03 October 2001

State Department Official Sees Heightened Efforts on Nuclear Security

The Bush administration is considering whether to shift priorities in U.S. support of the International Atomic Energy Agency so as to enhance the IAEA's efforts toward improving the security of nuclear materials and facilities, a State Department nonproliferation official says.

Richard Stratford, acting deputy assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation, told the House Committee on International Relations' Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights October 3 that the review is being conducted in response to the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington targets September 11.

"With our support and the support of its other member states, there is much the IAEA can do within its mandate to help in the fight against the scourge of terrorism," Stratford told the panel.

Stratford's testimony outlined the IAEA's role in physical protection of nuclear material and facilities, prevention of illicit trafficking in nuclear material, developing safeguards against diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful programs to weapons, and promoting the safety of nuclear facilities.

Following is the prepared text of Stratford's opening statement to the subcommittee:

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The Role of the IAEA in Safeguarding Against Acts of Terrorism

Statement of Richard J. K. Stratford Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation

Subcommittee on International Operations & Human Rights House Committee on international Relations

October 3, 2001

Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for this opportunity to discuss with you the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in protecting against acts of terrorism. In the wake of the tragic events of September 11, the international community is looking to strengthen all activities that enhance our protection against terrorist attacks. Many nations recognize that the IAEA has an important role to play in this area. The IAEA's special expertise lies in dealing with nuclear and other radioactive materials as well as nuclear facilities.

During the IAEA's annual meeting of Member States, which concluded on September 21, the Director General of the IAEA said that the international community cannot be complacent. It must increase its efforts in countering terrorism and in combating illicit trafficking or smuggling of nuclear materials. IAEA Member States agreed there is an urgent need to examine the IAEA's work in these and related areas. This effort has already begun, with particular attention to nuclear material and facility security, nuclear facility safety, and improved management of radioactive sources. Careful consideration is also being given to expanding and improving current activities or possibly initiating new activities to respond to the threat of nuclear terrorism.

Concern regarding terrorism is factored into several IAEA programs, These include four broad categories: (1) promoting physical security and protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear and other radioactive materials; (2) inhibiting the smuggling of nuclear material; (3) safeguarding nuclear material against diversion to nuclear weapons; and (4) promoting nuclear safety.

Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities

The security and physical protection of nuclear material refers to the need to ensure that nuclear material within a State's jurisdiction is consistently and reliably used and stored safely and securely, and that nuclear material and nuclear facilities within a State's jurisdiction are protected from sabotage. This is primarily a national responsibility. However, the IAEA provides important assistance to States in several ways. To improve the effectiveness of physical protection worldwide, the IAEA provides assistance to national regimes at both the nuclear facility and state levels.

The IAEA has published internationally accepted recommendations for the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities, and provides assistance to its members in improving their legal and regulatory frameworks governing the physical security of nuclear and other radioactive materials and nuclear facilities. A cornerstone of the IAEA's work in this area is its publication of international recommendations in "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities," also known as INFCIRC/225. First issued in 1972 and updated periodically to reflect the best in contemporary practice, INFCIRC/225 is now in its 4th revision. While not legally binding on States, the recommendations in INFCIRC/225 provide expert guidance concerning the objectives and elements of a national system of physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities. They address how to assign nuclear activities to physical protection categories as well as the requirements for physical protection of nuclear material in use and storage. They also address protecting nuclear facilities against acts of sabotage and the requirements for physical protection of nuclear material in transit.

A second key document is the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. This Convention was negotiated under IAEA auspices in the late 1970s and entered into force in 1987. It establishes specific obligations on States Parties for the physical protection of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes in international transport and storage incidental to such transport. The Convention obligates its parties to make specific arrangements and meet defined standards of physical protection for international shipments of nuclear material and promotes international cooperation in the exchange of physical protection information. The Convention also obligates States Parties to cooperate in the recovery and protection of stolen nuclear material. It requires States to establish as criminal offenses the misuse and threats of misuse of nuclear materials to harm the public and to prosecute or extradite for prosecution those accused of committing such offenses.

At the time the Convention was negotiated, some countries were unwilling to agree to requirements concerning domestic physical protection, in spite of strong arguments by the United States and other governments. Since 1998, we have urged consideration of expanding the scope of the Convention. In particular, we seek to extend the Convention to cover the physical protection of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes in domestic use, storage and transport and for physical protection to prevent sabotage of nuclear material and nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes.

