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Chapter 9 - New Civil-Military Institutions


The outlook of both civilians and military professionals was reflected
in the continuing search for effective institutional arrangements to
ensure sound civil-military cooperation in the post-World War II
period.

In 1947 - 1949, during the Truman presidency, Congress reorganized the
national security community, creating a new system to guide the
mobilization and direction of the armed forces. This change responded
not only to the experience of the two world wars, but to the
expectation that a long period of international tension lay ahead. The
National Security Act of 1947 was a response to one of the chief
military lessons of the century, the need to ensure effective
interservice coordination. The first secretary of defense, James
Forrestal, wrote that he could "not visualize a [future] situation in
which any one of the services would operate independently. We must
have a strong Army, a strong Navy and a strong Air Force, and we must
have them all working together in the closest cooperation under all
circumstances." The law created a secretary of defense, who became a
member of the president's Cabinet. The services were retained as
distinct entities with specified roles and missions, headed by
departmental secretaries, including a secretary of the air force. The
air arm was separated from the Army and given independent status. The
professional military heads of the services became members of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, thereby formalizing that ad hoc wartime
organization.
     
The law of 1947 created other new organizations intended to
improve the national security system. Of these the most important were
the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA). The NSC was set up to advise the president, particularly
on the relationship between policy and strategy. In addition to the
president, it included the secretaries of state and defense and the
service secretaries (all civilians). The CIA was established to
provide authoritative and comprehensive intelligence of the type
needed to make sound national security decisions in the complex
setting of the postwar years.

The law of 1947 proved wanting in some important respects. It created
a federation of military services instead of a truly centralized or
integrated system. It did not spell out the operational functions of
the services, which thereafter engaged in frequent controversies over
their roles and missions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not provided
adequate staff support. Above all, the secretary of defense lacked
sufficient authority and staff to exercise effective leadership.
President Truman pointed to the significance of these deficiencies:
"The Act [of 1947] fails...to attain effective and informed
civilian control." To correct this failing, Congress in 1949 amended
the law of 1947 to grant the secretary of defense enhanced authority
over the three military departments. The departments of the Army, the
Navy and the Air Force became components of a Department of Defense.
The service secretaries were removed from the Cabinet and the NSC,
although they retained control of their departments, which remained
"the principal operating agencies for administering, training and
supporting their respective forces." To direct the new organization,
the secretary of defense was given a deputy and three assistant
secretaries. The amendments also authorized a chairman of the JCS and
included the vice president in the NSC.

Additional adjustments were made--in 1953, 1958 and 1986--to
strengthen the efficiency of the national security agencies. In 1953
President Eisenhower decided to hold regular meetings of the NSC. He
also provided a staff for his national security adviser, who
administered the NSC, and augmented the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, adding six new assistant secretaries and a general counsel.

In 1958 the professional military heads of the individual services
were removed from the chain of command, i.e., the individual
departments no longer controlled field operations. Command authority
now ran from the president to the secretary of defense and then to the
principal field commanders. In addition, the secretary of defense
gained the power to consolidate or transfer functions within the
Department of Defense.

In 1986 the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act
further enhanced interservice cooperation by augmenting the powers of
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs at the expense of the individual
service chiefs. Joint-service officers would be drawn from each
service and would receive extensive training in the functions of joint
organizations. Promotion to the rank of general officer would require
considerable experience in the joint arena. The trend for the past 40
years has definitely been toward more centralization and "jointness"
to increase efficiency and control costs. Additional responsibilities
have been given to civilian members of the defense establishment. The
official history of the Office of the Secretary of Defense states
flatly: "The creation of the integrated structure for national
security affairs and the growing power of the secretary of defense
inevitably brought civilians--primarily the secretary, his deputy and
the assistant secretaries--increasingly into matters that had been
largely the domain of the military." Among these were "roles and
missions, centralized direction of military operations, the budget,
manpower controls, procurement, and foreign military assistance"--all
of the highest importance.

The addition of new agencies has also enriched the mix of military and
civilian officials in the national security process. These include the
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the Department of State, which
concerns itself with the diplomatic consequences of proposed defense
initiatives; and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense, which
weighs the military implications of proposed diplomatic initiatives.
Specialized organizations were also set up to deal with particularly
important questions: examples are the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency and the group in the Joint Staff known as J-5, which, among
other duties, provides military advice to the political leadership.
One older civilian organization, the Bureau of the Budget in the
Office of the President, which became the Office of Management and
Budget in 1970, assumed great importance in allocating resources to
the military services and other national security agencies such as the
CIA.

Perhaps President Eisenhower best summarized the intent of the
Congress in seeking to perfect the organization of the national
security community: "There must be a clear and unchallenged civilian
responsibility in the defense establishment. This is essential not
only to maintain democratic institutions, but to protect the integrity
of the military profession." He contended that "politically
accountable civilian officials" must make basic decisions, and that
"professional military leaders must not be thrust into the political
arena to become the prey of partisan politics." The new arrangements
for civil-military coordination assured accountability, economy and
planning, without compromising civilian control.

One consequence of these postwar developments was to weaken the role
of Congress in the determination of defense policy. Indeed,
quasi-legislative authority was frequently delegated to the executive
branch in the hope of instilling vigor and efficiency into planning
and decision-making. The executive branch became the preeminent actor
in the national security arena. Senator J. William Fulbright of
Arkansas expressed the prevailing view when he argued that the Senate
should not "initiate or force large events, or substitute its judgment
for that of the president," but rather should "explain and rationalize
the burden which the people bear, to help them to that degree of
understanding which will compel their agreement." Some legislators
became experts on national security affairs and made important
contributions, but they were more effective as supporters of the
Department of Defense than as independent figures. One scholarly
assessment summarized congressional behavior succinctly: "As the
nation has become vulnerable to military attack, the Congress has more
willingly conceded extraordinary exercises of executive power. It has
no choice. In many situations it now expects to be informed rather
than to be consulted."