25 April 2001

Missile Defense Will Not Decouple U.S., Allies, Official Says

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Strategic Affairs Lucas Fischer says missile defense "must be capable of protecting allies, friends, and deployed forces overseas as well as the United States," and must provide protection against accidental and unauthorized missile launches.

"We must be ready to reexamine the role of systems for direct defense against missile attack," Fischer said. He added that developing and acquiring a defense against a small number of missiles "would be a substantial additional factor dissuading states from seeking, or increasing, such a missile delivery capability."

Addressing an April 25 conference on missile defense sponsored by the Danish Parliament's Foreign Policy Committee, Fischer said the presence of missile defenses contributes to the prospect that a potential hostile attack "will be frustrated." The ability to complicate "a prospective opponent's calculation of success," he said, adds to uncertainty and weakens confidence that an attack will succeed. That is why "missile defenses must play a central role in today's deterrence posture," he said.

The missile defenses that the Bush administration intends to pursue "will be designed to engage and destroy a limited number of missiles of increasing range and sophistication, which are capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction and are being developed or sought by rogue states," Fischer said. The purpose of defenses, he added, is also to start to diminish what has been an "almost exclusive reliance on offensive weapons for deterrence."

Fischer emphasized that deploying missile defenses "will not 'de-couple' the U.S. from its friends and allies." The United States, he said, "is not interested in deploying defenses that would separate us from our friends and allies." Instead, he said, deploying defenses against coercion and attack by a limited arsenal of ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) from rogue states will increase the ability of the United States "to fulfill its security commitments in regional conflicts."

The official said the United States views missile defense as "a necessary element of deterrence and an opportunity for a collective approach to enhancing security for all."

On the subject of Russia's proposal for theater defenses, Fischer said, "the Russian concept would not provide for the area defense of North America or Europe," and, therefore, cannot be substituted for the concept proposed by Washington.

On the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, he said it "will have to be replaced, eliminated, or changed in a fundamental way" because it prevents the development and deployment of a missile defense system.

Following is the text of Fischer's remarks as prepared for delivery and made available in Washington:

U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Strategic Affairs Lucas Fischer
Before the Danish Parliament
Foreign Policy Committee Conference on NMD - Implications For The Global Order
Copenhagen, April 25, 2001
Remarks as Prepared for Delivery

Ladies and Gentlemen:

It is a privilege for me to be able to return for another visit to Copenhagen, and I am very honored to have been invited to speak at this important conference on missile defense. Its sponsorship by the Danish Parliament's Foreign Policy Committee demonstrates the seriousness with which this issue is being considered in Denmark, and this gives the United States an additional and important opportunity to present its views in a public and multinational forum.

Ensuring security has always relied on a mix of complementary elements. That mix has always, for example, included diplomacy and political alliances and, further, national defense efforts and military alliances to bind these efforts together. With the advent of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, the consequences of war grew even more terrible, and the use of nuclear deterrence to prevent war became a necessary further element in both national and alliance efforts to achieve security. Yet those developments in turn underlined the importance of classic diplomacy and its modern corollary --efforts through arms control and confidence-building to reduce instabilities and increase predictability and mutual understanding.

"Deterrence" has been a shorthand description of that more complicated situation, and its central element has been an assured capability to mount a devastating nuclear response to attack. Now, we stand 10 years after the Cold War's end, and we face clear evidence that the proliferation, and indigenous development, of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery pose the growing prospect of the threat of their use not only on a regional but on a global basis. It is therefore more than time to review our policy and reassess the range of threats to national and Alliance security and consider the right balance of tools to protect it.

There is no doubt that a retaliatory capability must still be a vital component of deterrence, and of our overall security posture. But the changes I've alluded to -- that the Cold War is over and that our opponents in that odd relationship are no longer opponents, and that a new set of states with different ambitions and security calculations are exploiting the limits of our nonproliferation efforts - -mean that the exact role of that component, and its specific implications for forces and policy, need reexamination. They mean, moreover, that we cannot continue to assume that deterrence will always succeed -- any more than we can assume that nonproliferation will always succeed - -and we must be ready to reexamine the role of systems for direct defense against missile attack.

Let me, therefore, state my theses.