Thanks to the efforts of Director General ElBaradei, experts from IAEA Members States have been considering how the Convention might be amended. In May 2001, they provided their recommendations to the Director General, who will convene an open-ended drafting group of legal and technical experts in December 2001 to prepare a Convention revision proposal based on those recommendations. International concern over the increase in illicit trafficking in nuclear material in the early 1990s has created a more receptive climate for amending the Convention. The horrific events of September 11 have imparted an even greater sense of urgency. If the revision effort succeeds, it would significantly strengthen international norms in this area.

In addition to facilitating the establishment of standards of physical protection and acting as a depositary for the Physical Protection Convention, the IAEA supports training to assist its members in establishing and maintaining effective national systems of physical protection. My colleague from the Department of Energy will give you more details about the work of the IAEA in this area and U.S. support to those programs.

We have worked with the IAEA for several years on a small program to deal with the problem of "orphan sources." Orphan sources are radioactive sources used in many different ways, including medical, industrial, research, or non-weapons military applications. They have either never been subject to regulatory control or have fallen out of this control because they have been misplaced, lost, or stolen. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, substantial numbers of radioactive sources and other radioactive materials have been misplaced and/or improperly stored in NIS countries. These sources and materials are not usable in making a nuclear explosive, but their radioactivity can raise serious human health and safety concerns. The Administration is reviewing the IAEA efforts to encourage Member States to find and secure orphan sources, with the possibility of building on the existing IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.

Prevention of Illicit Trafficking

Illicit trafficking in or smuggling of nuclear material became a major international concern during the early 1990s, following sharp rises in the number of confirmed cases. Since 1993, States have reported to the IAEA 11 trafficking cases involving highly enriched uranium, four of which were in quantities of a kilogram or more. States have reported 12 cases involving plutonium, one with almost 300 grams. The other cases involved much smaller quantities. While the total quantities involved to date are insufficient to construct a nuclear explosive device, the fact that there are any such materials in illicit commerce requires prompt and effective action.

Illicit trafficking is complex in nature, involving many different types of materials, facilities, individuals, groups and States. Combating illicit trafficking effectively involves numerous State authorities, including those with responsibility for law enforcement, security, and responding to radiological emergencies. It also requires coordination with such international organizations as the World Customs organization and Interpol.

In 1994, IAEA Members States called on the Agency to "take all necessary measures to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear material." This call emphasized that national governments and authorities must take the main responsibility for preventing illicit trafficking, but it also asked the IAEA to intensify its support to States in combating illicit trafficking. In response, the IAEA increased its activities in this area in coordination with other cognizant authorities. One primary area in which IAEA assistance has been of great benefit is in tracking trafficking information and coordinating access to this information for Member States and other international organizations.

Since 1992, the IAEA has tracked cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear material and analyzed them for patterns and trends. In 1995, the IAEA created an illicit Trafficking Database Program, inviting all its members to participate. Today there are sixty-nine participants. These States account for a very large part of the global nuclear industry, covering uranium yellowcake production, conversion, fuel fabrication, power and research reactors, enrichment, reprocessing, waste and various nuclear research installations. Participating States submit details regarding each illicit trafficking case, using an Incident Notification Form to ensure reporting in sufficient detail and with sufficient uniformity for trend and pattern analyses.

The United States has been a strong supporter of the Illicit Trafficking Database Program, particularly with respect to the design of the database and analysis of the cases. Currently, a U.S. expert at IAEA headquarters is providing full-time support to the program.

In addition to information provided by participant States, the IAEA also cooperates with other international organizations on illicit trafficking matters, including on relevant databases and information exchange. The IAEA works closely with other international organizations with responsibilities or interest in combating illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. A Memorandum of Understanding serves as the basis for the IAEA's coordination with the World Customs Organization. An Inter-Agency Coordination Committee on the illicit Cross-Border Movements of Nuclear Materials and Other Radioactive Sources meets on an annual basis to exchange information and plan joint activities. An agreement is being prepared with Interpol that would permit information sharing with the IAEA.

To provide assistance to its members, the IAEA has initiated a program, together with the World Customs Organization and Interpol, to train law enforcement officers in detection and response to illicit trafficking. In response to States' requests, the IAEA is also implementing a research program to promote the development of improved detection and response methodologies and technologies.

