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International Atomic Energy Agency Fact Sheet
The International Atomic Energy Agency was established in 1957 as an autonomous organization under
the aegis of the United Nations.
Aims and Activities
In accordance with its Statute, the IAEA's main
objectives are to seek "to accelerate and enlarge the contribution
of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity
throughout the world", and to ensure, "so far as it is
able, that assistance provided by it, or at its request or
under its supervision or control, is not used in such a way
as to further any military purpose".
To achieve these objectives, the IAEA fosters
research and development in the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy, promotes the exchange of scientific and technical
information, assists its 130 Member States through technical
co-operation, administers safeguards verification of
nuclear materials, establishes standards for nuclear safety
and radiation protection, and provides for the application
of these standards.
Safeguards
The Agency verifies non-proliferation commitments
and provides assurance to the international community
about the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear
material and facilities. Effective verification is vital to
the continued success of nuclear non-proliferation
efforts. In this regard, the Agency establishes and applies
safeguards to ensure that nuclear materials and nuclear
equipment intended for peaceful use are not used for the
production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices. Safeguards are essentially a technical
means of verifying a State's fulfilment of its commitments
to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as reflected
in such legal instruments as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
IAEA safeguards are applied pursuant to safeguards
agreements concluded between the Agency and
the State( s) concerned. In the case of non-nuclear-weapon
States (NNWS) parties to the NPT, "comprehen
sive" (sometimes referred to as "full-scope") safeguards
agreements cover all of a State's nuclear material and
activities. Comprehensive safeguards agreements are
also required by the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties,
which have been concluded to date for Latin America
and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Africa, and
Southeast Asia. Additionally, safeguards agreements,
known as "voluntary offer" agreements, are in force with
each of the nuclear-weapon States (NWS) recognized as
such under the NPT. These agreements, based on the
model comprehensive safeguards agreement contained
in the Agency document INFCIRC/ 153( Corr.), apply
only to the nuclear material and facilities voluntarily submitted
by the States concerned for Agency verification.
Another type of safeguards agreement, modelled on
Agency document INFCIRC/ 66 Rev. 2, is "item specific"
and covers individual nuclear facilities, specific items of
equipment, or specific nuclear material.
The objectives of NPT safeguards are to ensure that
safeguards are applied to all nuclear material in all
peaceful nuclear activities of the NNWS parties to the
Treaty and to assure the international community that
NNWS parties are complying with their peaceful use
undertakings. The Agency endeavours to fulfil these
objectives through a system that is designed to detect, in
a timely manner, diversion of significant quantities
(SQ) of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities
to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other
nuclear explosive devices and to deter such diversion by
the risk of early detection.
A significant quantity is the approximate quantity
of any given type of nuclear material which, taking
into account any conversion process involved, is
required for the manufacture of a nuclear explosive
device. The timely detection of diversion is a reference
to the maximum time-frame within which the Agency
seeks to detect any diversion from peaceful use. For this
quantification, the Agency looks at the "conversion
times" required to convert different types of nuclear
material into a nuclear explosive device.
The basic features of the original NPT safeguards
system are:
- nuclear material accounting, through which, on the
basis of information provided primarily by the
State, the Agency establishes an initial inventory of
nuclear material in the State, and records subsequent
changes to it;
- containment and surveillance measures to monitor
access to and movement of nuclear material; and
- on-site inspections during which Agency inspectors
have the right and obligation to carry out a variety
of measures (such as the examination of records;
taking measurements and samples of nuclear material
for IAEA analysis; and verifying the functioning
and calibration of instruments) for the purpose
of verifying the correctness of States' nuclear
accountancy data and also the completeness of declarations
related to their nuclear programmes.
On-site inspection is its most important feature.
Inspections are of three types: ad hoc, routine and special.
Ad hoc and routine inspections constitute the bulk
of inspections. They give the Agency access to nuclear
material and operating records and to specified locations
where nuclear material is, or may be, used or stored.
Special inspections are exceptional and may be prompted
by the State itself, or by the IAEA, if it considers that
information made available by the State is not adequate
for the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under the relevant
safeguards agreement.
Since their inception, safeguards have continually
evolved taking into account changes in technology.
Following the discovery of Iraq's clandestine enrichment
and nuclear weapons programmes, the shortcomings of
the safeguards system became apparent, and it was
agreed that the system would henceforth have to provide
assurance, not only about the non-diversion of declared
nuclear material and facilities, but about the absence of
any undeclared nuclear material and activities. To do
this, the system has had to move beyond its traditional
focus on nuclear material accountancy and also incorporate
more qualitative assessments of the completeness of
a State's declared nuclear activities and facilities.
