02 August 2001

Gephardt on U.S. Foreign Relations in the 21st Century

U.S. House Minority (Democratic) Leader Richard Gephardt says that during a four-nation mission to Europe last month he heard U.S. allies and a former adversary urge the United States to remain engaged in foreign relations, find ways to collaborate on major issues, and work to address common threats.

"Europeans are worried that America is on the sidelines," Gephardt said in an August 2 speech at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The Missouri Democrat headed a congressional delegation that visited London, Berlin, Brussels and Moscow to gauge European, and especially Russian, opinions on the current state of U.S. foreign policy.

"We found a pressing desire for American engagement in the world and for collaboration and dialogue with our European partners," he said. Leaders in each nation discussed fundamental issues that included nuclear arms control, strategic defense and environmental protection, he said.

Gephardt said he concluded from the meetings that the United States needs to develop a new strategic framework built on mutual security and the goal of encouraging full Russian integration into the trans-Atlantic community. "I am convinced that the key to this partnership is to identify common threats, build common institutions, and promote a common commitment to democratic values," he said.

The United States faces two choices in the 21st century, Gephardt said. One choice is to become unilateralist as the country did during the isolationist years of the 1920s, the other to pursue successful engagement with Europe and the world, he said.

Europeans said they were concerned about the U.S. rejection of the Kyoto global warming treaty, mixed messages on U.S. military support in the Balkans, the lack of a U.S. critical mediating role in the Middle East, a rejection of the Biological Weapons Convention enforcement protocol, and a future relationship with Russia, Gephardt said.

Gephardt laid out four major steps for building a new strategic architecture that call for the United States to:

• combine U.S. nuclear arms reductions with verifiable reductions by Russia. "Unilateral U.S. reductions will not increase our security in any meaningful way without reciprocal reductions by our former adversary," he said;

• work with Russia to promote non-proliferation measures such as weapons accountability, export controls and increased border security in Russia and in other nations that possess materials and delivery systems of weapons of mass destruction;

• work with Russia and U.S. allies to engage rogue nations that want to acquire or who already possess nuclear weapons; and

• work to backstop efforts to reduce threats by working together to improve defensive capabilities.

"A new strategic framework -- built on mutual security -- is in the interest of America, Russia and Europe," he said. "One nation, acting alone, cannot possibly build a lasting strategic framework to which all other nations submit."

These abbreviations and acronyms are used in the text:

• Kyoto global warming treaty: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
  
• G-8: Group of Eight major industrialized nations, including Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.
  
• ABM Treaty: 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
  
• INF: Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles.
  
• CFE: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.
  
• START: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I and II.
  
• CTR: Cooperative Threat Reduction.
  
• WTO: World Trade Organization.
  
• IMF: International Monetary Fund.
  
• EU: European Union.

Following is the text of Gephardt's remarks:

Democratic Leader Richard Gephardt
The Future of Trans-Atlantic Relations: Collaboration or Confrontation?
Speech made by the Democratic Leader at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Washington, D.C.
August 2, 2001

Last month I was privileged to lead a Congressional delegation to four key European capitals: London, Berlin, Brussels and Moscow. My colleagues and I met with leaders in each nation and discussed fundamental issues including nuclear arms control, strategic defense, and environmental protection. We talked about what these issues mean not just to the United States and Europe, but to the entire world.

One of our stops along the way was the Carnegie Center in Moscow. We had an excellent exchange of views with many of your Russian colleagues, and I thought it would be appropriate to provide an assessment of our trip at the Carnegie Endowment here in Washington. First, let me thank you for having me here today, and for all the work you do around the globe.

This is an important moment for America in the world. We face two choices in foreign affairs in this century. We can go it alone in the isolationist tradition of America in the 1920s, when we were disengaged and disinterested in affairs abroad. Or we can continue our successful engagement with Europe and the world, forming new partnerships rooted in the need and desire for mutual security, grounded on the demands and opportunities of a new era.

The reason for our trip was to strengthen America's role in trans-Atlantic and global affairs, and to have a productive dialogue with our allies and partners on the biggest issues of our times. It was a highly informative trip in many ways. We found a pressing desire for American engagement in the world and for collaboration and dialogue with our European partners.

In Brussels, NATO Secretary General George Robertson said that our allies wanted us to continue as a leader of NATO and help bring stability to the Balkans.

In Berlin, Chancellor Schroeder said it was important for America to have a seat at the table on global warming and other key environmental issues.

In Moscow, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said his government wanted to work with us on a strategic partnership anchored in real collaboration and dialogue, animated by a framework suited to a new century.

