*EPF502 03/31/00
Transcript: State Department Noon Briefing, March 31
(United Kingdom, Russia, Cuba, Lebanon, Middle East peace process, China/Taiwan, Kosovo, Romania, Department) (7100)

State Department Deputy Spokesman James Foley briefed.

Following is the State Department transcript:

(begin transcript)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Daily Press Briefing Index
Friday, March 31, 2000
Briefer: James B. Foley

ANNOUNCEMENTS
1 UNITED KINGDOM: Agreement on how to make progress in liberalizing aviation market to be posted after briefing.
1-3 RUSSIA: Sec. Albright revokes previous Chafee Amendment hold on Tyumen Oil (TNK) loan guarantees approval by Export-Import Bank. US believes the hold had a tonic effect on the situation. US remains concerned about rule of law, especially for investment climate.

CUBA
4-10 US interests section in Havana has not yet received visa applications from Juan Miguel Gonzelez or family members. US remains ready to give expedited consideration of such applications. US does not see this issue as portending a change in US-Cuba relations. US plans to support resolution about Cuba at UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva because of our view of abysmal human rights situation there.

LEBANON
10-11 US wants to see UNSCR 425 implemented, and favors withdrawal of all foreign forces.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
11-12 US is expecting some elaboration of Syria's views. US not going into details of issues between Israel and Syria.

CHINA (TAIWAN)
12 Defense Secretary Cohen spoke to issue of Taiwan's ability to defend itself militarily.

FRY (KOSOVO)
12-13 Pentagon set to send more forces to southern Kosovo and Macedonia , in order to supply US forces with enhanced capabilities to deal with any developing situations in its sector.

ROMANIA
13 US agrees with President Constantinescu's positive characterization of Congressmen Smith and Wolf and of their genuine concern for Romania and the OSCE.

DEPARTMENT
14-16 Deputy Spokesman thanked Secretary Albright, Spokesman Rubin, other colleagues for their cooperation during his three-year tenure; expresses enormous respect for media's job in covering foreign affairs.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

FRIDAY, MARCH 31, 2000
1: 17 P.M. (ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. FOLEY: This is my last briefing here in the State Department. I may have - that's the equivalent of a Bronx cheer: an insincere groan on the part of our friend from Reuters. But I may have a few parting shots, which I'll save until the end of the briefing.

I have a couple of announcements to make. One I'll just post. It has to do with negotiations, a meeting that took place between the British Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, and US Secretary of Transportation, Rodney Slater, yesterday, on how to make progress on liberalizing the US-UK aviation market. We will post that after the briefing.

The second announcement is as follows: On March 31st, today, Secretary Albright revoked her December 21st decision to invoke the Chafee Amendment to the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, that delayed approval by the Export-Import Bank of the US of two loan guarantees for the Russian Company, Tyumen Oil, also known as TNK. Her action today allows the Export-Import Bank to move forward on these loan guarantees whenever its board decides to do so. The loan guarantees would allow TNK to purchase $498 million in US oil refinery and exploration equipment.

As you know, the Secretary's decision to delay the transactions was based on our concerns about respect for shareholder and creditor rights in bankruptcy proceedings in which TNK was involved. We concluded then that the manner in which the Administration dealt with these concerns should reflect the policy priority we attached to the rule of law in Russia and, for that reason, we believed that more time was needed to review the issues, assess the situation, consult with Ex-ImBank and other government agencies before the transactions went forward.

Since that time, the Administration has been involved in an extensive review of the concerns and allegations that were raised in the case. We've been able to clarify a number of concerns to our satisfaction. In point of fact, the privatization of TNK was successfully completed, and the company has entered into serious negotiations with shareholders and creditors of the bankrupt companies, to resolve their differences. We've also opened a dialogue with the Russian Government, to impress on them the need to address weaknesses in Russia's legal framework that led to abuses in this case.

Following extensive consultation, after full consideration of the circumstances and these developments, Secretary Albright decided that the available evidence did not justify making the Chafee hold permanent, and; therefore, today she revoked her Chafee determination and the Ex-Im transactions can proceed.

Q: What is the name of the bank?