The IAEA began to introduce safeguards strengthening
measures in 1992. The focus of these strengthening
measures has been on obtaining more information
from States about their nuclear material, facilities and
plans, on gaining more access to locations at which
nuclear material is or could be present, and on using new
technology.
Between 1993-1995, the Agency developed further
measures to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the
efficiency of the safeguards system. Some of the measures
could be implemented under the legal authority
already conferred upon the Agency in comprehensive
safeguards agreements. Others required complementary,
legal authority. To this end, in June 1996, the Board of
Governors decided to establish an open-ended
Committee to negotiate a legal instrument that would
provide that authority. The Committee negotiated the
text of the Model Protocol Additional to Safeguards
Agreements between States and the IAEA for the
Application of Safeguards (" Model Additional
Protocol"), which was approved by the Board of
Governors in May 1997.
The Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/ 540
Corr.) embodies powerful, new tools to help the Agency
verify compliance with States' safeguards undertakings.
Building on earlier strengthening measures, an
Additional Protocol, in combination with the relevant
safeguards agreement, enables the IAEA to obtain as
comprehensive a picture as practical of a State's nuclear
material, activities, and plans. Thus, under the Model
Additional Protocol, a State is required to provide information
to the Agency and access mechanisms related to:
all aspects of its nuclear fuel cycle; nuclear fuel cycle-related
research and development; all buildings on a
nuclear "site"; the manufacture and any export of sensitive
nuclear-related technologies; long-term plans for the
development of the nuclear fuel cycle; and wider physical
access than previously provided for the purpose of
ensuring the absence of undeclared nuclear material and
activities or resolving questions and inconsistencies.
The Model Additional Protocol represents a balance
between rights and obligations of States and the
Agency. While a State concluding an Additional
Protocol incurs certain additional, legal obligations
under the Model Additional Protocol, the State's rights
are protected through the Agency's obligation to: ensure
that the broader access rights incorporated in the Model
document are not applied in any mechanistic or systematic
fashion; provide advance notice to the State in writing
of requests for access; accept managed access upon
request by the State; hold prior consultations with the
State; inform the State in writing of the activities and
results of activities carried out under the Additional
Protocol and the resulting conclusions it has drawn;
agree on Subsidiary Arrangements with the State, if
either the State or the Agency considers it necessary; and
maintain a stringent regime to ensure effective protection
against disclosure of all commercial, technological, and
industrial secrets and other confidential information.
Over 220 safeguards agreements are currently in
force with some 140 States, including 127 comprehensive
safeguards agreements with non-nuclear weapon
States parties to the NPT. At the same time, however, 55
States parties to the NPT have yet to meet their treaty
obligation to conclude a safeguards agreement with the
Agency. Comprehensive safeguards agreements pursuant
to regional nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty commitments
are in force with 31 of the 32 States party to the
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco); all 11
States party to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone
Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga); and 7 of the 9 States party
to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
(Treaty of Bangkok). The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), which has not yet
entered into force, also foresees the application of comprehensive
Agency safeguards in States party to this
treaty. Twenty of the 50 signatories to the Treaty of
Pelindaba have comprehensive safeguards agreements in
force pursuant to the NPT. As for Protocols Additional to
States' safeguards agreements, by the beginning of 2000,
46 such Protocols had been approved by the Board of
Governors, 45 of them with States parties to the NPT.
Initial implementation of the new measures con-tained
in the Model Additional Protocol began in 1998 in
those countries where an Additional Protocol had
already entered into force. The focus of ongoing and
future safeguards work is continuing to develop the
infrastructure necessary for Additional Protocol implementation
and, even more significantly, to develop a
system which integrates the "traditional" verification
activities conducted under safeguards agreements with
the new strengthened measures with a view to providing
enhanced assurance to the international community
about States' compliance with their non-proliferation
commitments.
The Agency's Safeguards Implementation Report
(SIR) for 1998, the latest currently available, shows that,
during 1998, as in previous years, the Agency did not
find any indication:
(1) that nuclear material, which had been declared and
placed under safeguards in States had been diverted
from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture
of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive
devices or for purposes unknown, or
(2) that facilities, equipment, or non-nuclear material
placed under safeguards were being misused.
In the future, as more and more States conclude
Additional Protocols, the Agency will also be able,
through Additional Protocol implementation, to provide
credible assurance about the absence of any undeclared
nuclear material and activities in States.