And finally in London, Prime Minister Blair urged America to stay involved in Europe in order to promote regional stability and advance our common, democratic values.

In short, we heard from allies and former adversaries that the U.S. needs to be engaged, find ways to collaborate, and work together to address common threats and enhance our collective future.

Europeans are worried that America is on the sidelines. They think the Bush administration has embraced go-it-alone policies that undermine international security, hurt our economic and environmental interests, and prevent us from seizing a historic opportunity for engagement with Russia. This was a chilling message. Europeans told us they were especially concerned about our flat-out rejection of the Kyoto global warming treaty, and our wavering commitment to NATO operations in Southeast Europe.

Two weeks ago 178 nations gathered in Bonn and agreed to implement the Kyoto treaty. The vast majority of the world's countries agreed on a framework to reduce greenhouse gases and stem the tide of global warming. The United States was not among them. We had abruptly rejected the treaty in March, and in Bonn we didn't even offer alternative proposals despite pleas from our closest allies.

German Environment Minister, Juergen Trittin, told our delegation just before Bonn that an aloof United States could devastate U.S.-European relations. I'm afraid he was right.

I'm not a scientist. But virtually every study I've seen leaves little doubt that global warming is a serious, mounting problem that must be addressed. Yet on this issue, the U.S. was disengaged, disconnected, without a voice or even a position at the negotiating table.

The Kyoto protocol is not perfect. It needs to be changed. The Europeans and Japan said they were willing to change it. But just last week EPA administrator Christine Todd Whitman said of Kyoto: 'Basically, we're going to continue to do our own thing here.'

The Europeans also said we had sent mixed messages on the Balkans. Just before our trip, President Bush had reassured NATO that America would remain with our allies in the region until the job is finished. I applaud the President on this commitment. But I'm disappointed that it took him months to make it. The administration spent week after week creating uncertainty and downright anxiety among our allies about our commitment to the region. In my view, this pushed our allies away from us, creating suspicion and distrust when a policy of continuity was needed most.

Our allies were also worried about our lack of commitment to an arms collection force in Macedonia. For years, American forces have been in Macedonia to stabilize the region. Lord Robertson told us that, like with most other NATO operations, an American presence was important for political reasons. It would reinforce our commitment to NATO and send a signal to the warring factions that a military solution is simply unacceptable. Yet the administration has resisted a commitment of even a small number of ground troops to this mission.

Europeans had other issues on their minds. Our backing away from a critical mediating role in the Middle East. Abandoning the biological weapons treaty. Weakening the small arms accord. And, most problematic as they look ahead, our future relationship with Russia.

Just as the Soviet Union shaped our policies during the Cold War, our European allies recognize that Russia will also be a major shaping force in the years to come. In Europe, everyone we met was talking about the future relationship between Russia and the United States. They were especially concerned about what increasingly seems like a unilateral policy on national missile defense, which could antagonize Russia and undermine U.S.-European relations.

While it's true that the administration backtracked somewhat at the recent G-8 summit -- saying it would work with President Putin and not single-handedly abandon decades of strategic nuclear arms control -- it's also true that, like with so many issues, the administration seems to be saying one thing and doing something different.

Earlier this year, President Bush announced that he wants to replace the existing strategic architecture of arms control and nuclear weapons agreements with a new strategic 'framework' for the 21st century. Updating these policies is a worthy goal. But it's become more than clear over time that the administration's principle aim is to push aside the ABM Treaty in order to build a new missile defense system. The administration repeatedly has said that it will move ahead whether or not it wins agreement from other nations. And other than missile defense, it has offered almost no new ideas for a strategic framework to promote security for America and the world.

Since the G-8 summit, President Bush and his aides have begun issuing ultimatums to the Russians: if you don't agree to our plans for offensive and defensive weapons by our deadline, we will pursue our objectives without you.

I think these ultimatums are unwise. And they are likely to have negative consequences for U.S. security and our position in the world.

Think about what has happened as the administration has ratcheted up the unilateral rhetoric in just the last few months:

The largely symbolic, yet potentially destabilizing treaty between Russia and China, designed in part to counter U.S. global dominance.

President Putin's announcement that he might place multiple warheads on Russian missiles.

And Russia's success at the U.N. in blocking our efforts to strengthen sanctions against Iraq, just ten days after Presidents Bush and Putin had their first meeting in Slovenia.

