage in fair competition. Americans worried about the competitive challenge Japan posed, and some argued that the scope of the problem created a new type of threat to America's national interests. While these fears have proven to be exaggerated, at the time, they were felt very keenly by many people.
As for our security relationship, the demise of the Soviet threat, coupled with generational change in Japan and other factors, led to a sharp increase in Japanese scrutiny of the form and function of the alliance. I want to be careful not to overstate this point, but there emerged a clear need to renew the sense of shared purpose and to adapt the alliance to changes in the international environment.
In addition to the need to work through these two fundamental challenges to our relationship, the U.S. and Japan faced a series of very significant developments in the region and around the globe. The measure of the present state of the U.S.-Japan relationship is the degree of success we have had in addressing the fundamental issues in our bilateral economic and security ties and in responding together to developments of common concern elsewhere.
From the outset, a key goal of this administration has been to increase market opportunities for U.S. companies in Japan. The U.S. emphasis on resolving trade problems was a source of tension in the relationship, and led some Japanese at the time to charge that we were too results-oriented, that we were seeking "managed," not free trade. But I believe the 39 market opening trade agreements we negotiated over the past eight years have produced real benefits to Americans and Japanese alike.
At the same time, we recognized the need to go beyond specific market access problems by seeking more systemic changes in the workings of the Japanese economy. Our deregulation initiative has aimed to open the way for greater competition in five sectors: energy, financial services, housing, medical/pharmaceutical, and telecommunications. These industries are critical to economic growth and are arenas in which the United States, not coincidentally, is highly competitive.
This ongoing effort to reduce regulatory drag on the Japanese economy puts us squarely in synch with the many Japanese who realize the need for fundamental change in order for their nation to remain competitive in the 21st century.
By the time I took up my post as Ambassador three years ago, American concerns about Japan's economic strength had reversed, as Japan's ongoing recession carried increasingly grave implications for the economic health not only of the region, but of the entire world. Japanese economic recovery became essential for American economic goals and for regional and international stability. This led the United States to strongly encourage Japan to take constructive action, to implement fiscal and monetary policies which would return the economy to a sustainable growth path led by domestic demand.
U.S.-Japan security ties have traditionally been a major stabilizing factor in the relationship. While the Japanese government has not wavered in its support for the alliance, it has faced increased pressure to reexamine various aspects of our presence. Changes in the international security equation, beginning with the breakup of the Soviet Union, have led to increased questioning of the purpose of the alliance. At the same time, political restructuring in Japan, coupled with generational change and the prolonged recession, has also increased scrutiny of the
47,000-strong U.S. military presence. Against this backdrop, the 1995 rape in Okinawa, which hosts approximately half our forces in Japan, galvanized resentment there.
Over the past five years, our base commanders throughout Japan have made a concerted effort to improve the conduct of our troops on and off-duty. They have worked hard to instill standards of respect, courtesy and discipline that we can all point to with pride. Relations between our bases and the local communities that host them have improved commensurate with this effort.
The U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security which President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto issued in 1996 set the agenda for addressing the need to adapt and strengthen our alliance. The two leaders reaffirmed the importance of maintaining existing levels of U.S. forces in Japan while enhancing our cooperation in a number of ways. Implementing this agenda has produced very significant steps forward in preparing the alliance to meet the security challenges of the next century.
Since I arrived in Tokyo, our two governments have begun implementing new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. The implementation of these Defense Guidelines has expanded the scope of our cooperation in dealing with contingencies, which has markedly improved our ability to respond together. We have achieved a number of additional important results in establishing a firmer foundation for sustaining U.S.-Japan defense cooperation into the new century:
-- More than half of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa's recommendations to streamline the U.S. military presence are complete, with good progress on the rest.
-- We have revised our Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement to enable our defense forces to share resources more effectively.
-- We have commenced joint research on Theater Missile Defense.
-- And, we have just concluded a new five-year Special Measures Agreement that maintains Japan's essential host nation support. Japan spends about
$4 billion per year in support of our military presence, which I understand is about as much as all the rest of our allies combined.
All of this adds up to a significantly more robust and effective alliance, which has great deterrent and operational value.
The American public, and their representatives in Congress, expect our friends and allies to join with us in promoting the international stability and security from which we all benefit. Around the world, no other country, except perhaps the United Kingdom, steps forward as readily as Japan.
Over the past several years, the international community has faced many new and ongoing challenges to peace, stability, and humanitarian ideals. In the Asia-Pacific region there have been a series of developments with the potential to alter the strategic equation fundamentally. A strong relationship with Japan remains an indispensable basis for:
-- engaging constructively with an increasingly powerful China;
-- responding to the multiplicity of challenges which North Korea has presented, ranging from development of weapons of mass destruction to famine;
-- dealing with the Asian financial crisis;
-- helping Indonesia fend off instability.