>From 1991 until the end of 1999, Agency safeguards
obligations in Iraq were subsumed in the mandate
assigned to the Agency under UN Security Council
(UNSC) resolution 687 and related resolutions. The
IAEA's activities in Iraq under these UNSC resolutions
were suspended in December 1998. The Agency was
accordingly unable to implement its mandate in Iraq and,
as a consequence, to provide any assurance that Iraq was
in compliance with its obligations under the resolutions.
In January 2000, IAEA inspectors returned to Iraq to
conduct an inspection pursuant to Iraq's NPT safeguards
agreement with the Agency. The inspection was limited
in scope and should not be seen as any substitute for the
Agency's work pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the
UNSC.
The Agency is still unable to verify the correctness
and completeness of the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea's (DPRK) initial declaration of its nuclear
material subject to safeguards and has therefore been
unable to conclude that there has been no diversion of
nuclear material in the DPRK. The safeguards agreement
between the DPRK and the Agency remains binding and
in force, and the Agency is continuing to implement
some safeguards measures in the DPRK, including monitoring
the "freeze" on the DPRK's graphite-moderated
reactors and related facilities, as requested by the UN
Security Council and as foreseen in the "Agreed
Framework" of October 1994 between the DPRK and the
United States. The DPRK continues to link the extent of
its co-operation with the Agency with progress in the
Agreed Framework.
Nuclear Technology
Hand in hand with its safeguards responsibilities,
the Agency works to foster the role of nuclear science
and technology in support of sustainable human development.
This involves both advancing knowledge and
exploiting this knowledge to tackle pressing worldwide
challenges: hunger, disease, natural resource management,
environmental pollution, and climate change.
The IAEA promotes the transfer of nuclear technology
for peaceful purposes to Member States with the
appropriate infrastructure, including safeguards agreements,
required to use the technology. Through its
Technical Co-operation Programme (TC), the IAEA
works in partnership with Member States using nuclear
technology to assist them to achieve their major sustainable
development priorities in a cost-effective manner.
Each year the Agency supports some 800 technical co-
operation projects worldwide. The Agency's assistance
is targeted to priority needs and provided where: such
technology is the most effective and appropriate, and the
recipient Member State has adequate infrastructure to
adopt and sustain such technology safely.
In 1998, the total resources available to the IAEA
for TC amounted to $US 64.5 million. Of the assistance
delivered in that year, the largest portion, 22%, related to
nuclear safety, while 21% was devoted to projects relat-ing
to human health, 16 % to food and agriculture, 11%
to physical and chemical sciences and marine environment,
water resources and industry, and 7% to nuclear
fuel cycle and waste technology. In 1999, total resources
for TC increased to $US 71.9 million.
Many nuclear techniques are relatively cheap, simple
to handle and offer excellent and often unique benefits
in such areas as insect control, water resources management,
human health, and environmental protection.
The sterile insect technique has been successfully
used in many parts of the world to combat insect pests of
agricultural significance. By mass rearing and sterilizing
male insects using nuclear techniques, the insect population
can be controlled by releasing the treated males into
the environment in large numbers. Unable to reproduce
because of the large number of sterile males, the insect
pest will gradually be eliminated. The Agency has participated
in a multi-year, million dollar programme in
Argentina to combat the fruit fly, a serious threat to the
$US 450 million yearly fruit export industry. And, unlike
most conventional insect control methods, the sterile
insect technique has no negative impacts on the environment.
Water shortage and water quality are ongoing challenges
to sustainable development worldwide. Isotope
techniques provide information that is unobtainable by
other means and contribute to sound water management
practices. The movement of trace amounts of environmental
isotopes in a water source can be tracked, there-by
providing a better picture of how and where the water
moves. Recognizing the significance of the water issue
in the context of sustainable development, the Agency is
currently sponsoring two major regional TC project
involving 12 countries (Algeria, Kenya, Madagascar,
Mali, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, the
United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe).
The national activities supported by the Agency in these
projects are part of high-priority government programmes,
in many instances, linked to bilateral and multilateral
donor-assisted water development projects. In
addition to addressing practical issues relating to water
resource assessment in this region, these projects also
seek to foster regional co-operation and strengthen isotope
hydrology capacity. In the Saudi Arabian Peninsula,
field investigations have also been conducted to develop
a more thorough understanding of recharge rates of the
water in sand dune areas. In Jordan, isotopic studies have
been undertaken to assess the effectiveness of surface
reservoirs constructed to capture flood water for replenishing
underground water aquifer systems.
