Decisions and Resolutions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference
Decision 1: Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty
- The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons examined the
implementation of article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty
and agreed to strengthen the review process for the operation
of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes
of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty
are being realized.
- The States party to the Treaty participating in
the Conference decided, in accordance with article VIII,
paragraph 3, that Review Conferences should continue to
be held every five years and that, accordingly, the next
Review Conference should be held in the year 2000.
- The Conference decided that, beginning in
1997, the Preparatory Committee should hold, normally
for a duration of 10 working days, a meeting in each of
the three years prior to the Review Conference. If necessary,
a fourth preparatory meeting may be held in the
year of the Conference.
- The purpose of the Preparatory Committee
meetings would be to consider principles, objectives and
ways in order to promote the full implementation of the
Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations
thereon to the Review Conference. These
include those identified in the decision on principles and
objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament,
adopted on 11 May 1995. These meetings should
also make the procedural preparations for the next
Review Conference.
- The Conference also concluded that the present
structure of three Main Committees should continue
and the question of an overlap of issues being discussed
in more than one Committee should be resolved in the
General Committee, which would coordinate the work of
the Committees so that the substantive responsibility
for the preparation of the report with respect to each
specific issue is undertaken in only one Committee.
- It was also agreed that subsidiary bodies could
be established within the respective Main Committees
for specific issues relevant to the Treaty, so as to provide
for a focused consideration of such issues. The establishment
of such subsidiary bodies would be recommended
by the Preparatory Committee for each Review
Conference in relation to the specific objectives of the
Review Conference.
- The Conference further agreed that Review
Conferences should look forward as well as back. They
should evaluate the results of the period they are reviewing,
including the implementation of undertakings of the
States parties under the Treaty, and identify the areas in
which, and the means through which, further progress
should be sought in the future. Review Conferences
should also address specifically what might be done to
strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and to
achieve its universality.
Decision 2: Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Reaffirming the preamble and articles of the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Welcoming the end of the cold war, the ensuing easing
of international tension and the strengthening of trust
between States,
Desiring a set of principles and objectives in accordance
with which nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament
and international cooperation in the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy should be vigorously pursued and
progress, achievements and shortcomings evaluated periodically
within the review process provided for in article
VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, the enhancement and
strengthening of which is welcomed,
Reiterating the ultimate goals of the complete elimination
of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and
complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control,
The Conference affirms the need to continue to
move with determination towards the full realization and
effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty,
and accordingly adopts the following principles and
objectives:
Universality
- Universal adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons is an urgent priority.
All States not yet party to the Treaty are called upon to
accede to the Treaty at the earliest date, particularly those
States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
Every effort should be made by all States parties to
achieve this objective.
Non-proliferation
- The proliferation of nuclear weapons would
seriously increase the danger of nuclear war. The Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has a vital
role to play in preventing the proliferation of nuclear
weapons. Every effort should be made to implement the
Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of
nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices,
without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
by States parties to the Treaty.
Nuclear disarmament
- Nuclear disarmament is substantially facilitated
by the easing of international tension and the strengthening
of trust between States which have prevailed following
the end of the cold war. The undertakings with
regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should thus
be fulfilled with determination. In this regard, the
nuclear-weapon States reaffirm their commitment, as
stated in article VI, to pursue in good faith negotiations
on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.
- The achievement of the following measures is
important in the full realization and effective implementation
of article VI, including the programme of action as
reflected below:
- The completion by the Conference on
Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and
internationally and effectively verifiable
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later
than 1996. Pending the entry into force of a
Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, the nuclear-weapon
States should exercise utmost restraint;
- The immediate commencement and early conclusion
of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and
universally applicable convention banning the production
of fissile material for nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with
the statement of the Special Coordinator of the
Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained
therein;
- The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon
States of systematic and progressive efforts to
reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate
goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States
of general and complete disarmament under strict
and effective international control.
Nuclear-weapon-free zones
- The conviction that the establishment of internationally
recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the
basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States
of the region concerned, enhances global and regional
peace and security is reaffirmed.
- The development of nuclear-weapon-free
zones, especially in regions of tension, such as in the
Middle East, as well as the establishment of zones free of
all weapons of mass destruction, should be encouraged
as a matter of priority, taking into account the specific
characteristics of each region. The establishment of additional
nuclear-weapon-free zones by the time of the
Review Conference in the year 2000 would be welcome.
- The cooperation of all the nuclear-weapon
States and their respect and support for the relevant
protocols is necessary for the maximum effectiveness
of such nuclear-weapon-free zones and the relevant
protocols.
Security assurances
- Noting United Nations Security Council resolution
984 (1995), which was adopted unanimously on
11 April 1995, as well as the declarations of the nuclear-weapon
States concerning both negative and positive
security assurances, further steps should be considered to
assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty
against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
These steps could take the form of an internationally
legally binding instrument.
Safeguards
- The International Atomic Energy Agency is
the competent authority responsible to verify and assure,
in accordance with the statute of the Agency and the
Agency's safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards
agreements with States parties undertaken in ful-filment
of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1,
of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of
nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices. Nothing should be done
to undermine the authority of the International Atomic
Energy Agency in this regard. States parties that have
concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards
agreements of the Treaty by the States parties should
direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and
information, to the Agency to consider, investigate, draw
conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accor-dance
with its mandate.
- All States parties required by article III of the
Treaty to sign and bring into force comprehensive safeguards
agreements and which have not yet done so
should do so without delay.
