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Chapter 7 - Expensive Security:    The Two World Wars


The long era of general international stability after 1815, so
favorable to the United States, ended in the early 20th century.
Although most Americans wished to retain the time-tested security
policies of the 19th century--political isolation and passive
defense--new dangers forced a revolution in the nation's approach to
its national security.

Clearly the high degree of national security between 1815 and 1914
masked the inevitable tension that exists between military values and
civil values. When war comes infrequently and causes little
disruption, it is easier to establish and maintain civilian control
over the military. The extensive warfare of the post-1914 period,
however, greatly increased the priority and the prestige accorded to
the armed services. What, then, happened to civilian control in World
War I and World War II?

President Woodrow Wilson responded effectively to the new challenges.
The U.S. intervention in World War I in April 1917 signalled a
departure in the nation's security policy. After Congress endorsed
Wilson's request for a declaration of war against Germany, the United
States abandoned the policy of isolation and turned to a policy of
extensive engagement in the affairs of Eurasia. This meant the
mobilization and maintenance of armed services fully prepared to
engage the most formidable opponents. Wilson had already set this
change in motion by supporting the National Security Act of 1916,
which envisioned a large warfighting army, and the Naval Act of 1916,
which for the first time called for "a navy second to none" capable of
conducting offensive operations against the fleets of other great
powers.

U.S. participation in World War I stimulated extensive institutional
innovations designed to improve civil-military communication and
thereby strengthen the efficiency of the armed forces. Enhanced
concern for national security required improvements in the means of
coordinating the efforts of the civilian sector and the military
establishment since both were faced with the task of conducting a
rapid mobilization on an unimagined scale. On the military side, the
War and Navy Departments underwent reorganization and expansion. On
the civilian side, President Wilson created many emergency agencies to
mobilize and deploy the armed forces as rapidly as possible. Chief
among these organizations was the War Industries Board, which provided
central direction for the industrial mobilization.

A definite division of responsibility for the war effort emerged
during the short period of combat from April 1917 to November 1918. On
the one hand, military leaders were allowed considerable freedom of
action in conducting field operations when tactical measures did not
compromise the larger political objectives of the nation. On the other
hand, civilian leaders largely controlled the mobilization, working
hand in hand with the military departments to provide the requisite
manpower and materiel.

Despite the remarkable expansion in the size and prestige of the armed
forces, civilian control was never relaxed during World War I. Wilson
retained firm direction of the armed forces, acting through the
civilian heads of the military departments. Only one breach of the
traditional pattern occurred. Just before the end of the war, late in
October 1918, General John J. Pershing, the commander in chief of the
American Expeditionary Forces, broke from Wilson's policy of seeking
an armistice with Germany. Writing an unauthorized letter to the
Supreme War Council, an inter-Allied organization that was considering
an armistice and peace terms for Germany, Pershing advocated
unconditional surrender rather than a negotiated agreement. Wilson and
Secretary of War Newton D. Baker reacted immediately. They
contemplated a stiff reprimand, but Colonel Edward M. House,
representing the United States on the Supreme War Council, arranged
for Pershing to withdraw his recommendation. The war soon ended, an
outcome that led Wilson and Baker to forgo disciplinary action against
Pershing.

Some violations of civil liberties did occur during the war. Political
radicals, conscientious objectors and German-Americans sometimes
encountered persecution as popular passion overcame good sense in the
heat of conflict. Fortunately, the judiciary, as it had during the
Civil War, managed to mitigate some of these serious errors and
eventually made amends. And President Wilson prevented the use of
military tribunals in dealing with charges of wartime sedition and
espionage.

When the war ended, President Wilson attempted to honor his promise to
associate the United States with an international security
organization. After incorporating the Covenant of the League of
Nations into the peace settlement with Germany (the Treaty of
Versailles), he led an unsuccessful attempt to obtain the approval of
the United States Senate. He envisioned the League as the medium
through which the United States would pursue a new foreign policy of
collective security. The nation's land power and especially its naval
strength would be used in cooperation with other nations to ensure
compliance with the decisions of the new organization. Although many
factors contributed to the Senate's rejection of the Treaty of
Versailles, by far the most important was the unwillingness of the
American people to countenance Wilson's revolutionary departure from
the old foreign policy of isolation. They were not yet convinced that
the United States should participate extensively in the affairs of the
Old World to guarantee America's security. They were also reluctant to
maintain large combat-ready armed forces in support of an activist
foreign policy. Hence, during the period between World War I and World
War II, the United States reverted to its 19th-century policy of
isolation.
     
However, aggression by Germany and Italy in Europe and by
Japan in East Asia again forced the United States to abandon
isolationism in favor of a demanding new engagement in world politics.
As aggression mounted overseas, the United States began to rearm and
to support the opponents of the Axis powers. The nation went to war in
December 1941 after Japan conducted a surprise attack against the
U.S.Pacific fleet based at Pearl Harbor and other military bases in
the Hawaiian Islands, and against U.S. forces in the Philippines. This
time the nation's military efforts far surpassed those of 1917 - 1918
in duration and scope. The government was forced to mobilize armed
forces for extensive service in Western Europe, the Western Pacific,
and elsewhere around the world. This state of affairs again posed the
prospect that overwhelming security requirements might erode civilian
control of a vastly expanded military.

