|
26 January 2001
NATO Secretary General on Depleted Uranium, NMD, European Security
NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson spoke January 25 in
Berlin at the Editors' Forum of the Federal Security Academy on
European security in the new century.
Before proceeding to the body of his remarks, Robertson addressed the
depleted uranium (DU) controversy at some length.
Noting that no NATO country or NATO itself has any interest whatsoever
in using munitions that pose significant long-term health risks to its
soldiers, Robertson said: "The reality, to date, is that a wealth of
experts, from a variety of countries and institutions, have looked at
DU, and none of them have found a link between its use and illnesses
among people who have served in the Balkans or live there.
"NATO countries have every reason to expose the truth, and nothing
whatsoever to hide," he emphasized.
Turning to European security, Robertson outlined four priorities for
2001:
- Supporting the transition to democracy and a market economy in
Yugoslavia.
- Encouraging positive change in Bosnia-Herzegovina. "One of my main
priorities in 2001 will be to make all the politicians of Bosnia
understand that international patience is not infinite, nor are our
resources -- and that sooner, rather than later, the people of Bosnia
will have to take the ownership of their own future in a peaceful,
democratic country," Robertson said.
- Improving the NATO-Russia relationship.
- Developing the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).
Robertson said that ESDI must be based on three principles: 1) a true
spirit of NATO-EU mutual cooperation; 2) "fully coherent and
compatible" defense planning between the two organizations; and 3)
participation in EU-led operations that is satisfactory to non-EU NATO
members.
Robertson also spoke of "ensuring that the discussion on National
Missile Defence [NMD] proceeds sensibly and maturely."
"The new U.S. administration has made it clear that they intend to
deploy an NMD system as soon as it is feasible," the Secretary General
said. "This, of course, has implications for the other Allies, for
Russia, and for the arms control regime itself."
Expressing satisfaction at the discussion on NMD to date, Robertson
said the United States has been "very forthcoming in sharing its
thoughts on NMD with the Allies, as well as the state of play in
negotiations with Russia on the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty."
Following is the text of his speech:
"European Security in the 21st Century"
Speech by Nato Secretary General, Lord George Robertson
Editors' Forum of the Federal Security Academy
Berlin
25 Jan. 2001
Ladies and Gentlemen,
It is a pleasure to be here with you today. This is one of my first
speeches of 2001, and considering how much NATO has been in the news
in the first few weeks of this year, I can think of no better audience
than one that includes a large number of news editors!
As you all know, NATO has taken up so much air time and newsprint in
these past weeks because of the controversy surrounding the use of
depleted uranium munitions. Because it is important, I will address it
right at the start.
First: No NATO country, nor NATO itself, has any interest whatsoever
in using munitions that would pose significant long-term health risks
apart from their intended military purpose. Everything we know about
Depleted Uranium, and there is a lot, makes clear that these munitions
are not in this category.
Second: We have a collective duty to ensure that the rhetoric on this
issue doesn't rapidly outpace the reality. The reality, to date, is
that a wealth of experts, from a variety of countries and
institutions, have looked at DU, and none of them have found a link
between its use and illnesses among people who have served in the
Balkans or live there. We must, of course, always be alert to new
information and be prepared to take measures if the evidence warrants
it. Meanwhile, we have to take the current scientific evidence fully
into account, and not be stampeded into unwise and hasty decisions.
That is precisely what NATO is doing. At a meeting in Brussels on
January 10th, NATO's Ambassadors agreed to set up a committee to look
at all the studies on any possible health effects of DU, and to share
freely all information we have amongst ourselves and with interested
parties outside of NATO. This special committee, to which the UNEP,
WHO, the European Commission, other NGOs, and also the Yugoslav
government have been invited, has met twice already and will keep
meeting. The heads of the Military Medical Services of the NATO
nations met on 15 January and exchanged their information about
Depleted Uranium - again indicating that it is not responsible for any
illnesses among soldiers who have served in the Balkans.
Let me stress again: NATO countries have every reason to expose the
truth, and nothing whatsoever to hide. The measures we are taking will
help us highlight the facts, coordinate information from experts and
nations and act as our clearing house for maximum openness.
January 10th, 2001 was, however, an important day at NATO headquarters
for more than the meeting on the issue of depleted uranium. There was
another meeting that I believe will come, over time, to be seen as
much more historically significant. On that day, the Foreign Minister
of Yugoslavia, Mr. Goran Svilanovic came to NATO Headquarters. He met
with me, and he met with NATO's Ambassadors. And he made perhaps the
most important statement made so far this year in international
politics, when he said that "NATO and the FRY are no longer enemies".
