U.S. Urges Disarmament Conference to Launch Fissile Material Talks

15 February 2001

U.S. Urges Disarmament Conference to Launch Fissile Material Talks

Speaking at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva February 15, U.S. Ambassador Robert Grey said the time has come "to demonstrate our commitment to FMCT (Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty) negotiations."
Noting the "explicit linkage" made by China "between FMCT negotiations and negotiations on a new outer space treaty," and the apparent similar linkage made by Russia, Grey stressed that the United States "does not link the start of FMCT negotiations to anything else. We would be quite willing to join in a decision to launch FMCT negotiations right now, as a step standing by itself and fully justified on its own merits."
Since such a proposal would probably not reach consensus in the conference, he said, the United States is prepared to agree to a comprehensive work program that calls for establishment of ad hoc committees on nuclear disarmament and on outer space "in the context of active and ongoing negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty."
Following is the as-delivered text of Grey's statement as delivered:

Statement by Ambassador Robert T. Grey Jr.
United States Representative to the Conference on Disarmament
Geneva
February 15, 2001
Mr. President,
Two years ago today, I was seated where you are sitting now, serving this Conference as its rotational President. But I can assure you that it is a far greater pleasure to sit here alongside other Member States and congratulate you as you complete four weeks of energetic and intense endeavor as presiding officer of the Conference on Disarmament. I know exactly how you feel.
In that same spirit, the efforts of my entire delegation are available to assist you and your immediate successor, Ambassador Vega of Chile, as you and he seek to promote agreement on the basis of the work program proposal advanced last August 24 by Ambassador Amorim of Brazil.
Ambassador Amorim's proposal remains a sound basis for reaching consensus in the Conference. It did not descend from heaven and was not engraved on stone, but I believe your soundings among a wide range of Member States have convinced you there is little room for tinkering with it. After all, Ambassador Amorim's proposal took full advantage of significant advances he inherited from his own distinguished predecessors, including Ambassadors Dembri of Algeria and Lint of Belgium. Further, Ambassador Amorim's proposal genuinely reflects the broad convictions of our colleagues and our strong belief that the Conference should get down to substantive work that will enhance international peace and security.
A few weeks after Ambassador Amorim tabled his proposal, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, the CD's former Deputy Secretary-General, delivered farewell remarks to the Conference (September 21, 2000). In doing so, Mr. Bensmail drew on over twenty years of experience, during which he acquired considerable insight into the whys and wherefores of multilateral diplomacy. I would like to commend and call attention to the following key paragraph:
"Preparing the ground for future negotiations through discussions and technical work is a prerequisite for the start of genuine negotiations. All major negotiations have been preceded by a pre-negotiations stage, in which some shared understanding is reached that a security problem exists and that it must be addressed multilaterally. This process may be arduous and time-consuming, but it provides the guarantee that the end-product, that is to say, treaty making, is based on solid foundations which take into account the security concerns of all and therefore ensures the universality and effectiveness of the agreements reached. What is required is a common willingness of all the membership of the Conference, making full use of its built-in flexibility and recognized expertise, to develop a workable and balanced program of work which takes into account the priorities and concerns of all."
In effect, Mr. Bensmail was describing the proposal that Ambassador Amorim put forward at the end of the preceding month. And by implication he was also commenting on efforts and plans of the Conference for handling the three topics that have been at the center of ongoing controversy: negotiations to conclude a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, and deliberations of the Conference on issues related to nuclear disarmament and outer space.
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
Above all, Mr. President, the Conference needs to start negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). In this case, "the pre-negotiations stage" was concluded long ago, after "arduous and time-consuming" endeavors which guarantee that treaty making will be based on solid foundations. These extended preparations included the following key events:

On July 14, 1992, U.S. President Bush announced a unilateral moratorium on the production of plutonium for use in nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, and he encouraged others to make similar statements. This announcement codified circumstances that dated from 1988, when the U.S. stopped producing plutonium for use in nuclear weapons. Almost a quarter-century before that, the U.S. ceased to produce highly enriched uranium for this purpose (1964).

On December 16, 1993, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution which called for the negotiation of "a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" (resolution 48/75 L, adopted without a vote).