• First, while technical accidents can perhaps always happen, a continued, stable security relationship of the United States and its allies with Russia faces far fewer dangers than that with its Soviet predecessor of 20 years ago. At that time, we all spent much effort considering how deterrence might lose stability, how in extreme circumstances rational states might feel obliged to make extreme choices. Those speculations were perhaps justified by the importance of avoiding such an event; but the watersheds of the INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) and START (Strategic Arms Reduction) treaties, CFE (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe), the reunification of Germany, the end of the Warsaw Pact, and NATO's reaching out to Russia underline that we live in a different world. The implications of this wholly beneficial development need to be thought through and reflected in the strategic force programs of each side.

• Second, while offensive retaliatory deterrence is an essential part of a sensible response to WMD and missile delivery threats -- just as are continued and intensified efforts to prevent proliferation of such systems and their technology -- we cannot expect it always to be sufficient.

• Therefore developing and acquiring a defense against small missile forces would be a substantial additional factor dissuading states from seeking, or increasing, such a missile delivery capability; a further reason, if such capabilities have been obtained, not to threaten their use; and, if these fail and a missile is launched-a means to intercept and thereby defeat it.

Let me expand on the particular concerns that underlie those latter points.

We are confronted with a more diverse, less predictable and more risk-prone group of states armed with or seeking weapons of mass destruction and increasingly longer-range ballistic missiles to deliver them.

These states are pursuing weapons of mass destruction and missile capabilities as tools of coercion and blackmail to achieve their objectives within their regions of interest. They also see these weapons as usable military instruments against their neighbors and as coercive tools of diplomacy, whose threatened use could deter the United States and our allies from coming to the assistance of friends in regions of vital interest. These weapons are sought as a means to counter our conventional forces and to break the cohesion of our alliances and coalitions. We need to ask what would have happened in 1991 or 1999 if Iraq or Yugoslavia had possessed ballistic missiles with chemical and biological warheads of sufficient range to reach the U.S. or our allies? A recent U.S. Intelligence Community estimate found that during the next 15 years the United States will likely face an ICBM threat from North Korea, probably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq. And well before that we can expect Iran, and perhaps Iraq, to have acquired capabilities to strike much of NATO Europe.

We have concluded that the prospect of weapons of mass destruction actually being used is greater than during the Cold War. As I stated earlier, deterring these new threats is different from the deterrence of the past, which is why for the deterrence of new and growing contemporary threats, both offenses and defenses are required.

Ballistic missile defenses contribute to deterrence of these threats by holding out the prospect that such a potential aggressor's attack will be frustrated, and by complicating a prospective opponent's calculation of success, adding to his uncertainty and weakening his confidence. Thus, missile defenses must play a central role in today's deterrence posture. We must also keep in mind that some potential threats, such as accidental or unauthorized launches of ballistic missiles, are, by their very nature, inherently undeterrable. For such contingencies as well, missile defenses provide an element of insurance that is in addition to their deterrent value.

• Therefore, our response to these new threats should incorporate combinations of offensive and defensive capabilities, as well as all the other elements of diplomacy, nonproliferation efforts, alliance frameworks, and effective tactical forces.

As you know, President Bush has stated that we will deploy missile defenses, based on the best options, at the earliest possible date. And he has also stated that these defenses must be capable of protecting not only the United States and our deployed forces, but also our friends and allies.

Our consideration of missile defense policy is taking place within a strategic framework that includes our present and future offensive force requirements and measures to strengthen our nonproliferation efforts.

The President and the Secretaries of State and Defense believe that the United States has a unique opportunity to think boldly in reviewing all aspects of American defense policy, strategy, and programs. Our approach is to identify key challenges to American security and to establish the broad principles guiding our strategy.

To formulate more detailed policies on these issues, President Bush has initiated a major and multifaceted national security strategy review. In addition to nuclear offense and defense matters, other elements of the administration's overall defense review include studies of conventional forces, acquisition reform, financial management, quality of life issues, and intelligence and space.

The key elements that we are thinking about in the area of deterrence strategy and requirements are as follows:

First, we are reviewing the conceptual framework for deterrence in light of contemporary and future threats.

