07 March 2001 Background Briefing on Bush-Kim Meeting North Korea dominated the discussions between President George W. Bush and South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung during their meeting March 7, according to senior administration officials. After the presidential meetings, U.S. officials who did not wish to be identified told reporters during a background briefing that Bush is skeptical about North Korea's commitment to existing agreements because of that country's lack of "transparency." At the same time, the U.S. officials said, Bush "supported President Kim's vision and he supported President Kim's efforts to improve relationships with the North. And the President believed that it was very important that this process proceed forward and that he would provide support to the President (Kim) for that effort." There is no policy difference between U.S. and South Korean approaches toward North Korea, the U.S. officials said. "We both see North Korea as a situation that needs to be worked through." On the question of Bush administration plans for missile defense, the American officials said President Kim made clear that he is "not opposed." Both presidents, they said, agree that "times have changed" and that "there is a role to play for defensive systems." Both sides have agreed to consult on the matter in the future, the U.S. officials said. Following is the White House transcript of the event: The White House Office of the Press Secretary March 7, 2001 Press Background Briefing On President's Meeting With South Korean President Kim Dae-jung The James S. Brady Briefing Room 3:47 P.M. EST Ms. Countryman: I want to start with a statement by the Press Secretary -- not me, the Press Secretary -- the Israeli Prime Minister to visit Washington. "President Bush welcomes the formation of Israel's new government and extends its congratulations to Prime Minister Sharon. The President will welcome the Prime Minister to Washington for a working visit on March 20. The United States and Israel share important strategic interests and objectives and enjoy a strong, long-standing relationship. "The President looks forward to discussing bilateral and regional issues with Prime Minister Sharon, including ways to bring an end to the violence and to advance peace and stability in the region." And now I want to introduce you to not one, but two senior administration officials who will take your questions on the visit today of President Kim Dae-Jung with President Bush. Senior Administration Official: I'm new at this, as you can tell. I'll talk just briefly, characterize the President's meeting that he had with President Kim Dae-Jung, and then the other official will talk about the luncheon that we had there. The President had a good meeting with President Kim Dae-Jung. They talked, had a frank exchange of views. They talked about a wide variety of things. The President expressed his support for the relationship with North Korea, for the President's support -- his support for the relationship between the U.S. and South Korea, and also his support for President Kim's policy towards North Korea. The President expressed, as he mentioned in the press conference, his little bit of skepticism as things move forward, but that did not take away at all from his sense that the meeting -- that he supported President Kim's vision and he supported President Kim's efforts to improve relationships with the North. And the President believed that it was very important that this process proceed forward and that he would provide support to the President for that effort, and that the President felt that the things you were doing was and are and continue to be important for civility in the region. They also talked about the relationship with the United States and trade issues. They talked briefly about U.S. forces in Japan, the importance of continuing U.S. force presence in Japan. President Kim repeated the story that he had expressed earlier of his discussions with President Kim Chong-il -- Chairman Kim Chong-il -- and Kim Chong-il's sense of the need to maintain U.S. forces on the Peninsula, even after unification. The President said he agreed with that idea; that's not news, that had been said during President Kim's earlier visit there. The overall tone was very positive. I think President Kim did an excellent job explaining to President Bush about his vision for the North and how he saw things proceeding. And President Bush listened intently and said that his thoughts about the North, that we wanted to make sure we had verifiable -- anything we did with the North was verifiable, but that he was going to support President Kim in his efforts. And President Kim assured President Bush that anything they did, they would consult with the United States before they proceeded to do anything forward. So they had a very positive meeting, they enjoyed it very much. They both -- the tone was very upbeat, and they expressed support for his policy. Also, I guess, on national missile defense, I have to say that President Kim expresses in the joint statement that he expressed support for the idea of defensive systems in terms of consulting about it, and he said plainly that Korea did not not support missile defense, national missile defense. In other words, well, let's see -- how was it said -- he said that: I didn't mean to say through the discussions that we've had that we were not supporting missile defense; that's not true. There is no intention on the part of our government to have that be misunderstood. And we've issued a statement through the press