4


Strategic Nuclear Weapons

(Arms Control and Disarmament)



1963 -- June 20
"HOTLINE" AGREEMENT
In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in Geneva to establish a direct communications link, or "hotline," between the two governments for use in the event of a crisis. The hotline agreement is updated in 1971 and again in 1984.

1969 -- November 17
SALT I TALKS
The United States and the Soviet Union open the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) in Helsinki to discuss limits on both strategic nuclear offensive weapons and anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems.

1971 -- September 30
ACCORD ON ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR WAR
The United States and the Soviet Union sign the "Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War." The agreement calls for:

    A pledge to maintain and improve safeguards against the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.
    Immediate notification should a risk of nuclear war arise from the detection of unidentified objects or any other unexplained incident involving a possible detonation of a nuclear weapon.
    Advance notice of any planned missile launches beyond the territory of the launching party and in the direction of the other party.

1972 -- May 26
SALT I TREATIES
U.S. President Richard Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev sign the two basic SALT I documents in Moscow; both enter into effect on October 3 of that year:

    The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty limiting strategic anti-ballistic missile defense systems.
    The Interim Agreement limiting strategic offensive weapons. The agreement freezes the number of intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers (ICBMs and SLBMs) at existing levels (1,710 for the United States and 2,347 for the Soviet Union).

1973 -- June 22
PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR AGREEMENT
The United States and the Soviet Union formally agree to consult with each other in time of crisis to avoid nuclear conflict.

1974 -- November 24
VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT
Meeting in Vladivostok, U.S. President Gerald Ford and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev announce agreement on a formula for a second plan to limit strategic offensive arms (SALT II):

    Both sides will be entitled to an equal aggregate number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs).
    Both sides will be entitled to an equal aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).

1979 -- June 18
SALT II TREATY
At a summit meeting in Vienna, U.S. President Jimmy Carter and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev sign the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II). Its major provisions are:

    A ceiling of 2,400 ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers for both sides, to be reached within six months after the treaty enters into force, with a further reduction to 2,250 by 1981.
    A sublimit of 1,320 on strategic ballistic missiles and heavy bombers equipped with multiple-warhead ballistic or multiple cruise missiles.
    Agreement that each side may build and deploy only one new type of ICBM.
    Agreement that the 1972 ABM Treaty will remain in effect.
    Monitoring of compliance by national technical means (NTM).
    No increase in the production rate of the Soviet Backfire (a medium-range bomber that is not limited by the treaty).

1979 -- December 27
SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN
Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter withdraws the SALT Treaty from Senate consideration. The United States announces that, on a reciprocal basis, it will not "undercut" the provisions of SALT II.

1982 -- June 29
START I TALKS
At the first session of the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva, the United States presents a proposal for strategic reductions to be implemented in two phases. The first phase would include:

    Reductions in strategic ballistic missile warheads to 5,000 for each side, with a sublimit of 2,500 warheads on ICBMs.
    A limit of 850 deployed strategic ballistic missiles, with a sublimit of no more than 110 "heavy" (large throw-weight) ICBMs, such as the SS-18.
    Substantial reductions in ballistic missile throw-weight.

The second phase would place an equal ceiling on heavy bombers and limits and constraints on other strategic systems.

1983 -- March 23
STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE ANNOUNCED
See section 8, March 23, 1983.

1983 -- December 8
SOVIET SUSPENSION OF START TALKS
Alleging a "change in the strategic situation" following NATO deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe, the Soviet Union refuses to set a date for the resumption of the START talks. The United States offers to return to the talks whenever the Soviets are ready (see section 5, November 24, 1984).

1984 -- September 24
U.S. PROPOSAL FOR "UMBRELLA" ARMS TALKS
In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, U.S. President Ronald Reagan proposes a broad "umbrella" framework for arms control talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. The president affirms the U.S. commitment to achieving, among other objectives, a substantial reduction in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals.

1985 -- January 7-8
AGENDA FOR NST
U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko meet in Geneva to set an agenda for new Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) to cover strategic nuclear arms, intermediate-range nuclear forces, and defense and space.

1985 -- March 12
NST NEGOTIATIONS
The United States and the Soviet Union begin NST negotiations. The initial (1983) U.S. START proposal remains on the table. The Soviet Union insists on placing limits on the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) as a precondition for progress in the strategic arms area.

