105th Congress Treaty Doc.
2d Session SENATE 105-36
_______________________________________________________________________
PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON ACCESSION OF POLAND,
HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC
__________
MESSAGE
from
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
PROTOCOLS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF 1949 ON THE ACCESSION OF
POLAND, HUNGARY, AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC. THESE PROTOCOLS WERE OPENED
FOR SIGNATURE AT BRUSSELS ON DECEMBER 16, 1997, AND SIGNED ON BEHALF OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER PARTIES TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
February 11, 1998.--Protocols were read the first time and, together
with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign
Relations and ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate.
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
The White House, February 11, 1998.
To the Senate of the United States:
I transmit herewith Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty
of 1949 on the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic. These Protocols were opened for signature at Brussels
on December 16, 1997, and signed on behalf of the United States
of America and the other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.
I request the advice and consent of the Senate to the
ratification of these documents, and transit for the Senate's
information the report made to me by the Secretary of State
regarding this matter.
The accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will improve the
ability of the United States to protect and advance our
interests in the transatlantic area. The end of the Cold War
changed the nature of the threats to this region, but not the
fact that Europe's peace, stability, and well-being are vital
to our own national security. The addition of these well-
qualified democracies, which have demonstrated their commitment
to the values of freedom and the security of the broader
region, will help deter potential threats to Europe, deepen the
continent's stability, bolster its democratic advances, erase
its artificial division, and strengthen an Alliance that has
proved its effectiveness during and since the Cold War.
NATO is not the only instrument in our efforts to help
build a new and undivided Europe, but it is our most important
contributor to peace and security for the region. NATO's
steadfastness during the long years of the Cold War, its
performance in the mission it has led in Bosnia, the strong
interest of a dozen new European democracies in becoming
members, and the success of the Alliance's Partnership for
Peace program all underscore the continuing vitality of the
Alliance and the Treaty that brought it into existence.
NATO's mission in Bosnia is of particular importance. No
other multinational institution possessed the military
capabilities and political cohesiveness necessary to bring an
end to the fighting in the former Yugoslavia--Europe's worst
conflict since World War II--and to give the people of that
region a chance to build a lasting peace. Our work in Bosnia is
not yet complete, but we should be thankful that NATO existed
to unite Allies and partners in this determined common effort.
Similarly, we should welcome steps such as the Alliance's
enlargement that can strengthen its ability to meet future
challenges, beginning with NATO's core mission of collective
defense and other missions that we and our Allies may choose to
pursue.
The three states that NATO now proposes to add as full
members will make the Alliance stronger while helping to
enlarge Europe's zone of democratic stability. Poland, Hungary,
and the Czech Republic have been leaders in Central Europe's
dramatic transformation over the past decade and already are a
part of NATO's community of values. They each played pivotal
roles in the overthrow of communist rule and repression, and
they each proved equal to the challenge of comprehensive
democratic and market reform. Together, they have helped to
make Central Europe the continent's most rebust zone of
economic growth.
All three of these states will be security producers for
the Alliance and not merely security consumers. They have
demonstrated this through the accords they have reached with
neighboring states, the contributions they have made to the
mission of Bosnia, the forces they plan to commit to the
Alliance, and the military modernization programs they have
already begun and pledge to continue in the years to come at
their own expense. These three states will strengthen NATO
through the addition of military resources, strategic depth,
and the prospect of greater stability in Europe's central
region. American troops have worked alongside soldiers from
each of these nations in earlier times, in the case of the
Poles, dating back to our own Revolutionary War. Our
cooperation with the Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs has
contributed to our security in the past, and our Alliance with
them will contribute to our security in the years to come.
The purpose of NATO's enlargement extends beyond the
security of these three states, however, and entails a process
encompassing more than their admission to the Alliance
Accordingly, these first new members should not and will not be
the last. No qualified European democracy is ruled out as a
future member. The Alliance has agreed to review the process of
enlargement at its 1999 summit in Washington. As we prepare for
that summit, I look forward to discussing this matter with my
fellow NATO leaders. The process of enlargement, combined with
the Partnership for Peace program, the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and NATO's
new charter with Ukraine, signify NATO's commitment to avoid
any new division of Europe, and to contribute to its
progressive integration.
