01 May 2001

Excerpts: House Members Debate Bush Missile Defense Plan

Several lawmakers serving on committees, subcommittees, and caucuses related to military issues debated the merits and shortcomings of President Bush's proposed missile defense system May 1 in the House of Representatives.

Representative Curt Weldon (Republican of Pennsylvania), the chairman of the House Armed Services subcommittee on Military Readiness, told fellow lawmakers that "what the President is going to offer is a layers approach, much like we have advocated, where we deploy those quickest possible technologies that are proven and tested to give us some short-term capability."

"It is about time that we begin deploying technologies that can assist us," said Weldon, the founder and co-chairman of the Congressional Missile Defense Caucus.

Missile defense "is for Americans, for Europeans, for Russians, and for all peace-loving people on the face of the Earth," the Pennsylvania lawmaker continued.

Presenting a perspective from the Democratic Party, Representative Ike Skelton of Missouri, the ranking minority member on the House Armed Services Committee, told fellow lawmakers that he does not oppose missile defense but believes, "as with any aspect of national security, that our expenditure should be proportional to the threat posed."

Reducing the missile threat "should be a cooperative undertaking involving the United States, nations that wish us well, and nations that do not," the Missouri Democrat said.

Every missile not built "is one we do not have to defend against," he said.

Developing U.S. policy on missile defense should be a cooperative process within the government as well, Skelton said.

"I hope the President will work with Congress in that effort," he said. "This is an area where I can assure the President that bipartisanship is possible."

Representative Neil Abercrombie (Democrat of Hawaii) said it was "imperative" that Congress "assess the role of missile defense policy in the overall context of national security and economic stability."

Abercrombie, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, pointed to the availability of advanced technologies and "the ambivalent attitudes toward nonproliferation agreements" by Russia, China, and North Korea.

Those three countries "have well-armed missiles capable of striking parts or all of the United States, and other nations, such as Iran, may possess similar technology in the not too distant future," he said.

While these dangers have led some to call for new strategies to meet the threat, Abercrombie said, the United States should be wary of "strategic decisions that might antagonize our international competitors and/or partners, leading them to adopt a posture even more belligerent in nature."

Abercrombie, who is the ranking Democrat on the House subcommittee on Military Personnel, also urged that the threat to America "be viewed holistically."

It should be viewed "with an eye receptive to the benefits of negotiation, diplomacy, and arms reduction possibilities, mindful of adversarial intent," he said, noting that the possibility of a threat "does not necessarily deem it likely."

Consideration of missile defense systems "must not acquire a 21st century Maginot Line mentality," Abercrombie said.

Representative John Spratt (Democrat of South Carolina), a member of the House Armed Services Committee, said he thought missile defense was worth pursuing, adding that "if it works, I think it is worth deploying."

But, he cautioned, "we have not proved that it works, not yet. In fact, after spending more than $60 billion on missile defense, we have learned as much about its limits as about its potential."

Every form of defense that has been explored "at great expense has been found to be an Achilles heel of one sort or another," Spratt said.

According to Spratt, boost-phase interceptors can be thwarted by fast-burn boosters or ablative covers; space-based systems move in fixed orbits and can easily be targeted and taken out; and sea-based systems are constrained by the finite amount of space available on a limited number of ships.

Ground-based, mid-course interceptors are "our clear first choice," Spratt said. However, he added, even this strategy has its shortcomings, as "the problem of discriminating warheads from decoys and chaff is a daunting problem that is a long way from being resolved."

Spratt said that through programs like Nunn-Lugar and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program the United States has helped to "deactivate so far 5,288 Russian warheads, 419 long-range missiles, and 367 silos."

These numbers, "what we have accomplished under these cooperative programs, dwarf the number of warheads that even the most robust NMD (national missile defense) system could have handled or could have stopped," he said.

Spratt urged President Bush to consider carefully the effect his proposed missile defense system could have upon these programs.