Nuclear techniques are widely used in medical
applications from x-rays and scintigraphy to radiation
therapy. They are also very effective in the diagnosis and
control of infectious disease. To combat the growing
global problem of tuberculosis (TB), which kills an estimated
1.5 million people per year, the Agency is supporting
several projects to improve the diagnosis of this
infectious disease and to help curb the spread of its
multi-drug resistant forms. In South Africa, the Agency
has been assisting national efforts to develop isotope-based
molecular methods for accurate and rapid detection
of multi-drug resistant TB. The Agency is also supporting
a regional project in Africa to use nuclear techniques
to detect the genetic mutations in the malaria parasite
which leads to drug resistance. Like TB, malaria is
a growing global health concern, infecting some 300 million
people worldwide each year.
The Agency operates its own research and services
laboratories, which contribute significantly to the transfer
of nuclear technology. For nearly 40 years, the
IAEA's Seibersdorf Laboratories, near Vienna, have carried
out research and provided a diverse range of technical
services in applied physics, chemistry, hydrology,
agriculture, and nuclear instrumentation. Since 1961, the
Agency has operated the Marine Environment
Laboratory in Monaco, which carries out research and
training in marine science, particularly in environmental
monitoring and in the study of radioactive and non-radioactive
pollutants in oceans and seas. It has a Joint
Division in Vienna with the Food and Agriculture
Organization to undertake research on the applications of
nuclear technology in food and agriculture. The Agency
also works with the World Health Organization on radiation
in medicine and biology and, with the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, supports the International Centre for
Theoretical Physics in Trieste, Italy. Additionally, information
on virtually every aspect of nuclear science and
technology is collected and disseminated by the IAEA
through its International Nuclear Information System in
Vienna.
Another major responsibility of the IAEA in the
field of nuclear technology relates to the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy. The Agency advises and assists govern
ments in the practical application of, and research on,
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including the production
of electricity, with special consideration being
given to developing countries. Where Member States
have decided to use nuclear energy to produce electricity,
the Agency continuously seeks to strengthen their
ability to plan and carry out related projects by organizing
interregional and national training courses, seminars,
workshops, technical co-operation projects, advisory
missions, and technical committee meetings, and by publishing
guidebooks and manuals. Where nuclear power
plants have already been built, or are under construction,
increased attention is given to promoting improvements
in plant operation and maintenance practices. The objective
is to achieve uniformly high levels of safety, reliability,
and economic performance worldwide.
As a focal point for international exchange on
nuclear technology and related issues within the United
Nations system, the Agency seeks to broaden debate and
information sharing. Since 1998, the Agency has organized
the Scientific Forum, as an adjunct to its annual
General Conference, where experts and delegates from
Member States can exchange views and information on
important technical issues relating to nuclear technology.
The first Forum examined nuclear technology in relation
to water resources and the aquatic environment. In 1999,
the Forum examined the issue of sustainable development
and the future role for nuclear power.
Reflecting its desire to broaden these outreach
activities to the non-governmental and private sectors, in
January 2000, the Agency organized the first Industry
Forum. Bringing together some 35 participants from 20
groups dealing with industrial aspects of nuclear energy,
the Industry Forum sought to canvas the views on trends
in the nuclear and regulatory fields against the background
of changing economic decision-making processes.
The results from this successful initiative will be used
to define possible areas for future synergy between
industry and the IAEA.
Nuclear Research Centres play an important role in
helping countries use nuclear technology safely. In
December 1999, the Agency organized a meeting of
these centres to provide a forum for exchange of views
on the future work of such centres and the challenges
faced in such areas as: waste management; reactor
design; decommissioning; water, food, and the environment;
and education for nuclear sciences and technology.
Safety
The IAEA promotes a comprehensive and effective
worldwide safety culture through three key elements:
binding international conventions, internationally
accepted safety standards, and measures to assist
Member States implement these conventions and
standards.
There are several international conventions related
to safety. These conventions are treaties between
governments, but they were established under IAEA auspices
and the Agency has defined roles in their administration.
The Convention on Early Notification of a
Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in
the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological
Emergency were established in the aftermath of the
Chernobyl accident in 1986, and each has more than 75
Contracting Parties. The Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material, in force since 1987,
applies to the protection of material that could be used
for nuclear weapons. The Convention on Nuclear Safety,
which entered into force in October 1996, places obligations
on Contracting Parties to take appropriate steps to
ensure the safety of their nuclear power plants. In April
1999, the first Review Meeting was held, at which each
of the Contracting Parties reported on the steps that they
had taken, and reviewed and discussed each others'
reports. At present, 52 States are Contracting Parties,
including all but one (India) of those with nuclear power
plants in operation. The Joint Convention on the Safety
of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of
Radioactive Waste Management, which was opened for
signature in September 1997, will perform a similar
function in relation to spent fuel and waste management
facilities, but has not yet entered into force.
