*EPF505 06/16/00
Text: Army General Henry Shelton Addresses Global Role of U.S. Military
(Says capability to fight two major theater wars safeguards allies) (2650)

The use of force by U.S. armed forces "ultimately must be a civilian decision," Army General Henry Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told an audience at the State Department June 15.

And while the central purpose of the armed services "is to fight and win the nation's wars...the military can do other things in support of our foreign policy and national interests," Shelton said. These other things include "maintaining American presence, providing deterrence" and intervening only if necessary, he said.

Addressing the Secretary of State's Open Forum, Shelton said that debate is most often provoked when military force is applied in ways which, some critics suggest, do not support vital national security interests.

In humanitarian crises, he added, "the use of military force focuses more on our capabilities and resources and less on pure combat power." Such interventions, Shelton said, should be limited in duration, have a clearly defined end-state, and "must not jeopardize our ability to respond to direct threats to our national security in other regions of the world."

Shelton emphasized the importance of safeguarding the "two major theater war" (2-MTW) capability of U.S. forces, saying that among other factors, it "enables us to carry out our national military strategy and allows us to meet our commitments to our friends and allies around the world." Without it, he said, "if we become engaged in, say, the Balkans for an extended period, then to whom do our friends in Southeast Asia, for example, turn for their security?"

Following are Shelton's remarks as prepared for delivery:

(begin text)

Ambassador Litt, Ambassador Holum, Dr. Hamre, members of the World Affairs Council, distinguished guests, fellow members of the Armed Forces, ladies and gentlemen. Good morning, and thank you very much Ms. Foley for that very generous introduction. Ambassador Litt, thank you for that very interesting and insightful presentation.

Let me say right up front that I'm very honored to be here at the West Wing of the Pentagon today to share the dais with these two great Americans -- Ambassador Litt and Dr. John Hamre and also to speak to you about some important matters of defense and state. Also I am very honored to follow David Litt to the podium. The Ambassador and I worked together in the past. I consider him to be a very gifted diplomat, a brilliant scholar, and a great American.

Dean Acheson after whom this wonderful auditorium is named, once said that ... "the rarest gift that God bestows on man is the capacity for decision." It is, in fact, the nature of decisionmaking in crises that I intend to focus on today.

But first of all, let me comment just a minute on Ambassador Litt's presentation. I think all of you here this morning recognize that he has some very dramatic and forward leaning proposals. While many of you are probably thinking, "Yes, but they are probably not the only way of improving the way of improving our way of doing business." I think that if you really stop and think about the simple message he brought this morning, I think it is "wake-up" call for the State Department and a challenge to the entire interagency. I think his proposals shatter obsolete Cold War paradigms and I urge you to explore his proposals thoroughly just as we will across the river in Foggy Bottom East.

When I address groups interested in foreign policy, I often talk about America's national interests for because I think they are important for all of us to understand. Our vital interests are important for humanitarian? otherwise. Today, however, I would like to forego a pedantic discussion of interests per se and focus instead on a practical discussion of a more fundamental issue. And that is the relationship between force and diplomacy during the conduct of complex contingency operations specifically, how the military, as an instrument of statecraft, can best support our national policy.

Let me stress that I'm not here to be prescriptive but rather to lay out requirements that I see for the use of force. T.S. Eliot once wrote: "Do I dare...do I dare?" Now T.S. Elliott was not asking those questions in the context of national security. But, I think they are particularly relevant as we look at our national security arena. Do we dare to use force when force is needed? And just as importantly for the world's sole superpower do we dare admit that force cannot solve every problem?

The decision to use force is the most important decision that our nation's leaders can make. And, of course, it ultimately must be a civilian decision. A decision that is based on sound military advice but one that is ultimately made by our political leaders on behalf of the American people. In making decisions of such consequence, I think it would do us well to remember that there is no template; no cookie cutter solution that can be applied to all situations. It's na��e to think that we can develop hard-and-fast rules to handle the complex array of contingencies and crises -- both great and small -- which America confronts almost on a daily basis, and, certainly those that we will confront in the future.

But, while each case has its own context and must be weighed on its own merit, this doesn't mean that we are doomed to deal with every contingency in an ad hoc fashion. There are clear parameters that should inform crisis management and there are robust mechanisms in-place to help decisionmakers do their jobs. The fundamental purpose of America's Armed Forces as you probably have heard numerous people say many times is to fight and win the nation's wars. Plain and simple.

That is our fundamental purpose, but not the only purpose. The military can do other things in support of our foreign policy and national interests, including maintaining American presence, providing deterrence, and, of course, intervening when necessary. But intervention, unless linked to a discernible national interest, is not sustainable.

When we look at the use of force to protect our vital national interests -- the really big things where the survival of the Republic is at stake, or where we are trying to protect our way of life, the use of force is not going to be an issue. We will do whatever is necessary -- use force, applied for combat, in a very overwhelming and decisive manner-- the imperatives of the use of American force.

However, it is the use of force in support of other interests than vital interests that engenders the most debate both inside the Potomac and this side of the river as well. Here, I'm talking about the broad range of interests that fall short of our "national survival" but, nonetheless, affect our nation -- both in terms of our national well-being as well as the character of the world in which we live. These run the gamut from an intervention to enhance regional stability and prevent genocide to an intervention in support of humanitarian relief.

At the high-intensity end of the use of forces, military force should be used if the costs and associated risks are commensurate with the desired end-state. At the low intensity end of this scale, such as humanitarian crises, the use of military force focuses more on our capabilities and resources and less on pure combat power.

These interventions, I believe, should first of all be limited in duration. Secondly, they should have a clearly defined end state. And, finally, they must not jeopardize our ability to respond to direct threats to our national security in other regions of the world.