"We do not want to diminish that effort and leave ourselves less secure rather than more secure," the South Carolina Democrat said. "That is why I plead to the President not just for the statement of policy, but also for balance and also ask him to make a bipartisan effort founded on consensus and not just on the unilateral position that his administration is pursuing."

Following are excerpts from the May 1 Congressional Record:

(begin excerpts)

Supporting the President's Missile Defense Initiative
House of Representatives
May 01, 2001

Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania: Madam Speaker, I rise in support of the President's announced speech to move forward with missile defense for this country.

It is outrageous to me, and it should be to our colleagues, Madam Speaker, that 10 years after 28 young Americans came home in body bags from Desert Storm, that we still do not have a highly effective theater missile defense system to protect our troops.

We have made some progress. We have pushed the PAC3 system, to the extent now where it is about to be deployed. We have made progress on the THAAD program, having had successful intercepts three times. We have had success in our Navy areawide program.

The Israelis have had success with the Arrow program. We are now moving together with them on the theater high energy laser program, which offers promising potential for us. We are working with the Europeans, particularly the Germans and Italians on the Medium Extended Area Defense System, or MEADs.

We are making progress, but we still have not had the success that we need. I am convinced that part of that is because for the past 8 years we had no consensus and leadership from the White House pushing this country on military defense as John Kennedy challenged America to land on the moon in 1960, and 9 years later we did it.

Madam Speaker, all of that is changing today, as the highest elected official in our country comes out solidly in favor of missile defense as a resource for defending our people.

Now, some would say, well, why do we worry about missiles when a terrorist can take a truck bomb and do the same thing? Well, we are concerned about terrorists activities. In fact, that is why in our committee we have plussed up funding for work-related to chemical and biological terrorism significantly over the past several years; but the fact is the weapon of choice by Saddam Hussein to kill 28 young Americans was not a truck bomb. It was, in fact, a low-complexity SCUD missile that sent those young Americans, half of them from my State, back home in body bags to be buried by their families.

Some say we cannot rush to judgment on national missile defense, and I can tell my colleagues what the President is going to offer is a layers approach, much like we have advocated, where we deploy those quickest possible technologies that are proven and tested to give us some short-term capability.

I say it is about time that we begin deploying technologies that can assist us. Some of our colleagues will say, wait a minute, the Russians will be backed into a corner. I say that is hogwash. Yes, the Russians do not trust us today.

Madam Speaker, I would say if I were a Russian today, I would not trust America either on missile defense, because three times in the last 10 years, we have publicly rebuked Russia on cooperation of missile defense. The first was after Boris Yeltsin in 1992 accepted George Bush's challenge to work together, and we began the Ross-Mamedov between our State Department and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In 1993, when Bill Clinton came into office, he abruptly canceled those talks. That sent a signal to Russia, we do not want you involved. The second time was in 1996, when the only cooperative missile defense program between this country and Russia, the Ramos project, was canceled by the Clinton administration.

It was only because Carl Levin, people like the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. Abercrombie), and the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt) went to war with the White House that we were able to reinvigorate the Ramos program and keep it alive, but the signal was sent to Russia we do not want to work with you.

The third example was in 1997, at a time where almost everyone says the ABM treaty needed to be flexible. The administration sent its negotiators to Geneva to negotiate two outrageous protocols that would actually tighten up the ABM treaty. One would create demarcation between theater and national missile defense artificial differentiation, the other would be multilateralization of the treaty.

The administration knew that neither the House or the Senate, especially the Senate would ratify those protocols, but they convinced the Russians that that was our position. Even though the Constitution requires the administration to submit those kinds of changes to the Senate for their advice and the consent for 3 years, the administration never did that, because they knew the Senate would not ratify them.

The Russians for the third time were tricked in their mind, tricked into believing that America really was serious about cooperating with them.

When the Duma included those two protocols, the part of START II ratification last spring, all of a sudden our Senate said no way are we now going to pass START II, because the Duma did what the administration did not do. They attached the protocols to the ABM treaty, as additions to the START II treaty, something that we would never accept in this country.