MR. FOLEY: Yes, of the company?

Q: The company, sorry.

MR. FOLEY: Yes, Tyumen, T-y-u-m-e-n, Oil, otherwise known as TNK.

Q: That was the whole issue? I mean, there was no political issue or - proliferation - it simply was --

MR. FOLEY: It had to do with the rule of law, as a general principle. But it had specifically to do with these transactions. We had concerns about certain bankruptcy proceedings involving -- Sidanko was the name of the other company that had gone bankrupt. It too (is) a Russian oil company and its subsidiaries, and the respect for shareholder and creditor rights, and those in related proceedings.

As I said, we felt that how the US dealt with these concerns needed to reflect the policy priority we place and attach to the rule of law in Russia, and that we needed more time to assess the transaction.

Q: Does this reflect in any way the new government, or is it just coincidental?

MR. FOLEY: It's coincidental. This happened, I believe, on December 21st that the - in any case, in December - yes, the 21st -- that the Secretary invoked the Chafee Amendment. We have been involved in an extensive and deliberative process to ascertain the facts, and to also assess how circumstances were changing.

And I just actually spoke to the Secretary about this a few minutes ago, and she explained how deliberative the process was, and she wanted it to be carefully considered before it came up to her for a decision. She's just made her decision today, but it reflects an ongoing and deliberative process that has come to completion today.

Q: Do you credit the Secretary's hold with having achieved any change in the situation by itself?

MR. FOLEY: We believe that it had a tonic effect on this particular situation. Moreover, in recent appearances, President Elect Putin has made clear public statements recognizing the importance of protecting investor and creditor rights, and the role they play in creating a welcoming climate for foreign and domestic investment.

This does not mean that all of our concerns about the protection of investor and creditor rights - and, indeed, the rule of law - in Russia have been addressed. This is, obviously, a work in progress. The Secretary's decision, both to invoke the Chafee Amendment and now to revoke it, were based on information received and developed in connection with these two particular Ex-Im transactions. It was focused on these narrow issues that came to us for a decision.

We do remain concerned about respect for the rule of law generally in Russia, which we believe is fundamental to Russia's successful transition to a market economy. The President Elect and his government have told us they share our concerns, and they are determined to improve the investment clime. This is clearly something that's in Russia's self-interest: that if Russia's economy is going to transition successfully to the market economy, and to integrate itself successfully in the global economy.

And if those developments are to translate into increased prosperity for the Russian people, then the rule of law is fundamental to that process. The ability to attract foreign investment is fundamental to that process. President Elect Putin clearly made the issue of the rule of law and anti-corruption central to his presidential election campaign. Obviously, we want to see implemented those commitments, but we do regard the Secretary's action in December as having had a positive effect on these particular transactions.

Q: You've spoken about this in general, but could you be slightly more specific about what has changed in Russian business practices, the rule of law, transparency, corruption, in the last three months, which were the concerns mentioned in December? What has actually changed?

MR. FOLEY: I think I've answered those questions, a minute ago --

Q: So you don't have any specific --

MR. FOLEY: -- by stating that the Secretary's decision was focused on these two transactions. We've seen a marked improvement in the underlying situation, the fact that this bankruptcy proceeding had transpired under dubious circumstances, which have now been addressed, and the concerns of shareholders and creditors are now being addressed successfully.

We made the larger point, as well, about how this decision was part of our overall concern about the rule of law. But one narrow decision that the Secretary made and has now unmade could not, in and of itself, fundamentally transform the overall situation involving the rule of law, and proper and sound economic practices in Russia.

We believe that the President Elect has made some commitments, expressed publicly, towards improvements in this area. As I said, we believe this is in Russia's self-interest. We believe that's recognized by the new Russian President and his government, but it's going to be a longer-term process to turn around that overall situation.

Other questions?

Q: Another topic?

MR. FOLEY: Sure.

Q: OK. Thank you, Jim.

Has the Secretary, or have you taken a look at the suggestion that the Vice President made yesterday, to settle the Elian Gonzalez situation by providing visas, possibly asking the Cubans to allow John Gonzalez to come to this country? Have you anything to tell us about that?

