04 April 2001 U.S. Outlines Proposals to Restrict Anti-Vehicle Mines Use Geneva -- The United States outlined in detail April 4 a set of proposals to restrict the use of anti-vehicle landmines, and expressed openness to alternate approaches to accomplishing this goal under the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). Edward Cummings, the head of the U.S. delegation to a meeting of CCW states parties, said the unrestricted use of such mines poses a humanitarian problem. Although anti-vehicle landmines do not cause as many civilian casualties as anti-personnel landmines, they pose a serious danger to humanitarian relief convoys, and can disrupt normal food distribution long after a conflict has ended, he said. Cummings spoke April 4 to the second meeting of the Preparatory Conference which is considering proposals for possible adoption by the CCW 2001 Review Conference that will be held next December in Geneva. Through its four protocols, the 1983 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) restricts specific categories of weapons such as -- landmines and booby traps -- that have been deemed by the international community to be particularly harmful, especially to civilian populations after conflicts have ended. Cummings noted that the CCW's Amended Mines Protocol (Protocol II) does not include the rigorous restrictions on anti-vehicle mines that the United States and Denmark originally proposed in 1995, and said that adding restrictions on this category of mines amounts to "unfinished business." The U.S. proposals entail the following: A requirement that all anti-vehicle mines be detectable by commonly available means. This is already a requirement for anti-personnel landmines under the Amended Mines Protocol. The United States would like to see the same standard applied to other categories of mines. A requirement that all remotely delivered anti-vehicle mines be equipped with self-destruct capabilities backed up by self-deactivation features to reduce serious risks to the civilian population. A requirement that the self-destruct feature operate within 30 days at a dependability rate of 95 percent, and that the self-deactivation feature ensures a dependability rate of 99.9 percent that within 120 days the mine becomes inoperable. Cummings said the United States continues to believe the best way to place restrictions on anti-vehicle mines would be by adding a second Technical Annex to the Amended Mines Protocol. But he said that the United States has listened to the concerns expressed by some delegations that the Amended Mines Protocol should not be amended so soon after its adoption. He announced that the United States and Denmark will submit a joint proposal for an alternate approach -- a new CCW protocol. This fifth protocol would be "devoted to restrictions on the use and transfer of mines other than anti-personnel landmines." Cummings said the proposal will be formally submitted by the United States and Denmark on April 6. But he emphasized that the United States believes that the approach of adding a second annex to the Amended Mines Protocol "is the most appropriate way to move forward" and " should still be considered." Additional documents and the texts of U.S. proposals are available on the Internet at: http://www.itu.int/MISSIONS/US/CCW. Following is the text of Cummings' statement as prepared for delivery: Statement of Edward Cummings, Head of the U.S. Delegation to The Second Preparatory Conference of the 2001 CCW Review Conference April 4, 2001 Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines Mr. Chairman, thank you. I would like to use this opportunity to discuss the U.S. proposals related to landmines. It bears noting at the outset some history. In 1995, the United States and Denmark proposed that CCW Parties adopt restrictions on the use of not only anti-personnel landmines but also other landmines -- that is, anti-vehicle, or anti-tank, mines. Although the U.S.-Danish proposal formed the basis for the Amended Mines Protocol, the amended protocol ultimately did not include the rigorous restrictions on anti-vehicle mines. In this sense, therefore, the proposals described here amount to important unfinished business. With your indulgence, allow me first to spend a moment introducing the proposals. I will then present an alternative approach to adoption of restrictions on mines other than anti-personnel landmines that takes into account concerns expressed by some delegations about amending the Amended Mines Protocol. Then I will ask Col. Paul Hughes of the U.S. Army to present the technical details of the U.S. proposals. First, an introduction to the proposals. Allow me to begin by stating what we believe to be the most important premise of these proposals: The irresponsible use of long-lived anti-vehicle mines poses a humanitarian problem. The ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) reported in September of last year that although the number of civilian casualties associated with anti-vehicle mines is less than AP (anti-personnel) mines, there are major effects in terms of denial of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations, as a result of anti-vehicle mining. The ICRC pointed out also that disruption of normal food distribution can persist long after a conflict has ended as a result of anti-vehicle mining. According to an ICRC report, "A survey of ICRC and National Red Cross and Red Crescent Society operations reveals a total of 20 incidents involving anti-vehicle mines in 11 countries during the 1990s. Each of these incidents resulted in the cancellation of relief operations for already vulnerable populations. A total of 16 staff were killed and 63 injured in these incidents. When relief had to be delivered by air, due to mined roadways, the financial costs to the ICRC increased between 10 and 20 times." Specific examples of anti-vehicle mine incidents illustrate the problem further: On October 23, 1998, a passenger bus was destroyed by an anti-tank mine near the town of Kandahar, Afghanistan. The blast was reported by ITAR-TASS (Russian News Agency) to have left 41 people dead and 35 injured. The mine was thought to have been in place since the 1980s. On August 29, 1995, the detonation of a mine under a UN relief vehicle in a refugee camp near Goma, Rwanda, contributed to a decision by relief agencies to evacuate all non-essential staff. On October 29, 1995, two