*EPF307 03/08/00
Text: State Official Deming March 8 on Asia-Pacific Security Issues
(U.S. strategic, economic interests in Asia still strong) (2340)

Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Rust Deming told the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific March 8 that "the end of the Cold War represented an end of an era but not the end of the need for our key alliances or a robust American military presence in the region."

"Our interest in maintaining a secure environment to allow economies to develop, trade to grow, and democracy to spread has not diminished," Deming said. "In fact the American strategic, political, and economic stake in East Asia has only increased."

He emphasized there is broad support in East Asia for a substantial U.S. military role in the region, as evidenced by the host nation support provided by Japan and the Republic of Korea, and the fact that a growing number of other Asian countries have also welcomed the opportunity to plan, train and exercise with U.S. forces.

With regard to U.S. military interaction with Indonesian armed forces, Deming said the two countries' military-to-military relations have been restricted for years because of U.S. concerns about human rights abuses in that country, but added that the United States wanted to be supportive of newly elected Indonesian President Wahid's efforts to reform his country's military.

"The Administration will continue to consult closely with Congress on step-by-step resumption of defense relations with Indonesia," Deming said.

He also said the White Paper issued February 28 by the People's Republic of China concerning cross-strait relations "contains far more than the threatening language that has garnered so much attention .... It also provides some proposals to facilitate cross-strait talks." Deming reiterated the United States commitment to seeing the Taiwan issued resolved peacefully through such talks.

"Clearly, we must anticipate that, over coming years, the security situation in the Asia Pacific region will change," Deming concluded. "However, under any foreseeable scenario, it will be in our interest and the interest of allies and the region as a whole to maintain a formidable American forward-deployed presence in East Asia."

Following is the text of Deming's remarks, as prepared for delivery:

(begin text)

Testimony before
The House International Relations Committee
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific

U.S. Security Concerns in Asia

By Rust M. Deming
Acting Assistant Secretary of State
For East Asian and Pacific Affairs

March 8, 2000

Thank you Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to join Assistant Secretary Kramer and Admiral Blair to discuss U.S. security interests in Asia and the Pacific. My colleagues from the Defense Department and our Pacific Command will discuss the military aspects of the security picture in some detail. Recently, Assistant Secretary Roth testified before this Subcommittee on regional developments, prospects in Indonesia and the crisis in East Timor. With all of this before the Subcommittee, I thought I would focus my remarks on how our military efforts support our broader interests in the region.

Ever since World War II, the American forward-deployed military presence and our bilateral alliance structure have been the foundation of security across the Asian Pacific region. Through the long years of the Cold War, the United States, working with its allies, contained the Soviet threat and provided the bulwark behind which many nations were able to build the foundations for prosperity and stability. Together with our allies and partners in the region, we created and maintained the environment in which Asian economies prospered and democracy has grown steadily.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the end of the Cold War marked a seminal point in the history of the 20th century. The solidarity of our alliances and our military presence in East Asia made an important contribution to this success story by containing the threat of Soviet expansionism in the Far East.

The end of the Cold war represented an end of an era but not the end of the need for our key alliances or a robust American military presence in the region. Our interest in maintaining a secure environment to allow economies to develop, trade to grow, and democracy to spread has not diminished. In fact the American strategic, political, and economic stake in East Asia has only increased. The American naval, air, and ground forces deployed in the Western Pacific, working with our alliances partners, continue to play the critical role in maintaining a stable environment.

On the Korean Peninsula we face one of the last residual challenges of the Cold War. As outlined by Secretary Perry in his review last year, we are addressing this challenge with a two pronged strategy. First, we maintain a strong deterrent on the peninsula through our alliances with the ROK and Japan and our forces stationed in South Korea and elsewhere in the region. Second, we stand ready to improve relations with the DPRK as it deals with issues of concern to the United States and our allies, particularly in the missile and nuclear areas. This comprehensive approach has the strong support of the ROK and Japan, which fully share our view that diplomacy can only succeed if it is backed with credible deterrence and resolve.

In Japan, our bilateral security relationship is as strong as it has ever been, and our bases there remain fundamental to our strategic presence in Asia. Japan is host to 47,000 U.S. troops, second only to Germany, and is home to the only carrier battle group stationed outside the United States. We have worked hard with the Japanese government over the last few years to strengthen our alliance. In 1996 President Clinton and then Prime Minister Hashimoto issued the US-Japan Security Declaration, which set forth the post Cold War rationale for the alliance and called for revision of the US-Japan guidelines for defense cooperation to enable us to cooperate more effectively in response to a regional crisis. These new guidelines have now been developed, and last year Japan passed implementing legislation. We are now working with the Government of Japan to flesh out our defense planning under these guidelines.

To further strengthen our alliance with Japan we are working with the GOJ to consolidate our base structure in Okinawa prefecture where almost half of US Forces in Japan are stationed. The key element of this program is the relocation within Okinawa of the Marine Air Station at Futenma, and substantial progress has been made on this in the last few months. We have also expanded our research program with Japan on Theater Missile Defense (TMD).

In Southeast Asia, we have worked in coordination with our treaty allies -- the Philippines, Thailand and Australia -- and with a number of other partners to strengthen regional stability. Our successful efforts in support of the transition in East Timor mark an important turning point. The government of Australia, together with others in the region, provided the leadership and the bulk of the forces to respond to this threat to stability in the region. Thailand provided the deputy INTERFET commander and the second largest contingent, and the Philippines provided the third largest force and the military commander for the follow-on UNTAET force. The United States supported this effort by providing several key capabilities for the multinational force that entered East Timor in October to restore security -- communications, logistics and intelligence.