1985 -- June 10
U.S. ADHERENCE TO SALT I AND II
President Reagan announces that the United States will continue to abide by the terms of the expired SALT I agreement and the unratified SALT II agreement. To this end, the United States will deactivate and dismantle an existing Poseidon strategic missile submarine (SSBN) when the seventh U.S. Trident submarine starts sea trials in the fall.

1985 -- September 27
SOVIET STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS PROPOSAL
During a meeting with President Reagan and Secretary Shultz in New York, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Schevardnadze proposes a 50 percent reduction in strategic missiles and an equal ceiling of 6,000 on "nuclear charges" (i.e., warheads), with no more than 60 percent of these "charges" in any one basing mode.

1985 -- October 6
U.S. "BROAD" INTERPRETATION OF ABM TREATY
U.S. National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane introduces a new, "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty that would allow more extensive work on space-based missile defenses than is permitted under the traditional, or "narrow," interpretation of the treaty as observed from 1972 to 1985 (see section 8, October 6, 1985).

1985 -- November 1
U.S. START PROPOSAL
The United States presents a new START proposal at the NST negotiations; the proposal includes:

    A limit of 4,500 reentry vehicles (RVs) on ICBMs and SLBMs.
    A sublimit of 3,000 RVs on ICBMs.
    A sublimit of 1,500 RVs on heavy ICBMs.
    A 50 percent reduction in the highest overall strategic ballistic missile throw- weight of either side (for the Soviet Union, over 5.4 million kilos; for the United States, less than 1.9 million kilos).
    A limit of 1,500 on the number of long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) on heavy bombers.
    A limit of 1,250 to 1,450 on the number of ICBMs and SLBMs.
    A limit of 350 on heavy bombers.
    A ban on new or modernized heavy ballistic missiles.
    A ban on mobile ICBMs because of difficulties in verification.

1985 -- November 21
GENEVA SUMMIT
President Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev issue a joint statement in Geneva following two days of intensive negotiations. They agree to commit their two countries to early progress at the Nuclear and Space Talks and to focus on areas where there is common ground -- the "principle of 50 percent reductions in the nuclear arms of the United States and the Soviet Union appropriately applied."

1985 -- December 23
U.S. COMPLIANCE WITH SALT II
The United States announces that it will continue to comply with the unratified SALT II Treaty beyond its December 31, 1985, expiration.

1986 -- January 15
SOVIET PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
General Secretary Gorbachev announces a three-stage proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2000. President Reagan, in response, indicates that the elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000 is "clearly not appropriate for consideration at this time." As a counterproposal, the president calls for "immediate progress" in the negotiations on the reduction of intermediate-range nuclear forces (see section 5, February 23, 1986).

1986 -- May 27
U.S. POSITION ON SALT
Because of alleged Soviet noncompliance with major arms control commitments, the continued buildup of Soviet strategic forces, and Soviet failure to follow through on its commitment to achieve early progress in the Geneva negotiations, President Reagan announces that the United States will no longer "base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on...standards contained in...a flawed SALT II Treaty...." The president then announces that the United States will exceed the SALT II treaty limits in fall 1986, when it equips the 131st B-52 heavy bomber with long-range ALCMs.

1986 -- May 29
SOVIET START AND SDI PROPOSAL
Abandoning its previous refusal to negotiate reductions in offensive strategic weapons until the United States agrees to renounce SDI, the Soviet Union introduces a new, two-part proposal in Geneva. It offers "interim" reductions in strategic offensive forces if both sides agree not to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty for 15 to 20 years.

The Soviet START proposal specifically calls for:


    A limit of 8,000 strategic nuclear offensive "charges" with no more than 60 percent in any one basing mode.
    An equal limit of 1,600 on SNDVs.
    Exclusion of U.S. forward-based systems (intermediate-range missiles, medium- range bombers, and carrier-based aircraft) if their numbers are not increased and if they are not redeployed.

1986 -- Fall
REVISED U.S. START PROPOSALS
The United States presents substantial revisions of its proposals to accommodate the Soviet idea of taking interim steps to 50 percent reductions, making it clear, however, that its 50 percent reduction proposal remains on the table and is preferred. The new position would limit each side to:

    1,600 SNDVs.
    7,500 ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs.
    5,500 ICBM and SLBM warheads.
    3,300 ICBM warheads.
    1,650 warheads on heavy ICBMs, on ICBMs with more than six warheads, and on mobile missiles (if deployment of the latter can be verified).

Soviet ballistic missile throw-weight would be cut by 50 percent.