On January 14, 1994, the CD approved the appointment of Canadian Ambassador Gerald Shannon as a special coordinator responsible for conducting consultations and developing a broadly acceptable mandate for negotiations to conclude an FMCT.

On October 4, 1994, U.S. Secretary of State Christopher and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian issued a joint statement in which they promoted the "earliest possible achievement" of a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.

In December 1994, the Russian Federation announced that as of the previous October 1, it had stopped producing plutonium for use in nuclear weapons. This complemented an official announcement made on April 7, 1989 that the former USSR would cease the production of highly enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons later that year.

On March 23, 1995, Canadian Ambassador Shannon reported to the CD on the consultations he conducted in 1994 and 1995 (PV.703). In part, he stated that Member States had reached agreement on a negotiating mandate based on General Assembly resolution 48/75 L, and that various views had been expressed in regard to issues that would arise during the negotiations. On the next day, his report was issued as a CD document (CD/1299).

During later stages of the same CD plenary (March 23, 1995), the Conference decided to adopt Ambassador Shannon's report and to establish an ad hoc committee to conduct negotiations. Unfortunately, however, the Conference did not reach agreement on the appointment of a chairman, and the FMCT ad hoc committee did not meet that year.

On April 18, 1995, UK Foreign Secretary Hurd announced that the United Kingdom had stopped producing fissile material for explosive purposes.

On May 11, 1995, the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) ended their review and extension conference in New York by adopting a principles and objectives document that called for the "immediate commencement and early conclusion" of FMCT negotiations.

On February 22, 1996, French President Chirac announced that France no longer produces fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.

On October 29, 1997, U.S. President Clinton and Chinese President Jiang Zemin called for "the earliest start of formal negotiations on the Prohibition of Production of Fissile Material Used in Nuclear Weapons and Other Nuclear Explosive Devices."

On May 11, 1998, after conducting a series of nuclear tests, India announced that it would "participate in the negotiations for the conclusion of a fissile material cutoff treaty in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament."

On June 4, 1998, after meeting here in Geneva -- and, in fact, in this very same room -- the Secretary of State of the United States and the Foreign Ministers of China, France, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom issued a communiqu?calling for negotiations "in the Conference on Disarmament for a Fissile Material Cutoff Convention with a view to reaching early agreement."

On July 30, 1998, Ambassador Munir Akram, the distinguished representative of Pakistan, delivered a plenary statement in which he declared, "Pakistan has consistently believed that a ban on the production of fissile materials should be promoted through a universal and non-discriminatory treaty negotiated in the CD and not through unilateral measures." To this end, he said, Pakistan would join in promoting a decision for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to conduct negotiations.

On August 11, 1998, the CD once again decided to establish an ad hoc committee to conduct negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Nine days later (August 20), the Conference decided to appoint Canadian Ambassador Mark Moher as the Chairman. During the ensuing two weeks, the committee met twice.

On December 4, 1998, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution, which called for the CD to reestablish its ad hoc committee at the beginning of the 1999 session (resolution 53/77 I, adopted without a vote).

On May 20, 2000, the Parties to the NPT ended their review conference in New York by adopting a final document that called for immediate commencement of FMCT negotiations with a view to their conclusion within five years.

On November 20, 2000, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution which called for the CD to agree on a program of work for the year 2001 that includes the immediate commencement of FMCT negotiations (resolution 55/33 Y, adopted without a vote).