In May 2001, the IAEA, the World Customs Organization, Interpol, and the European Police Office organized an international conference entitled: "Measures to Detect, Intercept, and Respond to the Illicit Uses of Nuclear Material and Radioactive Sources." The Conference was hosted by the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate in Stockholm. It was attended by governmental officials and facility operators from around the world. During the Conference, there was a broad exchange of information on technical systems and programs focused on reducing illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and the associated proliferation threat and radiation risk.

Safeguards

One of the IAEA's primary responsibilities -- safeguards -- is verifying that States do not divert nuclear materials in peaceful programs for use in nuclear weapons or any other unauthorized purpose. While IAEA safeguards activities are not the focus of this hearing, they do play an important supporting role in reducing the risk that terrorists could acquire nuclear material without detection.

Non-nuclear weapon States that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA for the purpose of verifying the fulfillment of their obligations not to divert any nuclear material under their control to nuclear explosive purposes. The IAEA also performs inspections in the five recognized nuclear weapons States and in non-NPT-signatory countries such as India and Pakistan, but they are not comprehensive in nature.

The application of IAEA safeguards in NPT non-nuclear weapon States requires that the State establish a national system for accounting and inspection of all nuclear material under the control of the State. The State is required to provide a domestic system to account accurately for all nuclear material within its borders and to conduct periodic inventories that are verified by IAEA inspectors. The system is not designed to prevent theft or diversion -- that is the role of physical protection -- but to deter such an action by facilitating early detection. This system can help a State account for all its nuclear material and to serve as a "burglar alarm" against a terrorist. A well-designed system will also help to pinpoint the origin of missing material, identify individuals that had access to it, and facilitate recovery of the material. IAEA safeguards can also help to deter a State from colluding with terrorists by diverting nuclear material from the State's national program to terrorist use.

Until the Persian Gulf War, States insisted that IAEA safeguards be applied solely to nuclear material "declared" by a State to the IAEA. IAEA inspectors were limited to conducting safeguards inspections in locations previously agreed to by a State and the Agency. Following the Gulf War, revelations of Iraq's covert nuclear activities led to concerted efforts to strengthen IAEA safeguards.

Over the past decade, the United States has led these efforts to expand the scope of safeguards to allow the IAEA to detect "undeclared" or secret nuclear activities. A variety of new safeguards measures and techniques have been developed. To provide the necessary legal basis for a State to accept new safeguards measures, a new legal document known as the "Model Additional Protocol" has been negotiated. States party to NPT safeguards agreements are now beginning to accept this new approach by negotiating their own Protocols based on the Model agreement. Once widely implemented, these protocols will substantially increase the information available to the IAEA regarding States' nuclear activities and provide expanded access for the IAEA to States' nuclear programs. The Administration, with the support of Congress, will exert its efforts to encourage widespread acceptance of this Additional Protocol and to ensure that other steps are taken as necessary to strengthen the safeguards system.

Nuclear Facility Safety

The IAEA plays an essential role in addressing nuclear safety at nuclear facilities worldwide. This is accomplished by the development of safety standards, the facilitation of technical meetings, and the provision of education, training and safety services. In addition, the Agency acts as a depositary for several international conventions related to the safety of nuclear installations including the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.

These Agency programs help to ensure that nuclear facilities are less vulnerable to terrorist activities. One of the most valuable services offered by the Agency includes safety reviews provided under IAEA direction at the request of Member States. These reviews are performed by teams of experts who assess national programs according to a variety of Agency safety standards.

Closing Remarks

There are an impressive number of IAEA programs that are particularly important in protecting nuclear material and facilities against acts of terrorism. These include developing and promulgating international standards and guidelines related to nuclear safety and physical protection, providing training and assembling teams of experts at the request of Member States to assess their national programs, and developing the standards that, if followed, will make nuclear facilities less vulnerable to sabotage. The IAEA's work with other organizations to combat illicit trafficking is of key importance in forestalling nuclear terrorism, as is the role of international safeguards in fostering nuclear security.

In the wake of the tragedy on September 11, we are all seeking to strengthen ways to counter and eradicate terrorism. As part of this effort, the Administration will be reviewing U.S. support of IAEA activities to determine whether our priorities should be revised to enhance the IAEA's efforts related to the security of nuclear materials and facilities. The IAEA is an organization known internationally for its competence and effectiveness. With our support and the support of its other Member States, there is much the IAEA can do within its mandate to help in the fight against the scourge of terrorism.

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