1986 -- October 11-12
REYKJAVIK SUMMIT
President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agree to limits of 1,600 on SNDVs and 6,000 on ICBM, SLBM, and ALCM warheads. The sides also agree that each heavy bomber not equipped with ALCMs will count as one warhead regardless of its weapons loading and that nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) will be limited in a separate agreement. The Soviet Union, however, demands that the United States accept measures that would cripple SDI, a condition that President Reagan refuses.

1987 -- May 8
U.S. DRAFT START TREATY
The United States presents a draft START treaty in Geneva reflecting the basic areas of agreement reached by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at the Reykjavik summit:

    A ceiling of 1,600 SNDVs.
    A ceiling of 6,000 warheads on these delivery vehicles.
    A sublimit of 4,800 ballistic missile warheads, with no more than 3,300 ICBM warheads and no more than 1,650 warheads on heavy ICBMs or ICBMs that carry more than six warheads.
    A 50 percent reduction in Soviet throw-weight.
    A ban on mobile missiles.
    Reductions to be phased in over a seven-year period.

1987 -- July 31
SOVIET DRAFT START TREATY
The Soviet Union presents a draft START treaty that includes:

    A 50 percent reduction in each side's strategic offensive arms.
    A ceiling of 1,600 SNDVs.
    A 50 percent reduction in heavy ICBMs.
    A ceiling of 6,000 nuclear warheads.
    A limit of 400 nuclear SLCMs on submarines.

The 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms is contingent upon achievement of a U.S.-Soviet accord to limit the testing and deployment of space- based missile defense systems.

1987 -- December 7-10
WASHINGTON SUMMIT
Meeting in Washington, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agree that their START negotiators should build upon the areas of agreement in the joint draft START treaty text being developed in Geneva. These include:

    A ceiling of 1,600 SNDVs with 6,000 warheads.
    A ceiling of 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles.
    A 50 percent reduction in ballistic missile throw-weight.

During the summit the two leaders make further progress on START, agreeing on a sublimit of 4,900 for the total number of ballistic missile warheads and guidelines for effective verification of a START treaty, building on the verification provisions of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

With regard to the debate over the "broad" versus the "narrow" interpretation of the ABM Treaty (see October 6, 1985), both sides essentially "agree to disagree."

1988 -- May 29-June 2
MOSCOW SUMMIT
At a summit meeting in Moscow, the United States and the Soviet Union agree to confine road-mobile and rail-mobile ICBMs to restricted areas, with right of dispersal for occasional operations and exercises, and accept the requirement to notify once dispersal begins.

On May 31, the sides sign the Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement. Designed to reduce the risk of nuclear war, the agreement requires each side to notify the other at least 24 hours in advance of all ICBM and SLBM launches.

1989 -- June 19
U.S. VERIFICATION AND STABILITY INITIATIVE
U.S. President George Bush announces a Verification and Stability Initiative designed to build confidence, enhance stability, accelerate resolution of outstanding verification issues, and provide both sides practical verification experience, thereby facilitating efforts to conclude a START treaty. The U.S. initiative proposes:

    Immediate establishment of on-site perimeter/portal monitoring of certain missile production facilities.
    Exchange of data on each side's strategic nuclear forces.
    Prohibition of encryption of telemetry on ICBMs and SLBMs.
    Familiarization with procedures for inspections to monitor the number of warheads on ballistic missiles.
    Notification of strategic exercises.
    Demonstration of tagging techniques for identifying missiles.

1989 -- September 22-23
WYOMING MINISTERIAL
During two days of meetings between U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, progress is made in the following areas:

    The Soviet Union drops its linkage between an agreement on missile defense and an agreement on START, but indicates that it might withdraw from a START treaty if the United States does not abide by the ABM Treaty.
    The Soviet Union agrees to eliminate its illegal early-warning radar at Krasnoyarsk without preconditions (see section 8, September 22-23, 1989, and October 23, 1989).
    Secretary Baker announces that "the United States is withdrawing its proposal to ban mobile ICBMs in START, contingent on funding by the U.S. Congress of U.S. mobile ICBMs."
    The Soviet Union agrees to U.S. proposals on the elements of verification for mobile ICBMs.
    Following President Bush's June 19 initiative on verification and stability measures, Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze sign the "Agreement on Principles of Implementing Trial Verification and Stability Measures."
    Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze sign an "Agreement on Reciprocal Advance Notice of Major Strategic Exercises," which requires each side to notify the other no less than 14 days in advance of one of its major strategic exercises involving heavy bombers to be held during that calendar year.