MR. FOLEY: A little bit. We have not yet received a visa application for Juan Miguel Gonzalez or any other family members, as of this moment. As I think you know, the father's attorney met with Department officials yesterday, and delivered a letter requesting that visas be issued to family members.

We explained to the lawyer in that meeting that any visa applications would have to be submitted to the US Interests Section in Havana. That's how the visa process works. And, as I said, our Interests Section, until this point, has not received such visa applications.

Now, we have stated previously that we will give expedited consideration to Mr. Juan Miguel Gonzalez's visa application, and to immediate family members. We believe that his presence in this country can help facilitate a successful and a smooth and humane resolution of this case.

Q: If I could, just to ask, Jonathan: What about what Mr. Al Gore had to say yesterday on this subject matter? Can you comment?

MR. FOLEY: No. That's not a State Department matter.

Q: Is he more in line with Administration policy or is he - let me stick to that. Is he out on his own on this? Because I gather - I have a hunch that what he said will be looked on fairly favorably in southern Florida. He couldn't be playing politics, could he?

MR. FOLEY: That's not for me to answer. You know, I have managed to survive three years at this podium -

Q: And your good assignment reflects your caution. (Laughter.)

MR. FOLEY: -- as a foreign service officer --

Q: You wouldn't be going to Geneva if you were a risk-taker. (Laughter.)

MR. FOLEY: I wouldn't be a foreign service officer if I were a risk-taker. Check that. We're going to strike that from the record. (Laughter.)

But I have refrained for three years from commenting on domestic politics. I think Mr. Rubin has made clear that, as we enter the final stretch of the presidential politics season, we are not - we are the State Department. And Secretary Albright has given us all the lead on that: that we are not going to involve ourselves in domestic politics or comment on it.

I believe that the White House, in their briefing a few hours ago, did answer that particular question. But to be helpful - as helpful as I can, Barry - the State Department itself has not been involved in the adjudication of this case. This has been a matter for the INS, under the aegis of the Justice Department, to look at issues such as status and custody and asylum and entry into this country. Those are matters that are handled by those agencies.

The State Department itself has served essentially as a conduit of information, and also we are the visa-issuing agency, and that obviously is a relevant matter today in light of your questions.

Q: You spoke about expediting visas for Juan Miguel and immediate family members. Does that extend - to what extent does that extend towards the 31-member group that President Castro is proposing? MR. FOLEY: Well, the words mean what they say. And you've been here yourself long enough to be able to parse and interpret words that we say and words that we don't say. I was referring, as you rightly point out, to Mr. Gonzalez and Elian's immediate family members. I did not say so in reference to a putative larger group. In terms of, or in reference to that question, I would ask you to hark back to what I said yesterday, in that we're not going to preadjudicate or speculate on what we might or might not do in relation to visa applications that we've not received.

Q: You said quite specifically that you haven't received any applications from any family members. Just a technicality - have you received any visa applications for anybody in the case -- any of these people?

MR. FOLEY: Cuba is a populous island. I'm sure we've received visa applications.

Q: None of these 31 people have submitted regular visa applications either?

MR. FOLEY: Well, I couldn't comment on that list. I haven't really, myself, pored over every word Mr. Castro uttered. But I think your question, though, legitimately references whether we've received visa applications in line of the Gonzalez lawyers' visit to the State Department yesterday. We have not.

I wasn't trying to be cute.

Q: That's OK. That's all right, Jim. I know that you're a short-timer.

A follow-up on that, though. Can you give us a timetable for how the US Interests Section in Havana might handle this? They close probably early this afternoon. Is there any mechanism for submitting these visa applications over the weekend? Do you have any idea how that would be handled?

MR. FOLEY: I don't have the precise answer to your question. We are trying to show goodwill and cooperation in this case. We believe, as I've indicated, that the presence of the father in this country can help facilitate a prompt and humane resolution to this case. And because of that, we've indicated that, in conformity with established guidelines, that we would deal with his application, and those of immediate family members, on an expedited basis.

