16 July 2001

U.S. Seeks Understanding with Russia on ABM Treaty

The United States seeks "some kind of understanding" with the Russians, both on the strategic framework as a whole and on specific areas such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, says State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher.

Boucher told reporters at the State Department's July 16 press briefing that "ultimately, the United States intends to go forward" with a missile defense system. "And we have made clear that we have the right to withdraw from the (ABM) treaty, if necessary. But ... the goal is to try to work this out with the Russians."

Following is the excerpt from the briefing dealing with missile defense and the ABM Treaty:

(begin excerpt)

Question: A question, please, on trying to reach some accommodation with the Russians on missile defense. The Secretary spoke that we maybe need something new, a piece of paper of some kind, in a newspaper interview.

There was a notion at one point -- it was more than a notion -- it was repeatedly said that the US, the new administration, wanted the treaty amended. Is that --

Mr. Boucher: I think if you look back, you will not find that in the lexicon of the new administration.

Q: Well, whether it's there or not, I thought it was. At least that was the understanding, that we wanted the ABM treaty changed in a way that would clear the way for your program. Is that no longer the case? Do you want to start out afresh? Could you elaborate on what it is you don't want to do and what it is you might want to do?

A: I think the newspaper was kind enough to print the actual words that the Secretary used. And you will see in there that what we are talking about, what the Secretary talked about is a whole range of things that this could be. The point is to reach some kind of understanding with the Russians and express that as appropriately in paper or non-paper or joint statements or treaties or modifications or adjustments, whatever. But the goal is to first reach understandings on the strategic framework as a whole. And then, second of all, to deal specifically with the areas we need to deal with, like the ABM treaty.

Ultimately, the United States intends to go forward. And we have made clear that we have the right to withdraw from the treaty, if necessary. But we would like to work this out. And the goal is to try to work this out with the Russians, and then the exact form of that could be a variety of things.

Q: Could that exact form include doing something with the treaty?

A: It could include the whole range of things the Secretary talked about last week.

Q: I am asking about doing something. Because whatever is --

A: Doing something with the treaty? Yes.

Q: It could involve doing something to the treaty, changing the treaty?

A: We have talked about getting beyond the constraints of the treaty. How exactly that gets codified or not codified or whether that is because we send a letter that says we're no longer party to this or whether it's because we agree to change it, or we agree to replace it, or we have a joint statement. That remains to be seen.

Q: Good. Thank you.

Q: Given the US desire to work with the Russians, a partner in some ways, on missile defense issues, how much of a setback is the joint pact that came out of Moscow with the Chinese? And particularly the statements regarding the ABM Treaty?

A: I think, first of all, remember this -- we have been aware of this for some time, these meetings that they have had, and the fact that they were working on a treaty of friendship has been quite clear to many, all of us, for some time. It is a treaty of friendship, not an alliance. It doesn't have mutual defense in it or anything like that. And we have never felt that this was a zero-sum game. We have felt that it is important for us to have good relations with Russia and with China, and we have always felt it is important for them to have good relations with each other. They have a long border in the region, and it is important for them to get along. So we don't see it as any particular threat to us or to our plans.

Q: There seems to be some confusion about your intentions -- the Administration's intentions regarding -- withdrawing from the pact. What is driving the agenda? Is it the test program, or is it the desire to achieve an agreement with Russia before you proceed with the test program?

A: Well, I think if you look at the testimony that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz gave last week and the other statements that we made last week, what is driving the program is the need to develop an effective defense against the kind of threats that we see coming up in the future. That program has been laid out to the extent it can be at this point, and the President has directed that we undertake an aggressive program of testing.

There is no particular goal of breaking the ABM Treaty as part of that program, nor is there any particular constraint of staying within its limits. In doing this, in carrying out this program, developing an effective defense, we want to do this in cooperation, we want to do this by working it out with the Russians, who were parties to the ABM Treaty, and doing it in cooperation with our friends and allies.

But the goal here is to develop an effective defense against the kind of threats that we see coming up in the future for ourselves, for our forces, for our allies.

Q: You are talking about understandings on the whole strategic framework, with the ABM Treaty almost as a sort of small subset. Mr. Wolfowitz was saying last week, months rather than years by the time they bump up against that treaty. It's a heck of a timetable you're setting, isn't it? How are you going to -- how far have you gotten so far?

A: We are going to work hard.

Q: But would you say --

A: We have had a number of discussions already with the Russians. We will keep having discussions with the Russians. But as I said, the goal is not something to do with the ABM treaty; the goal is to have an effective defense against threats of the future.

Q: The answers -- the body language, the way you're saying these things suggests to me, and I guess it suggests to my friend over there, that the priority for the administration is to go ahead with a missile defense, irrespective of the treaty, with Russia's acquiescence, if possible, without it --

A: I am not saying anything new in that regard.

Q: Not saying anything new, but there has just been a successful test and the Russians are angry again, or opposing it again, opposing what you're doing, saying you are triggering an arms race, the US is. The allies are fairly silent about it. It's all right. I think your answer is, that's the top priority, getting a missile defense. The treaty somehow may figure in or may not figure in, is my impression of what you are saying.

