10 July 2001

U.S. Negotiator Testifies on Biological Weapons Convention

The State Department's special negotiator for chemical and biological arms control says the Bush administration has "serious substantive concerns" with the existing text of a proposed protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention.

Testifying July 10 before a subcommittee of the House of Representatives' Committee on Government Reform, the negotiator, Ambassador Donald Mahley, said the administration is "grappling with its final decision" with respect to the protocol.

That decision, he added, will be made "in the light of our legitimate national security concerns, and how well this protocol will advance the interests of all countries toward diminishing the threat of biological weapons."

In what he said was an effort to clarify inferences that could be drawn from recent press coverage of the issue, Mahley stressed that the United States "is not thinking about withdrawing its support from the Biological Weapons Convention" and, indeed, "unreservedly support(s) the 1975 convention ... that underpins these negotiations."

Mahley spoke on a panel with Dr. Edward Lacy, principal deputy assistant secretary of state for verification and compliance, and Ambassador James Leonard, former U.S. ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament.

Leonard, in his own testimony, took the position that, despite the protocol's clear imperfections, "our interests would be served and our security enhanced by the completion of the protocol."

Following is the text of Mahley's testimony, as prepared for delivery:

(begin text)

Testimony of Ambassador Donald A. Mahley, Special Negotiator for Chemical and Biological Arms Control, Department of State Before The House Government Reform Committee Subcommittee On National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations

The Biological Weapons Convention: Status and Implications

July 10, 2001

Mr. Chairman. It is my great pleasure to reappear before you today to discuss the current state of play in the ongoing negotiations for a protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). You will recall from my previous appearances before this subcommittee that the United States is pursuing a policy that will strengthen the convention and aid in efforts to counter the biological weapons threat in the world.

There have been press stories recently concerning these negotiations, which make a number of claims both about the position of the United States and the prospective outcomes for the negotiations. I would like to take this opportunity to clarify some of the inferences that may have been drawn from those stories.

First of all, the United States has been very clear throughout the last six years of negotiations. We unreservedly support the 1975 Biological Weapons Convention that underpins these negotiations, and we have a strong desire to see the ability to counter the growing biological weapons threat in the world enhanced. The United States is not thinking about withdrawing its support from the Biological Weapons Convention, and such implications are absolutely false and unfounded.

It is sometimes difficult to understand that these negotiations are for a protocol that is to be supplemental to the underlying convention. The negotiations are only open to states parties to the convention, states that have already forsworn biological weapons completely. The mandate for the protocol negotiations specifically prohibits any result from modifying, reducing, or altering the basic obligations of the convention itself. Thus, the commitment of the states parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, including the United States, should not be altered by the outcome of the protocol negotiations.

The negotiations have continued since the last time I appeared before this subcommittee. While the "rolling text," a set of national negotiating positions loosely connected by agreed elements of a protocol, still exists, negotiation on the basis of that text has now become sterile. Those issues amenable to drafting improvement or internal compromise have been settled. The remaining issues reflect substantive differences among countries to which those countries attach importance. Thus, in a discussion of detailed textual proposals on a single issue, countries have become unwilling to relinquish their positions without identifying some compensating gain elsewhere.

The ad hoc group chairman, Tibor Toth of Hungary, has attempted to resolve the disagreement with the "composite text" he introduced at the last negotiating session. It is a text designed to make no country really happy, but to offer simultaneous ways forward on the full range of competing national issues and national positions.

As I indicated to the other ad hoc group parties during the last round, the United States has a number of important substantive areas in the "composite text" where our long standing negotiating positions have not been incorporated. We have serious substantive concerns with the text as Ambassador Toth presented it. Many contentious issues still remain to be solved in the protocol negotiations. Among them, one issue continues to be a lightning rod for disparate views of the underlying purpose of the negotiations themselves. That is the issue of export controls. I have presented the United States view of this issue before -- but I would like to reprise it briefly. The United States does not view negotiations about a protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention to be a discussion of trade access. It is a negotiation about national security and confidence in attempts to control and eliminate a particular weapon of mass destruction -- biological weapons. We are not prepared to undermine, weaken, or otherwise compromise our overall approach to countering proliferation of biological weapons capability through any protocol. The United States believes that all the tools currently available to reduce this threat, as well as any that we would be prepared to accept in a protocol, are complementary. While none alone may be a sufficient answer to the threat, none should be discarded or weakened -- it is a price much too dear to pay for any multilateral regime.

The United States also has a number of concerns about biodefense and proprietary information that the proposed text does not fully satisfy. The United States has an extensive biodefense program designed to protect both our armed forces and our population from rogue states and terrorists. Providing extensive information about these efforts in an unclassified format to an international organization under the guise of "transparency" runs the risk of providing a proliferator or terrorist with a roadmap to exploit our vulnerabilities. Many of our friends and allies around the world share in the benefits of our biodefense work. We believe firmly that protecting it is essential not only for our security, but also to the security of others.

The United States is the world's leader in biotechnology. The cost of early research and development -- including all the efforts that do not result in viable products -- is enormous. Providing others with the means to avoid such sunk costs or to obtain process information for unfair competition would endanger not only the industry, but the benefits that industry provides to the entire world. Again, the current text does not obviate the concerns about the issue we have expressed throughout the negotiation.

The United States is still considering its approach. I would repeat the underlying principle of the United States approach to this negotiation: we seek improvement in the ability to impede the threat and reality of biological weapons proliferation in the world. We recognize that there is some risk inherent in any such effort, given the magnitude and advanced state of U.S. biodefense activity and the biotech industry in the United States. What we have sought is a balance that would achieve greater benefit in the nonproliferation and arms control objectives than costs to legitimate national security and commercial interests. That is a judgment that will be made finally at senior political levels of the executive branch, informed by both the substantive analysis of the interagency review I chaired this spring and the political context of the negotiations.

The perceived need to search for a formal way to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention originated in the frustration of the third review conference to find other ways to enhance implementation of the convention. Many of the issues that have consumed the bulk of negotiating time in the ad hoc group relate directly to concerns one or more countries have expressed in previous review conferences of the convention. Contentious arguments have been diverted from the fourth review conference to the ad hoc group. If there is no sense during the fifth review conference in November that a protocol addressing these issues is in sight, we can expect a very troublesome review conference, with some bitterly fought attempts to incorporate national views in the final document of the review conference. This is another factor the United States will take into consideration in its approach to the protocol.

The United States is grappling with its final decision, and I would end on a repetition of a point I made earlier: We understand the objective, and we understand the balancing we must do in evaluating the available options. The United States intends to make those decisions in the light of our legitimate national security concerns, and how well this protocol will advance the interests of all countries toward diminishing the threat of biological weapons.

(end text)