and through or foreign ministry that's explained our position. And the President said, thank you for that explanation; I appreciate that very much. Q: So they do support missile defense? Senior Administration Official: No, he does not not support missile defense. (Laughter.) He does not -- there was no intent by the confusion that resulted from the statement before; there was absolutely no intent on the part of President Kim or others to say that he was not supporting the President's policy. Q: But he was not saying he supported it? Senior Administration Official: No, he did not. Nor was he asked to support it. Q: Did he mention the "confusion"? Senior Administration Official: No. He said: I'm sorry for the issue in the media about it. Q: Was the meeting largely focused on North Korea and, secondly, who was at the meeting? Senior Administration Official: The meeting was -- I think the, let's see -- I'd say about half the time they talked about North Korea, back and forth. And I would say that President Kim gave a very articulate explanation of his views, to which the President was very interested in hearing. Who was at the meeting? The President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and Ari Fleischer and myself. And on the Korean side there were -- Q: Dr. Rice? Senior Administration Official: Oh, and Dr. Rice, of course. Yes, Dr. Rice. And, on the Korean side -- I was the note-taker. On the Korean side there were the -- you can help me with this -- the Foreign Minister, Ambassador Yang, the ambassador here, and also the National Security Advisor, Mr. Kim, was present at the meeting. Q: Did President Kim ever express to the President any concern or ask him why this administration felt it necessary to undertake another review of policy toward North Korea, when former Secretary of Defense William Perry had just completed a year-long review that had the cooperation of both South Korea and Japan? Ms. Countryman: John, can we finish with the introductory part -- the Senior Administration Official is going to talk about the lunch and then we can take all the questions. Senior Administration Official: Okay, we'll do that. Senior Administration Official: Thank you. The party at the lunch was somewhat larger and I was there, so I can brief you on that. But, also, Secretary of the Treasury, O'Neill, attended and Scooter Libby, of the Vice President's staff was there. The lunch was very cordial. They talked a bit about baseball, which is a very popular sport in Korea, also. More importantly, they talked about the two economies. I think the most fundamental discussion was really President Kim's indication that he plans to continue his economic reform policy, he plans to continue to take steps that will make Korea a good place for American investors. And both Presidents indicated that more balance in our economic relationship would be desirable. Q: Do I need to ask it again? Senior Administration Official: Yes, maybe you could just paraphrase it again? I'm sorry. Q: Did President Kim or any of the Korean delegation, any member of the Korean delegation talk to the President about this administration's decision to again review policy toward North Korea, when former Secretary of Defense William Perry had just completed a year-long review that had both the cooperation of South Korea and Japan? Did he say why do we need to do this all over again -- even though it's your prerogative? Senior Administration Official: No, there was no discussion about reference to Perry's review or anything like that. Q: No, no, no. I'm not talking about Perry's review. I'm talking about your review. Did he ever say, I understand you're reviewing this, do we really feel it necessary to do that, didn't we just have a review? Senior Administration Official: No, what they talked about in that vein was that the U.S. is going to continue its work on the agreed framework and that we're going to take a look -- as we go forward with that, we're going to take a look at our polices, see ways that we can improve that. But there was no discussion in detail why you're doing that or why you're not doing that. Q: But General Powell seemed to indicate that any negotiations or discussions or dialogue with Pyongyang are on hold until this review is completed? Senior Administration Official: No, I think -- well, I didn't hear what Secretary Powell said. But what the discussion about that was that there would be a -- we're not going to immediately start negotiating with North Korea. There is no discussion about -- there is no talk about that. There are certain elements of the arrangements or the agreements that are worth looking at and we're going to look at that and we're going to continue dialogue with that when it's appropriate to do so. Q: Did President Kim express any concern about a timetable for that? I mean, Secretary Powell came out and said, you know, there is no hurry. But South Koreans appear to indicate -- Senior Administration Official: No, there is no concern about timetable on that issue. President Kim explained his -- what he has going on. He said he'd consult with us on this. He's expecting a visit of Kim Chong-il to South Korea sometime in late spring or early summer. But there was no discussion about timetable. Q: Is there any policy difference between the U.S. and South Korea toward North Korea? Senior Administration Official: None, no. There is no policy difference. We both see North Korea as a situation that needs to be worked through. And President Kim has a vision for doing that. President Bush said he would support that vision and that we want to