A: Yes. We intend to conduct the program the President has asked for in terms of an aggressive program of testing. I would point out the test on Saturday was well within the confines of what the treaty permits. But the focus of this effort is not the treaty; the focus is to develop an effective defense against limited attack, limited number of missiles. We will keep talking to the Russians.

In the statements that they have made, the Foreign Ministry did reiterate their desire for consultation and cooperation. We've started a discussion with the Russians and we expect to continue that discussion.

Q: Could I ask something else on the same subject, general subject? This may not be the origin of this story, but is there some second thoughts now about the program of trying to assist Russian scientists in a way that takes them away from, you know, arms programs and diverts them to something more civilian in nature?

A: We have been conducting a review that is completed or substantially completed of our assistance programs to Russia, the nonproliferation programs that we have. We are now consulting with our Congress to get their views of these different programs. That will be done before we make any final decisions. Following those consultations, we will have to make the decisions on which of the recommendations of the review group to accept and what would happen to individual programs.

But let me say in general terms that we continue to believe it is in US national interests to assist Russia in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the material and the know-how for weapons of mass destruction, as well as ballistic missile technology. So that point remains pretty firm.

Q: But maybe in a different way from the way it has been done before?

A: I don't want to try to prejudice the outcome of the review. They are looking at these --

Q: Why not? It's in the newspapers this morning. It's on page 1.

A: So? There are a lot of things in the newspapers. Sometimes they're true.

Q: Well, this is a reputable newspaper and it has the ring of truth to it. Two very good correspondents wrote --

A: Is that the standard that we hold newspapers to, the ring of truth?

Q: No, I wondered if you wanted to try the agreements out on all of us -- the recommendations out on all of us, or just try it out on one or two --

A: You can ask the newspapers who they might have talked to.

Q: No, I didn't say they came from here. It's no longer a secret, is what I'm saying.

A: Barry, I'm not going to --

Q: That's all right. We'll get it. I assure you.

A: Barry, you can do what you want. My job is not to stand up here and repeat things in the newspaper.

Q: One more on missile defense. Richard, in order to have this system, that means the US fears some kind of threat from Russia or China in the future or from terrorists?

A: I think we made quite clear that the missile defense system is not directed against the deterrent forces in China and Russia. It is a system to provide a limited defense against possible threats from other places in the future.

Q: (Inaudible) -- China's military buildup is not directly against Taiwan but also Japan, US. What's your comment on that?

A: I don't have any particular comment on that, no.

Q: Also, in the pact with China with Russia, they said they are going to build a justified new world order, and what is your opinion on that?

A: Again, I commented on that before. Nothing more to say.

Q: Just back to missile defense, given the months, not years, time frame, and the fact that it takes -- I mean, you would have to notify the Russians at least within six months if you decided to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. Can you give us any kind of timeline when a decision will be made as to whether or not the US will specifically withdraw from the treaty?

A: No.

Q: Or not withdraw, make a decision?

A: No. We can't be any more specific. We have said that we know that some of the testing can bump up into the limits. We don't feel we know the need to get beyond the constraints of the treaty, but exactly when and how we are not able to define at this point.

Q: Do you happen to know -- can I just comment, last point -- do you happen to know -- it's probably in the treaty, if we look in the text -- but if you happen to know, does it provide like six months notice -- does it --

A: I believe your colleague is right. It's six months.

Q: No, no, does the treaty itself provide a specific notice arrangement?

A: He just said six months, and it sounds like he has checked it more recently than I have. But I believe that is correct.

Q: European diplomats are saying that they have not been fully briefed on the Alaska part of the reports, which came out on the Hill at the hearing and so on last week. Can you tell us when the United States intends to consult in more detail with its allies about the testing program in Alaska?

A: I think a lot of that the Defense Department would have to handle the kind of details of the various testing programs and deployment schedules. So I am not really able to do that.

Q: Can I follow up? Do you have anything on North Korea's and the United States talks in New York?

A: We will do that later. Let's finish with missile defense, if we can.

Q: Well, while the Pentagon is leading the testing program, is the State Department in charge of the consultation part of it?

A: As you have seen from the past, we work with colleagues and other agencies on this. The consultation teams that went out this spring included Defense, State and others. Actually some of the teams were led by different agencies, so we are working with them on this, but as far as having a schedule of different pieces of the deployment and the testing, that is a Defense Department thing.

Q: I just wanted to explore your earlier comments. You are talking about understandings on the strategic framework. Can you explain what exactly those would cover, first of all?

And secondly, you mentioned the Russian statement, but what was your response to that actual comment that this test threatened international treaties based on the ABM?

A: As I said earlier, this test was well within the confines of the ABM Treaty. And as far as understandings on the strategic framework, I think the President has discussed in his speech and in his meetings and discussions when he went to Europe, that we need to get beyond the Cold War attitudes towards nuclear issues; needed a new strategic framework that included both the issues all the way from offensive reductions to non-proliferation to diplomacy to counter-proliferation and missile defense. And that we were looking to discuss those issues broadly with the Russians in terms of a new strategic framework.

(end excerpt)