What that particularly means, in terms of what hour of the day or on the weekend, I can't define for you now, but we are willing to expedite. And if that requires action at a given moment, or on a given day of the week, I think we would be in a position to do so. But I can't answer it speculatively at this point.

Q: Do you consider it the same situation as when the grandmas came? Is it similar in that case to being --

MR. FOLEY: We are capable of acting expeditiously, and we've indicated a willingness to do so.

Q: Jim, I would like to try a question that you sort of step back from -- to a forest-and-trees kind of analogy here. This has blown into this enormous situation, where you have a small immigrant community in Miami which has kind of taken over the INS and the Justice Department, and to some extent this building, and has occupied a tremendous amount of time in news media as well. Now this situation has gone into the political campaigns as well.

But doesn't it strike you as strange that, for the first time, maybe in a large number of years, the Cuban Government and the US Government are agreeing on something? Do you see that this could be an opening at all for some other kind of relationship?

MR. FOLEY: No, I do not. We have, for many years, been very clear that we are receptive to a better kind of relationship with Cuba: namely, with a Cuba that has embarked on the road to political reform -- to democratic reform. We've seen no movement in that direction, nor do we see reason for optimism on those grounds. Cuba has had the same leader, now into, I believe, his fifth decade. There doesn't seem to be any even glimmer of willingness to open up that political system and allow Cuba to join the ranks of the hemisphere and, indeed, of the world community that has, by and large, broken with traditions and systems of authoritarianism. And so there is no basis for any kind of a meaningful or fundamental shift in our relationship. It so happens that, on some specific topics -- for example immigration, where we have negotiated a migration accord -- we have been able to work together, even against the backdrop of fundamental political differences between our political systems.

And so I would not read any larger political significance, whatsoever, into the US Government's handling of this issue. Indeed, as the President of the United States made clear yesterday -- as he has previously -- the Administration has endeavored from the beginning to try to treat this on the basis of the law, and on the basis of parental rights, vis-?vis the child, and not to politicize the issue. I think the politicization of the issue has not come from the side of the US Government.

Q: I don't think that's really the root of the question, if you don't mind.

MR. FOLEY: Well, Betsy may disagree.

Q: No, no, what you're defending - what you're defending is that this judgment is being made on the merits of the case and not being made for political reasons, one way or another.

I thought - and if that's not Betsy's question, which I think it is, it would certainly be mine. Out of such incidents, sometimes things grow. Is there any possibility - I mean, you hear glimmers in Iran - I don't know where they are - but you see glimmers all over the globe. But you never see glimmers in Cuba. And, of course, you're above politics, but you never see glimmers in Cuba.

Is there any possibility that this can be the vehicle, even though it's being dealt with in a non-political way, can be an opening, can be something you can build on to establish some sort of a relationship with Cuba? Your description of how the hemisphere reacts to Cuba, you know, I mean, the world is not with the United States on Cuba.

MR. FOLEY: I didn't describe how the hemisphere reacts to Cuba.

Q: Well, you described them as being sort of not acceptable to most folks --

MR. FOLEY: Out of step. No, I didn't say that. I said, "out of step." No, but I think I --

Q: A lot of the world doesn't see Cuba in the terms the State Department and south Florida do. So the question really is, is there a possibility that this will galvanize, in some way, a more realistic approach to Cuba?

MR. FOLEY: First of all, I think I answered that very question that Betsy asked. And the answer was, basically, no. Let me amend it slightly. We are open to working with a Cuba that is changing, that is embarking on democratic reforms, but we don't see that. It would be nice to speculate that such changes could emanate from Cuba. But I - now finishing three years watching this closely and commenting on it from time to time - do not share the implication in your question, when you used the word "realistic," calling for more "realistic" policy.

I think that those who call for revisions in the way we approach Cuba are basing their hopes on a false premise, which is that Mr. Castro could somehow see it in his interest to embark on a course that could lead to a liberalization, and to an opening of the system and to real political expression and competition; that somehow he would agree to participate and change in a movement that would undo his dictatorial rule. I, at least personally, don't share that premise. One can always hope. But that, narrowly --

Q: I just think -- I meant it's there. For good or bad, it exists and it has existed as a Castro government for more than 30 years. It's there. And you deal with all sorts of countries, good and bad. You deal with countries on the terrorism list, and the President goes half way around the world to meet with leaders of such countries. "Realistic" means, as I was using it, it's just there. And there's a theory, as I am sure you know as a State Department officer. The theory is you don't deal based on like or dislike; you deal with countries because they're there.