A democratic Russia is and should be a part of that new
Europe. With bipartisan congressional support, my
Administration and my predecessor's have worked with our Allies
to support political and economic reform in Russia and the
other newly independent states and to increase the bonds
between them and the rest of Europe. NATO's enlargement and
other adaptions are consistent, not at odds, with that policy.
NATO has repeatedly demonstrated that it does not threaten
Russia and that it seeks closer and more cooperative relations.
We and our Allies welcomed the participation of Russian forces
in the mission in Bosnia.
NATO most clearly signaled its interest in a constructive
relationship through the signing in May 1997 of the NATO-Russia
Founding Act. That Act, and the Permanent Joint Council it
created, help to ensure that if Russia seeks to build a
positive and peaceful future within Europe, NATO will be a full
partner in that enterprise. I understand it will require time
for the Russian people to gain a new understanding of NATO. The
Russian people, in turn, must understand that an open door
policy with regard to the addition of new members is an element
of a new NATO. In this way, we will build a new and more stable
Europe of which Russian is an integral part.
I therefore propose the ratification of these Protocols
with every expectation that we can continue to pursue
productive cooperation with the Russian Federation. I am
encouraged that President Yeltsin has pledged his government's
commitment to additional progress on nuclear and conventional
arms control measures. At our summit in Helsinki, for example,
we agreed that once START II has entered into force we will
begin negotiations on a START III accord that can achieve even
deeper cuts in our strategic arsenals. Similarly, Russian's
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention last year
demonstrated that cooperation on a range of security matters
will continue.
The Protocols of accession that I transmit to you
constitute a decision of great consequence, and they involve
solemn security commitments. The addition of new states also
will entail financial costs. While those costs will be
manageable and broadly shared with our current and new Allies,
they nonetheless represent a sacrifice by the American people.
Successful ratification of these Protocols demands not only
the Senate's advice and consent required by our Constitution,
but also the broader, bipartisan support of the American people
and their representatives. For that reason, it is encouraging
that congressional leaders in both parties and both chambers
have long advocated NATO's enlargement. I have endeavored to
make the Congress an active partner in this process. I was
pleased that a bipartisan group of Senators and Representatives
accompanied the U.S. delegation at the NATO summit in Madrid
last July. Officials at all levels of my Administration have
consulted closely with the relevant committees and with the
bipartisan Senate NATO Observer Group. It is my hope that this
pattern of consultation and cooperation will ensure that NATO
and our broader European policies continue to have the
sustained bipartisan support that was so instrumental to their
success throughout the decades of the Cold War.
The American people today are the direct beneficiaries of
the extraordinary sacrifices made by our fellow citizens in the
many theaters of that ``long twilight struggle,'' and in the
two world wars that preceded it. Those efforts aimed in large
part to create across the breadth of Europe a lasting,
democratic peace. The enlargement of NATO represents an
indispensable part of today's program to finish building such a
peace, and therefore to repay a portion of the debt we owe to
those who went before us in the quest for freedom and security.
The rise of new challenges in other regions does not in any
way diminish the necessity of consolidating the increased level
of security that Europe has attained at such high cost. To the
contrary, our policy in Europe, including the Protocols I
transmit herewith, can help preserve today's more favorable
security environment in the transatlantic area, thus making is
possible to focus attention and resources elsewhere while
providing us with additional Allies and partners to help share
our security burdens.
The century we are now completing has been the bloodiest in
all of human history. Its lessons should be clear to us: the
wisdom of deterrence, the value of strong Alliances, the
potential for overcoming past divisions, and the imperative of
America engagement in Europe. The NATO Alliance is one of the
most important embodiments of these truths, and it is in the
interest of the United States to strengthen this proven
institution and adapt it to a new era. The addition of this
Alliance of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic is an
essential part of that program. It will help build a Europe
that can be integrated, democratic, free, and at peace for the
first time in its history. It can help ensure that we and our
Allies and our partner will enjoy greater security and freedom
in the century that is about to begin.
I therefore recommend that the Senate give prompt advice
and consent to ratification of these historic Protocols.