1990 -- May 16-19
MOSCOW MINISTERIAL
At a ministerial meeting in Moscow, Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agree:

    To a 600-kilometer range threshold for ALCMs.
    That the first 150 U.S. heavy bombers can carry up to 20 ALCMs but will be counted as carrying 10, and the first 210 Soviet heavy bombers can carry up to 12 ALCMs but will be counted as carrying 8. After the first 150 U.S. or 210 Soviet heavy bombers, the discount will disappear.
    To limit nuclear SLCMs to 880 in number in a separate, politically binding agreement.

1990 -- May 31-June 3
WASHINGTON SUMMIT
At a summit in Washington, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev sign the "Joint Statement on the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms." The statement recapitulates already-agreed START provisions and adds two new provisions agreed during the summit:

    A sublimit of 1,100 on mobile ICBM warheads.
    A schedule for implementing the reductions in three phases over seven years.

The presidents also agree that follow-on START negotiations will begin "at the earliest practical date."

1991 -- July 31
SIGNING OF START I TREATY
Presidents Bush and Gorbachev sign the "Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms" (START I), which calls for the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce their strategic nuclear forces over seven years to 1,600 SNDVs and 6,000 "accountable" warheads, of which no more than 4,900 may be on ballistic missiles. This will result in a cut in strategic warheads of 25 to 35 percent.

In addition, the Soviet Union will reduce its heavy SS-18 ballistic missiles by 50 percent (to 1,540 RVs) and its aggregate ballistic missile throw-weight by 46 percent (to 3,600 metric tons).

1991 -- September 27
UNILATERAL NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS PROPOSAL
President Bush announces that the United States will withdraw all of its land-based tactical nuclear weapons from overseas bases and all of its sea-based tactical nuclear weapons from U.S. ships, submarines, and aircraft (see section 5, September 27, 1991). The United States will also immediately stand down all strategic bombers currently on day-to-day alert status and store their weapons, immediately stand down all ICBMs scheduled for deactivation under START, halt development of the rail garrison and mobile ICBM program, and cancel the follow- on short-range attack missile (SRAM-II) for heavy bombers.

1991 -- October 5
SOVIET RESPONSE TO U.S. INITIATIVE
President Gorbachev, in response to President Bush's initiative, announces that the Soviet Union will immediately:

    Stand down all strategic bombers currently on day-to-day alert status and store their weapons.
    Stand down 503 ICBMs, including 134 MIRVed missiles.
    Stop the buildup of launching facilities for rail-based ICBMs, halt their modernization, and return them to basing facilities.
    Discontinue development of a small mobile ICBM and of a short-range attack missile for heavy bombers.

1991 -- November 27
NUNN-LUGAR LEGISLATION
The U.S. Congress passes the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act (the Nunn- Lugar legislation) authorizing the transfer of up to $400 million in Department of Defense funds in fiscal year 1992 to help the Soviet Union destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons; transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction; and establish safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons.

1991 -- December 25
DISSOLUTION OF THE SOVIET UNION
The Soviet Union dissolves and is replaced by 12 independent states, including four with nuclear weapons on their territory. These countries, except Georgia, form the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

1992 -- January 27
RUSSIAN ANNOUNCEMENT OF UNILATERAL INITIATIVES
Russian President Boris Yeltsin announces that Russia intends to cease production of strategic bombers and ALCMs, forego replacing tactical nuclear warheads for ground-launched weapons that are scheduled to be destroyed, and close down all remaining nuclear reactors that produce plutonium for weapons by the year 2000. He calls on the United States and Russia to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals to 2,000 to 2,500 warheads each, to begin talks on a fissile material cutoff agreement, and to de-target strategic nuclear missiles aimed at each other's territory.

1992 -- January 28
U.S. WEAPONS REDUCTION OFFER
In a speech to the U.S. Congress, President Bush offers to cut U.S. strategic weapons further. He announces that, "After completing 20 planes for which we have begun procurement, we will shut down further production of the B-2 bomber. We will cancel the small ICBM program. We will cease production of new warheads for our sea-based ballistic missiles. We will stop all new production of the Peacekeeper missile. And we will not purchase any more advanced cruise missiles."