be consulted, but -- we want to have consultations with the Koreans as they work through that. And President Kim was very happy to say that. In fact, it was initiated by President Kim, he said, I will consult with you as we work through this step by step. So I don't think there is any big difference between us and them. Q: Was there any discussion of the warnings out of North Korea on February 21st and again last Saturday about the window of opportunity closing? Senior Administration Official: No. No. Q: No concern by either party that time may, in fact, be running out? They don't have -- Senior Administration Official: No. No. Yes, David. Q: Did President Kim at any point raise his intent to sign this peace declaration with Kim Chong-il when he comes? Senior Administration Official: No. Q: He did not? Senior Administration Official: No. Q: And given your statement that President Bush said he supports President Kim's openings to the North, should we interpret that to mean that the United States fully supports the idea of signing a peace declaration with the North -- Senior Administration Official: No, I didn't -- well, I don't think that President Kim has made to clear to anyone what his intentions are there. Q: He did not today? Senior Administration Official: He certainly did not today. He certainly did not today. Senior Administration Official: David, I think we would fully expect that to be part of the consultations that we'll have. I think one of the things that came out of the meeting that maybe should be stressed more is agreement by both sides that close coordination is absolutely essential; and that that coordination will take place as the South Koreans prepare for the possible -- Senior Administration Official: Right. There was no discussion about a peace treaty or peace program or anything of that nature on any time -- Q: Not a treaty, but a declaration. Senior Administration Official: There was no discussion of a declaration. Q: But both Presidents used the term frank and honest and described it in discussions, which usually implies some level of disagreement. Were there, in fact, open disagreements? Senior Administration Official: No, I think this is -- no. I think what you should take away from this is that both Presidents expressed their views very clearly. There wasn't a lot of diplomatic gobbledy-gook. There was an expression by President Kim of what he thought and what his views were of North Korea, a very clear description. There wasn't any idealism put into that. It wasn't fantasized in any way. It wasn't romanticized. It was very direct and clear. The President accepted that as a realistic view and the President returned with his realistic view of North Korea. So there was a frank, realistic exchange about what North Korea is really like. Q: And will the Perry work be reviewed at all in this U.S. policy? Senior Administration Official: That was not part of -- Q: No, but can you say in the policy -- Senior Administration Official: I'm sure that the work that was done by the Perry review will be taken into consideration, just as will the views of many other people and other work that's been done. But, obviously, the work of the Perry group is very fundamental and there is a lot of value in it. So it's not going to be just thrown out. There is going to be a -- there has been a lot of work that's been done already. Q: President Bush expressed his skepticism on North Korea this morning. Could you tell me why he's so skeptical? Senior Administration Official: Well, I think what the President has said many times is that North Korea is an exporter of technologies that are not helpful to the United States. So he prefers to see North Korea demonstrate through its actions, rather than its words, what its real intentions are. So we're waiting for actions. I think that's the point on that. Q: Was there any discussion at all on how they can help solve the issue of abduction of Japanese nationals? Senior Administration Official: No, no discussion about that. But there was -- there was a discussion and an agreement to make sure that we consult with Japan and Japan's issues while we're working through our consultations. It wasn't specifically mentioned, but, generally, the idea was mentioned. Q: Did the President tell President Kim at any time that he thought he was moving too quickly with North Korea -- concessions? Senior Administration Official: No, he did not. No, he did not. Q: I wanted to ask about the agreed framework. What exactly were the discussions about that and where exactly does the United States stand on that? You said, we're working on that, but I just wonder -- Senior Administration Official: We're going to continue with our commitments under the agreed -- in the discussion they didn't get into details on the agreed framework. But, separately, to answer your question about where we're at on that, they talked about the relationship in general, but not in specifics about the agreed framework. But to answer your question about where we are on that is we're looking at the agreed framework, we're continuing with our obligations under it. We're proceeding as if we do have an arrangement -- it's not just a bilateral relationship, it's a multilateral process. We have to consult with all of our allies and we're going to look at it and see how we can improve it or make it better or go through it. So it's going to be a consultative process within ourselves and also with our allies before any changes, disruptions or anything else like that is going to be made. Q: If I could go back to the President's skepticism about