Now, I don't know who among us, even six months ago, would have dared
to bet that this meeting, and that statement, would take place so
quickly. But they did happen -- and they illustrate vividly the
dramatic importance of the change of government in Yugoslavia.
We don't have to look very far back in time to realise how significant
that change is. Just six months ago, the Milosevic regime was still in
power. Milosevic was still looking for ways to cause trouble in
Kosovo, and exploit the volatility in the Presevo Valley, adjoining
Kosovo. He was threatening to use force to overthrow the
democratically elected Government of Montenegro. He refused to
recognise the legitimacy of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a country. He
provided a safe haven for fellow individuals indicted for war crimes.
He refused to participate in clearing the Danube, with enormous
financial implications for the region. Milosevic, personally
responsible for four Balkan wars, for so much suffering, so much
dislocation, and so many grave abuses of human rights and outrages
against human decency, his very existence as a Balkan leader was an
affront to his neighbours, and to the broader international community.
He represented a permanent threat to peace and stability in Europe.
Today, things are very, very different. Yugoslavia is no longer a
pariah state. On the contrary -- President Kostunica has moved quickly
to bring his country in from the cold, and the international community
has moved with equal speed to open the door. Yugoslavia has now
retaken its seat in the United Nations and the OSCE, and it is working
hard to join the Council of Europe. Relations between Serbia and
Montenegro -- so recently seen as the next potential Balkan conflict
-- are now following a peaceful path. Yugoslavia has recognized
Bosnia-Herzegovina as a country. The countries of the region have
welcomed Yugoslavia back into the fold. And in a true sign of the
times, NATO and Yugoslavia are working on a daily basis towards a
common purpose: preventing extremists from causing more violence in
the Presevo Valley.
Simply put, a black hole has been closed in South East Europe. When
the people of Yugoslavia bravely and decisively removed the Milosevic
regime from office, Yugoslavia began the transition that the other
countries of the region have already embraced: towards democracy,
peaceful resolution of disputes, and integration into the wider
Europe.
This is an historic success - for the Yugoslavs and those who helped
them topple Milosevic. And our first challenge of the year 2001, in
NATO and in the broader international community, is to reinforce that
success. To support Yugoslavia, where possible, in making that
positive transition. And in so doing, to continue to contribute to the
steady democratization and growing stability of South East Europe.
Of course, for there to be stability in South East Europe, there must
be stability in Kosovo and Bosnia. And a second challenge we face in
the upcoming year is consolidating the progress we are making in those
two areas as well.
For Kosovo, the year 2000 was a good one, in terms of setting the
foundations for a peaceful, self-sustaining future. The people of
Kosovo held their first free and fair democratic election perhaps
ever, and they mainly chose representatives who espouse a non-violent,
democratic approach to accomplishing their goals. This is a sign of
political maturity, and it bodes well, I believe, for stability in
Yugoslavia.
This does not mean that there are no more challenges. There most
certainly are. The security situation for minorities, and support from
inside Kosovo to the insurgent activity in the Presovo Valley and the
5km wide Ground Safety Zone on the Serb side of the boundary with
Kosovo, are real causes for concern, and NATO is fully engaged in
tackling them. But overall, I believe that Kosovo is heading in the
right direction.
The record in Bosnia-Herzegovina, too, is mixed -- but also heading in
the right direction. The recent elections were portrayed by much of
the international press as a victory for nationalist parties. On the
surface, it seems that way. But it is also worth remembering that, in
each and every election held in Bosnia since 1995, moderate parties
have won more and more votes. This was true in the most recent
elections as well -- and as a result, for the first time, it is as
least mathematically possible for Governments to be formed in Bosnia
without the participation of Nationalist parties. This may not seem
like much -- but we have to remember that it has been only five years
since the war ended. Patience is still necessary. And that patience is
being rewarded -- albeit far too slowly. One of my main priorities in
2001 will be to make all the politicians of Bosnia understand that
international patience is not infinite, nor are our resources -- and
that sooner, rather than later, the people of Bosnia will have to take
the ownership of their own future in a peaceful, democratic country.
A third NATO priority for 2001 will be to further improve the
NATO-Russia relationship.
All of us here are familiar with the ups and down of this relationship
over the past decade. Kosovo was the most obvious low point. Relations
are, however, once again back on track. Russian forces are working
very well with NATO forces in the Balkans. The NATO-Russia Permanent
Joint Council is meeting regularly, and discussing cooperation on a
wide range of the most serious security issues. And just last month,
Foreign Minister Ivanov met with his NATO counterparts at NATO
Headquarters, to discuss deepening our relations further.