In a preview of what will become the START II Treaty, President Bush reports that, "I have informed President Yeltsin that if the [CIS] will eliminate all land-based multiple-warhead ballistic missiles...we will eliminate all Peacekeeper missiles. We will reduce the number of heads on Minuteman missiles to one and reduce the number of warheads on our sea-based missiles by about one-third. And we will convert a substantial portion of our strategic bombers to primarily conventional use."

1992 -- May 23
LISBON PROTOCOL
The United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine sign the START Protocol at a ceremony in Portugal. Under the protocol, all five countries become parties to START, and the three non-Russian former Soviet republics agree to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapon states "in the shortest possible time." In addition to the protocol, in letters to President Bush, the heads of the three republics pledge to eliminate all the strategic weapons on their territories within the seven-year START reduction period.

1992 -- June 16-18
WASHINGTON SUMMIT "JOINT UNDERSTANDING" ON START II
During a summit meeting in Washington, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin develop the framework for a follow-on strategic reduction agreement (START II). The "Joint Understanding" calls for:

    Elimination of all MIRVed ICBMs.
    A limit of 1,750 SLBM warheads.
    Counting rules whereby bombers count as the "number of warheads they are actually equipped to carry."
    Reductions by both sides to between 3,000 and 3,500 warheads each by the year 2003.

1992 -- End of July
START II
At the end of July, the United States submits a draft of the START II Treaty to Russia.

1992 -- July-November
START I ACTIVITIES
On July 2, the Kazakhstan Parliament ratifies START I; the U.S. Senate ratifies it on October 1, and Russia ratifies it on November 4. Russia decides not to exchange the instruments of ratification, however, until Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine reach agreement on the dismantlement of their nuclear forces and join the NPT.

1992 -- October 22-23
BELARUS MISSILE TRANSFER
Belarus agrees to transfer its nuclear missiles to Russia.

1992 -- December 5
U.S. DISMANTLEMENT ASSISTANCE TO UKRAINE
President Bush offers Ukraine $175 million in Nunn-Lugar assistance for the dismantlement of its strategic weapons.

1993 -- January 3
START II
Presidents Bush and Yeltsin sign the "Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms" (START II).

The treaty calls for a reduction in U.S. and Russian strategic warheads to no more than 3,000 to 3,500 each on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. The reductions are to be completed in two phases by the year 2003 -- or by the end of 2000 if the United States helps finance the destruction and dismantling of weapons in Russia. Additional limits include:


    A ban on MIRVed ICBMs.
    Elimination of all SS-18 heavy missiles.
    A sublimit of 1,700 to 1,750 SLBM warheads (about one-half the SLBM warheads projected for the United States under START I).
    Freedom to "download" (remove) warheads from strategic missiles in order to meet required reductions or to deMIRV ICBMs.
    No discount for heavy bomber weapons (the number of weapons counted for heavy bombers will be the number they are actually equipped to carry).
    The right to "reorient" to conventional missions (and thus exempt from the overall limits) up to 100 heavy bombers, provided they have never been equipped to carry long-range nuclear ALCMs.

1993 -- January-February
START II ACTIVITIES
On January 15, President Bush submits START II for Senate ratification. On February 9, President Yeltsin submits START II for Supreme Soviet ratification.

1993 -- February 4
BELARUS RATIFICATIONS
On February 4, Belarus ratifies START I, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Lisbon Accord.

1993 -- April 23
SPEEDING UP ELIMINATION UNDER START I
In an effort to "help build a new security partnership with Russia and the other Commonwealth states," U.S. President Bill Clinton announces an accelerated timetable for U.S. strategic forces reductions under START I.

1993 -- July 2
KAZAKHSTAN RATIFICATIONS
Kazakhstan ratifies START I; it accedes to the NPT on February 14, 1994.

1993 -- November 18
UKRAINE RATIFICATIONS
The Ukrainian Parliament ratifies START I and the Lisbon Protocol but with such serious reservations as to place Ukraine's commitment to join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state in doubt.

1994 -- January 14
TRILATERAL STATEMENT
The United States, Russia, and Ukraine sign a Trilateral Statement in which Ukraine agrees to transfer strategic nuclear warheads on Ukrainian territory to Russia in exchange for compensation in the form of fuel assemblies for nuclear power stations and security assurances once Ukraine becomes a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT.

The United States and Russia also issue the "Moscow Declaration," in which they agree to de-target their nuclear missiles no later than May 30, 1994 (see January 27, 1992).

