*EPF316 03/29/00
Text: Newsom on State/Defense Department Foreign Policy Coordination
(From electronic journal "U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda") (2780)

(The ability of the Departments of State and Defense "to operate 'jointly' will have a profound impact on U.S. leadership in the world and effectiveness in protecting our interests and those of our allies and friends," says Eric D. Newsom, assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. "We need to understand the nature of this mixed or joint instrument, and what it requires from the two or more sets of bureaucracies called upon to implement our national security strategy," he says. The following article, adapted from a recent speech given by the assistant secretary, is included in the March issue of the State Department electronic journal "U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda," which addresses the topic, "The Making of U.S. Foreign Policy." The Internet address for the journal is: "http://www.usinfo.state.gov/journals/journals.htm".)

UNITING THE TOOLS OF FORCE AND DIPLOMACY TO ENHANCE SECURITY
By Eric D. Newsom

The ability of the United States to shape international events in ways that advance U.S. interests will in large measure depend on whether the Department of State, together with the Department of Defense and other agencies, can respond creatively and cooperatively to the joint challenges we face in a changing world environment. The world we live in now is undergoing a revolution in technology, communications, and information flow; in business practices and organizational structures; in ways nations relate to one another and respond to their publics; in the ability of multinational corporations and other non-governmental organizations to influence international events; and in how regional and international organizations respond to conflict and humanitarian and natural disasters.

Our military has recognized that these factors contribute to a "Revolution in Military Affairs" that may well be changing the very nature and conduct of war. They are seeking to adapt to the new realities both within the individual service structure (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines) and in the "joint" world in which the capabilities of each of the services must be brought to bear to achieve U.S. security objectives. The new world environment has demanded a new way of being a soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine. It now often requires an understanding of international politics, ethnic rivalries, local politics in a foreign country, and how fair elections can work -- as much as how to command a unit and take the next hill or piece of land.

In much the same way, the State Department is experiencing a kind of "Revolution in Diplomatic Affairs" in which the role of the diplomat in the 21st century and the way we communicate, make decisions, negotiate, and conduct public relations (which we call public diplomacy) -- even the very nature of the work that we do -- have radically changed. Diplomats today are out in the field working with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) on anti-drug campaigns in Latin America, flying in military helicopters over Northern Iraq, assisting refugees and planning non-combatant evacuations in Africa, implementing regional security cooperation efforts in Central Europe, and planning the next phase of civilian operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor.

The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Revolution in Diplomatic Affairs bring the work of the soldier and the work of the diplomat to an intersection on an almost daily basis worldwide. The international environment and the challenges we face are such that our policy-makers often must use the military and the diplomatic instruments in concert rather than as distinct, separate tools to achieve our goals.

In the Gulf War, our military planned and conducted Desert Storm in concert with a coalition of partners that required the work of diplomats to assemble and to maintain. In Bosnia and Kosovo, and similar peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, diplomacy must be employed to coordinate with allies and partners on a host of issues ranging from managing the electoral process to treatment of international war criminals. Following Hurricane Mitch, when the U.S. military responded to urgent calls for help from beleaguered governments, diplomats negotiated terms of entry and departure and helped facilitate the military's disaster relief work. In other world regions, diplomats and soldiers sit together in the meeting halls of NATO and the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum.

Without naming it as such, we are evolving -- in practical ways every day -- into a new kind of "interagency jointness" in which State and Defense cooperate to achieve the goals set out for us by the President and our policy leaders. Secretary of State Albright and Secretary of Defense Cohen exemplify this new trend. In a recent op-ed piece in the Washington Post, they wrote: "As Secretaries of Defense and State, we work daily to combine the tools of force and diplomacy in order to protect the security and advance the interests of the American people." They went on to say, "Our armed forces must remain the best-led, best-trained and best-equipped in the world....But we also need first class diplomacy. Because on many occasions we will rely on diplomacy as our first line of defense -- to cement alliances, build coalitions, and find ways to protect our interests without putting our fighting men and women at risk."