Mr. President, after all the announcements made and promises exchanged over quite a number of years, it is time for us to demonstrate our commitment to FMCT negotiations. The concept of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty is fully mature, and the plan for negotiations has repeatedly been endorsed by the international community. Given all the ample preparations that I have just cited, the Conference will have shown it is no longer capable of doing anything of consequence if we cannot even begin to negotiate on this issue. And I know that you, Mr. President, as a worthy successor to the commitment and dedication of your distinguished predecessors Gerald Shannon and Mark Moher, will continue to do your utmost for the cause they championed.
I recently read the transcript of a statement that the official spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation made in Moscow on January 29. In part, the Ministry's spokesman advocated "the earliest possible achievement of progress in Conference activity, including -- on parallel tracks -- the start of the work within its framework of the Ad Hoc Committees on weapons grade fissile materials and on talks to prevent an arms race in outer space." The spokesman then went on to state that Russia considers it "of fundamental importance that both committees have a mandate to negotiate."
To the best of my understanding of this unofficial translation from the Russian original, the net implication is that Russia is linking the two issues, specifying under what conditions it is prepared to undertake work on either. I therefore find it puzzling that earlier in the same paragraph, the Ministry's spokesman declared, "we condemn the path of interlinkages at the CD, of converting one issue into the hostage of another." If the Russian Federation really does condemn linkages, this implies that Russia would be willing to support an immediate stand-alone decision to start FMCT negotiations. Perhaps the Russian delegation would be willing to enlighten us on that.
Last September 14, Ambassador Hu Xiaodi, the distinguished representative of China, declared, "the issues of outer space and FMCT cannot but be closely linked." In part, this stemmed from his view that "serious doubt has been cast on the nature and purpose of FMCT negotiations." I wonder, Mr. President, whether this means that China is planning to produce more fissile material for use in nuclear weapons, or just wants to keep that option open. These comments were Delphic on that issue, to say the least. But one point is exceedingly clear: China has made an explicit linkage between FMCT negotiations and negotiations on a new outer space treaty.
Let me shine a spotlight on the views of my own country. The United States does not link the start of FMCT negotiations to anything else. We would be quite willing to join in a decision to launch FMCT negotiations right now, as a step standing by itself and fully justified on its own merits.
We understand, however, that such a proposal would not command consensus in the Conference. As a compromise, the United States has accepted the basic approach that Ambassador Amorim advanced on August 24: a comprehensive program of work that would include negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and organized discussions on issues related to nuclear disarmament and outer space. The overwhelming majority of Member States have said they can accept that, whereas a small number have not yet agreed to do so.
Let me make the net situation quite clear and emphatic. The United States is prepared to agree to a CD work program that calls for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament and an ad hoc committee on outer space, in the context of active and ongoing negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.
Outer Space
When we consider outer space on its own merits, seeking to appraise its suitability as a focus for concrete and specific work, the contrast with FMCT negotiations is immediate and striking. As many U.S. representatives have repeatedly emphasized, there is no arms race in outer space, nor any prospect of an arms race for as far down the road as any one can see. We fully support the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and judge that it, along with a number of other inter-national agreements, is entirely equal to the task of preventing an arms race in outer space. The United States is therefore not persuaded that there is a realistic and current need for further measures aimed at enhancing international peace and security in outer space. To put it quite simply, outer space issues are not ripe for negotiations in the CD.
We realize that others have different convictions. What we do not understand is why those who do not share our views are unwisely and unrealistically insisting on immediate negotiations on a new outer space treaty, a diplomatic tactic which has the net effect of blocking discussion of the very issues they say they care about. What are these Member States afraid of? Is the current paralysis in the Conference their actual goal, what they really are seeking to achieve? Thanks to these Member States, the Conference has not yet started the "pre-negotiations stage" that Mr. Bensmail mentioned in his farewell remarks - the "arduous and time-consuming" work of exploring whether there may be "a shared understanding ... that a security problem exists and that it must be addressed multi-laterally."
According to the draft mandate that Ambassador Amorim tabled, Members of the Conference would establish an ad hoc committee on outer space to "examine and identify specific topics or proposals." The draft states that such substantive proposals could relate to confidence-building or transparency measures, general principles, treaty commitments, or certain other aspects. For its part, the United States is willing to participate in an organized discussion aimed at examining those issues -- in the context of active and ongoing negotiations on an FMCT.
Outer space is now the home of a wide range of satellites that provide crucial services on economic and commercial levels. In addition, many countries have satellites that provide various types of data for military purposes to ships, aircraft, and ground forces worldwide. These realities will have to be taken into account in any organized discussion of outer space issues. As Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov stated on February 1, "Some medicines are more dangerous than diseases themselves."