William J. Clinton.
LETTER OF SUBMITTAL
----------
Department of State,
Washington, February 9, 1998.
The President,
The White House.
The President: I have the honor to submit to you, with a
view to its transmission to the Senate for advice and consent
to ratification, Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949
on the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
These protocols were opened for signature at Brussels on
December 16, 1997, and were signed on behalf of the United
States of America and the other parties to the North Atlantic
Treaty.
Adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to the NATO
Alliance will contribute materially to the national security of
the United States. It will advance the efforts we have
undertaken with our allies and partners to build an undivided,
democratic, and peaceful Europe, which in turn reduces threats
to our own national interests. It will strengthen the stability
of a region that helped spawn this century's world wars and the
Cold War, which we prosecuted at a cost of trillions of dollars
and hundreds of thousands of American lives. It will give us
capable new allies willing and able to defend our common
interests. It will demonstrate continuing American engagement
and leadership in transatlantic affairs.
The addition of these three states to NATO is a central
element of our transatlantic strategy. This strategy aims to
strengthen the favorable security environment in the region
created by the seminal events of the past decade: the end of
the Cold War, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the dissolution
of the Soviet Union itself, the rise in its place of a
democratic Russia and other newly independent states, the
establishment of market democracies throughout Central Europe,
the peaceful reunification of Germany, and the conclusion of
agreements to reduce and stabilize conventional and nuclear
armaments throughout the region.
These transforming events reduce the likelihood of large-
scale aggression in Europe, but also present a host of new
challenges and dangers. Threats stemming from the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and conflicts fueled by ethnic
or religious tensions, such as in Bosnia, loom immediately.
Over the longer term, Europe could face the possibility of
renewed aggression or threats to its interests. Europe's new
democracies must be more fully integrated into the
transatlantic region's security, economic, and political
institutions in order to prevent the erosion of recent
democratic gains and the possibility of conflict.
All these require continuing American engagement in the
region's security affairs and changes in European and
transatlantic security institutions. To this end, we have
strengthened the role of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, opened the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development to new members, pursued the
adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe,
worked closely with the European Union and urged its
enlargement, supported democratic and market reforms in Russia,
Ukraine, and the other newly independent states, and pursued
initiatives with states in the region, such as the Charter of
Partnership signed with the three Baltic states on January 16.
NATO's unique attributes--an unrivaled military
capability, an integrated command structure, and a primary
focus on the collective defense of its members--require that
this Alliance remain the keystone of our involvement in the
transatlantic region's security affairs. Those attributes made
NATO a principal instrument of our successful effort to defend
the territory and values of the North American and European
democracies during the Cold War, and made NATO history's most
successful Alliance.
Since then, the Alliance has repeatedly demonstrated its
continuing utility and competence. NATO's success in stopping
the war in Bosnia underscores its military effectiveness.
NATO's completion last December of a thorough reform of its
command structure, reducing the number of commands from 65 to
20, testifies to the premium it places on operational
coherence. The addition of new members from Central Europe,
along with other adaptations in the Alliance's operations and
command structure, will further strengthen NATO's
effectiveness, protect more of Europe from future threats, and
bolster the development of a Europe whole and free.
Specifically, the addition of these three democracies to
the Alliance will increase the security of the United States in
four ways.
First, it will reduce the prospect of threats to Europe's
security, such as those we have seen throughout this century,
which could harm American interests and potentially involve
American forces. Integrating Central European states into NATO
will reduce the chances of conflict by ensuring that such
states pursue cooperative rather than competitive security
policies. It also will help deter potential threats to this
region from materializing. These include the dangers posed by
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means
for their delivery. NATO's enlargement can also help address
the possibility, although we see it as unlikely, that Russia's
democratic transition could fail and that Russia could resume
the threatening behavior of the Soviet period. By engaging
Russia and enlarging NATO, we will give Russia every incentive
to deepen its commitment to democracy and peaceful integration
with the rest of Europe, while foreclosing more destructive
alternatives.
