Fox, Robin. HUMAN NATURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS (The National Interest, no. 62, winter 2000/2001, pp 77-86)
The author is concerned with the definition of human rights and the fact that the phrase is often used in a vague or woolly way. For example, do human rights accrue to an individual or to a collective entity -- society, for example? Few would argue against or for one definition totally, he adds. For example, the individual has human rights, but so does the family, he maintains. He also discusses the distinction between natural rights and human rights, the former being a term much more commonly used in earlier times. Many of the human rights, for example, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights run counter to natural rights, he argues. "Despite attempts to base these (human) rights on nature, in most cases they -- by their very design -- run counter to nature, or at best, concern things about which nature is strictly neutral," he concludes.
Astier, Henri. RIGHTS OF THE DESPISED (American Prospect, August 14, 2000, vol. 11, no. 18, pp 30-33)
Astier stresses that war crimes defendants must have more due process in court. He laments the fact that the prosecutions for the international criminal tribunals established to prosecute war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, "have received the lion's share of the international community's resources and attention." In addition, three trial judges adjudicate innocense or guilt. There is no right to a jury trial. In addition, key hearings have been held in closed session, he adds. The media and the public frequently assume guilt when charged, he concludes -- as summed up in the frequent reference to "indicted war criminals," rather than indicted war crimes suspects.
Franck, Thomas M. ARE HUMAN RIGHTS UNIVERSAL? (Foreign Affairs, vol. 80, no. 1, January/February 2001, pp.191 - 204)
Franck points out that human rights are really universal, as detailed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) -- applicable throughout the world, and applicable to all classes and races of people, including all women. But he says many countries use the "sovereign state" argument to justify a particular violation of human rights against a group or individual under their jurisdiction. For example, the argument that the Taliban uses to justify the repression of women is the same argument used by some U.S. states to justify the execution of minors who have committed murder, Franck argues. Although the degree of alleged repression is radically different in degree, the argument is the same, says the author, "that states have a sovereign right to be left alone and not be judged by international human rights standards." But the UDHR, and the Covenants signed in later years that were designed to enforce it, make no exceptions for "cultural exceptionalism." The author also discusses a parallel argument in the debate -- whether human rights accrue to individuals or communities -- globalization versus individualization. But the author argues that this is a false dichotomy. "The globalization of human rights and personal freedoms is rarely an affront to any legitimate interest in cultural self preservation," he concludes.