Arms control and threat reduction are therefore key components of both our national security strategy and our acquisition goals. We must meet the force planning requirements necessary to respond to international threats, while at the same time we must use arms control to reduce that threat. Thus, we must promote confidence in compliance with international regimes; increase their scope; and increase transparency.

Today, we face a new, increasingly daunting task in meeting the challenge posed by the growing spread of weapons of mass destruction (and their delivery vehicles); pursued by a new type of rogue, sometimes transnational, actor; and complete with an entire new and complex set of questions. We need to address questions such as: How to much more effectively integrate nonproliferation and counter-proliferation initiatives into the larger national security picture? How to prevent political, economic, and technological realities from impeding or reducing the effectiveness of nonproliferation objectives and their respective regimes? And, how to prevent the effects of such realities from constraining our ability to verify other nations' compliance with these regimes (such as the political constraints on UNSCOM, or the absence of a challenge inspection under the auspices of the Chemical Weapons Convention)?

The same Revolution in Military Affairs that challenges us to modernize our warfighting capability to meet the demands of a changed battlefield will also have a tremendous effect on efforts at threat reduction. Last year, this conference actually focused on precisely this idea, "Arms Control and the Revolution in Military Affairs." It was observed that technological advances will change the way we perceive, detect, and reduce threats to our national security. For example, the use of remote monitoring and detection technology can assist arms control regimes, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, to meet verification and compliance aims.

Technological advances, however, represent a double-edged sword. The challenge of emerging technologies will be to maximize the benefits of new and innovative technological breakthroughs as aids in proliferation control, while discouraging the use of these increasingly available and inexpensive resources to allow rogue actors to easily obtain weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles.

Without a doubt, strides in monitoring and detection technology aid compliance efforts and increase confidence in control regimes. The near total integration of information systems into our society -- in to both the public and private sectors alike -- will serve to advance everything from our ability to learn, process, store, and send information, to our ability to communicate and work together. Yet, that availability, integration, and often more open information architecture also represent vulnerabilities for others to exploit.

The question of controlling the threat of information warfare, including space and satellite technologies, needs to be fully examined to both identify the true nature of its threat potential, and to be able to effectively respond in the future. The recent transfer of satellite licensing authority from the U.S. Department of Commerce to the Department of State is a strong example of the U.S. commitment to prevent the leakage of technologies for the purpose of undesirable military application.

No one can ignore that we are all increasingly affected by the changing economic relationships, and occurrences, around the world -- caused by "industrial globalization." Economic and security priorities, however, are often at odds. The ability to reconcile these equities will be an increasingly difficult challenge into the 21" century. One area of concern is the field of biotechnology and determining how the twin issues of technology transfer and export controls reconcile when applied to the realm of biotechnology. Nowhere is the dual use dilemma as strong as in this sector, where legitimate advances in the pharmaceutical industry may have the potential to be used in the manufacture of biological agents. Yet, the strong link between the defense world and the pharmaceutical industry is required for biological defense (for example, in the development of broadband vaccines).

Today, the issue of industrial technology transfer is a top priority issue for senior DoD management. The goal is to enable us to embrace "globalization", while at the same time, protect our national security and prevent our technological advances from falling into the hands of potential adversaries. We realize that international armaments cooperation increases the potential security risks involved in the transfer of militarily significant technology. Yet, such cooperation is essential in a world in which "coalition warfare" is the likely case; and, therefore, where comparable weapons performance and systems interoperability are required for effective military superiority. To eliminate the risks of international armaments cooperation, we must insure that adequate controls are in place to eliminate the transfer of technology outside a group of select members who are in agreement as to those controls -- in both principle and practice -- or even into the commercial world. This, of course, requires governments and firms to recognize the new security environment -- one where fences and visitor controls are perhaps less critical than cyber controls.

One of the major issues of the early 21st century, then, is how to expand the defense industrial structure globally; how to achieve a truly global marketplace, and yet control militarily significant technology. Industrial globalization can provide us a way to help meet the challenge of a widening technological gap among members of our coalition partnerships. And this positive trend towards globalization must also be accommodated by an equally positive trend towards greater civil/military industrial integration. Again, however, we must do this in a way to still control critical national security technologies -- an admittedly difficult challenge.

While events in the Balkans have delayed the ratification of START 11 by the Russian Duma, the likelihood of a bilateral reduction to START 11 levels -- and possibly to those envisioned by the accords reached in Helsinki and New York seem inexorably linked to the prospects of new defensive systems. Here, new approaches must be found to balance the goals of continued strategic stability, between the U.S. and Russia, and a counter to the threats posed by the acquisition of long range ballistic missile systems by rogue states.

Arms control requirements have driven changes in the force structure in many areas, including the strategic nuclear deterrents. The idea of transitioning SSBNs to SSN attack submarines is one example of how an arms control-driven force drawdown may result in the restructuring of our forces in a manner that saves resources, improves defensive capabilities, and should be capable of complying with treaty restrictions. Nowhere is the symbiotic relationship between force requirements and arms control more apparent than in the debate over the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the concept of National Missile Defense.

Some twenty countries possess or are developing weapons of mass destruction. More than twenty nations have theater ballistic missiles or cruise missiles. Many states continue to progress in developing longer-range ballistic missiles. With a U.S. deployment decision on NMD likely by the middle of 2001, negotiations on ABM Treaty modifications will certainly be required. This, of course, presents a challenge. The planned NMD system will be designed for a limited threat, and deployed in sufficiently limited quantities, to clearly only create a defense against a small number of long-range ballistic missiles from rogue states -- nations against whom traditional deterrence methods are likely to prove ineffective. This deployment, however, is not designed for, nor would it be effective against, a large number of sophisticated missiles, and thus should not affect the intent of the ABM Treaty. Nevertheless, successful negotiations over the coming months will be critical.

Advances in technology will also play a major role in on site inspection as a supplement to inspection personnel, both in promoting transparency and in reducing the hefty verification costs. In some cases, as witnessed with UNSCOM in Iraq, remote-monitoring technology m ay prove to be a less politically sensitive option than an inspection presence. Yet, our recent experience with on-site inspection under the auspices of different regimes -- particularly UNSCOM and the Chemical Weapons Convention -- clearly demonstrates the need and effectiveness of on site inspection for future arms control regimes and challenges, such as the Biological Weapons Convention and Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).

Also, technology certainly aids in increasing transparency and -- when put in the context of an inspection or arms control regime -- can improve dialogue and help foster an atmosphere of trust. The value of transparency created in a multilateral forum of willing states is a critical element of U.S. non-proliferation objectives.

Perhaps one of DTRA's most successful programs has been the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program -- as a model for success in the field of non-proliferation. The program continues to achieve notable accomplishments in the former Soviet Union, including ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber destruction, and the construction of a fissile material storage facility to safely store special nuclear material from systems being destroyed, as required by START. Thus, as a realistic example of forward-looking arms control efforts, CTR could provide a model for use as a threat reduction tool in other regions, or as a framework for the future of arms control in the 21" century. CTR plays a major role in assisting our Former Soviet Union partners in meeting arms control commitments. Most likely, international assistance will prove critical in order to assist Russia in meeting its obligations, under the Chemical Weapons Convention, to destroy the world's largest chemical weapons stockpile by 2007.

In conclusion Thomas Jefferson once wrote "as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must change also and keep pace with the times." We have all been witness to the changes over the past decade -- and, in fact, over just the past year -- in the threats we face. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency is certainly at the forefront of America's institutional change to better understand and more effectively meet those threats.