This last point is especially critical. There are those who advocate that we should abandon our Two Major Theater War (or 2-MTW) capability under the rationale that, since we face no true peer competitor anywhere in the world today, we can afford to restructure to something less bulky and more agile. Now, I'm all in favor of increased agility, lethality, and mobility -- anything we can do to improve our forces in that regard. But, there is a fundamental flaw in the logic that we can achieve this only at the expense of our 2-MTW capability. Let me stress that this capability is not a strategy. But it is a requirement that enables us to carry out our National Military Strategy and allows us to meet our commitments to our friends and allies around the world. If we abandon our 2-MTW capability, we risk our own security and the security of our friends around the world.

Although this capability does not allow us to do everything, it does provide the forces necessary to carry out our strategy as well as provide us the flexibility to deal effectively with an unpredictable world. If we abandon our 2-MTW capability, then we must ask, "What do we give up?" Or, more importantly, "Who do we give up?" Let me remind you that at the heart of alliances lies some measure of selfish cost-benefit analysis. Without a 2-MTW capability, if we become engaged in, say, the Balkans for an extended period, then to whom do our friends in Southeast Asia, for example, turn for their security?

We do not want to be in the position or the situation that causes us to choose between responding to a threat in one region and having to abandon our friends and allies in another. The American people do not want that, I know that you would not want that and neither do I.

Ladies and gentlemen, when we consider military intervention, sustaining our involvement abroad does require the support of the American people and the Congress. And the further removed we are from our vital national interests then it becomes more and more challenging to sustain the support of the American people over time. I think that in every case, when we contemplate the use of force, we should consider a number of important questions. Questions like:

-- Is there a clearly defined mission?
-- Is the mission achievable, and are we applying the necessary means to achieve it decisively?
-- Do we have milestones, against which we can measure or judge our effectiveness?
-- Is there an exit strategy? Or, put another way, do we have a strategy for success within a reasonable period of time?
-- Do we have an alternate course of action just in the event the military action either fails or takes too long?
-- Are we willing to resource for the long haul?
-- If our military efforts are successful, are the appropriate national and international agencies prepared to take advantage of the success of the intervention? We all think the use of that particular questions applies.
-- Have we conducted the up-front coordination with our allies, friends, and international institutions to ensure our response elicits the necessary regional support to ensure long-term success?

Having said all that, of course, as all of us in this room understand, if our vital national interests are at stake, then we are -- and we must be -- prepared to act alone.

Let's be realistic. I think that in any intervention that we face, anytime we want to use our forces abroad, we're going to face some opposition at home. That is the way of American democracy. That has been that way in the past and will be that way in the future. Therefore, to gauge whether we should or shouldn't intervene, we must examine whether our involvement advances the interests of the American people? If we decide in the affirmative, then we must remain very clear in the purpose that we have going in, and very resolute in our action.

Over the past decade, we've seen our Armed Forces used over and over again. For example, the U.S. Army's usage was up 300 percent since 1989, and I'm pleased to report that they have performed extremely well in achieving the military tasks that have been set forth by the political leadership of this great country. But, the overriding lesson from our extensive experiences in contingency operations in this decade is that we must bring all our resources to bear -- economic, political and diplomatic, and military -- if we expect to be fully effective in solving non-military problems that are rooted in deep religious, cultural or ethnic strife.

The great French diplomat Talleyrand once said to the head of the French Army, "When my profession fails, yours must come to the rescue." I would submit that we cannot afford to separate diplomacy and force so rigidly. How much better it would be if we work together so that we could prevent failure by the former necessitating rescue by the latter. Instead, we should follow the advice of President Kennedy, who said, "Diplomacy and defense are not substitutes for one another. Either alone would fail."

We now have a formalized relationship that establishes that critical link between policy and power in PDD (Presidential Decision Directive) 56 "Managing Complex Contingency Operations." It basically gives us a framework that helps us orchestrate all the instruments of power toward a common goal in peace and humanitarian assistance operations.

I will tell you today that PDD 56 is a major step forward. It, in fact, forces all of us -- the politician, the diplomat, and the soldier -- to ask the tough questions and most importantly to ask the tough questions up front at the front end of contingency operations. We - State and Defense - must improve our long-range strategic planning abilities to get a better grip on anticipating the next international pitfall -- before it becomes the next international crisis. That is Ambassador Litt's message to us today, and I applaud him for having the vision and courage to articulate it.

In a very troubled world, we see many worthy causes that cry out for military intervention. And being "the better angels of our nature," to use President Lincoln's phrase, it often prompts to get involved very quickly. Sometimes, of course, providing help is exactly what we should do. But, it is also prudent to consider that unintended consequences may accompany well-intentioned impulses to use our strength for the good of the international community.

The military, of course, is the hammer in America's foreign policy toolbox. And it is a very powerful hammer. But every problem we face is not a nail. We may find in some cases that sorting out the good guys from the bad is not as easy as it seems. Yet again, we may find that getting in is a lot easier than getting out.

These are the types of issues we need to confront when we make the decision to commit our military forces. Because, when we do, we lay our prestige, our word, our leadership, and -- most importantly -- the lives of our great young Americans on the line. Yes -- it eases the burden on our diplomatic efforts because it is activity. But, we must be very careful not confuse activity with progress. Unless the problems we face can be solved militarily, we are risking the lives of our sons and daughters without a realistic chance for long-term success. This is a pitfall we must always avoid.

It's been a great pleasure to speak to a great group of foreign policy practitioners of whom the question of decisionmaking during crises is not a theoretical exercise, but a real-world concern.

I look forward to hearing from Dr. Hamre. Then, we will all look forward to taking your questions. Thank you very much.

(end text)

(The Washington File is a product of the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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