MR. FOLEY: But I would argue on the grounds of realism that, in order to move forward, it takes two to tango; and that Mr. Castro is a dictator, and it is not in his perceived self-interest to move along the path of political change and opening. And so to return to yours and Betsy's question - no, in no way, shape or form is the US Government's treatment of this issue connected with any larger political - political intention vis-?vis Cuba. Nor is it really, I think, realistic to speculate that there could be such a movement or shift, in the absence of fundamental changes in Cuba.

Q: Could I just ask on the visa thing again in a different way?

MR. FOLEY: Yes.

Q: I mean, you did say, on the one hand, you don't generally comment whether you're favorable or not to visa applications when they haven't been made yet. On the other hand, you also said that the immediate family members are going to be dealt with expeditiously, and you made it sound like a positive answer is the most likely one.

So I still would like to ask you then, do you agree with Mr. Castro's view that Elian will need his kindergarten teachers and an extended group -- as many as 31 people -- to come here to help him adjust back to Cuban society in case he's going back there.

MR. FOLEY: Well, Mr. Castro is someone who called me, earlier in the week "half an idiot," and if I were to --

Q: (Inaudible. Laughter.)

MR. FOLEY: Yes. Well put, Barry. If I were to agree with him, I would be proving him right, I think, and so I'm not going to.

Q: Do you want to call him something and make a headline? Last day, you know.

MR. FOLEY: Well, what I will say is I think he did significant damage to my career prospects. This is not going to looked well upon by any future Senate committee that might be considering me.

But seriously, you're right. We're not able to formally forecast a visa adjudication decision. What we have said - and you're right to point it out - is that we believe that the father's presence here can be helpful to this process, and so we're prepared to expedite the adjudication of the visa. I can't prejudge the ultimate outcome of that, but we're favorably disposed, though.

Q: Well, then you're not prepared to expedite applications from kindergarten teachers?

MR. FOLEY: Well, Jonathan asked - tried to draw that distinction, and I think I made clear I wasn't quarreling with the distinction that emerged from his question: that we are saying this in the case of Mr. Gonzalez and the immediate family members. And for the others, we're not certainly going to preadjudicate or prejudge in any way their applications, because we haven't received them. We will adjudicate visa applications that we receive.

I've gotten pretty good at this after three years.

Q: I'm trying to get you to say what I just said, and you didn't.

MR. FOLEY: Other questions?

Q: I take your point about not seeing much change in Cuba, but what do you say to the argument that in Cuba, as in many other parts of the world - for example, North Korea or the Eastern bloc before change - by stimulating contact, even with the authorities, you might be able to stimulate the kind of change that you're seeking in Cuba.

MR. FOLEY: I think that's where the premise is flawed, though. That's what I was trying to say to Barry: that the premise that Mr. Castro will willingly cooperate in that which might under his dictatorial rule, I think is flawed. Yes, we do deal with each country around the world on the basis of our judgment about our values and our interests and how best to promote them, and we don't have a "one-size-fits-all" formula for dealing with countries around the world.

The analogy that's often thrown at us is one between Cuba and China, for example, that we believe in engagement with China. But China has embarked for 20 years, and especially in the last number of years, on a thoroughgoing economic reform. There has been retarded political reform, an opening clearly, and major human rights violations, and practices that we don't agree with. Nevertheless, there's much greater freedom in China, there's much greater space for civil society to develop. There is a groundwork, therefore, to build on, in which political liberty may emerge over time.

In Cuba, you have a dictatorial communist government that seeks to maintain its monopoly on power and its control over all aspects of society, and one which is not engaging in economic reform either, is not allowing there to develop an independent civil society. We have tried to work around the margins of the system, such as it exists, in Cuba. Secretary Albright, as you know, and the President have announced over the last few years initiatives designed to reach out to Cuban civil society. There were hopes, engendered at the time of the Pope's visit to Cuba, that there would be a greater width of freedom developing in Cuba - hopes that were disappointed in the aftermath of that visit.

