|
05 April 2001
U.S. Official Says Dealing with Explosive War Remnants Is Complex
Dealing with the issue of explosive remnants of war "is extremely
complex" and "does not lend itself to simple, easy solutions," says
Edward Cummings, head of the U.S. delegation to the Second Preparatory
Conference of the 2001 Review Conference on the Convention on
Conventional Weapons (CCW).
Addressing the Preparatory Conference April 5, Cummings urged creation
of an "open mandate for an experts process to consider the problem of
UXO (unexploded ordnance)" and measures to effectively address the
problem. He said this may lead to adopting, as the Canadians have
suggested, the best practices used by nations to deal with the problem
and not pursuing a protocol which might take years to negotiate.
Cummings said parties to the CCW should "consider taking feasible
steps on a voluntary basis, unilaterally or in consultation with
others, to address UXO problems in the short term."
The United States agrees with the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) that anti-vehicle mines can be addressed outside of the
context of explosive war remnants. "Parties that truly want to address
the problems identified by the ICRC -- a sentiment widely expressed
during this meeting -- have an opportunity to do so by supporting the
U.S.-Danish proposal," Cummings said.
He also said the United States strongly agrees with the United Kingdom
and France that "the proposal to consider depleted uranium (DU)
munitions within the context of remnants is inappropriate,
particularly because DU, on its own, does not cause an explosive
remnant."
Following is the text of Cummings statement:
April 5, 2001
Explosive Remnants of War
Mr. Chairman, thank you. The issue presented by this discussion is
both very old and rather new. It is old because explosive remnants of
war -- unexploded ordnance -- have been with us since the earliest use
of explosive devices in armed conflict. It has always been true that
unexploded devices have remained on battlefields following conflict --
this has been among the costs of war. It is a cost that Egypt, China,
Russia, Latvia and many Europeans -- among others, of course -- bear
from the First and/or Second World War. I daresay that it is a cost
that many nations represented in this room today must bear. The cost
falls not just on our treasuries but on our citizens, civilians who
unknowingly may disturb an explosive remnant of war.
The issue is new because the ICRC has presented us with proposals to
address what they have termed "explosive remnants of war." But even
here there are old issues - landmines, for instance, within the ambit
of the ICRC proposals, are dealt with by the CCW and the Ottawa
Convention. Also, the principal munition identified by the ICRC -- the
cluster munition -- has been the subject of debate in the CCW before,
specifically in the 1970s. Yet never before has such a comprehensive
proposal to regulate unexploded ordnance -- what we often call "UXO"
-- been offered for the consideration of States. For raising the UXO
issue in this forum, we owe the ICRC a debt of gratitude.
It is now, however, up to States Parties to the CCW to consider the
proposal of the ICRC and determine the scope of the issue, the nature
of the problems, and the most appropriate measures in light of those
problems. Each delegation participating in this Preparatory Conference
is at the early stages of fully understanding the issues; for many of
us, this may be the first sustained engagement in the issue. For that
reason, we must take our responsibility to consider the ICRC proposal
seriously, fully recognizing both the military advantages of the
munitions that may leave UXO behind and the humanitarian concerns UXO
can generate.
The proposal to deal with UXO illustrates a noteworthy dynamic:
strengthening the reliability of munitions serves both military and
humanitarian objectives. On the military side, it appears to us
uncontroverted that the key weapon category identified by the ICRC --
the cluster munition -- serves extremely valuable and important
military objectives. The military utility of cluster munitions has
been recognized by those seeking restrictions on their use, as was
made clear, for example, in Switzerland's intervention yesterday. As
compared to traditional unitary bombs, improved cluster bombs cause
less destruction, reducing the harm to civilian populations during
armed conflict. The particular tactical uses of cluster munitions by
aircraft enable fewer sorties and thus reduces the risk to pilots. To
the extent cluster munitions enable the targeting of more military
objectives per sortie than the unitary bomb, they can shorten
conflicts and reduce the need to deploy ground forces. All of these
military advantages are strengthened when the munition has a high
degree of reliability -- that is, when the munition functions as
designed, exploding on an intended military objective.
By the same token, a higher degree of reliability benefits both
friendly military forces and civilian populations, since there is no
military advantage to be gained by UXO. The unexploded ordnance --
whether a submunition, artillery or mortar shell, or other munition --
can only serve to compound the advance of ones' military forces, since
UXO can just as easily and unpredictably harm soldiers as civilians.
It goes without saying that there is no legitimate military advantage
in causing civilians to fear that they might set off UXO when playing
in a field, walking along a river, or otherwise going about their
business in an area formerly the site of hostilities.
With these common military and humanitarian advantages in mind, the
United States has already begun to consider ways to enhance the
reliability of cluster munitions. In January of this year, the United
States Secretary of Defense directed that, in the future acquisition
of cluster munitions, the U.S. goal is to attain a reliable
functioning rate of at least 99 percent. Such a goal would include not
only working to ensure, as much as feasible, that such munitions
function as intended. It would also mean that, where such munitions
fail to function as intended, they are reliably incapable of causing
an explosive problem once their intended use has concluded.
