27 March 2002

Preparing NATO to Meet New Threats, by Richard L. Kugler

(This byliner by Richard Kugler was published in the electronic journal, "U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda," on March 27. The article and the entire journal can be found on the Internet at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0302/ijpe/ijpe0302.htm. No republication restrictions.)

Preparing NATO to Meet New Threats: Challenge and Opportunity
By Richard L. Kugler
Research professor in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington

In dealing with the new threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), NATO is confronted with one of its biggest challenges in many years, but an imperative opportunity, too. As the events of September 11 and the ongoing war on terrorism show, the challenge is to meet dangerous threats that are arising far outside NATO's borders, but gravely menace the safety and security of both North America and Europe. The opportunity is to reform NATO so that it can better defend against these threats and defeat them. NATO has begun pursuing this agenda, but thus far, critics portray its response as shaky and incomplete. Whether NATO will react decisively remains to be seen, but one thing can be said: Throughout its long history, NATO has flourished as the world's best alliance of democracies because it has always risen to the occasion and changed with the times. For the good of all members, it needs to do so again.

The New Threats of a Globalizing World

Make no mistake, modern-day terrorism and WMD proliferation are "Article 5 threats" in NATO's parlance. So-called "Article 4 threats" are directed only against common interests outside NATO's borders: ethnic warfare in the Balkans is a good example. By contrast, the new threats are capable of violating NATO's borders and striking the societies of all its members as well as their military forces: the time-honored definition of Article 5 threats that activate NATO's collective defense pledge. Unlike terrorism of the past, moreover, the new threats are capable of inflicting catastrophic damage. The terrorist strikes on the United States on September 11 killed over 3,000 innocent people from many countries -- more than the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Future attacks are not only possible but seem likely. Yet these threats seem small in comparison to the greater damage that nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons could inflict if they are unleashed. Today the United States lives under siege. Can Europe be far behind?

Why are these threats emerging? The direct answer is the evil intentions of perpetrators who are willing to inflict massive destruction on their victims, NATO members and other countries as well. But the full reasons are wider and more deep-seated. The new geopolitics is one reason: new forms of rivalry among nation-states and political ideologies that transnational groups, such as terrorists, are joining. Another cause is globalization, the accelerating cross-border flow of trade, finances, technology, and communications that is drawing once-distant regions closer together, creating webs of interdependent ties. Earlier, globalization was seen as uniformly positive because it offered to bring economic growth and democracy to all corners of the world. But more recently, globalization has emerged as hydra-headed, for it also strains regions unprepared for the information era, modernization, and stiff competition in global markets. Globalization is producing a bifurcated world. Yes, it is making the already-prosperous democracies even wealthier, while helping others make progress. But elsewhere, it is nurturing venomous anti-western ideologies and deeply angry actors -- nihilistic terrorists and menacing countries bent on acquiring WMD systems -- that are willing to lash out against the western democracies and others that they blame for their fate.

These new threats are merging together in ways that reinforce each other. They also are gaining access to the modern information systems and technologies that allow them to inflict violence at very long distances, from one continent to the next. Beyond this, these threats are bringing further chaos and turmoil to the vast southern arc of instability, stretching from the Middle East to the Asian littoral, along which most of them reside. This trend is rapidly making NATO's old distinction between Article 4 and Article 5 obsolete. While the new threats are arising in regions well outside Europe, they menace NATO's strategic interests, its democratic values, and its physical safety at the same time.

Crafting a Political and Strategic Response

As U.S. policy recognizes, the western democracies must mount a strong political and strategic response to growing dangers that, if left unchecked, could cause the early 21st century to go up in smoke. Clearly, this response must aspire to bring better governance, market economies, and modernizing societies to poverty-stricken regions along the southern arc and elsewhere, including Sub-Saharan Africa. Just as clearly, this response must also aspire to defeat the twin threats of global terrorism and WMD proliferation. The United States and its European allies must defend themselves against these serious threats. In addition, these threats must first be quelled if long-term efforts to bring progress to troubled regions are to succeed. In today's world, the pursuit of security and progress must go hand-in-hand. Indeed, the former is a precondition for the latter.

The United States will lead the response in the security arena, but it cannot carry the weight alone, nor should it be expected to do so. As Europe's premier security institution, NATO is the natural vehicle for helping prepare Europe's contribution, organize it, and harmonize it with U.S. efforts. In the aftermath of September 11, NATO rose to the occasion by declaring global terrorism an Article 5 threat. It sent AWACS aircraft to help defend the U.S. skies, assigned naval forces to patrol the eastern Mediterranean, increased intelligence sharing, initiated an inventory of national civil emergency resources, and bolstered multilateral coordination of law-enforcement measures aimed at rooting out terrorist cells. When U.S. forces launched combat operations in Afghanistan, British forces joined them, and other European countries offered to help. Later, several European countries, including Germany and France, sent troops to lead multinational peacekeeping in Afghanistan, and their special forces took part in Operation Anaconda against lingering al-Qaida strongholds.