Do we have more on Cuba, or do you want to go on to something else?

Q: Hasn't there been a greater repression of dissidents in Cuba in recent months -- an increase in repression, I should say?

MR. FOLEY: As you know, we are going to support a resolution in Geneva on Cuba's human rights record, precisely because we believe their human rights record is abysmal and, indeed, has worsened over the last year.

Q: Well, I'm asking about the question of some kind of rapprochement vis-?vis Cuba. If you say Cuban Castro - Prime Minister Castro, the leader Castro is a dictator, how do you describe Syria's Assad, whom your President is dealing with, and how do you describe Kim Chong-il, whom the State Department officials are dealing with? Are they not dictators?

MR. FOLEY: We've been very clear. I think Mr. Rubin spoke about our view of the lack of democracy in Syria. I think it's absolutely indisputable that in North Korea you have an authoritarian system. There is no, I think, doubt on either score.

Other questions?

Q: New subject?

MR. FOLEY: Sure.

Q: Yesterday, when you were speaking about Lebanon, you gratuitously brought up all foreign forces leaving, in the context of Resolution 425. And I wondered - which is not included in Resolution 425. I wondered, did you intend to bring this question of all foreign forces into the mix of Syrian-Israeli-Lebanese peace negotiations?

MR. FOLEY: First, I am not sure I share your assessment that what I said was gratuitous, but we will leave that aside for now --

Q: Or new.

MR. FOLEY: Or new. You're right. You've been here longer, though, Barry.

Q: Goes back 20 years. All foreign forces.

MR. FOLEY: There's nothing you haven't seen or heard.

No, it's been long our policy that we want to see Resolution 425 implemented, and we want to see all foreign forces withdrawn from Lebanon. I believe there are a number of UN Security Council resolutions that are relevant in this regard that we have voted for.

Q: This probably is a dry hole, but Mubarak on the way home -

Q: (Inaudible.)

Q: No, same subject.

MR. FOLEY: We'll let Jonathan --

Q: You didn't say whether you intend to introduce this question of all foreign forces into the mix, the agenda for peace talks between Israel and Lebanon and Syria. Or do you consider it to be purely a bilateral matter between Lebanon and Syria?

MR. FOLEY: What we're focused on now is trying to advance the cause of a negotiated settlement between Israel and Syria, eventually between Israel and Lebanon. And we believe that that is the ideal framework for there to be effected a withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon.

Barry was asking me about other contingencies yesterday, but I'm talking about in the ideal. We also favor the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. I don't think I can parse those words any further, though.

Q: President Mubarak who, you know, has this role, that you folks support, of being a go-between, on the way home seemed to be - well, actually doesn't seem to be - said flatly that no concessions can be expected of Syria, and he criticized Barak for trying to hold on to a sliver of land from the disputed land. And the Syrian press, which isn't exactly a free-wheeling free press, also spoke as if there is no more give there.

I know we've been through this; maybe this is all a dry hole at this point. But do you expect - where does the US expect the movement to come from? Is Syria that unmovable, do you think, or is there some room to - something to work with? Do you have something to work with there?

MR. FOLEY: It is a legitimate question. I was about to chastise you for asking the same question we've been batting back and forth for the last few days. As you formulate it, though, it is legitimate. One needs something to work with. And right now, we don't have that.

As I said yesterday, the President went to Geneva, and we had been consulting with the Israelis, and some of the ideas and perspectives that the President presented were serious ideas. And the Syrian leader was not in a position to accept them.

But if we are going to be able to carry the ball farther, we need an elaboration on their side. Now, we recognize this may take some time. It may not happen overnight. But nevertheless, the President was clear that, in the mode we are in now, we are expecting some elaboration from the Syrian side.

Q: On the same subject, can you conceive of a Syrian offer which continues to incorporate their core demand but which makes significant concessions in other areas and which, thereby, gives you something to work with, as you put it?