Switzerland has submitted an important and thoughtful proposal dealing
with reliability. We look forward to working closely with Switzerland
on its proposals and to discussions with other delegations. A major
issue to be addressed is reliability both in peacetime testing and in
actual battlefield conditions. Our discussions should not be limited
to particular technical means that may now be available to increase
functioning rates of munitions, such as fusing. The self-destruct and
self-deactivate technology for certain cluster munitions may differ
from anti-vehicle mines. Technology innovations in the future may
offer improved ways to reach higher rates of reliability. Thus, our
discussions in this regard should not be limited to an examination of
the specific technology that enables our anti-vehicle mines to attain
a very high self-destruct/self-deactivate dependability rate.
At the same time, several delegations have noted that there are cost
implications of the Swiss and ICRC proposals. In comparison to the
known costs for detectability and self-destruct/self-deactivation
features for mines -- which we pointed out yesterday are minor,
amounting to a few dollars per mine -- the costs of the remnants
proposals are currently unknown and deserve considered study.
The proposal to deal with UXO, however, raises more questions than it
answers. It is simply the fact that the issue of "explosive remnants
of war" is extremely complex. It does not lend itself to simple, easy
solutions. Even understanding the nature of the issue requires
detailed understanding of the military utility of weapons that may
cause UXO and the problems UXO causes. We do believe that some of the
ICRC proposals have merit and deserve our consideration. In
particular, we are prepared to consider what kind of steps would be
appropriate to warn and educate civilians on the presence and effects
of UXO. In this context, it would also be appropriate for all States
to consider increasing their support for and interaction with the
current mine action and clearance programs underway. We are also
prepared to consider what kind of technical information can be made
available to assist the UN and clearance organizations.
We would also note that the ICRC has suggested that anti-vehicle mines
can be addressed outside the context of explosive remnants of war. We
agree strongly with this approach. As other delegations have noted,
anti-vehicle mines are very different from other kinds of weapons that
leave UXO. We believe that they should be addressed as a method and
means of war. Moreover, we have an opportunity to deal with
anti-vehicle mines in the context of the joint U.S.-Danish proposal
discussed yesterday. Parties that truly want to address the problems
identified by the ICRC -- a sentiment widely expressed during this
meeting -- have an opportunity to do so by supporting the U.S.-Danish
proposal.
Yet we do believe that there are problems with some specific proposals
of the ICRC. First, the ICRC's specific proposal to shift
responsibility to clear UXO on the party that delivered the munition
would not only be very difficult to implement but also goes counter to
the long-established customary international law principle of the
rights and responsibilities of the sovereign state over its territory.
We are not convinced that the analogy made to the Amended Mines
Protocol's provision on responsibility is entirely appropriate. The
provision in Protocol II, which the U.S. proposed, is militarily
feasible, as the dimensions of the responsibility are clearly
established in the relevant articles of the Protocol.
Second, the ICRC has proposed dealing not just with UXO but with the
use of cluster munitions near concentrations of civilians. We share
the view expressed by others that existing international humanitarian
law adequately regulates questions related to targeting, and that such
a specific rule in the context of cluster munitions is unnecessary.
We also note that caution is necessary in applying provisions from
other CCW protocols to explosive remnants of war. Each provision was
written with an appreciation for the uniqueness of the weapons
addressed in the relevant protocol. An analogy to UXO may not
necessarily follow. For example, the specific rule developed for
incendiary weapons in the CCW was based largely on how such weapons
are used tactically, such as in close air combat. It also acknowledged
the post-attack risk of fire spreading out of control, which is not a
risk with cluster munitions. This rule in Protocol III, in our view,
cannot be applied in a militarily feasible manner with respect to
cluster munitions. Application of the incendiaries principle to
cluster munitions could pose greater risks to civilians and greater
damage to civilian objects in the vicinity of a military objective
because the principal alternative to the use of cluster munitions, a
traditional unitary bomb, can cause much more significant damage.
Finally, we strongly agree with the United Kingdom and France that the
proposal to consider depleted uranium munitions within the context of
remnants is inappropriate, particularly because DU on its own does not
cause an explosive remnant.
We strongly agree with other delegations that the object of our work
leading to the Review Conference should be the establishment of an
open mandate for an experts process to consider the problem of UXO and
measures that may effectively address that problem. These may include
best practices, as the Canadian delegation has suggested, and may not
lead to a protocol. As the Canadian delegation correctly noted this
morning, negotiation of a protocol would, in all likelihood, take
several years. Thus, CCW Parties should strongly consider taking
feasible steps on a voluntary basis, unilaterally or in consultation
with others, to address UXO problems in the short term. The Review
Conference, in other words, should not prejudice the experts process
by requiring a specific outcome, such as a draft legal instrument. The
experts work should be open-ended.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude by reiterating my government's
keen interest in reducing the humanitarian and military problems
caused by UXO. We look forward to working with you and with other
delegations in crafting a workable mandate for experts work for
adoption this December. Thank you.
Return to the Washington File
|