Western relief agencies suspended operations in eastern Zaire after two American relief workers for the American Refugee Committee were wounded in a mine blast. One worker lost both her legs, and the other suffered other serious injuries. On August 28, 1995, a 16-ton truck operated by CARE Canada detonated an anti-tank mine planted at the entrance to the CARE Goma compound. On August 18, 1994, five people were killed when a truck ferrying refugees back to Kigali hit a landmine near the small, northern town of Byumba, reported the International Organization for Migration. The Ugandan driver, two refugees, and two unidentified people were killed. Now let me turn to the proposals. Specifically, the proposals entail the following: One: A requirement that mines other than anti-personnel landmines be constructed or modified so as to be detectable by commonly available means. The proposal would adopt the same standard for detectability as required for anti-personnel landmines. From a humanitarian perspective, we believe such a requirement would greatly facilitate the detection and clearance of anti-vehicle mines on roads used by civilian traffic. We also believe that detectability of anti-vehicle mines would have a significant military value, decreasing casualties among peacekeepers and friendly military forces and facilitating the detection and clearance of such mines on roads used by humanitarian vehicles and other civilian traffic. The U.S. military believes strongly that detectability of anti-vehicle mines would have little if any impact on the mines' utility in blocking, turning or channeling enemy mechanized forces. We see very little if any military advantage to be gained by the use of non-detectable anti-vehicle mines, -- and much potential humanitarian and military benefit. Two: A requirement that all remotely-delivered anti-vehicle mines be equipped with self-destruct capabilities backed up by self-deactivation features. Long-lived remotely-delivered mines pose serious risks to the civilian population, since they could remain active and unmarked on roads used by civilians long after they served the military purpose for which they were laid. Self-destruct and self-deactivation features also make sense from a military perspective, minimizing civilian casualties without compromising legitimate military uses, reducing the risks to one's own forces. We see no reason to distinguish the effects of remotely-delivered anti-vehicle landmines from anti-personnel landmines; the humanitarian issues at stake are the same. Third: A requirement that the self-destruct feature for all remotely-delivered landmines other than anti-personnel mines operates within 30 days at a dependability of 95 percent, and that the self-deactivation feature ensures that, within 120 days, the mine may not operate at a dependability of 99.99 percent. This rigorous requirement would further reduce the risk to civilian populations from the use of landmines. Mr. Chairman, I would like to take a moment to address what has been perhaps the most often expressed concern of States Parties to the Amended Mines Protocol and those considering ratification of the Amended Mines Protocol. A number of delegations have, in recent months and days, expressed concern about amending Protocol II so soon after its adoption. Our delegation has not shared that particular concern. We have made clear our view that amending the protocol could serve to spur additional ratifications, just as occurred prior to the First CCW Review Conference in 1994 to 1996. Nonetheless, we have listened carefully during our discussions to other delegations on this issue. We understand the concerns of States and we have endeavored to meet those concerns. Having listened, the United States would like to draw the attention of delegates to an alternative approach: a new protocol, what we hope will be a fifth CCW protocol simply devoted to restrictions on the use and transfer of mines other than anti-personnel landmines. We present this approach as a response to the concerns identified about amending an amended protocol at this time. We continue to believe that a second Technical Annex to the Amended Mines Protocol, as proposed by the U.S. delegation in December, would be the most appropriate way to move forward and that such an approach should still be considered. Nevertheless, we believe that it is time to move forward and to work toward restrictions on the use and transfer of anti-vehicle mines in a manner that ultimately results in general agreement. We have asked the Secretariat to distribute informal copies of this alternative approach, which we would submit formally to the Preparatory Conference on Friday. This is a joint proposal of the United States and Denmark. It is an effort to conclude the unfinished business of the U.S.-Danish proposal made during the first CCW Review Conference. We would welcome comments and suggestions on the text from any delegation. The proposal accomplishes the same objective proposed by a second Technical Annex we proposed in December -- with one exception. That exception is that, because it treats only mines other than anti-personnel mines, it does not enhance the specifications for the self-destruct and self-deactivation features of remotely-delivered anti-personnel mines. We will look for ways to address that aspect separately and would welcome suggestions from delegations before the next Preparatory Conference. In any case, the proposal stands on its own in terms of applicability only to mines other than anti-personnel mines. As such, it is also intended to address concerns of some Ottawa Convention States regarding the fact that our original proposed Technical Annex would have affected certain anti-personnel mine restrictions. Let me reiterate: The proposal described here is aimed at attaining consensus for adoption of balanced, reasonable restrictions on anti-vehicle mines within the CCW. We are open, indeed very interested, in engaging on a substantive level to address substantive concerns. We look forward to working with other delegations in this endeavor over the coming months. With that brief introduction, I turn to Col. Hughes for a presentation of the technical details of the proposals. Col. Hughes will address technical questions related to the anti-vehicle mine proposals that we have heard from delegations over the past months and days. Thank you. Return to the Washington File