As part of our overall policy to engage China, we are seeking to develop a relationship with China's military, a subject that Adm. Blair and Assistant Secretary Kramer will address in more detail. Let me just say that our efforts to engage the Chinese military do not occur in a vacuum. They occur within our commitment to "one China," dialog and the peaceful resolution of differences, what we have called the "three pillars" of our position, and within our commitment to faithfully implement the Taiwan Relations Act. They are also very much affected by the overall atmosphere of the relationship.

In that context, let me comment briefly on the White Paper on cross-strait relations issued by the PRC on February 28. The White Paper states in part that Beijing would have reason to use force against the island if Taiwan refused cross-strait negotiations on reunification indefinitely. That new formulation is unwelcome, and we have expressed our deep concern to China at high levels both in Washington and in Beijing. We have made it abundantly clear that we are committed to seeing the Taiwan issue resolved peacefully through cross-strait dialogue. The White Paper contains far more than the threatening language that has garnered so much attention. It also provides some proposals to facilitate cross-strait talks. We urge Beijing to resume this dialogue.

It is important to emphasize that there is broad support in East Asia for a substantial U.S. military role in the region. Japan and the ROK both demonstrate, through the host nation support they provide, the importance they attach to their alliances with the U.S. and to our forward-deployed presence. A growing number of other countries in the region have also welcomed the opportunity to plan, train and exercise with U.S. forces.

These activities, together with foreign military sales and opportunities for foreign military personnel to train in the United States under IMET, help to cement common perspectives and personal relationships between U.S. and foreign militaries, which in turn increase the opportunity for cooperation and diminish the risks of misunderstanding. They strengthen our ability to advance our security interests in the region.

Our military relationship with Indonesia remains difficult. Military-to-military relations have been restricted for years because of U.S. concerns about human rights abuses in East Timor, Aceh, Papua (formerly known as Irian Jaya) and elsewhere in Indonesia and over the issue of accountability for past atrocities under the regime of former President Soeharto. Among the restrictions, Indonesian military officers could not participate in the regular IMET program and were limited to the narrower E-IMET curriculum, which emphasized resource management, military justice systems, military codes of conduct, civilian control of the military, and the protection of human rights. The types of arms transfers and foreign military sales (FMS) were limited. DoD Joint Combined Exercise and Training (JCET) programs in Indonesia were also frozen in early 1998 when additional abuses by Indonesian military (TNI) units came to light. They have not been resumed.

Because elements of the Indonesian military had backed militia violence and devastation in East Timor and as a means to secure Indonesia's acceptance of an international peacekeeping operation, President Clinton suspended in September 1999 our remaining military-to-military relations with Indonesia. This step blocked all new training under E-IMET and further military sales and transfers (with the exception of U.S. munitions list items associated with commercial communications satellites and Y2K remediation). Some former E-IMET students who were in the U.S. when the suspension was announced have been allowed to complete their studies using non-IMET funds. Legislation (section 589 of the FY 2000 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, the "Leahy Amendment") also conditions resumption of FMS and IMET or E-IMET with Indonesia upon a credible accountability process for abuses in East Timor and repatriation of the remaining refugees in West Timor who wish to return home. We support the letter and spirit of this legislation. The U.S. has not initiated any IMET/E-IMET programs in FY 2000, nor conducted DoD JCET programs with Indonesia since they were frozen in 1998.

However, President Wahid has undertaken a bold program to assert civilian control over TNI and to promote general military reform. In February, for example, he removed General Wiranto from the cabinet in the wake of the report calling for further investigation of his role in the reprehensible crimes, aided and abetted by the Indonesian military, in East Timor. We want to be supportive of his effort within the political and legislative constraints on renewing our military-to-military ties with Indonesia. Any U.S. resumption of defense relations with Indonesia would reflect concrete changes in the situation in Indonesia and be designed to reinforce positive trends in reform of the Indonesian military. The Administration will continue to consult closely with Congress on step-by-step resumption of defense relations with Indonesia.

We strongly support the development of a series of regional organizations, including the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which have brought countries and economies together to improve economic cooperation and reduce frictions.

In the security area, ASEAN has established, together with the United States and its other "dialogue partners", the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in order to discuss security issues and to explore ways in which members could reduce tensions, build confidence and move toward preventive diplomacy. The region continues to look more closely at various multilateral fora, and the U.S. is taking an active role in supporting the activities of such fora, which we see as a complement to our bilateral alliances.

These organizations support U.S. interests in fostering prosperity and stability, but they are not intended to be, and are not, mutual security organizations such as exist in Europe. They are not substitutes for our bilateral alliances or the U.S. military presence.

Clearly, we must anticipate that, over coming years, the security situation in the Asia Pacific region will change. As that happens, we will need to adapt our force structure and presence in consultation with our allies. That possibility was acknowledged by the United States and Japan in the 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto Security Declaration which said: "in response to changes which may arise in the international security environment, both governments will continue to consult on defense policies and military postures, including U.S. force structure in Japan, which will best meet their requirements." However, under any foreseeable scenario, it will be in our interest and the interest of allies and the region as a whole to maintain a formidable American forward-deployed presence in East Asia.

Thank you.

(end text)

(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: usinfo.state.gov)

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