20 April 200

General Shalikashvili on Importance of CTBT in Preventing Proliferation

Statement by General (Ret.) John Shalikashvili
Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State
For the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(As Prepared for Delivery)
Foreign Press Center
Washington, D.C.
April 20, 2000

I am very pleased to speak with you today, less than a week after the Russian Duma voted to ratify START II and a few short days before the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review conference begins in New York.

The Duma��s action indicates that Russia still wants to work with us on strategic arms control both by endorsing existing accords and negotiating even lower warhead limits. I hope that the NPT Review Conference will reaffirm the security benefits that Members already get from the Treaty and re-energize further efforts to achieve the Treaty��s goals.

Two questions are bound to arise at the Review Conference: (1) whether the U.S. remains committed to global arms control and non-proliferation efforts; and (2) whether it has a viable strategy for ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

I believe it is vitally important that both be answered with a resounding "yes." This is why I recently agreed to be Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

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Before I discuss what I am doing on the Test Ban Treaty, let me offer a general observation. During the 1990s, the world made remarkable progress on building what I will call a "nuclear restraint regime."

As you well know, this regime seeks both to prevent proliferation and to reduce the dangerous legacy of the Cold War. It utilizes formal accords, such as the START agreements and the NPT, and less formal approaches, such as the Nunn-Lugar program. It is closely linked to arrangements for banning other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, including the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Missile Technology Control Regime.

While most of the world has been headed away from weapons of mass destruction, a few countries ?most notably Iraq and North Korea ?have tried to move in the other direction. Luckily, they were checked by a united response from the international community. But we may not manage as well the next time around.

The world stands in a tenuous position as we enter the twenty-first century. Can we build on the arms control and non-proliferation accomplishments of the past decade and before? Or will we watch helplessly as the global nuclear restraint regime slowly dissolves or explodes? Two simple things ?interests and action ?will make the difference.

To avoid a nuclear nightmare, policy makers around the world ?and by this I mean not only Presidents and Prime Ministers, but also legislators, military leaders, and anyone else who influences decisions in a given country ?must remain convinced that they are better off pursuing security within a global arms control and non-proliferation framework than without one.

But passive interest is arms control will not suffice. National policy makers must feel strongly enough to exercise leadership when appropriate and to support collective efforts in whatever other ways they can.

The United States clearly has a huge stake in preventing proliferation. Our allies and our military personnel stationed in places like East Asia and the Persian Gulf are directly threatened by weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons programs heighten existing tensions between regional rivals and multiply the devastation that could occur

should war break out. They pose risks to American economic interests, including access to oil and the free flow of commerce and trade, as they do to the interests of most other nations. Our own population and territory could be put at risk, as could that of our friends.

This explains why the United States has committed so much time, energy, and money to building up the global nuclear restraint regime. The U.S. led the push for an indefinite extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 and was equally instrumental in negotiating the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We have also led the international response to challenges that have occurred recently, such as the nuclear tests in South Asia, North Korea��s nuclear program, Iraq��s repudiation of its inspection obligations, and Iran��s efforts to obtain nuclear and missile technology.

To be sure, other countries make vital contributions. But our friends and allies have clearly indicated that they cannot do it without us. And because the U.S. has been so important to global non-proliferation efforts, our failure to ratify the CTBT has raised serious concerns about whether we remain committed to arms control as part of our security strategy.

The Clinton Administration has never wavered in its support for the Test Ban Treaty. But as I��m sure you know, two-thirds of the U.S. Senate must give its approval before the President can deposit our instrument of ratification. Last October 13, 48 Senators voted for ratification, 51 voted against it, and one basically abstained. Thus, the United States?ability to ratify the Treaty and resume a full leadership role efforts to bring it into force requires changing the votes of at least 19 Senators ?a goal that is neither trivial nor impossible.

Since this is an election year and Congress has a short legislative calendar, it would not be practical or productive to press for Senate reconsideration this year. The next Administration will be in a much better position to secure Senate approval if we use the intervening time for a low-key, reasoned dialogue that clarifies issues and considers ways to addresses Senators?concerns.

Simply put, this Treaty is too important to national security, international stability, and American leadership to do nothing for the rest of the year. Let me explain why and then say more about my efforts.

A global ban on nuclear testing essentially rules out a renewed nuclear arms race. Make no mistake -- more possibilities exist: to focus the energy from nuclear weapons, or enhance radiation, or otherwise advance the art or lower the threshold to use. But without testing, no one can confidently develop advanced new nuclear weapons types. Without testing, there is no way to be sure that a new design will function as intended, or perhaps at all.

The CTBT reinforces the strategic arms reduction process. It confirms that neither the U.S. nor Russia is making significant qualitative improvements in its arsenal, which fosters a stable environment for further reductions in nuclear arms.

The CTBT can help head off a nuclear arms race in South Asia, the place where the risk of nuclear war is perhaps highest now. India and Pakistan have fought three wars since independence in 1947 and both conducted nuclear tests in 1998. Persuading them to formalize their testing moratoria through the CTBT is a major goal of the international community. But it is not easy asking them to give up a legal right to test if we retain it.

Banning tests slows the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries by throwing another tough obstacle in the way of anyone who wants nuclear arms. Potential proliferators can make simple fission bombs without testing. But a test ban makes it much harder to get nuclear weapons down to the sizes, shapes, and weights that are deliverable in light airplanes, rudimentary missiles, even terrorists' luggage.

The CTBT also strengthens the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the larger non-proliferation regime. A global test ban is explicitly mentioned in the NPT��s preamble, and was prominent in the 1995 decision for a permanent NPT. We will all be in a much better position to keep the NPT regime strong when we have followed through on our commitment to the CTBT.

Every U.S. ally strongly supports our ratification of the CTBT. All of them have signed the CTBT, most have ratified it already ?with Turkey being the most recent, and the rest intend to do so. Neither they, nor anyone else outside our borders, has any doubts about the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Instead, our allies fear that if we walk away from the Test Ban Treaty, U.S. leadership on arms control and non-proliferation will be seriously weakened.

If some state were to test in total disregard for global arms control norms and agreements, the CTBT helps alert the international community and unite it for an effective response. The Treaty establishes an unprecedented international monitoring system and it provides an entirely new capability for challenge on-site inspections if the international system or our own capabilities points to a possible nuclear test.

So, what am I doing to lay the groundwork for U.S. ratification? For the past month, I have been talking with Senators from both political parties; scientific, military, and diplomatic experts; and others inside and outside the U.S. government. So far, I have been primarily in a listening mode. I want to make sure that I understand the true nature of each person��s concerns and that I do not overlook any important issues.

This consultation process takes time. Questions, for example, about the Treaty��s verifiability involve complicated scientific and diplomatic issues that should not be glossed over lightly. But I have been very pleased that Senators have been very willing to talk with me even though they do not expect a vote again this session. And I��ve been equally impressed by the willingness of other Americans with a wide range of views on the CTBT to offer their ideas for moving forward.

When the time is right, I will offer recommendations to the President and the Secretary of State. I hope that these recommendations will also inform the next Administration��s approach to the Treaty and assist its ratification efforts. Of course, I cannot predict how the American political landscape will look in a year. But I firmly believe that a quiet, non-partisan dialogue about the CTBT now will help the next set of U.S. policy makers act in a way that makes the Twenty First Century safer for everyone.

(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: usinfo.state.gov)