the North Korea leader. Did President Kim express any sign or body language that might suggest his feeling about President Bush's comment on -- Senior Administration Official: No. No. No. Q: Did President Kim suggest anything he would like the United States to do to help in the process? Did he express his druthers with regard to U.S. policy towards North Korea? Senior Administration Official: No, he just said that he -- it was important for the United States to remain engaged, but he didn't specifically say you should do this or do that, or you should pick up the phone or you should go have a meeting, or -- he didn't say anything like that, nothing like that. Q: President Bush said at the end of the meeting that he was concerned that North Korea was not complying with some of its existing agreements. I assume that he meant by that the 1994 agreed framework. Could you tell us what exactly he -- Senior Administration Official: No, I don't think that would be an assumption to make, because there's no evidence that Korea is not complying with that, with the 1994 -- there's just -- there are some small details or some small things that -- this was not part of the discussions, but just on background here, there were some things that happened that are not exactly what you would expect -- logistics, some logistics situation difficulties. Things take a long time to get done with them. If there are expectations that you have that they've said they're going to do something and they don't do it for a long time -- but there has been no indication of them violating the agreed framework. There's no -- is that correct -- no, we're just talking about -- Q: The President's statement was fairly clear, though, where he said there is some question about whether they are complying with what we -- he said, agreements -- means existing agreements? What agreement was he referring to? Senior Administration Official: I'm not trying to put words in the President's mouth, and I'll leave his statement stand. But what there is concern about is the verification of existing arrangements. In other words, we don't have -- what he did say, what the President said -- and he said it in the meeting -- is that we have -- or, in the, I think, the press briefing -- is that there are transparency questions that North Korea is not a transparent state, and therefore, we do not have a hundred percent ability to monitor these agreements. So his concern about them is not of a specific instance of violation, but our confidence in whether or not these agreements are being violated or not. Q: I don't want to be too picky on this, but we only have one agreement with North Korea that I know of. Senior Administration Official: Right. When he said, agreement arrangements, what he's talking about is the proposal that was on the table at the end of the administration wasn't verifiable, in his mind. Q: So what he was referring to -- Senior Administration Official: He was referring to the totality of it in the sense that I was saying that he's concerned about there not being verifiable -- Q: But that wasn't an agreement. I mean, obviously, there was a negotiation underway. We only have one agreement. Senior Administration Official: Correct. And even that is an agreed framework. Q: Was the President correct when he said that we -- Senior Administration Official: The President is always correct. (Laughter.) Senior Administration Official: David, if I could just offer one comment on the agreed framework. As you know, there are certain provisions of the agreed framework that only come into play at certain points in the process. That is, the IAEA doesn't get in there to see what they might have stored away in the past until the first light water reactor is in operation. I don't know that that's what the President was referring to, but obviously there are some elements in there that have not yet taken place. Q: But we haven't reached that point yet. Senior Administration Official: No, we haven't reached those points yet. Q: So when he talks about some concern as to whether or not North Korea is living up to the agreements or has violated the agreements, was the word "agreement" just an imprecise choice of words? Senior Administration Official: I don't want to characterize what he says, but look at -- yes, obviously, there is only one -- there is an agreed framework. There aren't a lot of other agreements. The President's concern is about our ability to verify any arrangement that we may have in the future, or we have had in the past. That's what is there. Q: Did the President talk at all about -- did he make his case to Mr. Kim about missile defense, and do you detect any sort of movement on their part and their support -- Senior Administration Official: President Kim made his clear statement about -- that he's not opposed to NMD. And there was a discussion about the importance, as it was mentioned in the joint statement, there's a discussion about -- that the times have changed -- the President's point that the times have changed, and that there is a role to play for defensive systems, which President Kim agreed to, and that we agreed to consult on these sorts of things in the future. Q: It sounds like Mr. Kim made a hard sell on North Korea. Did President Bush return? I mean, did he make a hard sell on missile defense? Senior Administration Official: I wouldn't call it a hard sell. President Kim is known for his vision, and a lot of people have said that President Kim is a starry-eyed dreamer who has an idealistic sense. That was not, at all, the sense that was communicated to the