- International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards
should be regularly assessed and evaluated.
Decisions adopted by its Board of Governors aimed at
further strengthening the effectiveness of Agency safeguards
should be supported and implemented and the
Agency's capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities
should be increased. Also, States not party to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
should be urged to enter into comprehensive safeguards
agreements with the Agency.
- New supply arrangements for the transfer of
source or special fissionable material or equipment or
material especially designed or prepared for the processing,
use or production of special fissionable material to
non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary
precondition, acceptance of the Agency's full-scope
safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments
not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices.
- Nuclear fissile material transferred from military
use to peaceful nuclear activities should, as soon as
practicable, be placed under Agency safeguards in the
framework of the voluntary safeguards agreements in
place with the nuclear-weapon States. Safeguards should
be universally applied once the complete elimination of
nuclear weapons has been achieved.
Peaceful uses of nuclear energy
- Particular importance should be attached to
ensuring the exercise of the inalienable right of all the
parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and
use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination
and in conformity with articles I, II as well
as III of the Treaty.
- Undertakings to facilitate participation in the
fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and
scientific and technological information for the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy should be fully implemented.
- In all activities designed to promote the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment
should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States party
to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries
particularly into account.
- Transparency in nuclear-related export controls
should be promoted within the framework of dialogue
and cooperation among all interested States party
to the Treaty.
- All States should, through rigorous national
measures and international cooperation, maintain the
highest practicable levels of nuclear safety, including in
waste management, and observe standards and guidelines
in nuclear materials accounting, physical protection
and transport of nuclear materials.
- Every effort should be made to ensure that the
International Atomic Energy Agency has the financial
and human resources necessary to meet effectively its
responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation,
safeguards and nuclear safety. The Agency should also
be encouraged to intensify its efforts aimed at finding
ways and means for funding technical assistance through
predictable and assured resources.
- Attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities
devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear
safety and raise serious concerns regarding the application
of international law on the use of force in such cases,
which could warrant appropriate action in accordance
with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
The Conference requests that the President of the
Conference bring the present decision, the decision on
strengthening the review process for the Treaty and the
decision on the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, to the attention of the
heads of State or Government of all States and seek their
full cooperation on these documents and in the furtherance
of the goals of the Treaty.
Decision 3: Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Having convened in New York from 17 April to
12 May 1995, in accordance with article VIII, paragraph
3, and article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons,
Having reviewed the operation of the Treaty and
affirming that there is a need for full compliance with the
Treaty, its extension and its universal adherence, which
are essential to international peace and security and the
attainment of the ultimate goals of the complete elimination
of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international
control,
Having reaffirmed article VIII, paragraph 3, of the
Treaty and the need for its continued implementation in
a strengthened manner and, to this end, emphasizing the
decision on strengthening the review process for the
Treaty and the decision on principles and objectives for
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, also adopted
by the Conference,
Having established that the Conference is quorate
in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty,
Decides that, as a majority exists among States
party to the Treaty for its indefinite extension, in accordance
with article X, paragraph 2, the Treaty shall continue
in force indefinitely.
Resolution on the Middle East
The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Reaffirming the purpose and provisions of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Recognizing that, pursuant to article VII of the
Treaty, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones
contributes to strengthening the international non-proliferation
regime,
Recalling that the Security Council, in its statement
of 31 January 1992, 1 affirmed that the proliferation of
nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction
constituted a threat to international peace and security,
Recalling also General Assembly resolutions
adopted by consensus supporting the establishment of a
nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the latest
of which is resolution 49/ 71 of 15 December 1994,
Recalling further the relevant resolutions adopted
by the General Conference of the International Atomic
Energy Agency concerning the application of Agency
safeguards in the Middle East, the latest of which is
GC( XXXVIII)/ RES/ 21 of 23 September 1994, and noting
the danger of nuclear proliferation, especially in
areas of tension,
Bearing in mind Security Council resolution 687
(1991) and in particular paragraph 14 thereof,
Noting Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and
paragraph 8 of the decision on principles and objectives
for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted
by the Conference on 11 May 1995,
Bearing in mind the other decisions adopted by the
Conference on 11 May 1995,
- Endorses the aims and objectives of the
Middle East peace process and recognizes that efforts in
this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to, inter
alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well
as other weapons of mass destruction;
- Notes with satisfaction that, in its report
(NPT/ CONF. 1995/ MC. III/ 1), Main Committee III of
the Conference recommended that the Conference "call
on those remaining States not parties to the Treaty to
accede to it, thereby accepting an international legally
binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or
nuclear explosive devices and to accept International
Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all their nuclear
activities";
- Notes with concern the continued existence in
the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, and
reaffirms in this connection the recommendation contained
in section VI, paragraph 3, of the report of Main
Committee III urging those non-parties to the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that operate
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to accept full-scope
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;
- Reaffirms the importance of the early realization
of universal adherence to the Treaty, and calls upon
all States of the Middle East that have not yet done so,
without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible
and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;
1995 Decisions and Resolution
- Calls upon all States in the Middle East to
take practical steps in appropriate forums aimed at making
progress towards, inter alia, the establishment of an
effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons
of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological,
and their delivery systems, and to refrain from taking any
measures that preclude the achievement of this objective;
- Calls upon all States party to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular
the nuclear-weapon States, to extend their cooperation
and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring
the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle
East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass
destruction and their delivery systems.
Published by the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs
|