It is no wonder the Russians do not trust us. If I were in Russia today, I would not trust America's intentions in missile defense either. It is time to get beyond that. We can, in fact, rebuild a trust that we have lost and let the Russians know that missile defense is not about backing them into a corner.

Missile defense is for Americans, for Europeans, for Russians, and for all peace-loving people on the face of the Earth.

Missile Defense
House of Representatives
May 01, 2001

Mr. Skelton: Madam Speaker, it is no secret that missile defense is perhaps one of the most significant national security issues facing the House this year. How our country decides to pursue reducing that specific threat affects how much we will be able to spend on other aspects of defense, how we will deal with our friends and allies, and how America participates in shaping the world.

I do not oppose missile defense. Neither do many Democrats. But I believe, as with any aspect of national security, that our expenditure should be proportional to the threat posed.

My friend, the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. ABERCROMBIE), has laid out some very sound principles by which I believe we should proceed in considering our system, and that is a significant one.

Reducing the missile threat should be a cooperative undertaking involving the United States, nations that wish us well, and nations that do not. Every missile not built is one we do not have to defend against.

Developing our policy should also be a cooperative process, Madam Speaker. I hope the President will work with Congress in that effort. This is an area where I can assure the President that a bipartisanship is possible.

I look forward to hearing from the expert, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt), and I also compliment the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. Abercrombie) on his seminal work in this area. I thank him for that.

Let me speak first about the threat as it involves military intelligence. Missile defense, if nothing else, is at the terminal end of military operations. Its use represents a failure to deter, and perhaps, more to the point, a missed opportunity to have assessed accurately intentions and activity of a potential enemy.

There is no substitute, and I will repeat it, there is no substitute for comprehensive intelligence-gathering and analysis if the preventative value of missile defense is to be maximized.

Now, there are several points that should be brought out that can be termed as principles on missile defense. The deployment of missile defense systems to protect our country and its interests is a decision that should be considered in the following context.

First, missile defense investment must be measured in relation to other military requirements.

Missile defense must counter a credible threat.

Missile defense will require an integrated, fully-funded military and intelligence effort, and I will repeat, that reliability and timely intelligence is critical to the success of any missile defense system.

Missile defense must be proven to work through rigorous, realistic testing prior to any final deployment decisions. In other words, it has to work.

Missile defense must improve overall United States national security. This is fundamentally a question as to whether deploying defenses will encourage opponents to deploy counter-offenses, encouraging in the process a global missile proliferation race.

Missile defense must be deployed with an understanding that those benefiting from its protection will share in its costs. That is, if the benefits of a missile defense system are extended to share with American allies in Europe or elsewhere, equitable burden-sharing arrangements need to be made.

Finally, deployment of missile defense will be debated in relation to the provisions of the antiballistic missile defense system.

Madam Speaker, the whole issue of missile defense will be a serious issue this year. The President is making a statement regarding that later today. It is an area where bipartisanship is needed. It is an area that I feel very certain that bipartisanship will happen, but we need to be thorough and not rush to judgment and do something that is wrong or inaccurate, or something that does not work or meets the threats that are obviously apparent.

Again, let me commend our friend, the gentleman from Hawaii (Mr. Abercrombie), on his efforts. I look forward to hearing our friend, the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Spratt), who has done a great deal of work in this area.

United States Missile Defense

May 01, 2001

Mr. Abercrombie: Madam Speaker, with the President making his remarks today on missile defense, I think we need to recognize unprecedented political challenges loom on the strategic horizon. Current U.S. defense force planning is set within an atmosphere of great uncertainty. Historic rivals of the United States, such as the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc nations, have either disintegrated altogether or lost much of their competitive influence.

Regional state actors, particularly on the Asian continent, show signs of future ascendancy on the world political stage. Other nation states, some exhibiting anti-U.S. bent, continue to challenge American allies and interests around the world, even as U.S. peacekeeping and peacemaking commitments evolve.