One of the most important ways in which we can deepen our relations
is, very simply, through better communication. NATO needs to be more
effective at conveying to Russians what the Alliance is, what it does
and why -- because Russians need to understand more clearly that NATO
is not, nor does it want to be, any threat to their security. That is
why I will be travelling to Moscow on 19-12 February to open a NATO
Information Office in Russia. This office will provide accurate and
timely information to anyone interested in NATO and NATO issues, and
therefore help to eliminate some of the myths and illusions that
sometimes get in the way of practical cooperation. Today NATO and
Russia are indeed partners - and no longer combative opponents.
That principle -- eliminating myths and illusions, to get on with
practical cooperation -- is what is driving the final priority I wish
to address today. I am referring of course, to the development of the
European Security and Defence Identity.
Now, anyone following the news over the past few months would have had
difficulty avoiding the many stories on this issue. But if I may say
so, much of the recent coverage on ESDI has missed the point (-- and
particularly in the UK). It has missed the point on why it is
happening; and it has missed the point on what is happening.
First: why is Europe developing a stronger capability?
First, because Europe is changing. What was a loose collection of
states has become a Union of unprecedented economic and political
strength. Indeed, the GDP of the European Union today is roughly
equivalent of that of the United States. It is only logical that such
a Union also has a credible defence dimension. The Europe of the 21st
century is ready and willing to take on a more robust role in security
- and that makes eminent common sense.
ESDI is also necessary because in this new Century, Europe must make a
greater contribution within NATO. For many years, the United States
has been calling on Europe to develop its capabilities in the defence
field, to "balance burdens" more fairly. The Kosovo air campaign made
it crystal clear that there is still enormous progress to be made in
this regard. The United States had to bear a disproportionate share of
the burden, the cost, and the risk, notably because European forces
were simply not appropriately structured and equipped for the
operation. This imbalance of capabilities between the United States
and Europe is neither fair, nor politically sustainable over the long
term. Both North America and Europe want to see a strong European
pillar within the Alliance, to balance burdens and responsibilities
more equitably. This rebalancing will help strengthen and reinforce
our transatlantic link, and not in any way weaken it.
Finally, ESDI is also necessary because in the 21st century, there
will be times when Europe needs to be able, or will be forced, to take
the lead in handling some security challenges. During most of NATO's
first 50 years, the existential threat posed by the Soviet Union
necessitated constant U.S. engagement in almost all aspects of
European security. Today, however, Europe faces different challenges,
such as smaller regional conflicts and civil wars within small
countries. These challenges will not necessarily always engage North
American security interests, and Europe must develop the capability to
handle them when North America does not wish to be engaged.
Nothing could be worse for the transatlantic linkage for there to be
only two options for any crisis in Europe; NATO or nothing.
As a result of these fundamental changes, both the EU and North
America have agreed that now is the time for Europe to take on a
stronger role in defence.
That is why ESDI is happening. Let me now set the record straight on
what is happening.
Contrary to what many pundits believe or would like us to believe,
Europe is actually getting more capable. Indeed, in the last 18 months
Europe has made more progress on ESDI than in 18 years before. Europe
has defined its essential requirements, and made initial military
contributions to meet them. It has also set up political and military
staffs to give direction on security matters. And NATO, for its part,
has defined how it will provide support to EU-led operations, and has
begun to work with the EU in defining its requirements more precisely.
And we have established an interim security agreement between the two
organisations.
We have also made progress towards setting up permanent institutional
relations between NATO and the EU. A month ago, at the Nice Summit,
the European Union set out its vision of how these relations should
develop. Just a few days later, and taking due account of the Nice
meeting, NATO Foreign Ministers agreed on the Alliance's proposed way
ahead -- and the proposals from both organizations show they are both
singing from the same song sheet when it comes to permanent relations
between them.
Both organizations believe that NATO's Council and its counterpart in
the EU should meet regularly, not only when there are crises. Both
NATO and the EU believe that EU and NATO ministers should meet once
per EU-Presidency. And of course, both organizations believe that, in
times of crisis, contacts and meeting should be stepped up. This
commonality of the approach between NATO and the EU should soon lead
to the establishment of broad, effective working relations at all
levels.
This is all substantial progress - but of course, it is still early
days. And as our work progresses towards developing a stronger
European capability, we must follow three main principles if this
project is to deliver on all its potential.
The first principle is that there must be a true spirit of mutual
cooperation. Of course, both organisations will relate to each other
on an equal footing -- but they have to work as closely as possible
together, in the fullest possible transparency, and in respect of the
autonomy of decision of each organisation.
