29 June 1999

Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)

Background

A ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices ("cutoff") is an important objective for strengthening international security. President Clinton first called for cutoff negotiations in September 1993. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a consensus resolution in support of a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) shortly thereafter, proposing a multilateral agreement to halt the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium (PU) for use in nuclear explosives or outside of international safeguards.

In 1995, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) agreed by consensus to establish an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a cutoff treaty based on the UNGA resolution. In May 1995, at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference, NPT parties agreed to seek as a priority "the immediate commencement and early conclusion" of cutoff negotiations. However, certain states are linking FMCT negotiations to progress on other disarmament issues -- a position that the United States and others do not support. Because the CD takes decisions by consensus only, this has brought progress on the cutoff treaty to a standstill.

In August 1998, the CD finally re-established the Ad Hoc Committee (AHC) to negotiate a cutoff treaty. The committee met twice -- on August 27 and September 1 -- and in its final report recommended that the AHC be re-established when the CD reconvened in January 1999. Last fall, the UNGA endorsed that recommendation. Regrettably, the CD has not yet re-established the AHC to resume negotiations. The U.S. continues to press for negotiations to resume shortly.

The Benefits of an FMCT

Under an FMCT, the five nuclear weapon states (China, France, Russia, the U.K., and the U.S.) and states not party to the NPT would be prohibited from producing HEU and PU for any nuclear explosives. To this end, an FMCT would require that fissile material produced after entry into force of the treaty is not used for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. An FMCT would not impose constraints on fissile material produced prior to entry into force.

An FMCT would provide significant nuclear arms control benefits by:

• Capping the quantity of fissile material available for nuclear weapons globally (complementing the qualitative limits imposed by the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty);
• Extending verification measures to fissile material production facilities not currently subject to international monitoring;
• Strengthening stability in volatile regions;
• Making the current unilateral, political moratoria on fissile material production for nuclear weapons by the U.S., U.K., France, and Russia legally binding and subject to international verification;
• Extending the NPT prohibition by non-nuclear weapon states on production of fissile material for nuclear weapons to the five nuclear weapon states and the "threshold" states; and
• Helping to demonstrate to all countries the nuclear weapon states' commitments to fulfilling their NPT obligations.

A multilateral, non-discriminatory, and internationally and effectively verifiable cutoff treaty is an important step in the process of nuclear disarmament. Conclusion of an FMCT would further strengthen efforts toward achieving widely shared nuclear disarmament objectives. Efforts to reduce nuclear weapons can go forward with much greater certainty if all fissile material production is subject to legally binding verification measures that: a) provide confidence that other states are not producing fissile material production for nuclear weapons, and b) lay a legal foundation for further nuclear disarmament measures. Ending the unsafeguarded production of fissile material would make an important contribution to international nuclear disarmament efforts.

Chronology of Recent Events

March 1991: The United States ends reprocessing of PU for nuclear weapons (production of HEU for weapons ended in 1964).

September 27, 1993: President Clinton proposes a multilateral agreement to halt production of HEU and separated PU for nuclear explosives or outside international safeguards in his address to the UNGA.

December 1993: The UNGA adopts by consensus a resolution (48/75L) calling for the initiation of cutoff negotiations.

January 14, 1994: Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin make a joint statement calling for rapid conclusion of a cutoff treaty.

January 1994: The Conference on Disarmament (CD) appoints Canadian Ambassador Gerald Shannon as special coordinator for cutoff. Ambassador Shannon begins consultations with CD member states on an FMCT.

October 4, 1994: Secretary of State Christopher and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian issue a joint statement promoting the "earliest possible achievement" of a cutoff treaty.

December 1994: Russia announces that it stopped PU production for use in nuclear weapons on October 1, 1994. (Soviet leader Gorbachev announced on April 7, 1989 that Moscow would cease the production of HEU for use in nuclear weapons that year.)

March 24, 1995: CD agrees by consensus to adopt Canadian Ambassador Shannon's report recommending establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee with a mandate to negotiate a cutoff treaty based on the December 1993 UNGA resolution.

April 18, 1995: During the NPT Review and Extension Conference, British Foreign Secretary Hurd announces that the United Kingdom had ceased the production of fissile material for explosive purposes.

May 11, 1995: At the end of the NPT Review and Extension Conference in New York, all parties agree on the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" decision document to seek the "immediate commencement and early conclusion" of cutoff negotiations in accordance with the March 1995 CD mandate.

February 22, 1996: French President Chirac announces that France no longer produces fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.

September 24, 1996: In his address to UNGA, President Clinton calls on the CD to take up the challenge of negotiating a fissile material production cutoff treaty immediately.

April 1997: NPT Parties at the 1997 Preparatory Committee Meeting for the 2000 NPT Review Conference reaffirm the importance and urgency of negotiating an FMCT.

October 29, 1997: President Clinton and Chinese President Jiang Zemin agree to pursue in the CD "the early start of formal negotiations on the Prohibition of the Production of Fissile Material Used in Nuclear Weapons and Other Nuclear Explosive Devices."

May 11, 1998: After conducting a series of nuclear explosive tests, India announces that it will "participate in the negotiations for the conclusion of a fissile material cutoff treaty in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament."

June 1998: The UN Security Council, the G-8, and the P-5 call for the negotiation of an FMCT with a "view to reaching early agreement."

July 30, 1998: In a plenary statement, Pakistan's CD Ambassador Munir Akram announces that Pakistan would support the immediate commencement of FMCT negotiations and would help promote a decision to establish an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate the treaty during the 1998 CD session on the basis of the 1995 agreed mandate.

August 11, 1998: The CD agrees to establish an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate an FMCT on the basis of the 1995 agreed mandate and report.

August 20, 1998: The CD agrees that Canadian CD Ambassador Mark Moher will chair the FMCT Ad Hoc Committee.

August 27, 1998: The FMCT Ad Hoc Committee convenes for the first of two meetings in 1998.

September 1, 1998: The FMCT Ad Hoc Committee meets and approves a final report calling for the early re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee when the CD reconvenes in 1999.

November 13, 1998: The UNGA adopts by consensus a resolution urging the resumption of FMCT negotiations in the CD.