These examples demonstrate a simple yet profound fact of international relations: one nation, acting alone, cannot possibly build a lasting strategic framework to which all other nations submit. We preserved stability in the last 30 years because the two superpowers agreed to the rules of the road and wrote them together with other nations. We negotiated. We collaborated. And we signed the ABM, the INF, the CFE, and the START Treaties.

That's a successful track record. And we face peril today if we abandon it along with our friends and allies and potential partners around the globe. A unilateral approach to missile defense could hurt U.S.-European ties, destabilize relations with Russia, antagonize China, and isolate us from the world.

If the administration is truly committed to a new strategic framework that enhances our security and foreign relations, it must be engaged in Europe. It must be open to a new partnership with Russia. It should not unilaterally scrap the ABM Treaty. And instead of ultimatums, it must be willing to collaborate with other nations on a new security architecture.

The President has said that Russia is no longer the enemy. I agree with him. But Russia also is not yet a true partner to the United States.

There is great potential for collaboration with Russia.

But we must understand the complex nature of this relationship. And we must act accordingly.

The administration has moved ahead with praise for President Putin one day and unilateral actions the next. In meetings at Slovenia and Genoa, President Bush praised President Putin instead of criticizing his domestic policies in a constructive way. Later, President Bush shifted course, choosing confrontation over collaboration, adopting an unbending position on the ABM Treaty and missile defense.

Some Russians I spoke with found this confusing. Others said they were suspicious of our intentions. These actions have confounded many of our European allies, and they have made some apprehensive about the future.

We must move in a different direction in our dialogue with Russia. We should be honest in our views and consistent in our delivery. We should work together on issues of security among other areas of mutual interest. And we must clearly state our concerns about Chechnya, freedom of the press, religious tolerance, and the rule of law. Truth be told, Russia has in some ways become less free, less tolerant and less open since I last visited in 1998.

This is a disturbing development. We must watch it closely. I am not talking about being hostile to Russia. I am talking about being direct and honest as we advance our principles and pursue our interests. This approach is neither cynical nor is it idealistic. It can work. It has worked.

President Nixon signed the ABM Treaty and still highlighted the abuses of the [Leonid] Brezhnev regime.

President Reagan signed the INF Treaty and still strongly criticized Soviet domestic policies.

And the first President Bush signed START I 10 years ago this week and still pushed for reforms that helped topple the Soviet Union.

I am confident that we can collaborate with Russia today on a new security architecture, and still call attention to policies that don't meet international standards. We are no longer divided by ideology. We have a unique opportunity to work more closely than ever to advance America's national interest.

That's why it's short-sighted at this time simply to try to get Russia to acquiesce to the desire by some to abrogate the ABM Treaty and construct a missile defense program that has not yet been proven to work. This is especially true when such actions could undermine our security and destabilize regions that are important to our interests.

Instead, in conjunction with our European allies, we should use this opportunity to pursue a partnership with Russia, collaborate on a new strategic framework that has meaning and value for all, and increase security not only for the United States, but for all nations that share this vision. Our goal should not be simply to build up our nation's defenses, but rather to increase our nation's security.

Framing a dialogue in these terms -- mutual security as opposed to a unilateral shield -- would lay the ground for a strategic framework that does more than simply trade new missile defense programs for offensive nuclear weapons cuts. In my view, a true trans-Atlantic collaboration can achieve a more comprehensive strategic framework that includes expanded arms control efforts, better non-proliferation measures, joint efforts to confront rogue states, and new, balanced, defense capabilities.

Last month the East-West Institute issued a report on U.S.-Russian relations. It reached a similar conclusion and made some of the same recommendations that I make here today. But I strongly disagree with the report's argument that the Bush administration's approach to Russia will lead to the broader strategic framework that is within our grasp.

Let me lay out the steps as I see them for building the new architecture.

First, we should combine U.S. nuclear arms cuts with verifiable reductions by Russia. This is critical. Unilateral U.S. reductions will not increase our security in any meaningful way without reciprocal reductions by our former adversary. We should also jump start efforts to implement START II, move forward on START III, and work to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Second, we must work with Russia to promote non-proliferation measures. These include weapons accountability, export controls and increased border security in Russia and other countries that possess materials and delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction. It also means helping Russia safeguard its nuclear weapons while preventing their further deterioration. A small investment in these areas can go a long way to reduce incentives for countries to export these materials to other nations.

In the last decade, we have already made substantial progress with Russia. For example, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program has more than anything else enhanced international security. It has dismantled nuclear weapons, secured fissile materials, and reduced the number of weapons of mass destruction. Unfortunately, the Bush administration put this program on hold for several months, and now it is trying to cut parts of it. We in Congress should do our part as well -- by lifting bans on funding important CTR programs to eliminate plutonium and destroy chemical weapons.