The U.S. military has been tasked in the President's National Security Strategy report to prepare itself to respond across the full spectrum of military operations, including: major theater warfare, peace enforcement, hostile and non-hostile non-combatant evacuations, humanitarian and disaster relief in hostile and non-hostile environments, and simply creating favorable and interoperable relations with foreign militaries who can support us in the military tasks we undertake. It is clear that at every notch on this spectrum, diplomacy will be an integral element of success -- either to reduce or eliminate the need for use of force, maintain coalitions, or negotiate peace.

Thus, in any scenario for the future, our ability to operate jointly will have a profound impact on U.S. leadership in the world and effectiveness in protecting our interests and those of our allies and friends. This will require us to cooperate not only at the highest levels and on an ad hoc basis, but regularly in the corridors of our bureaucracies where we plan and conduct our nation's business.

Success will require habits of cooperation that will undergird success when our leaders employ an instrument of policy that is at once military and diplomatic. We need to understand the nature of this mixed or joint instrument, and what it requires from the two or more sets of bureaucracies called upon to implement our national security strategy.

Since returning to the State Department in 1994, I have seen change, in both State and Defense, in how we think about and approach the marrying of force and diplomacy in pursuit of our national objectives. Together we have achieved fundamental strategic objectives for the United States in the post-Cold War world. Yet, we have a long way to go. Historical differences, institutional cultures, and stereotypes have fostered attitudes of territoriality and some distrust in our dealings with each other's organizations -- or at least very different conceptions of our respective roles and missions.

In order for our leaders to integrate force and diplomacy as a new sort of policy tool, the Defense and State Departments will have to break out of old cultural and institutional barriers to an unprecedented extent and find new, creative ways of planning and doing business together.

This is a major goal of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, and we are pursuing it vigorously. Some are skeptical about this new approach and strongly urge us to go slowly.

Frankly, I don't think the United States can afford to have us inch along in this process. Though we can analyze trends and make predictions, we do not know for certain when and where the next conflict will arise that will require the combined use of force and diplomacy. Though we managed in Bosnia and Kosovo, ad hoc cooperation should evolve into better institutional ties and arrangements that allow us to know one another and respond rapidly when the mix of force and diplomacy is required in an unpredictable international environment.

For this reason, we are developing methods to promote cooperation, coordination, cohesion, and consensus on how best to use our diplomatic and military tools to shape the international environment.

At its essence, this means planning together from the top down, and then cooperating in implementation. This will involve serious interaction between State and Defense in developing State's foreign policy goals as well as its bureau and embassy program plans. It also should involve serious interaction in the formulation of goals and objectives in defense policy, and in such key planning exercises as the Quadrennial Defense Review and regional military "theater engagement plans."

This is not to say that each agency should take over the other's work or dictate or meddle in each other's business. At a certain point, soldiers must be soldiers, and diplomats must be diplomats. Rather, the goal is to develop and implement plans and policies that are informed by and in sync with one another in fulfillment of the President's National Security Strategy. We're trying to do that now in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, working closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other sectors of the military establishment to achieve this goal.

Second, as we seek to shape the international environment and respond to current events, we need to better coordinate the work of all of the interagency players, not only Defense and State. We are making progress in this area. One of the highlights of my tenure as assistant secretary for political-military affairs has been the work that we have done to advance political and military coordination on complex contingency operations (such as Kosovo and our role in East Timor). An important tool is Presidential Decision Directive-56 (PDD-56), which provides mechanisms for interagency cooperation in these circumstances. As the bombing campaign in Kosovo wore on, 30 military and civilian officers from 18 agencies, bureaus, and offices collaborated over several intense weeks of work to produce a 46-page "mission analysis." This ultimately shaped the UN Mission in Kosovo and KFOR (Kosovo Peacekeeping Force) operations and helped synchronize international efforts after the bombing stopped. Despite initial skepticism on the part of some, this process was shown to work better than even the optimists had predicted.

Now we are seeking clearer, more effective mechanisms to make the PDD-56 process work better. A new contingency planning Interagency Working Group will greatly advance this effort.