Developments during World War II paralleled those of World War I in
many respects. Following the precedent set during 1917 - 1918,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt created many emergency agencies to
manage what he called "the arsenal of democracy." The most important
were the War Production Board (1942) and the Office of War
Mobilization, set up in 1943. The professional heads of the armed
services came together in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which organized
essential interservice cooperation, arranged distribution of resources
between the theaters of war, and directed massive military campaigns
that eventually played a major role in defeating the armed forces of
Italy, Germany and Japan. Although civilians dominated the emergency
agencies, the uniformed military leaders remained free to direct the
operations of forces in the field, provided that their actions were
consistent with the president's policy and strategy.

Again, the war, despite its protracted character and its intensity,
did not breed significant challenges to civilian control. Although the
wartime crisis enhanced military participation in national planning
and decision-making, military leaders displayed no inclination to
supplant appropriate civilian influence. The much-enlarged defense
establishment included many civilians and citizen-soldiers, who
identified with established traditions of civilian control. Sadly,
some violations of civil rights took place, the most egregious being
the internment of Japanese-Americans, which the Army considered
necessary for national security. But, as it had during World War I,
the judiciary interposed its authority to control abuses. After the
war ended, indemnities were twice distributed to the
Japanese-Americans, in at least partial recompense for their tragic
mistreatment. Interestingly, the wartime experience of millions of
civilians and civilian-soldiers also led to a postwar
"civilianization" of military legal procedures (see the sidebar at the
end of this chapter).
     
What accounts for the preservation and even the strengthening
of civilian control in the United States during the great wars of the
20th century?

* The defense of democracy. Americans viewed the expansion of the
military establishment as an unavoidable measure to ensure the
preservation of their freedoms. They perceived civilian control of the
military as an indispensable aspect of the democratic process they
sought to preserve. Both citizen-soldiers and those who remained at
home remained committed to civilian control. No group emerged to
advocate changes in traditional practice.

* The growth of military professionalism. During the last years of the
19th century and continuing into the 20th century, the U.S. military
services became thoroughly professionalized. This development had
several ramifications. First, the military constitutes a profession
whose membership is determined on the basis of achievement. In the
United States, military officers constitute neither a class nor a
caste. Mandatory retirement further undermines any basis for the
development of class or caste identifications.
     
Second, institutions founded to provide training and education
to the officer corps, such as the military academies, the command and
staff colleges, and the senior war colleges, seek to inculcate the
value of professionalism in those they train. Professionalism requires
of each officer a commitment to professional excellence--the
observance of the highest technical standards in meeting the
requirements of his or her chosen field. This generally excludes
concern with political, economic or civil matters that fall outside
the narrow purview of the military profession. Hence, by definition,
professionalism embraces the commitment to civilian control of the
military.

Professionalism does not completely exclude participation in politics.
Officers and enlisted personnel are encouraged to vote. They may
contribute money to political parties or directly to a candidate.
However, active-duty military personnel may not run for office or be
involved in the campaigns of others running for office. In the United
States, politics is viewed as a career, and if active-duty officers or
enlisted personnel want to pursue that kind of career, they must give
up their career in the military. No laws prevent retired military
personnel from running for office, holding office or participating in
the political campaigns of others. Indeed, a number of retired
military men have succeeded in being elected president of the United
States (see sidebar in Chapter 3).

Both ideological commitments and professional creeds helped prevent
undue military influence in U.S. government during World War I and
World War II. The preservation of civilian control did not stem from
impersonal forces. It flowed from the active and sustained commitment
of both civilians and military professionals to an idea that had
proven itself in good times and bad. Louis Smith has written that
"civil dominance, regardless of how securely grounded it may be in the
Constitution and in the statutes, is not self-implementing. Like any
other principle, it must be cherished in the public mind if it is to
prevail. Like any other policy, it requires translation into effective
administration." The U.S. national experience during the two world
wars confirms this judgment.

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SIDE BAR: The Uniform Code of Military Justice

Through World War II, the U.S. military lacked a code of law to govern
the conduct of its personnel. The extensive use of courts martial in
World War II and the severity of the sentences led to widespread
demands for reform. In response, James Forrestal, the first secretary
of defense, appointed a committee headed by Edmund Morgan of Harvard
Law School, to draft a code. Secretary Forrestal instructed the
committee that "the modernization of the existing system should be
undertaken with a view to protecting the rights of those subject to
the code and increasing public confidence in military justice without
impairing the performance of military functions." The Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ), adopted in 1951, civilianized and liberalized
the military's criminal laws and procedures, and extended certain
rights of citizenship to service personnel.

A number of the UCMJ's provisions demonstrate the effort to impose
civilian legal standards on the military. Article 37 made it an
offense for an officer convening a court martial to attempt to
influence its outcome. Additionally, the accused gained the right to
qualified legal representation. The code mandated pretrial
investigations and hearings. Another provision required a systematic
review of court-martial convictions by the Judge Advocates General,
Military Boards of Review, and in some cases by the three-judge
civilian Court of Military Appeals. In one important instance the
provisions of the Code ran ahead of civilian law. Fifteen years before
the U.S. Supreme Court guaranteed civilians the same right in the
Miranda decision, Article 31 assured accused military personnel the
right to remain silent during all stages of interrogation.

Several changes have been made in the UCMJ since 1951, most recently
in 1983. A major revision occurred in 1968 with the passage of the
Military Justice Act, which strengthened the role of military lawyers;
provided that any serviceman facing summary court martial could demand
a special court martial where full due process would be afforded; and
transformed military "boards of review" to "courts of review," which
symbolized the movement toward civilianization. Perhaps most
important, the act mandated that defense counsel must be provided to
the accused, except when such counsel "cannot be obtained on account
of physical conditions or military exigencies," in which case the
commander ordering a trial in the absence of a defense lawyer must
make "a detailed written statement, to be appended to the record,
stating why [lawyer defense counsel] could not be obtained."