Second, adding Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to
NATO will make the Alliance stronger and better able to address
Europe's security challenges. These states will add
approximately 200,000 troops to the Alliance, a commitment to
common values and political goals, and a willingness to
contribute to the security of the surrounding region, as they
have demonstrated through their contribution of over 1,000
troops to the mission in Bosnia. The military and strategic
assets of these states will improve NATO's ability to carry out
what is and will remain its core mission, collective defense,
as well as its other missions.
Third, the process of adding new states to NATO bolsters
stability and democratic trends in Central Europe. Partly in
order to improve their prospects for membership, states in the
region have settled border and ethnic disputes with neighboring
states, strengthened civilian control of their militaries, and
broadened protections for ethnic and religious minorities. Such
actions help to prevent conflicts in the region that could
adversely affect American security and economic interests.
Fourth, NATO's enlargement, with other elements of our
transatlantic strategy, advances European integration and moves
the continent beyond its forced division of the past half
century. The perpetuation of Europe's Cold War dividing line
would be both destabilizing the morally indefensible. To help
erase that line, NATO launched the Partnership for Peace
program with 27 non-NATO states, opened its doors to new
members, inaugurated a constructive relationship with Russia
through the NATO-Russian Founding Act, signed a new charter
with Ukraine, and created the Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council.
These Protocols propose to add Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic to NATO as full members, with all privileges and
responsibilities that apply to current allies. The core
commitment to these three states will be embodied in the
existing text of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, including
the central collective defense provision in Article 5, which
has proved its reliability across the decades of the Treaty's
existence. Article 5 represents our country's solemn commitment
to the security of the other allies, but the Treaty reserves to
each NATO member, including the United States, decisions about
what specific actions to take should a NATO member be attacked,
and fully preserves Congress' Constitutional role in decisions
regarding the use of force. During the Fall of 1997, NATO's
military authorities concluded the Alliance would be able to
meet the Article 5 and other security assurances to the new
states from their first day of NATO membership.
The decision to enlarge NATO's membership results from
intensive analysis of the implications of this initiative and
the qualifications of the three states now proposed for
admission. At the Brussels summit in January 1994, NATO
declared that the Alliance remained open to membership for
other European states, and created the Partnership for Peace
program in part to help prepare interested states for possible
membership. The Alliance's September 1995 Study on NATO
Enlargement set out the rationale and process for adding new
members. At its Madrid summit in July 1997, the Alliance
invited Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to begin the
process of accession, and declared its determination to keep
the door open for other states interested in joining NATO.
Between September and November of 1997, NATO held four
rounds of accession talks in Brussels with Poland, and five
each with Hungary and the Czech Republic. These discussions
examined in detail the three states' military capabilities,
their willingness to contribute forces to NATO activities, and
their readiness to accept the political and legal obligations
of NATO membership. These discussions were based in part on
Defense Planning Questionnaire response completed by each of
the three states; these questionnaires are NATO's standard
instrument for obtaining information on the military
contributions of member states.
During the accession talks, the three states accepted
NATO's broad approach to security and defense, as outlined in
its Strategic Concept and subsequent Alliance statements. They
confirmed their intention to participate fully in NATO's
military structure and collective defense planning and, for the
purpose of taking part in the full range of Alliance missions,
to commit the bulk of their armed forces to the Alliance. They
accepted the need for standardization and interoperability as
part of the foundation for multinationality and flexibility.
They expressed their readiness to accept the nuclear element of
NATO's strategy and policy and the Alliance's nuclear posture.
They accepted NATO's restrictions and procedures for the
handling of sensitive information. They also recognized and
accepted that the Alliance rests upon a commonality of views,
based on the principle of consensus in decision making, and
expressed a readiness to contribute to attaining such
consensus. Finally, they agreed to assume shares of NATO's
common-funded budgets that cumulatively constitute slightly
over four percent of the total.
On November 10, 12, and 17, 1997, respectively, the Czech
Prime Minister, Polish Foreign Minister, and Hungarian Foreign
Minister wrote to NATO Secretary General Javier Solana to
confirm that, on the basis of the completed accession talks,
their states desired to join the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and were willing to accept in full all the
obligations and commitments pertaining to their membership. At
NATO's Ministerial on December 16 in Brussels, I joined all
fifteen other NATO ministers in agreeing to make these states
full members, subject to the ratification of member
governments.
Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that the
Alliance may add ``any other European state in a position to
further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the
security of the North Atlantic area.'' It was on that basis
that the Alliance added Greece and Turkey in 1952, the Federal
Republic of Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982. The unanimity
of NATO leaders in welcoming Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic into the Alliance reflects the qualifications of each
of these states and a confidence that each of them will, in
fact, make meaningful contributions to transatlantic security.
Poland's size, location, population, and resources have
cast this state in a pivotal role in European security affairs
throughout the past two centuries. Its addition to the Alliance
will create an important anchor for regional security. Poland
has the most significant military resources in Central Europe,
and will bring to the Alliance 23 combat brigades, at least
eight squadrons of combat aircraft, and modest naval resources.
Poland now spends 2.4 percent of its Gross Domestic Product on
defense, it has adopted a 15-year plan for military
modernization, and the country's strong economic performance
during this decade suggests that it will have adequate
resources to fund that plan and contribute substantially to
Alliance capabilities.
Poland also has a heritage of strong political values
consistent with those of the Alliance. Poland was home to
Europe's first written constitution, and its officers played
important roles in support of the United States during our
Revolutionary War. In the 1980s, the resistance of the Polish
people to authoritarian rule and their efforts through the
Solidarity trade union helped topple Soviet domination of their
own state and others in the region. Since 1989, Poland has held
two presidential and three parliamentary rounds of elections,
the results of which have shown a broad and stable political
commitment to tolerant politics, market economics, and an
outward looking foreign policy. Poland has resolved a broad
range of issues with its neighbors, including accords with
Germany, Lithuania, and Ukraine, and contributes a force of
nearly 500 to the NATO-led mission in Bosnia, as well as
contributing to peacekeeping operations in other regions of the
world. Indeed, Poland currently has more soldiers deployed in
multinational peacekeeping operations than any other state.
Hungary, as well, already has proved its commitment to
NATO's security objectives. Hungary's willingness to offer its
base at Taszar to American forces enabled our troops to deploy
to the NATO-led mission in Bosnia safely and effectively. This
commitment to help bring stability to southeastern Europe has
been valuable to the Alliance in this circumstance, and will be
in others as well. Hungary has further demonstrated its
commitment to NATO's objectives by contributing an engineering
battalion to the Bosnia mission. Hungary will bring eight
combat brigades and five squadrons of combat aircraft to the
Alliance, and has committed to a five year program to increase
its defense spending by one-tenth of one percent of Gross
Domestic Product for each of the next five years.
Hungary also brings values and a political outlook that fit
well with those of the Alliance. The Hungarian people expressed
early and courageous opposition to Soviet domination in their
1956 uprising, and played a key role in the dramatic events of
1989. They have held two rounds of presidential and
parliamentary elections since then and have pursued
constructive policies throughout the region. Hungary's recent
treaties with Slovakia and Romania have helped to defuse
tensions regarding ethnic Hungarian minorities in those states.
In a national referendum in November, 85 percent of Hungarians
voting favored their country's membership in the Alliance.
The Czech Republic also will be a strong addition to NATO.
A vibrant democracy during the inter-war years, it is today
among the most western of the former Warsaw Pact states in both
geography and outlook. The Czechs contributed forces to
Operation Desert Storm and currently contribute over 600 troops
to the NATO-led mission in Bosnia. Like Poland and Hungary, the
Czech Republic has participated actively in the Partnership for
Peace program. The Czechs will contribute 11 combat brigades
and six squadrons of combat aircraft to the Alliance. The Czech
government recently approved a budget that fully meets its
commitment to increase defense spending by one-tenth of one
percent of GDP in each of the next three years.
The Czechs have proved their attachment to values shared by
the Alliance's member states. Their Velvet Revolution of 1989,
like events of the Prague Spring two decades earlier,
demonstrated an abiding commitment to democracy, civil society,
and the standards of human rights espoused by Vaclav Havel and
other Czech leaders. Since then the Czechs have held three
rounds of parliamentary elections, separated from Slovakia on
peaceful terms, and concluded agreements with Germany settling
a range of issues, including those related to treatment of
Sudeten Germans during the post-World War II era.