MR. FOLEY: I have not - and Mr. Rubin has not - gotten into the particulars of the issues between Israel and Syria. I am not going to be in a position to do so today.

Q: Well, I just wondered if Mr. Cohen had done it all, that all that's to be said by the Administration on Taiwan's defense - he got into it today and it's pretty authoritative.

MR. FOLEY: Were you in the Middle East still?

Q: I was not.

MR. FOLEY: OK.

Q: Is there something further on the notion that Taiwan isn't able to defend itself?

MR. FOLEY: He is the dean, Terry. He's got a large number of years.

Q: No, no, no. It's a quick hit and you probably have nothing to add to it.

MR. FOLEY: Well, I believe that Secretary Cohen noted that, number one, what was asked had to do with some classified reports and assessments that we can't speak to. Secondly, I think he noted that it was our view that Taiwan did have capable self-defense forces. And, number three, the fact that we work on such reports is, in and of itself, a demonstration that this is a topic of concern to us, and that it's something that obviously informs our decisionmaking, given our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act.

Q: On the Pentagon, can you talk about the new deployment to Kosovo, and the greater shipments of weapons?

MR. FOLEY: I have a little bit of information - not a lot, because it's mostly something that the Pentagon would be able to speak to.

But the US is increasing its forces in KFOR's Multinational Brigade East, with 125 reconnaissance troops who will help monitor Kosovo's boundary with southern Serbia. In addition, a company of the First Armored Division, already in Macedonia, will be equipped with tanks and artillery.

We continue to be concerned about the possibility of unrest along Kosovo's boundaries. These additional deployments will provide US forces with enhanced capabilities to deal with any situation that develops in its sector. We continue to insist that all parties exercise restraint, refrain from any violent or provocative actions, and permit UNMIK and KFOR to carry out their work.

Again, I would refer you to the Pentagon for more details.

Q: Same subject. What has the response been from the UCPMD to your - those Presevo Valley people - to your appeal for them to observe the agreement they made?

MR. FOLEY: They have not come into compliance yet with the commitments that they made in the meeting held under Mr. Thaci's leadership. There is no movement since yesterday, since this question was asked extensively yesterday.

Q: Are we there? It's time to say goodbye. So goodbye and good luck.

MR. FOLEY: Oh, Barry, you're so - you're so emotional.

Q: No, no, no, they're trying to get their questions in.

MR. FOLEY: Well, can we take one more? Barry, this is my last chance.

Q: Yeah, I know.

MR. FOLEY: This soap box is --

Q: Say something about Romania, then.

Q: Yeah, I would like to try a question on Romania.

MR. FOLEY: Yes, sir. Barry, you're prophetic.

Q: If you have any reactions to the response of former Romanian President Ion Iliescu to the latest discussion on the Eastern European Helsinki Commission?

MR. FOLEY: Yes, I have a brief answer. We agree with President Constantinescu's positive characterization of Congressman Smith and Wolf, and of their genuine concern for Romania and the OSCE. We're not going to characterize the congressmen's alleged remarks, or subsequent responses by other parties. I think you should address those queries to Congressmen Smith and Wolf.

Q: And I had just one. Has the State Department anything to say about an incident that took place in Santa Teresa, New Mexico, where Border Patrol agents were fired upon by Mexican soldiers, and Mexican soldiers were then --

MR. FOLEY: I don't have anything on that.

Q: You don't have anything on that?

MR. FOLEY: I don't.

Q: Have you heard anything about - have you heard about the incident?

MR. FOLEY: No. Well, actually, I heard about it on the radio, but I have not seen anything on it. We'll look into it for you.

Q: You going to come back on it next week?

MR. FOLEY: Yes. I will come back on it next week. Someone will look into it for you.

Q: Then a final question would be: What's your near future looking like?

MR. FOLEY: My near future?

Q: Yeah.

MR. FOLEY: I'm going to New York for the weekend, so that's what my near future is. And the future looks brighter, indeed.

Would you permit me to say a few words, Barry?

Q: Please. I wish you would.

MR. FOLEY: I have try to resist the sort of Academy Award-type self-indulgence.

Q: Well, nobody is going to hug you today. (Laughter.)