Second, we are reexamining our nuclear weapons force requirements. U.S. policy is to achieve a credible deterrent with the lowest number of nuclear weapons consistent with our present and future national security needs and our Alliance commitments. Moving to lower numbers could involve proven arms control tools, innovative unilateral initiatives, or some combination. We will seek to persuade Russia to join us in future offensive reductions, but we are prepared to lead by example.

As long as nuclear weapons remain one of the pillars of deterrence, these weapons must be safe, secure, reliable, and effective. The level of forces we will in the end retain will be conditioned upon a number of factors, not least of which is the fact of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology.

Third, we aim to develop recommendations on ballistic missile defenses consistent with our policy to develop and deploy, at the earliest possible date, effective defenses drawing on the best technologies available. We seek to identify and assess the spectrum of ballistic missile defense capabilities that can contribute to U.S. security and that of our allies. These defenses will be designed to engage and destroy a limited number of missiles of increasing range and sophistication, which are capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction and are being developed or sought by rogue states. It is important to emphasize that they will be capable of countering only limited attacks, not large ones. These defenses must be capable of protecting allies, friends, and deployed forces overseas as well as the United States, and must also be capable of protecting against accidental and unauthorized missile launches.

The purpose of defenses is also to start diminishing our almost exclusive reliance on offensive weapons for deterrence. This is important to our effort, as Secretary of State Powell has said, "to make the world a safer place with fewer nuclear weapons and with the ones that remain having less currency." We are committed to creating a new strategic framework, one defined by lower levels of nuclear weapons and a greater role for missile defense.

The President and Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld are committed to substantive and meaningful consultations with our allies. As that review proceeds and in order to formulate sound decisions, we value and want allied input.

As all of you are aware we have some diplomatic challenges to work through regarding Russia, China, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

Russia and China have expressed their strong opposition to our missile defense plans. The President has said that we will address Russian concerns about the impact of our defenses on their deterrent. Our defenses will be designed to deter and defend against limited attacks from rogue states, not against a large attack.

As for the fate of the ABM Treaty, it is hard to argue that this 1972 treaty meets the needs of today's strategic framework. In fact, the opposite is true. The ABM Treaty in its current form prohibits us from developing and deploying effective missile defenses against rogue missile threats. We will deploy defenses as soon as possible; therefore, we believe that the ABM Treaty will have to be replaced, eliminated, or changed in a fundamental way.

We must remember that Russia, too, faces a threat from the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, we believe that Russia's proposal on theater defenses for Europe demonstrates a recognition of this threat. The Russian proposal envisions a cooperative effort with Europe for point defenses of deployed European and Russian forces. It is important to note that the Russian concept would not provide for the area defense of North America or Europe. In view of this, the Russian proposal can not be a substitute for the missile defense concept articulated by President Bush and his national security team. We are, however, studying Russia's ideas carefully at NATO and will respond collectively as an alliance.

We will continue to work to persuade Russia that deployment of effective missile defenses does not threaten the Russian deterrent.

We are also ready to have a serious discussion with China and to listen to its views. This point was made to Vice Premier Qian during his recent U.S. visit. The Vice Premier reiterated China's interest in a dialogue on missile defense as soon as possible. We intend to engage in such a dialogue in the future.

Of course, a key part of any discussion we have with Moscow and Beijing will continue to be their roles and responsibilities with respect to the emerging missile threats from rogue states such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.

Perhaps the harshest criticism of missile defense is the suggestion that an "invulnerable" United States will seek to act unilaterally without regard for the concerns and priorities of its friends and allies. I want to emphasize that missile defenses will not "de-couple" the U.S. from its friends and allies. The U.S. is not interested in deploying defenses that would separate us from our friends and allies. The principle of shared risk is not in doubt or open to question. Indeed, protections from coercion and attack by a limited arsenal of ICBMs from rogue states will increase the U.S. ability to fulfill its security commitments in regional conflicts. We see missile defense as a necessary element of deterrence and an opportunity for a collective approach to enhancing security for all. As President Bush has said "America's development of missile defenses is a search for security, not a search for advantage."

And so I hope that I have conveyed to you what underpins the U.S. view of missile defense and of the wider threats and trends in the world that we believe require all of us to move in this direction.

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to begin this conference, and I will be happy to respond to your questions.