The addition of these three states to the Alliance is part
of a strategy to improve not only their security and that of
current NATO members, but also all other states of Europe,
including the Russian Federation. It is the intent of the
United States, and of NATO, to avoid any destabilizing
redivision of the European continent, and instead to promote
its progressive integration. The Alliance declared at its
Madrid summit that it will leave the door open for the addition
of other new members in the future, and that it will review
this process at its next summit, which will be held in
Washington in April 1999. It is encouraging that states that
aspire to NATO membership, but have not yet been invited to
join the Alliance, nonetheless welcomed the series of
enlargement decisions at Madrid, the creation of the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council, and similar steps as beneficial
to their own security.
The NATO-Russia Founding Act, signed in May of 1997, has
special importance in this regard. The Founding Act opened the
way to a new and constructive relationship between the Alliance
and Russia. It therefore complements the efforts of individual
allies to see a democratic, peaceful Russia integrated into the
community of European nations and security structures. To that
end, the Founding Act created a new forum, the Permanent Joint
Council, which allows NATO and Russia to pursue security issues
of mutual interest. The Council first convened at the
Ministerial level on September 26 in New York, met among
Defense Ministers in Brussels on December 2, and again among
Foreign Ministers on December 17. The Founding Act, the
Permanent Joint Council, the integration of Russian forces in
the mission in Bosnia, and other actions by NATO stand as
evidence to the Russian people that the Alliance's enlargement
in no way will threaten Russia's security, but rather will
enhance it by deepening democratic stability in Europe.
The Founding Act and Permanent Joint Council advance
Russia's cooperation with NATO and integration in European
affairs, but they also safeguard NATO's freedom of action and
the integrity of its decisionmaking. The Founding Act places no
restrictions on NATO's ability to respond to the security
environment as its own members see fit. Similarly, the
Permanent Joint Council has no power to direct or veto actions
by the North Atlantic Council, which remains NATO's supreme
decisionmaking body. Moreover, all actions within the Permanent
Joint Council must proceed by consensus, which provides the
United States and each other NATO member with an effective veto
over proposed points of discussion or action. The Ministerial
meetings of the Permanent Joint Council to date demonstrates
that it can be a useful forum for advancing relations with
Russia, and that it will not adversely affect NATO's progress
on internal issues such as the Alliance's enlargement.
NATO's enlargement and related adaptations, which will
enhance the security of its members and partners, also will
entail financial costs to the United States and our allies over
the coming years. At the Madrid summit in July 1997, NATO's
leaders commissioned a study of the military requirements of
the Alliance's enlargement, and of the resource implications of
meeting those requirements. The declaration from that summit
expressed the confidence of NATO's leaders that ``Alliance
costs associated with the integration of new members will be
manageable and . . . the resources necessary to meet those
costs will be provided.''
The studies completed by the Alliance this past Fall
confirm this view. They estimate that the addition of these
three members will require approximately $1.5 billion in
expenditures from NATO's common-funded military budgets over
the next 10 years. The United States currently provides about
one quarter of these common-funded budgets and will continue to
do so after the addition of the new states. Thus the additional
costs to the United States of adding these three states to the
Alliance is estimated to be about $400 million over the next
ten years. Adding other states to NATO in the future likely
will entail costs as well, although it is not possible to
estimate these without knowing which states might be invited
and when.
There are other costs to the United States less directly
related to NATO's enlargement. Under the Warsaw Initiative, the
United States has provided bilateral foreign military financing
assistance to Central European states totaling approximately
$185 million between fiscal years 1996 and 1998, of which $37.3
million in the current fiscal year is allocated to Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic. In addition, we provide
funding to assist partner participation in the Partnership for
Peace program and ``in the Spirit of Partnership for Peace''
exercises and events, which totaled about $80 million from
fiscal years 1996 to 1997. The three invited states took full
advantage of this assistance to play a major role in the
Partnership for Peace program. While all these programs are
consistent with the aims of NATO enlargement, they constitute
neither direct nor automatic costs of enlargement, and their
continuation will relay on future decisions by Congress to
provide funds.
