26 July 2001

North Korea's Missile Program Is a Top U.S. Concern

North Korea's efforts to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles pose "direct threats to the United States and thus are extremely destabilizing," says Special U.S. Envoy Charles L. Pritchard.

Testifying before the House International Relations Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific July 26, Pritchard said North Korea's missile program is among the United States' top concerns.

"We have taken note of Chairman Kim Jong Il's statement that he will maintain until 2003 the long-range missile launch moratorium," he said. "It should be clear that North Korea's launching of a long-range missile would have serious consequences for regional security, return the Peninsula to a state of high tension, prompt widespread international condemnation, and do grave harm to North Korea's relations with the United States."

"Verifiable constraints on the DPRK missile program will give us confidence that North Korea is abiding by its commitments and thus are vital to meaningful progress in U.S.-DPRK relations," he said.

Pritchard is the Special Envoy for Negotiations with the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) and United States Representative to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

The "most immediate and pressing threat" on the Korean Peninsula, however, comes from North Korea's "robust conventional forces and their forward posture," Pritchard said. "We are determined to work with our South Korean ally to address our shared concerns over this threat."

Recent talks between North and South Korea yielded some positive results, he said. Both sides agreed to demine a corridor through the Demilitarized Zone, so that the railroad running from Seoul to Sinuiju could be re-linked.

Pritchard said the Bush administration is willing to discuss "all issues" with the leadership of North Korea.

"We have told the North Koreans that we have not set preconditions for our talks," he said, but added that North Korea has yet to offer a direct answer to President Bush's June 6 offer for talks.

Following is the text of Pritchard's testimony, as prepared for delivery:

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United States Policy Toward the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Testimony of Special Envoy Charles L. Pritchard
Special Envoy for Negotiations with the DPRK and United States Representative to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)
Before the Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives
July 26, 2001

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. As you know, Assistant Secretary Kelly is traveling with Secretary Powell and was unable to appear before you today. In his June 12 testimony before this committee, he indicated his commitment to get to the Hill as often as possible and, in his words, "consult and consult and consult." In his absence, Assistant Secretary Kelly asked me to appear before you today. With the recent completion of our review of United States policy toward North Korea, this is an excellent time to examine where we stand and how we can move forward and advance the interests of the United States and our allies. With your permission, I would like to make a short presentation and then respond to any questions you may have.

Conclusions of the Policy Review

After several months of intense discussion with our friends and allies and among the experts both in and outside of the U.S. government, the Administration concluded its policy review in early June. The President's statement of June 6 clearly laid out the Administration's approach: we are seeking serious discussions with North Korea on a broad agenda that includes missile, nuclear, and conventional force issues and humanitarian concerns. We have adopted a comprehensive approach that we believe will further our basic goals of North-South reconciliation, peace on the Korean Peninsula, a constructive U.S.-North Korea relationship, increased regional stability, and a better way forward for the people of North Korea. We were guided in our review by several principles. First among them was to place a priority on our alliances and focus on supporting progress in North-South reconciliation.

If the DPRK takes serious steps to improve relations with the United States, we are prepared to expand our efforts to help the North Korean people, ease sanctions, and take other political steps.

International Coordination and Consultations

During our policy review, we consulted regularly and often with our key allies. President Bush welcomed South Korean President Kim Dae-jung to Washington in mid-March. Later that month, South Korea hosted the first of this year's Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group meetings with the United States and Japan. The United States hosted a second such meeting in May, and we are currently working to schedule a third in early September.

Our trilateral and bilateral coordination meetings were crucial to the success of our policy review. We benefited immensely from the exchange of ideas with South Korea and Japan, and we have been pleased by their public remarks in support of our conclusions.

We have also met at senior levels with our European friends and allies, both before and after Swedish Prime Minister Persson led the European Union Troika's May trip to Pyongyang. We are pleased that the European Union is urging North Korea to address the very serious human rights concerns that we share.

Proposed U.S.-DPRK Talks

In the week following the President's announcement of our policy review conclusions, I transmitted to my North Korean counterpart, Vice Minister Kim Gye Gwan, our interest in meeting for bilateral talks. We set no preconditions, and I deferred to Vice Minister Kim to select a date and venue. Our interest is not to get bogged down in procedural matters but rather to discuss issues of concern and offer North Korea the opportunity to demonstrate the seriousness of its stated desire for improved relations with the United States.

