01 November 2000 Fact Sheet: Nuclear Suppliers Group This fact sheet was released by the Bureau of Nonproliferation of the U.S. Department of State: With 39 member states, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a widely accepted, mature, and effective export-control arrangement, which contributes to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons through implementation of guidelines for control of nuclear and nuclear-related exports. Members pursue the aims of the NSG through voluntary adherence to the Guidelines which are adopted by consensus and through exchanges of information on developments of nuclear proliferation concern. The first set of NSG Guidelines (Part 1) governs exports of nuclear materials and equipment which require the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the recipient facility. The Part 1 nuclear control list is called the "Trigger List" because the export of such items "triggers" the requirement for IAEA safeguards. The second set of NSG Guidelines (Part 2) governs exports of nuclear-related dual-use equipment and materials. The NSG Guidelines also control technology related to both nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use exports. Both Parts 1 and 2 of the NSG Guidelines aim to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or explosive devices while not hindering such trade. The NSG was formed in 1974 following the Indian nuclear explosion which demonstrated how nuclear technology and materials transferred for peaceful purposes could be misused. The NSG Guidelines, first published in 1978, established requirements for: (1) formal recipient government assurances confirming safeguards and no nuclear explosive use; (2) adequate physical protection; and (3) particular caution in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and weapons-usable materials. The Guidelines also strengthened retransfer conditions. Nuclear suppliers took note when the 1990 NPT Review Conference committee on implementation of Article III recommended that NPT parties: (a) consider further improvements in measures to prevent diversion of nuclear technology for nuclear weapons; (b) coordinate controls of exports of significant nuclear-related items; and (c) require full-scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply to non-nuclear weapon states. Shortly thereafter, it became apparent that nuclear export controls had not prevented Iraq, a party to the NPT, from pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program through acquisition of significant dual-use items. In response to these developments, the NSG decided in 1992 to: (a) establish guidelines for the control of transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials and technology which could make a significant contribution to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities; and (2) adopt a policy of requiring full scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of supply of nuclear Trigger List items to non-nuclear weapon states. Chairmanship of the NSG rotates on an annual basis with the host of the annual Plenary meetings assuming the Chair for that year. The Plenary can decide to set up technical working groups on matters such as review of the Guidelines or control lists, procedures, information sharing, transparency and outreach activities. The NSG Dual Use Consultations (DUR) meets at least twice a year to coordinate dual-use control issues. The Permanent Mission of Japan in Vienna serves as the NSG Point of Contact in providing administrative support, including provision of meeting space and distribution of documents. The 2000 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Plenary and related meetings took place in Paris the week of June 19-23 under the chairmanship of France. The Plenary accepted the U.S. offer to chair the 2001 NSG Plenary at Aspen, Colorado, in early May at which time the U.S. will assume the chairmanship for that year. The Plenary welcomed Belarus, Cyprus and Turkey as new NSG members and Slovenia as an observer. The outgoing Italian Chairman of the NSG reported that Slovenia had taken all the necessary steps to qualify for NSG membership and recommended early action in confirming the necessary member consensus for Slovenian membership. The Plenary noted that Kazakhstan has also been working to accord its nuclear export controls with the NSG Guidelines and authorized the French Chair to continue contacts with Kazakhstan regarding future NSG membership. The British Chair of the Implementation Working Group (IWG) reported substantial progress toward reaching consensus on restructuring which would confirm the primacy of the plenary and replace the Dual Use Regime with a Consultative Group to deal with both Part 1 (Nuclear) and Part 2 (Dual-Use) issues. There has been less progress toward reaching consensus on revisions to clarify and strengthen the Part 1 Guidelines (primarily because of Russian opposition). The Italians presented a report on the status of controls over transfers of intangible technology, recommending that the NSG continue to follow the issue. The Plenary agreed to do so. The outgoing Italian Chair reported outreach activities with non-members including--China, Egypt, India and Iran. The Plenary agreed that the French chair should continue to coordinate outreach contacts with non-members. In Vienna meetings during October 2000: (a) Slovenia was welcomed as a new member and subscribing government; (b) the Transparency Working Group heard details about a German Government offer to host the proposed NSG Website and a Netherlands Government offer to provide funding; (c) the Implementation Issues Working Group made substantial progress toward reaching agreement on restructuring proposals to strengthen the Plenary and to eliminate the current separate Dual Use Regime; and (d) the Dual Use Consultations heard a report from the U.S., under the agenda item "Programs of Concern in Sensitive Countries," regarding India's nuclear program and concerns about the proposed (Russian) supply of low enriched uranium to the Indian Tarapur reactors. This issue is expected to be fully discussed in a special intersessional plenary meeting called by the NSG Chair (France) for early November 2000 in Vienna. (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov) Return to the Washington File