Japan's role as a vital partner of the United States is not confined to the Asia-Pacific by any means. Japan is a constructive participant in the Middle East peace process, both through political dialogue with all parties concerned and by the expenditure of some $576 million in assistance there since 1993. Similarly, Japan has been a major contributor to efforts to restructure the economies of Russia and the rest of the former Soviet bloc, and a reliable supporter of UN peacekeeping and disaster relief efforts wherever they are necessary. Last year Japan devoted approximately $220 million toward resolving the Kosovo conflict. Japan has also taken the lead in international efforts to bridge the "digital divide."
American engagement with Japanese political leaders, officials, experts, and media is critical to the coordination of our approaches to common problems and to the smooth functioning of our global cooperation.
Of particular note in this context, the Common Agenda, launched in 1993 by President Clinton and Prime Minister Miyazawa, established unique partnerships among governments, NGOs, and private citizens. Its 18 initiatives in fields such as environmental protection, health, counter-narcotics, and scientific research are producing real benefits. Polio eradication, control of the spread of HIV, the International Coral Reef initiative, improved understanding of climate change -- the list goes on, but the point is straightforward: U.S.-Japan cooperation is producing direct beneficiaries around the world, and creating new patterns for achieving common goals.
Working with a succession of Japanese counterparts, we have kept faith with the fundamental principles of the U.S.-Japan partnership -- our shared values of democracy, a market-based economy, international peace and stability. The intensification of our cooperation on a diverse array of challenges has produced concrete results for citizens of both countries.
U.S. investment in Japan has surged by more than $11 billion over the past 3 years, and is up another
$6 billion in the first half of this fiscal year. This is exactly the type of success we aimed for in launching our bilateral investment initiative, and we hope to promote further growth in our ongoing dialogue on improving the investment climate. Correspondingly, membership in the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan has increased by 380 firms to a total of 3,170 over the same period. A few years ago, a significant complaint of American companies was the difficulty of recruiting talented Japanese employees. That is no longer a problem, and graduates from Japan's top colleges and graduate schools are signing on with our firms in record numbers.
Our deregulation efforts have produced great progress. In telecommunications, thanks to the U.S. push to open the cell phone market to competition, almost half of all Japanese now have cell phones, which now outnumber conventional ones. Ironically, this is probably the sole area in information technology in which the Japanese are ahead of us. Our latest effort to reduce interconnection costs will result in an estimated $2 billion benefit to competing carriers, including ours. In housing, reduction of various restrictions will lead to an estimated jump of 17% in housing starts within an hour's drive from Tokyo, and we can expect a corresponding increase in opportunities for U.S. building materials firms, which currently do $1.5 billion in annual business in Japan. Efforts to liberalize the financial services market have been highly successful, leading to a significant increase in the number of foreign financial firms operating in Japan. Given the U.S. strength in this sector, it is not surprising that American firms captured the top four spots as advisors to M&A transactions in Japan and that a U.S.-Japan joint venture led the market in new equity issuances.
Our 1998 civil aviation agreement removed all restrictions on a number of American carriers, allowing them to operate from the U.S. to any point in Japan and beyond without numerical limitations, and for the first time permitting extensive code-sharing by American carriers with Japanese and third-country partners. While the liberalization has been mutually beneficial, our carriers cannot operate all the services the market would bear, because of the physical limitations of Narita Airport. It is manifestly in Japan's own interest to increase its international aviation links, and we are continuing to pursue this in official channels.
Our two governments have just agreed in principle to conclude a social security totalization treaty, which when ratified will allow Americans and Japanese working in each other's countries to continue paying into their own social security systems rather than into a foreign system from which they are unlikely to ever draw benefits.
All of this adds up to a new dynamic in which American and Japanese economic successes are not viewed as coming at each other's expense.
The progress we have made in our security, political, and economic cooperation has laid a solid foundation for further growth in the relationship. In the region and globally, our expanded coordination contributes to stability and well-being. Our strengthened alliance enhances the reassuring U.S. military presence
in the region. Cooperation on our shared political agenda is indispensable to an effective international response to problems which affect us all. In sum, the bonds between our two countries have grown stronger during the course of the last eight years, which benefits Americans and Japanese in many different ways.
Throughout the U.S. presidential election campaign I felt confident in assuring our Japanese friends that the outcome would not produce a radical shift in our relations, and that Japan would be regarded by a Bush Administration or a Gore Administration as our strongest ally in the region and as a global partner for addressing our common challenges. In either case, I expect that the incoming U.S. administration will maintain the same fundamental goals this administration has been pursuing with Japan:
-- improved market and investment access for American firms;
-- further progress in deregulation and structural reform;
-- strengthening and adaptation of our alliance as the mainstay of a continuing forward-deployed presence in the region;
-- effective management of changing circumstances on the Korean Peninsula;
-- encouragement to Japan to continue enhancing its contributions to international peace and stability.
The U.S.-Japan partnership is one that requires constant and close attention. There are many reasons for this, ranging from geography to the differences in our political systems. And there is no question that senior officials on both sides of the Pacific devote more attention to this bilateral dialogue than to any other. But, as I hope I have demonstrated in my remarks today, the results are evident and substantial.
We have accomplished much in cooperation with Japan these last several years, and I hope have laid the basis on which the next administration can build to do even more.
Thank you very kindly for your attention this afternoon.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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