While North Korea has not offered a direct answer to our offer of talks, they have acknowledged the President's June 6 statement and have not rejected it. They have complained that we are trying to dictate the agenda and that we have left out issues they deem important. We have told the North Koreans that we have not set preconditions for our talks with North Korea, and we are willing to discuss all issues. However, the appropriate way for us to hold our discussions is by meeting for formal talks, not by exchanging statements through our media channels. We are working through what we refer to as the New York channel to move the process forward.

Missile Issues

Missile issues are important and we will seek to address them in talks with the North. Our concerns can basically be divided into two areas: indigenous missile development/deployment and missile exports. North Korea's own missile development/deployment efforts already threaten U.S. forces and allies in East Asia. Its efforts to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles pose direct threats to the United States and thus are extremely destabilizing. We have taken note of Chairman Kim Jong Il's statement that he will maintain until 2003 the long-range missile launch moratorium. It should be clear that North Korea's launching of a long-range missile would have serious consequences for regional security, return the Peninsula to a state of high tension, prompt widespread international condemnation, and do grave harm to North Korea's relations with the United States.

North Korea's missile exports, which arm states in already-tense regions, threaten U.S. forces and friends in the Middle East and are irresponsible. Missile exports provide the DPRK a key source of hard currency, ways to cultivate outside relations, and a means to support R&D on more advanced missile systems.

We therefore need to work vigorously, bilaterally and with allies and like-minded countries, to constrain DPRK missile activities. In particular, we want to pursue discussions with North Korea aimed at reaching agreement to constrain its domestic and export programs. As the President has stated, effective verification measures will be an essential component of any missile agreement with North Korea. Verifiable constraints on the DPRK missile program will give us confidence that North Korea is abiding by its commitments and thus are vital to meaningful progress in U.S.-DPRK relations.

Agreed Framework Issues

We have carefully reviewed the implementation of the Agreed Framework and have stated that the United States will abide by its commitments and expects North Korea to do the same. Indeed, improved implementation of the Agreed Framework provisions relating to North Korea's nuclear activities is one of our top priorities. With the support of the Congress, we will continue to deliver through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil each year until the completion of the first of two light water reactors being built by KEDO. Excavation begins at the site this autumn, and the project will reach a major turning point next year when the "first concrete" is poured.

As you know, the Agreed Framework calls for the DPRK to come into full compliance with its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement before the delivery of key nuclear components can occur. North Korean cooperation with the IAEA will be a top priority in our anticipated dialogue with the DPRK.

In the past, maintaining North Korea's freeze on its nuclear facilities and safely storing the spent fuel from one of its frozen reactors demanded much of the immediate attention. As the KEDO project switches into high gear, however, the DPRK's cooperation with the IAEA will become increasingly important. Although the date for delivering key nuclear components is still in the future, the DPRK must begin active cooperation soon, to avoid serious delays in the KEDO project. Cooperation with the IAEA is central to successful implementation of the Agreed Framework and a prerequisite for completing the light water reactors.

Conventional Forces

There is no question that the most immediate and pressing threat on the Korean Peninsula comes from North Korea's robust conventional forces and their forward posture. We are determined to work with our South Korean ally to address our shared concerns over this threat.

Last year's dialogue between the two Koreas brought about progress in a number of areas, including the military realm. The two countries' Defense Ministers met for the first time, and President Kim Dae-jung and Chairman Kim Jong Il agreed in June 2000 to demine a corridor through the Demilitarized Zone, so that the railroad running from Seoul to Sinuiju could be re-linked.

We will consult closely with South Korea on confidence-building measures that we can both urge North Korea to support.

Humanitarian Concerns

Finally, let me note that we continue to seek to help the North Korean people address the most pressing problems, including starvation and oppression. We will continue to respond to the World Food Program's appeals, and we will also press the North Korean government to increase the number of monitors and allow the WFP's monitors the freedom of movement that they need to ensure that international assistance reaches its intended recipients. The United States is well on its way to delivering the 100,000 metric tons of food aid pledged in March for WFP's DPRK relief program. WFP expects an expanded need for assistance from the international community both this year and in 2002, as this year's poor first harvest has worsened North Korea's already serious food shortages.

We will continue to seek to encourage respect for human rights, raising the matter directly with the North Korean government. We also will continue to make our views clear through such publications as our Country Report on Human Rights Practices and our Report on International Religious Freedom.

We will also continue to work closely with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, both as a donor and as a partner, to try to ensure that the needs of North Korean asylum seekers are met. We are concerned by the plight of North Korean refugees, and we commend the Chinese government's decision to allow seven North Korean asylum seekers to leave the country in June.

I would be happy to respond to your questions.

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