The very definition of American interests is in transition as varied threats emerge in the post-Cold War world. . . .

The availability of advanced technologies has also reached a significant level of concern as Russia, China, and North Korea, continue to exhibit ambivalent attitudes towards nonproliferation agreements.

The 2001 Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress notes the spread of materials with potential applications to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and highlights the proliferation of advanced long-range delivery systems.

Another study, the Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Working Group by the National Defense University laments, and I quote, "Given the diffusion of advanced military technologies and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, one could envision an adversary armed with longer-range missiles and cruise missiles, weapons of mass destruction, advanced integrated air defense systems, and/or sophisticated anti-ship mines and missiles by 2010, if not sooner." . . .

Set within this context, U.S. strategists are challenged with questions about nuclear strategy and force posture, arms control regimes, and missile defense modernization options. Missile proliferation has introduced an immediate threat to American uniformed personnel stationed abroad, and brought to the fore the prospect of ballistic missile attack on the United States as a real possibility within the next 5 to 7 years.

China, Russia, and North Korea each have well-armed missiles capable of striking parts or all of the United States, and other nations, such as Iran, may possess similar technology in the not too distant future.

This new setting has led some to call for a new strategic synthesis and a doctrinal requirement to, in the words of Michael Krepon, and I quote, "reduce the dangers from missiles and weapons of mass destruction in the uncertain period ahead."

Still, the view of the threat from abroad should not create a threat from within. An effort must be made to avoid strategic decisions that might antagonize our international competitors and/or partners, leading them to adopt a posture even more belligerent in nature. Krepon suggests, and I quote, "The net effect of missile deployments should be to reinforce reductions in nuclear forces, reassure allies, support nonproliferation partners, and reduce the salience of missiles and weapons of mass destruction."

Thus, the threat to America should be viewed holistically. It should be viewed with an eye receptive to the benefits of negotiation, diplomacy, and arms reduction possibilities, mindful of adversarial intent. The possibility of a threat does not necessarily deem it likely. Whereas missile threats to the United States and allies indeed exist and are likely to increase, other threats also remain. America, therefore, should invest in a force structure commensurate with likely threats. Above all, consideration of missile defense systems must not acquire a 21st century Maginot Line mentality.

Calls for nonpartisanship respecting an issue are generally rhetorical and strategic in nature as regards their political origin. Missile doctrine made manifest in congressional policy, however, cries out for just that approach. No other defense posture is as pregnant with controversy and potential for bitter political conflict. The costs of commitment alone set off warning bells throughout the budget spectrum. Discussion can rapidly descend into confrontation and accusation if we do not pledge to bring serious, sober consideration and resolution to the table. What is needed presently is the equivalent of a congressional deep breath.

We need to remember the various missile launch scenarios are abstract evaluations and the solutions promulgated in response are visions, for the most part, still on paper and in the mind's eye.

Missiles, offensive or defensive, are at best a technological answer to a military question, not a diplomatic answer to a question of negotiation. International diplomacy and national policy remain an art, not a science. Science is fixed and immutable in its consequence, while art, as Andy Warhol said, is what one can get away with.

Congress must guard against allowing missile defense systems becoming the policy, allowing the technology, in effect, to develop its own psychology. There is gradually being created in the United States a burgeoning military and corporate apparatus dependent in large measure on missile defense to rationalize its existence.

It is imperative, therefore, that the Congress assess the role of missile defense policy in the overall context of national security and economic stability. The issues are real. The responsibility is ours.

National Missile Defense
House of Representatives
May 01, 2001

Mr. Spratt: Madam Speaker, President Bush will outline today his plan for national missile defense. I reserve judgment until I hear the speech, but I have been following SDI and NMD, National Missile Defense, for years; and I have a few thoughts of mine that I want to share with the House, for whatever they may be worth.