President. It was a very realistic sense in North Korea. So it was very clear. It wasn't -- if you heard his presentation, you would not think that he was an idealist who didn't know what was going on. So the President did not take exception to President Kim's discussion. He listened very carefully to it, and he appreciated what President Kim had said there. Q: In what context did they discuss the U.S. forces in Japan and other -- Senior Administration Official: There was no discussion about forces in Japan. There was a general discussion about the presence of U.S. forces in Korea, and an agreement -- or, not an agreement, but a back and forth that continuation of those forces were important. And both sides agreed on that. Senior Administration Official: You actually said "Japan" earlier. You must have -- Senior Administration Official: I'm sorry, I meant to say Korea when I said Japan. I apologize for that. There was no discussion about Japan and forces there. I meant to say Korea. Q: Usually in the context of an important official visit, an administration likes to convey the same message, all officials speaking about the visit like to convey the same message. But we heard a very conciliatory comment or comments by Secretary Powell yesterday, and a much different message was delivered today. How do you account for that? Senior Administration Official: I don't -- well, I don't see that there's any difference there. Secretary Powell was talking that there are elements in these agreements that are worth pursuing, and following through on; President Bush saying that whatever we do has got to be verifiable. Those two are complementary. Q: But diplomacy is a matter of emphasis. I don't think -- I agree, they didn't contradict each other, but diplomacy being a matter of emphasis, I don't think you can square the two. Ms. Countryman: Well, we disagree. Q: Does President Bush plan to slow talks with North Korea on its missile program and focus on reducing conventional forces? Senior Administration Official: I think the President has an interest in conventional forces. I would say he does have an interest in that. They did not talk about slowing down any talks or anything like that. Q: I have two questions, actually. President Bush said that he was skeptical of North Korea, the North Korean leader. Secretary Powell said that North Korea is a threat. And the President -- President Bush said that he supports President Kim's vision. What vision does he support? Senior Administration Official: Well, President Kim has a vision that says that the situation with North Korea is not a good one, and that there should be reconciliation and peace on the Peninsula over time. It doesn't mean that it happens tomorrow. This is a long-term project. And that in order to deal with North Korea, that you need to take steps to communicate with them and talk to them, and that he's trying to do that. He's trying to build these bridges. So it's a vision with a long-term -- it's a realistic vision. It's not saying that North Korea is a great place. It's not saying it's a wonderful society that we want to join together and live together as they exist. It's saying it's a long project, many, many year project, and that they're going to continue to work at this together and go with a vision. Q: Can I follow-up on that? In terms of -- just about a few weeks ago the North Korean Foreign Ministry had come out saying that the Bush administration was taking a hard line approach against North Korea and threatening to abandon its freeze on its missile testing if that hard line approach continues. Now we have the President -- Senior Administration Official: Who said? You're saying the North Koreans said -- Q: I think it came out from the Foreign Ministry. And now you've got the President of the United States expressing publicly skepticism about the North Korean leader. Is there a concern that these -- this will build -- Senior Administration Official: No. Q: -- and that it would be less likely for the U.S. to be able to engage with the North Koreans? Senior Administration Official: No, no. We're not going to -- we don't want to get in a back and forth with North Korea. We're going to be patient about this. We're going to see how North Korea responds with their actions, and not with their words. We all know that North Korea has a propagandistic press, and we're not going to go back and forth with that media. Q: What did President Kim say that gave President Bush the sense that Kim had a realistic sense of North Korea? Senior Administration Official: He portrayed the situation as he saw it, as it was. He didn't say that it was a great place; he said that this is a place that has economic difficulties, it's a place that is tightly controlled, and it's a place that needs assistance. Otherwise, it's going to be in serious trouble. Q: It's been suspected that this whole reassessment and review of the relations with North Korea is a part of selling the missile defense. It's always a good argument to have the North Koreans threat and saying -- and to say that nothing is verifiable that the North Koreans say. It's a good argument for missile defense, and it certainly can be a deal with South Korea, if you are supporting missile defense, then you will go ahead with North Korea? Senior Administration Official: No, that sort of argument wasn't engaged in. That argument, that discussion of using North Korea as a justification for missile defense, that discussion was not involved. There wasn't any discussion about that. Q: If, as you say, that part of President Kim's vision is to engage in