This principle of close cooperation applies in particular to defence
planning. And the second principle which must guide NATO-EU relations
is that defence planning by the two organizations must be fully
coherent and compatible. Each NATO and EU country has only one set of
forces, and only one defence budget. It is absolutely vital,
therefore, that these forces are structured, equipped and trained to
be able to handle all the tasks we give them: NATO and EU missions,
not either/or. Coherent defence planning is the key -- and it will be
vital to ensuring that European capabilities actually add to existing
NATO capabilities, to everybody's benefit.
The final principle which must guide the further development of
NATO-EU involved the issue of participation. Very simply, all of
NATO's members, as well as the EU states, must be satisfied with the
provisions we put in place for the participation of non-EU NATO
members, including Canada, in EU-led operations.
We have already made a lot of progress. In recent months in
particular, the EU has been forthcoming in the provisions it envisions
for the participation of non-EU NATO members. For example, the EU has
committed itself to intensify consultation in times of crisis, which
will also enable non-EU European Allies to raise their concerns when
they consider their security interests to be involved. In a similar
vein, non-EU European Allies can request meetings with the European
Union and submit proposals for agenda items.
These proposals, along with new proposals for consultation and
cooperation with Canada, demonstrate that the EU addresses the
concerns of the non-EU Allies. These are important steps in the right
direction. I am very optimistic that this issue will be resolved to
the satisfaction of all countries concerned - not only because we have
made such good progress, but also because the establishment of
satisfactory participation is a precondition of the success of the
whole enterprise. If the necessary flexibility and goodwill is there,
I am sure we can make the progress we need -- and develop the NATO-EU
relationship into a real success. In so doing, we will ensure that the
Euro-Atlantic community becomes more capable of addressing effectively
whatever security challenges we face in future.
Let me mention two other important topics briefly. First is NATO
enlargement. Now, as Secretary General, my job is not to make the
decision as to who should join. That is for NATO's member states, and
as many of you know, NATO's Heads of State and Government will be
gathering at a Summit next year to consider issuing further
invitations for NATO membership. Between now and then, my job is to
ensure that the enlargement process proceeds as it should. This means
ensuring that all the issues are debated fully, by all the interested
parties. It means giving the nine applicant countries as much feedback
as possible, through our Membership Action Plan. It means reminding
those aspirants that they will have to make difficult decisions, and
tough decisions, if they are to meet NATO's standards, in particular
on defence reform. Needless to say that the final decision on
enlargement remains fundamentally political as well.
The second challenge we will face, as we go deeper into the year 2001,
is ensuring that the discussion on National Missile Defence proceeds
sensibly and maturely. The new U.S. administration has made it clear
that they intend to deploy an NMD system as soon as it is feasible.
This, of course, has implications for the other Allies, for Russia,
and for the arms control regime itself.
That being said, I am very pleased with the way the transatlantic
discussion on NMD has gone until now. NATO has proved its value as a
forum for consultation among Allies on security issues. The U.S. has
been very forthcoming in sharing its thoughts on NMD with the Allies,
as well as the state of play in negotiations with Russia on the ABM
Treaty. Similarly, the other Allies have made their views and concerns
known to the United States through regular meetings in NATO. I am
confident that this issue will be handled with equal openness,
transparency and good will as we look to the future.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
In October 1999, fifteen months ago, I took up my post as Secretary
General. And as I walked through the doors of NATO on my first day, I
thought of the advice that Lord Carrington, the NATO Secretary General
from 1984 to 1988 gave his successor, Manfred Woerner. As Woerner
arrived, Carrington said to him, "Now it's up to you to bore yourself
for the next four years, Manfred".
Well, soon after Woerner took up his position, the Berlin Wall fell,
the Soviet Union collapsed, and NATO had to intervene in the war in
Bosnia. And a few years later, Woerner reminded Lord Carrington of his
remark, noting that he was still waiting for boredom to set in.
Carrington answered that if he had known what was going to happen so
soon after he left, he would have kept the job!
Perhaps ironically, it is certainly true that, since the Cold War
ended, the position of NATO Secretary General has become a lot more
active than it was previously. And my relatively early tenure has been
no exception. Indeed, barely a week has gone by since I took up my
post in which NATO has not been in the news for one reason or another!
While this has meant some rather long days for me, the broad reason
for all this attention is very positive. Very simply, NATO today is
engaged actively from one end of the Euro-Atlantic area to the other.
Building security through partnerships. Encouraging and assisting
defence reform in newly democratic countries. Backing up diplomacy
with robust military force. Where necessary, managing crises. And
maintaining the peace in volatile environments.
This is a challenging agenda, by any definition. But we are having
real success in making it work. And as we enter the year 2001, I am
confident that the Alliance will build on that success, and continue
to enhance security right across the Euro-Atlantic area.
Thank you for your attention!
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
Return to the Washington File
|