Third, we must work with Russia and our allies to engage rogue nations that want to acquire or already possess nuclear weapons. We should use our leverage to pursue verifiable agreements that eliminate such threats. And we must work together to isolate rogue regimes that refuse to respond to these measures.

We cannot allow Russian veto threats at the United Nations to weaken our ability to contain Saddam Hussein. We should take advantage of Russia's relationship with North Korea, among other nations, to advance a strong counter-proliferation agenda. Similarly, Russia's security dialogue with China could become a useful mechanism for deepening understanding among all three countries -- to the benefit of U.S. interests in Asia.

Finally, as a backstop to these efforts to reduce threats, we must work together to improve our defensive capabilities. The U.S. intelligence community has argued that the greatest threats to America and its allies are not ballistic missiles but terrorism, biological warfare, and an array of other new menaces. We need to take preventative measures and use our resources wisely. We need better border security, strong anti-terrorism measures, and new methods for detecting weapons of mass destruction. We should continue research on limited, effective, and affordable missile defense systems in cooperation with other nations threatened by rogue states. And we must insure that our troops -- the backbone of the military -- have the support they need each and every day.

A new strategic framework -- built on mutual security -- is in the interest of America, Russia, and Europe. But it is important that we establish a stable, long-term partnership with Russia in order to fully implement the framework and enjoy all its benefits. While developing the framework, we should encourage Russia's full integration into the trans-Atlantic community. After my discussions last month, I am convinced that the key to this partnership is to identify common threats, build common institutions, and promote a common commitment to democratic values.

President Putin opened the door to this first effort when he acknowledged earlier this year that Russia and Western Europe face a common missile threat. Lord Robertson urged us to seize this opening. It is good advice. Joint efforts in this area could spur collaboration on defensive technologies and measures to reduce threats at their source. We also should engage Russia in a deeper dialogue on other common threats such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and HIV/AIDS, which, according to recent reports, is spreading at alarming rates in Russia and neighboring states.

We must also build common institutions. In Europe, we heard that the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council was inadequate and unsatisfactory, at least in the eyes of the Russian government, because it only includes consultations.

Just as the Cooperative Threat Reduction program is focused on Russia's internal nuclear threats, we need to work through institutions to protect against external threats to the United States, our European allies and Russia. Perhaps the best way to reach this goal is Russia's eventual integration into NATO. Even President Putin has suggested that we work toward this day. NATO was created to defend against common threats and reduce conflicts among members. So what better way to prevent a new Cold War or something worse than to extend to Russia the prospect of NATO membership? Such an offer could also ease concerns about further NATO enlargement, especially in the Baltics.

Finally, the U.S.-Russian and U.S.-European partnership must rest on a common commitment to democratic values. We must be consistent and clear: a pre-condition to full integration is an open society with freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the rule of law. The United States has promoted these goals through a variety of aid programs. We should continue down this path. But it will be up to Russian leaders to determine the course of democracy and the pace and extent of integration into Europe.

A partnership stretching through Europe and into North America will bring countless benefits in trade, help us shape globalization, and increase peace and prosperity around the world. We can work on free and fair trade agreements that enhance people's standard of living and provide strong labor and environmental standards for all nations. We can strengthen development and financial institutions like the WTO, the IMF, and the U.N., among others. And we can fight the global AIDS pandemic which is wreaking havoc on the economies and societies of too many nations. This pandemic fuels military instability and has become an international security problem as well. I remain convinced that winning this battle is the moral imperative of our time.

Last month we heard a great deal about European Union enlargement. There seems to be no dissent to the idea that the EU will expand to at least 9 additional countries over the next several years-making the EU a community of 450 million people. This community will trade with the U.S. and Russia, creating economic ties that will reinforce the strategic ties that have been the focus of my talk.

Finally with Russia, we must be honest about the limitations that will result if universal democratic values fail to take hold, and the opportunities that will rise up if they are allowed to flourish.

We must further our ties with Russia in a clear-headed way, build on our historic relationship with Western Europe, and fulfill the goal of a strategic partnership and framework for the 21st century.

This is my vision of where the United States should go. And after our meetings in Europe last month, I am more convinced than ever that the Europeans share this vision as well.

This is in keeping with the best in our recent international traditions. It is, in my view, a common vision for the coming century. And I hope with my head and heart that we move forward together, make the hard choices, and seize the moment to make a positive difference in the national security and everyday lives of all our citizens."