a dialogue with the North Koreans, how is it consistent with supporting that vision, then, that the United States withdraw from that dialogue while it conducts a review? Senior Administration Official: We're not saying it's withdrawing from the dialogue; we're continuing with our work under the agreed framework. We're going to look at what is important to continue doing under the different sorts of discussions we've had at different levels of discussion, and we're going to conduct our review. We're not going to put anything in the deep freeze; we're going along and we're doing -- Q: But I get a sense from General Powell's statements today that, at least as a -- Senior Administration Official: We're not going to start and go at the same place where the Clinton administration left off. We're not going to exactly say, okay, we're going to pick up where they started, and nothing's happened, and we're going to go forward. We're not going to do that. We're going to look at this. Q: That's what the Secretary said yesterday. He said, we're going to pick up where they left off. So how do you account for -- Senior Administration Official: Picking up the key -- I don't want to -- do you want to -- Senior Administration Official: What I think Secretary Powell has said on a number of occasions is that during the discussions we had in the Clinton administration, some promising ideas were put on the table, and he believes that part of our review ought to be to consider whether we ought to follow up on some of those, pick up on some of them. As you will recall, at the end of the Clinton administration, we were talking about a possible presidential visit; we are not now talking about a possible presidential visit. The dialogue that takes place will be at a very different level. Q: The Foreign Ministry of North Korea is -- I'm sorry -- the Foreign Ministry of North Korea has reported its break -- between U.S. and North Korea. What is the U.S. response to that? Senior Administration Official: We haven't heard that. Senior Administration Official: I think you have to look at what the North Korean Ministry said. And as one of the previous questioners said, there were a lot of conditionals in there -- if such and such happens, we will, et cetera, et cetera. Q: The President said transparency and verification is a problem in North Korea. What was the reaction of President Kim? Senior Administration Official: What was the reaction of President Kim? Q: Yes. Senior Administration Official: I think that was in the media, in the press availability. Q: -- talk about -- Senior Administration Official: No, that was a comment that was made in the press availability. Q: Did President Bush indicate any way concretely the action he could take to support President Kim's vision? Was there anything -- Senior Administration Official: No, I think what we said we would do is we would want to listen to what you have to say and we want to consult with you, and we're going to work together with you on working through these ideas here. There wasn't any, we'll do this, if you do that, or anything like that. Q: President Kim was the first Asian leader to meet with the President. Is the President still willing to meet with Prime Minister Mori of Japan in the near future? Senior Administration Official: He's willing to meet with other -- whomever is appropriate at the appropriate time. We don't have any -- I really can't talk about other visits. Q: -- appropriate person to meet with -- Senior Administration Official: Of course. (Laughter.) He's one of the appropriate people to meet with. (Laughter.) Who hasn't had a question? Q: Can you tell us more specifically who is going to review the U.S. policy toward North Korea? And can I ask you if so-called Perry process doesn't exist any more? Senior Administration Official: The which process? Q: The Perry process. Senior Administration Official: The Perry process. Do you want to talk about that? Senior Administration Official: Well, I think as my colleague said earlier, the Perry process has taken place. It has created some good writings. It has created some interesting ideas, and some things that should be reviewed by this administration as it moves ahead to decide how it wants to deal with North Korea. I think we'll review everything that has gone on before. The review will take place during the -- in the national security process. We haven't decided yet exactly who the members of that review will be, or whether it will lead to a report or anything like that. But I think what you have to recognize, and that I believe the ROK government recognizes, is that there is a new administration in office, and new administrations review policy and decide how they want to proceed. And that review often starts with what went on before. And it's very natural to go back and study that as we decide how to move forward in the future. Q: Understanding that the North Korean policy is under review, there's been a lot of talk, both in the media and by South Korean officials, that there is a window of opportunity with North Korea. Does the Bush administration also see a window of opportunity, or do they look at it differently? Time frame-wise, is it a window of opportunity or -- Senior Administration Official: There was no discussion about that as a window of opportunity or that there is any time constraint on this, there was no discussion. Two more questions. Q: Does President Bush see any positive steps or any positive signs coming out of North Korea? Senior Administration Official: If he does, I haven't heard that. Return to the Washington File