There are also costs related to enlargement that will be
borne by our new and current allies. With regard to NATO's
direct expenditures through its common-funded budgets, our
Canadian and European allies will continue to bear about 75
percent of the cost In addition, as noted, the three new states
plan on making substantial investments in military
modernization and reorganization over the coming years, and
have committed to achieve defense spending levels on a par with
other NATO members. Several leaders from the region have noted
that their countries likely would need to spend more on
military modernization if they were left outside the Alliance.
Current allies will also continue to make investments
through their national military budgets to help ensure that an
enlarged NATO can carry out its missions. In particular, NATO's
military authorities have stressed the need for improved lift,
logistics, and other power projection capabilities, and many
current allies are undertaking modernization efforts in these
areas. For example, France is restructuring its armed forces to
be more mobile and easily deployable, and is establishing a
Rapid Action Force designed for rapid response in both European
and overseas contingencies. Already, Britain provides NATO's
only rapidly-deployable corps headquarters committed to NATO,
and British forces are the backbone of the Allied Command
Europe Rapid Reaction Corps. Germany is standing up a Rapid
Reaction Force of some 53,000 fully-equipped troops from its
Army, Navy, and Air Force. In addition, NATO's recent decisions
to develop Combined Joint Task Force capabilities and a
European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance will
enable European allies to play a larger role and to bear
additional burdens.
The decision to pursue the enlargement of NATO has
reflected, in our country, a unique process of bipartisan
cooperation across the two political branches of government.
Both the Senate and House have considered the question of
adding new members to the Alliance in some depth over the past
three years. In July 1996, the House approved the NATO
Enlargement Facilitation Act by a bipartisan majority of 353 to
65, and the Senate adopted a similar resolution by a margin of
81 to 16. During the course of 1997, four Senate committees
held ten hearings on the strategic, military, diplomatic, and
budgetary implications of this initiative.
In addition, on April 22, 1997, the Majority Leader and
Minority Leader of the Senate created the Senate NATO Observer
Group, comprised of 28 Senators from both political parties, to
work with the Administration of the process of NATO
enlargement. During the past year, senior administration
officials met with the members and staff of this Group in
classified sessions over a dozen times, briefed them on
military and political issues related to NATO's enlargement,
provided a range of classified documents and periodic issue
summaries, and consulted them in advance on key questions, such
as which states to support for admission to the Alliance. Four
members of this Group, along with four members of the House of
Representatives, attended the NATO summit in Madrid last July
as members of the United States delegation, and participated
directly in its proceedings.
This unprecedented process of consultation has helped
ensure a thorough and bipartisan examination of the full range
of issues at stake in NATO's enlargement. It has helped to
inform decisionmaking within the executive branch. It also has
helped to ensure that the voice of the American public plays a
role in this set of decisions that will so vitally affect their
own lives and those of their children.
The Protocols to the Treaty of 1949 for each of the three
states are identical in structure and composed of three
Articles. Article I provides that once the Protocol has entered
into force, the Secretary General of NATO shall extend an
invitation to the named state to accede to the North Atlantic
Treaty, and that, in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty,
the state shall become a party to the Treaty on the date it
deposits its instrument of accession with the Government of the
United States of America. Article II provides that the Protocol
shall enter into force when each of the parties to the North
Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government of the United
States of America of its acceptance of the Protocol. Article
III provides for the equal authenticity of the English and
French texts, and for deposit of the Protocol in the archives
of the Government of the United States of America, the
depository state for North Atlantic Treaty purposes.
The addition of these three states to the Alliance, along
with the other elements of our transatlantic strategy, will
enable NATO to help accomplish for Europe's east what it has
accomplished for Europe's west over the past half century. It
will safeguard our own country's vital interests in Europe's
well-being, and help ensure that aggression, conflict, and
repression do not once again visit that continent as they have
too often, and at terrible cost, throughout our lifetimes. I
therefore convey these protocols to you with high expectations
that their ratification will further strengthen the peace and
security of the transatlantic region well into the approaching
century.
Respectfully submitted,
Madeleine Albright.