This new way of cooperating is a challenge for both military and civilians. Every U.S. military officer has studied the great Prussian military thinker Karl von Clausewitz and understands that military operations and objectives are always subordinate to strategic political and diplomatic goals. But that understanding has not necessarily led to the conclusion that civilians should sit at the military planning table. Today's international environment continues to call for limited, precise, often untraditional uses of military power in the pursuit of specific -- but sometimes rapidly changing -- political objectives. This will require a more open approach to planning interlinked military and political objectives.

The State Department also will have to alter its traditional conceptions. We are only beginning to understand what it means when we say that our work does not end when we negotiate an agreement. The abstractions of a settlement must be made operational. We need to sweat the kind of details we may normally ignore. We must be willing to deal with matters that were not previously part of the diplomatic realm: how to create police forces, how to rebuild defunct judicial systems, how to reestablish a functioning currency, how to make an uncooperative host nation military accept civilian authority and stop massacring opponents, and how to perform a host of other, unusually uncongenial, tasks.

Joint planning will never be easy, even in the best of all possible worlds. During the planning for the period after the bombing campaign in Kosovo, strong differences surfaced between Defense and State. At times, parts of the Defense Department buttoned up and went silent whenever State officials showed up. It took some battering on the gates to get insights into military planning and thinking. Both departments fought hard about issues like policing, military support to civil administration, and so on. To the credit of both, we did not paper over our disagreements. There were vigorous debates.

But, before anyone was deployed in support of the post-bombing effort, we came to closure on an agreed strategy and plan. Great and contentious issues were argued and settled before, not after, mission start-up, providing those who implemented the plan with clarity of purpose and division of labor. I contend that the whole process was of great value, and a precedent for the future, even if subsequent events in Kosovo did not go according to plan. As the late president General Dwight Eisenhower once said, "A plan is worthless, but planning is everything."

In addition to State-Defense planning, our international environment also requires coordination with the U.S. Agency for International Development, which is often called upon to organize the response to humanitarian crises throughout the world, drawing on U.S. military resources. These humanitarian efforts sometimes take place in the midst of a peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation, making coordination among the various components absolutely imperative.

Not every issue or challenge requiring close coordination is a complex contingency operation or a major humanitarian effort. The U.S. effort to shape the international environment requires objectives that are in sync and actions that are well coordinated. To facilitate this daily coordination at the working levels, we might do well to develop a "Country Team" approach in Washington comparable to the one that works so well at our embassies abroad. To some extent, we do this in the Interagency Working Group process. But this process is often issue specific rather than ongoing; we need further opportunities for a free-flowing exchange of ideas and information.

As a means to overcome institutional barriers and stereotypes, I recommend various measures: We need to expand the existing program of exchanging officers between the Defense and State Departments both in Washington and in the field. We should look for more opportunities for Foreign Service Officers to serve on senior military staffs, and at the same time, we should offer opportunities for senior military officers to hold policy-level positions in the State Department. I would like to see military officers serving at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level in State, and State officers serving in the Defense Department in the same capacity, as in the past.

In addition, we need to look at opportunities for joint training. We should increase the number of State Department officers who attend service schools. And I would like to see our own National Foreign Affairs Training Center open its doors wider to military colleagues as we study regional policies, negotiating, and other foreign service professional skills and political-military issues.

Finally, there is a compelling reason for those of us in the State-Defense security community to cooperate from the top down and the bottom up: our responsibility to the men and women in the military and in the Foreign Service who serve on the front lines of defense for the United States in some of the most difficult places in the world. When we conduct our business in Washington at the rarefied levels of planning and interagency discussion, it is easy to forget that our success or failure to act effectively together can have serious consequences for the actual people called upon to implement our decisions and directives. It pains me every time I hear our military in the field say they do not understand what our policies are and how they are supposed to be advancing them. We need to make sure that they go out with the clearest goals and objectives, the best-crafted plans, and the highest quality equipment we can get for them. In today's world, that requires "joint" cooperation by military and civilian. We are committed to this effort.

That is why my goal for the Political-Military Bureau at State is to increase the level and depth of understanding between State and Defense of each other's missions and to strengthen our planning and cooperative efforts. Recently, I wrote a memo to Secretary Albright offering this as the bureau's primary mission for the year 2000. I know she shares this goal and is committed to making it happen.

(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: www.usinfo.state.gov.)
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