The IAEA establishes safety standards for nuclear
power plants, research reactors, radioactive waste management,
the transport of radioactive materials, and the
use of radiation and radioactive materials in medicine,
industry, and research. These standards include Safety
Fundamentals (basic objectives, concepts and principles),
Safety Requirements (requirements that need to be
met to satisfy those basic objectives and principles), and
Safety Guides (guidance on how to comply with the
Safety Requirements). Where appropriate, these safety
standards are co-sponsored by other relevant international
organizations, such as the World Health Organization,
the International Labour Organization, and the Nuclear
Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development. All countries receiving
Agency support for projects must adhere to these safety
standards.
The IAEA contributes towards the application of
safety standards in Member States by rendering safety
services on request, by fostering international information
exchange on safety, by promoting education and
training in relevant subjects, and by providing safety
related assistance.
A variety of safety services are offered on request,
including:
- the Engineering Safety Review Service, which
assesses a wide range of safety aspects of nuclear
power plant design and engineering;
- International Regulatory Review Teams, which
review how national authorities oversee nuclear-related
activities;
- Operational Safety Review Teams, which review
how operational safety performance at individual
nuclear power plants is assured and how any shortcomings
may be remedied; and
- the Transport Safety Appraisal Service, which
examines how countries implement the international
regulations for the safe transport of radioactive
material
.
The Agency acts as a central body for international
information exchange by organizing conferences and
seminars, by producing a wide range of publications and,
increasingly, through the Internet. In the event of a radiological
emergency or accident, it has specific information-
exchange responsibilities: to convey authoritative
information about the situation to all of its Member
States rapidly.
Most of the Agency's safety related assistance is
delivered through TC. The Agency is undertaking a
major TC project to improve the safety infrastructure for
the use of nuclear technology in the fields of medicine,
agriculture, industry, and research in more than 50
Member States. This 'safety infrastructure' includes
national safety legislation and regulations, a regulatory
body with the authority and resources to enforce the regulations,
a system for controlling radiation sources, radiation
protection measures, emergency plans, and related
training of personnel. In recent years, assistance has, on
average, been provided to approximately three countries
per year, in most cases due to emergencies involving
radiation sources.
Policy-Making Organs and Management
The Agency is made up of the General Conference,
the Board of Governors, and the Secretariat. The General
Conference consists of all Member States of the Agency,
each having one vote. The Conference normally meets
once a year and takes its decisions by consensus or by
majority vote, except on matters regarding finance,
amendments to the Agency Statute, and suspension of
membership, which all require a two-thirds majority
vote.
The Board of Governors, which currently consists of 35 2 members designated or elected on the basis of
regional distribution or technological expertise, carries
out the statutory functions of the Agency. The Board usually meets five times per year.
The Secretariat has six departments: Nuclear
Energy, Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Sciences and
Applications, Safeguards, Technical Co-operation, and
Management and is headed by the Director General, who
is appointed for a four-year term by the Board with the
approval of the General Conference. The current
Director General, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, was appointed
in December 1997.
The IAEA submits annual reports on its work to the
General Assembly of the United Nations.
Membership
Membership in the Agency is open to States,
whether or not Members of the United Nations or any of
its specialized agencies, which deposit an instrument of
acceptance of the IAEA's Statute after their membership
has been approved by the General Conference, on the
recommendation of the Board of Governors. As of
December 1999, there were 130 Member States.
Budget
The IAEA's regular budget for 2000 is $US 229.4
million, including income (some $US 4.9 million) for
reimbursable work.
Headquarters
Vienna International Centre
P. O. Box 100
Wagramer Strasse 5
A-1400 Vienna, Austria
Telephone: 43-1-2600-0
Fax: 43-1-2600-7
E-mail: Official. Mail@ iaea. org
Internet: http://www.iaea.org/worldatom
2000 NPT Review Conference
The 43rd General Conference, which concluded
1 October 1999, adopted a resolution to amend the
Agency Statute to expand the Board's membership to 43.
This change will take effect once it has been accepted by
two thirds of all Member States and once the General
Conference has confirmed a list of all Member States
which has been adopted by the Board, by which each
Member is allocated to one of the eight regional areas
listed in the Statute.
Published by the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs
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