Now that the United States is widening the war on terrorism to other regions and preparing to confront such WMD proliferators as Iraq, the situation calls for the Europeans and NATO to launch additional efforts in support. While the United States must not act unilaterally when multilateralism is viable, the Europeans must not sit on the sidelines, criticizing but not helping. Will they respond constructively? Much depends upon Europe's leaders and a healthy transatlantic dialogue. Because a debate is in progress across Europe, critics have their doubts. Yet vigorous debate is nothing new for NATO. In the past, debates have always been the forerunner of a widespread consensus behind strong political and strategic responses that met the requirements of difficult times, including during the Cold War when the dangers were also great and the policy issues equally thorny. Hopefully the past will be prologue.

The Agenda Ahead

NATO's strategic response needs to cover the full spectrum of policy instruments: political, diplomatic, economic, and military. This demanding agenda necessitates that even as NATO enlarges to welcome new members and pursues a close dialogue with Russia, it cannot afford to become a loose collective security pact that lacks military teeth and strategic punch. In addition to bolstering homeland defenses on both sides of the Atlantic, NATO must strengthen its capacity to launch demanding security operations well outside Europe, for it will not be able to cope with the new threats if it remains a border-defense alliance. NATO should not become a "global alliance," but it does need to become capable of acting strongly and wisely in other theaters.

A compelling case can be made that NATO should rewrite or amend its current strategic concept, adopted in 1999, in order to establish a consensus for new policies aimed at managing the new threats. Such a consensus should neither ask the Europeans to support U.S. efforts in rote ways nor give them a brake on assertive U.S.-led efforts. Instead, it should establish a common framework for the United States and Europe to act together in energetic, collaborative ways. Harmonizing alternative views requires patient dialogue, but this approach has worked in the past, and it can work again. The United States and some European countries may not always agree on specific actions, but their core interests and goals are compatible in ways that normally will permit common perspectives.

NATO also must ensure that it continues to act as an alliance of equals. As during the Cold War, its future efforts in specific areas may be carried out by coalitions of the committed and able. Sometimes these coalitions may act outside the NATO structure, with NATO in support. But NATO should steer away from any "division of labor" that divides the alliance into separate blocs. This judgment applies to politics and diplomacy, but it especially holds true for military operations. NATO should not expect the United States and Britain to act as "bad cops," while other members act as "good cops" who pursue peaceful reconciliation with adversaries. Nor should the United States and Britain carry out the intense combat missions, while other NATO members perform peacekeeping in the aftermath. Nor should the United States perform high-tech bombing missions, while other members fight on the ground. A seamless sharing of duties, coupled with a flexible approach to the particulars, is best.

Finally, NATO and the Europeans must improve their military capabilities for missions against the new threats. Today's European militaries are larger and stronger than is commonly realized, with 2.4 million active-duty troops and $150 billion in defense spending. But because they still focus on defending their borders, they lack the capacity to project power to long distances, where the new threats reside. In addition, they are in danger of falling further behind the U.S. military as it transforms itself with new operational doctrines and technologies, including modern information systems, sensors, and munitions. If today's interoperability gap widens further, European and U.S. forces might not be able to fight together even if Europe's political leaders do not want to sit on the sidelines and watch.

While a crash defense buildup is not necessary, the Europeans need to configure a portion of their forces for swift power projection and high-tech strike operations with U.S. forces. To help guide this effort, NATO could replace its ongoing "Defense Capabilities Initiative" with a tighter-focused transformation effort aimed at acquiring high-priority capabilities. Initially this effort might create a small European "spearhead force": a fully networked force composed of about 60,000 ground troops, plus several fighter wings with smart munitions and naval combatants with cruise missiles. Such a posture would be similar in size to the European Union's force for Petersberg tasks, but its NATO mission would be to complement similar spearhead forces that the new U.S. defense strategy is creating. If the Europeans create such a force, their relevance to the new era will grow faster than critics think possible.

Conclusion

The upcoming Prague Summit in November 2002 offers a forum for launching a new era of NATO change and reform. Undeniably, pursuing this weighty agenda will change NATO's strategic horizons and the transatlantic relationship as well. But the new threats make this agenda essential, for otherwise NATO will erode and its members will be left endangered. This imperative defines both the challenge and the opportunity ahead.

(Note: The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. Government.)