Nuclear Disarmament
The United States takes very seriously our obligation stated in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." Since the nuclear arms race ceased quite some time ago, one key benchmark has already been achieved.
Thus far the United States and the Russian Federation have made significant reductions in their nuclear arsenals as the result of negotiated agreements and unilateral initiatives. The substantial reductions called for in START I will be achieved on schedule before the end of the year. When reductions to START II levels have been completed, the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal will be only one-third as large as it was at the height of the Cold War.
The United States remains committed to even further reductions in nuclear arms. President Bush has said the U.S. should take the lead toward a safer world when it comes to nuclear weaponry. I look forward to reporting on developments in this field as we pursue that goal.
It is exceedingly difficult to believe that the physical security and ultimate fate of hundreds of millions of human beings must forever be held hostage to the prospect of instant annihilation. This intense irony, this profound paradox was at the core of Cold War theories that seem well overdue for an upgrade. Although the new Administration will review these issues over the coming weeks, it would not be premature to point out that missile defense can enhance strategic stability and further reduce the danger that nuclear weapons will ever be used.
Given the progress achieved thus far and the other factors I have mentioned, what can the Member States of the Conference actually do to facilitate the long-term process of nuclear disarmament? The single most important step is for Member States to decide to launch negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. This, after all, is the only multilateral undertaking related to nuclear disarmament that can actually be negotiated now. Prohibiting the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons is a necessary step on the long-term path toward complete elimination. And by becoming parties to an FMCT, the nuclear weapons states would accept inspection, monitoring, and reporting requirements that are likely to be far more intrusive than any which apply to them now.
On the other hand, what can Member States of the Conference expect to achieve in a separate ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament? We really do not know, and these chronic doubts were closely associated with the longstanding reluctance of the United States to agree to the establishment of such a committee.
On March 7, 2000, Mr. Frank Miller, then serving as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction, gave an extended briefing in this chamber on achievements thus far and U.S. plans for further reductions in nuclear arms. It was thoroughly rooted in current realities, and it seemed to be well received by those who attended.
After considering this event and its net outcome, the U.S. Government decided that as a major step aimed at bringing about agreement on a work program that includes active and ongoing negotiations on an FMCT, the United States can agree to the establishment of an ad hoc committee in which Member States will discuss issues related to nuclear disarmament.
In comparison, Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov said on February 1 that Russia supports the idea of establishing "a subsidiary body entrusted with an explore Tory mandate for broad discussions on the problem area of nuclear disarmament." Would that be an ad hoc committee along the lines proposed by Ambassador Amorim, or is the Russian Federation advocating something else? Perhaps the Russian delegation would also be willing to enlighten us on this.
As I have already stated, the U.S. has made yet another adjustment to our strong initial views on the overall work program of the Conference. In other words, the United States has agreed with great reluctance to the establishment of an ad hoc committee in which Member States will discuss issues related to outer space. And having taken these two important and difficult steps, we have gone as far as we can go.
Mr. President, I believe that Member States are as close as we can ever expect to be to agreement on an overall program of work. We have been wrestling with this for several years, and it would be exceedingly unwise to let the moment slip away. After all, the proposals we are actively considering owe much to the wisdom and discernment of many prior Presidents of eminent stature, including two highly distinguished diplomats who previously served as Foreign Ministers of their respective countries - Ambassador Mohamed-Salah Dembri of Algeria and Ambassador Celso L. N. Amorim of Brazil. My delegation takes their contributions very seriously. Their efforts have clearly identified the kind of a work program that should command consensus.
It is therefore deeply disappointing that the Conference is becoming more and more like England's Long Parliament of the 17th century, an irrelevant and anachronistic irritant that clearly became a major part of the problem, not part of the solution. Certain delegations accept proposals on the premise that others will reject them and relieve these delegations of the need to do so on their own. Then, when a consensus seems to be emerging, they scuttle back and forth, disavowing what they previously claimed to support while trying to raise the stakes in their favor. Tactical intrigue becomes an end in itself, and the notion of a collective responsibility to make a positive contribution to multilateral arms control is rapidly becoming a distant and fading memory.
It is important to understand that unused attributes and traits may atrophy or even become extinct, and that institutions which do not perform according to just and reasonable expectations may end up extinguishing themselves. If this Conference takes yet another opportunity to miss an opportunity, that is precisely the risk it will be running.
Thank you, Mr. President.

(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)

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