MR. FOLEY: That was - that was - I don't think anyone - it wasn't April Fools Day but nobody has ever surprised me. I hope that door is bolted over there, by the way.

But I'm a foreign service officer, and we tend to toil rather anonymously in embassies around the world, and people do really remarkable unsung work, our foreign service officers, in many difficult places around the world.

In the last four years, I've had a rather unusual opportunity for a foreign service officer, to serve at sort of the nexus of politics and press in Washington. I worked for Senator Coverdale on Capitol Hill for a year, and then was asked by the Secretary to serve as Jamie Rubin's deputy for the last three years. And I am, first of all, grateful to Jamie - and he is obviously a very gifted Spokesman, and he has taught me an enormous amount about how to deal with you guys here.

And as far as the Secretary is concerned, it has been a real privilege and an enormous source of pride for me to serve her for the last three years. I also worked for another Secretary of State, Secretary Eagleburger, a number of years ago in the State Department, and he reminds me a lot of Secretary Albright. They are both people who are tough and who love their country and believe America should stand tall in the world.

And he had a definition of what constitutes a good or successful foreign service officer or diplomat. In some sense, what I am going to say contradicts what I said about myself earlier, but I'm not talking about myself. He said that what defines a good foreign service officer is someone who has guts; in other words, the willingness to tell it like it is, even when your superiors don't necessarily want to hear it.

And I think, by that yardstick, Secretary Albright is certainly a very gutsy lady who tells it like it is around the world, to Congress and to the American people. And as I said the other day, I think she has a very ambitious idea of America's role in the world, and I believe will go down as one of our really great modern Secretaries of State.

I would also like to thank a number of people I've worked closely with over the last years. The Secretary's Chief of Staff, Elaine Shocas, who many of you have traveled with; with my many colleagues in the Bureau of Public Affairs, whom you work with, including Lula Rodriguez, whom I've been very close to; and Marthena Cowart, another deputy assistant secretary. And in the Press Office, all of you have worked with Lee McClenny and now with Phil Reeker, who is doing an admirable job, and Julie Reside and many others, including the estimable Nancy Beck, whom you all rely on more than anybody, I think, in this building, and many other press officers and press assistants.

I would like to thank my secretary, Joanne Pettaway, and the special assistants who have worked for me, including Michelle King and Christopher Bush and Alison Shorter.

Just a few words before closing on our relationship. Certainly it is an adversarial relationship by definition. We've had some difficult moments, where we've avowed, I think, eternal hatred towards each other. I don't speak collectively but, in individual cases, we've had our ups and downs. And that's really in the nature of the game.

I can remember a number of occasions, or several anyway, when I've said, "I will never talk to that reporter again," and quickly learned to regret having said that, because we have to work with you. And I think on your side, too, you felt that at some points we've been unfair or unhelpful and you've vowed to get us, which maybe you've done - but then discovered that you need us too. So there is a symbiotic relationship there.

I've served in several countries where there wasn't a free press, and I therefore developed there, even before dealing with you guys, the conviction that we cannot be a free society unless we have a free press. And with a free press goes a lot of reporting that we don't like, and sometimes we think it's unfair or unbalanced, and sometimes it is; sometimes that's just our perspective. I think our roles are equally important in our democracy: yours to report on what we're doing, ours to do a good job in foreign policy. They don't necessarily always coincide. Sometimes, for us to do a good job, we can't be as helpful to you as you want. But, therefore, we work in parallel and not always together.

But I have enormous respect for all of you and the work you do, and I've gotten a much better sense of how difficult the work is that you have to do. Sometimes, I think we're disappointed in your editors, that they don't allow you to give more coverage of what we do. And we are the only superpower; what we do and don't do, I think, as Secretary Albright has said, can make an enormous difference in what kind of world we're going to live in. And all of you are trying to - even when you are criticizing us, you are covering us and covering the world. And I wish sometimes your editors would give your work wider play and deeper respect.

But you've got my respect, and it's been a real pleasure, and I hope to continue to maintain friendships with all of you.

Thank you very much.

(end transcript)

(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: usinfo.state.gov)
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