1994 -- January 15
AID PLEDGE TO BELARUS
President Clinton pledges $50 million in additional aid to Belarus, including $25 million in assistance for transferring strategic nuclear weapons to Russia.

1994 -- February 3
UKRAINIAN ACCEPTANCE OF TRILATERAL STATEMENT
The Ukrainian Parliament accepts the Trilateral Statement clearing the way for START I ratification. The parliament acknowledges that Article V of the Lisbon Protocol applies to Ukraine, but continues to refuse to accede to the NPT.

1994 -- May 30
DE-TARGETING OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR MISSILES
The United States and Russia complete the de-targeting of their strategic nuclear missiles (see January 14, 1994). Britain also de-targets its missiles under a separate agreement with Russia.

1994 -- September 22
NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW
Conducted by the U.S. Department of Defense, the Nuclear Posture Review concludes, among other things, that cuts in forces below 3,000 to 3,500 should not be undertaken until the START II treaty has been implemented.

1994 -- September 27-28
WASHINGTON SUMMIT
In a joint statement, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin "confirm their intention to seek early ratification of the START II Treaty." The presidents further agree that "once the START II Treaty is ratified, the United States and Russia will proceed to deactivate all strategic nuclear delivery systems to be reduced under START II by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other steps to remove them from combat status."

1994 -- November 7-9
SECURITY ASSURANCES FOR UKRAINE
President Clinton and the leaders of Russia and Britain send letters to Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma extending formal promises of security assurances once Ukraine accedes to the NPT.

1994 -- November 16
UKRAINE ACCESSION TO NPT
After receiving assurances from the United States, Britain, and France, the Ukrainian Parliament approves Ukraine's accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state.

1994 -- December 5
START I TREATY IN FORCE
The five parties to the START I Treaty -- the United States, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine -- exchange instruments of ratification for START I at the Budapest Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe summit.

1995 -- March 1
START I BASELINE INSPECTIONS
START I baseline inspections begin and last 120 days.

1995 -- April 25
KAZAKHSTAN BECOMES NUCLEAR-FREE
Kazakhstan announces that it has completed the transfer of 104 SS-18s and that it is now nuclear-free.

1995 -- June 22
START II SUBMITTED TO RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT
Russian President Boris Yeltsin submits START II to the Russian Parliament for ratification.

1996 -- January 26
U.S. SENATE RATIFIES START II
The U.S. Senate approves a resolution of ratification of START II by a vote of 87 to 4.

1996 -- June 1
UKRAINE TRANSFER OF WARHEADS
President Kuchma announces that Ukraine has transferred the last strategic nuclear warhead on its territory to Russia (see January 14, 1994).

1996 -- October 16-18
RUSSIAN REFUSAL TO RATIFY START II
U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry visits Moscow in an attempt to persuade Russian legislators to ratify START II and to work on improving U.S.-Russian military cooperation. Even after Perry's unprecedented address to the Russian Duma, the Russian lower house of Parliament continues to refuse to ratify the treaty.

1996 -- November 23
NON-NUCLEAR BELARUS
Belarus fulfills its START I and NPT obligations when it transfers its last 16 former Soviet SS-25 ICBMs and associated nuclear warheads to Russia and becomes a non-nuclear state.

1997 -- January 24
U.S. START III INITIATIVE
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott travels to Moscow and delivers a U.S. proposed framework for a START III agreement that includes reducing the U.S. advantage in SLBMs. The United States links the agreement, however, to Russian ratification of START II and the creation of a Russia-NATO charter, among other conditions.

1997 -- March 21
HELSINKI SUMMIT
At the Helsinki Summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin issue a "Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces" containing several elements:

    Agreement that "...once START II enters into force, the United States and Russia will immediately begin negotiations on a START III agreement."
    Agreement to extend the elimination deadline for strategic nuclear delivery vehicles under START II from 2003 to December 31, 2007, a delay of five years.
    Agreement to deactivate all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles scheduled for elimination under START II by December 31, 2003.
    Agreement to initiate separate talks concerning "possible measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems."
    Agreement on a framework for START III to include:

      Reductions to 2,000 to 2,500 deployed strategic nuclear warheads by December 31, 2007 (coterminus with the extended START II deadline);
      Measures, to be determined through negotiation, to establish transparency in warhead inventories and destruction of such; and
      The goal of making the START treaties permanent.

1997 -- April 9
RUSSIAN DUMA VOTE ON START II
The Russian Duma votes to indefinitely postpone debate over START II ratification.

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