I think National Missile Defense, NMD, is worth pursuing, and if it works, I think it is worth deploying. But we have not proved that it works, not yet. In fact, after spending more than $60 billion on missile defense, we have learned as much about its limits as about its potential. Every form of defense we have explored at great expense has been found to be an Achilles heel of one sort or another. Boost-phase interceptors can be thwarted by fast-burn boosters or ablative covers. Space-based systems, whether they are lasers or kinetic interceptors move in fixed orbits and can easily be targeted and taken out. Sea-based systems are constrained by an obvious factor, the finite space availability on ships available.

We for now settle on ground-based, mid-course interceptors, which I consider to be our clear first choice, the right way to go, but I will be first to tell you that the problem of discriminating warheads from decoys and chaff is a daunting problem that is a long way from being resolved.

We have spent 18 years and $60 billion since Mr. Reagan made his speech; and if we have learned anything, it is that missile defense is not likely to render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete. It may enhance deterrence, I believe it will; but it is not likely to replace deterrence.

There is, however, a threat, a threat of an unauthorized or accidental attack, a threat of a rogue attack, existing and emerging, and I think it would be wise to have a missile defense system to meet that threat. But we have to recognize, we have to be realistic and recognize that a rogue or unauthorized attack can well come in an unconventional manner and probably will, rather than by missile with the sender's signature written all over it, and that threat, the threat of nuclear weapons in the hands of parties undeterred by our ability to strike back, is a very real threat best opted at its source.

If we strike ahead to defiantly on our own abrogate the ABM treaty and deploy any defense systems that we want to deploy, we may very well jeopardize the arms control measures that make us secure and make ourself less secure rather than more.

Now, I think that ground-based interceptors are the first right step. We build the SBIRs-Low system anyway. We are working on a technology here with ground-based interceptors that are complementary to the technology we use for theater missile defense systems. Everybody agrees that is a need we need to develop; and it will be proved to be useful, I think, to have a system on the ground which can be tested continually and improved incrementally.

But having said that, having said that, I want to say, I do not think we should be so zealous to deploy any system that we deploy a substandard system that has not been tested and tested rigorously or else we will find ourselves on a rush to failure.

Finally, I think we need to be realistic. We are soon going to get a defense budget from the Pentagon. We are told it could be to $200 billion to $300 billion to $400 billion more than the $2 trillion we have already provided in the FYDP for the next 6 years. We need to be realistic about not only the acquisition costs but the life cycle costs of a ballistic missile system.

I do not think NMD deserves a trump card in our budget. It is time, I think, that we in the Congress and elsewhere in the government stopped treating BMD, ballistic missile defense, as a political totem. That is what it has become, a political totem like no other weapon system we have ever seen.

It is time for us to start treating this just as any other weapon system. It does not need cheerleaders. It does not need pallbearers, what BMD, what NMD needs is candor. It needs to be held to the same standards of feasibility, cost effectiveness as every other weapon system we buy and deploy.

If we are going to sell this system to others, our allies, our adversaries, our former adversaries, to Russia, we need to have unity or some cohesion among ourselves, bipartisan unity.

I think if we stay within these bounds, we can build that kind of bipartisan consensus. We should never lose sight of this fundamental fact. We have got a rough, rocky relationship with the Russians right now, but we are making progress. While we can work with Russia, we should work with Russia to secure their missile systems, to secure their nuclear and fissile materials. And bear this in mind, a critical point, through programs like Nunn-Lugar and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, we have helped to deactivate so far 5,288 Russian warheads, 419 long-range missiles, and 367 silos. These numbers, what we have accomplished under these cooperative programs, dwarf the number of warheads that even the most robust NMD system could have handled or could have stopped.

We have only begun in that effort. We do not want to diminish that effort and leave ourselves less secure rather than more secure, that is why I plead to the President not just for the statement of policy, but also for balance and also ask him to make a bipartisan effort founded on consensus and not just on the unilateral position that his administration is pursuing.

(end excerpts)