27 September 2000 Under Secretary Holum on Intersection of Science, Security The Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security says U.S. global leadership and American security rest on "our unparalleled scientific and technological base, an economy adept at harnessing scientific and technological advances, and a free society within which intellectual and economic enterprise flourish." Under Secretary John Holum told an audience at the National Academy of Sciences Conference on Scientific Communication and National Security in Washington on September 27 that while the United States places high value on academic freedom, independent thought and privacy, "we are keenly aware of the potential national security and non-proliferation risks inherent in the export and transfer of technology, including intangible technology." Holum said the scientific and security communities need to consider how "intangible" exports and transfer methods "affect international security and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery." Although long a potential risk, he said "the opportunities for such transfers have exploded." And, with respect to international security, the official said "the consequences of the 'right' information winding up in the wrong hands can be devastating and long-lasting." While it is not possible to completely stem the flow of dangerous data, Holum said, "it is possible to slow it down." One of the areas of particular concern is the potential for "person-to-person" technology transfers, he said. Following is the transcript of Holum's remarks: John D. Holum, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Remarks to the National Academy of Sciences Conference on Scientific Communication and National Security Washington, DC, September 27, 2000 Thank you for the opportunity to participate on this panel. This continues what for me at least could be called "Science at State" month -- just last week I was privileged to preside over the swearing in Dr. Norman Neureiter as Science and Technology Adviser to the Secretary of State. We are delighted to have a man of Dr. Neureiter's experience and knowledge in this position. In the State Department we are relying more and more on scientific resources here and abroad, inside and outside the government, to help us advance the nation's interests. In arms control and non-proliferation, this is emphatically the case. Science and technology are indispensable in the business of negotiating and implementing treaties, enhancing inspection activities, and our other critical tasks. I see scientific advance as an enabler of arms control. So I'm truly happy to be here. Science, National Security and Foreign Policy What I'd like to discuss today goes to the heart of what this Conference is about -- finding the balance between promoting the exchange of information to fuel scientific progress, and constraining the diffusion of sensitive information to countries or groups that could use it to damage our interests. In the bureaus under my purview -- arms control, non-proliferation, political-military affairs, and verification and compliance -- a big part of our mission is to curb the proliferation of sensitive information. I'll leave the specifics of our policies to the experts after lunch. For now, I'd like to make a few general comments on the context that informs the U.S. approach to restricting sensitive information. The U.S. government places a high value on academic freedom, independent thought, and privacy. We take strong principled stands on these issues in international fora. U.S. world leadership and U.S. security themselves rest upon our unparalleled scientific and technological base, an economy adept at harnessing scientific and technological advances, and a free society within which intellectual and economic enterprise flourish. At the same time, however, we are keenly aware of the potential national security and non-proliferation risks inherent in the export and transfer of technology, including intangible technology -- a concept I'll elaborate upon in a moment. I think everyone will agree that where national security is involved, we need to restrict information sharing. This is nothing new. We all know of the isolation and restrictions on scientific activity and information placed on Manhattan Project scientists during World War II. Many of them chafed at their lack of freedom and the need to conceal their progress. Now things are even more complicated. Most fundamentally, during World War II, and then during the Cold War, we knew pretty well who were the enemies and who were the friends. We had few qualms about sharing at least some kinds of information and technology with our allies, but relationships with Eastern bloc countries were not so "give-and-take." The West developed an export control regime to keep sensitive goods and technology from flowing to the East -- and it worked fairly well. Now, however, export control issues are more complex. There are more countries to worry about, both on the supply and on the demand side. And the items and technology we used to control, such as computers, are now widely available. In some areas the standard for control has become less identification of what might help a weapons program, and more a projection of where the commercial market is headed. To further complicate export control efforts, we must also deal with emerging opportunities for intangible technology transfers. In the past, technology transfers were generally easier to track -- goods and services, or data on paper, delivered personally or in the mail. But today, ideas are exchanged at the drop of a "Send" key. We routinely fit enormous quantities of data in tiny spaces, and we can instantaneously fax or e-mail to any corner of the globe. So now we need to think about how this category of "intangible" exports and these methods of transfer affect international security and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery. Of course, "intangible" transfers have long posed a risk; but today, with more avenues for communication available and less need for direct face to face contact, the opportunities for such transfers have exploded. Within the context of U.S. constitutional protections, current U.S. export control laws and "catch-all" controls give us the means, when necessary, to restrict data and technology transfers that can raise national security, foreign policy, or proliferation concerns, regardless of how the data was transferred. But, as we have seen with the Internet, controlling intangible technology presents serious enforcement challenges. In substantial part, effective control will depend on awareness and voluntary compliance. But where international security is concerned, the consequences of the "right" information winding up in the wrong hands can be devastating and long-lasting. Of course all the secrecy is not government sponsored. Even in pure science, details of progress may be omitted in communications, for example to protect a pending publication. The private sector has safeguards for information, including patents, copyright protections, and other intellectual property rights, to protect individuals' and companies' products and information. There, too, the best choice is not complete openness, or absolute secrecy, but balance. Government's efforts are limited by the fact that, in part due to the spread and accessibility of the Internet, there is quite a bit of potentially dangerous information already out there -- not only in the nuclear realm, but also with respect to other destructive technologies. The dual-use character of pharmaceutical and chemical processes has facilitated the diffusion of weapons-relevant information. Realistically speaking, it's not possible to staunch entirely the flow of dangerous data. But it is possible to slow it down. For example, our export control and non-proliferation efforts have not averted the possibility of intercontinental range missiles in North Korea. But we have impeded it, gaining time for defenses to develop -- technically and diplomatically. And we have limited North Korea's choices, simplifying the job of defense, if that's what a future President chooses. What Information is Controlled? With so much information on the streets -- or, more accurately, the information highway -- what needs to be controlled? Controls reach technical data such as diagrams, manuals and blueprints, and technical assistance (such as instruction, skills training, and consulting services). In all of these areas, specific lists of regulated items are spelled out in law or implementing regulations. These govern, for example, the import and export of defense articles and services, including technical transfers; nuclear-related commodities, services and technology; and dual-use commodities, technology and software. Violations can result in the loss of export privileges, significant civil penalties and criminal fines and imprisonment. We do not control information in the public domain, or if it concerns commonly taught general scientific, mathematical or engineering principles. And we are particularly careful to avoid unnecessary restrictions on the flow of information. We've loosened controls on exports of computer technology as it became more available from other producing countries and we've permitted the flow of uncontrolled information materials to certain states of concern, subject to international obligations. How the U.S. Controls Information As I've mentioned, one of the challenges we deal with is the speed with which information can now be transferred. As our international security warrants, we try to control the "export" of data regardless of the medium -- it could be downloaded off a Web site, sent via e-mail or fax, or it could be a question about systems capabilities during a meeting here in the United States. The most difficult intangible transfer of technology to control is passing on "know-how." It usually occurs very simply -- a scientist or engineer asking or answering questions about a technology or a system's capabilities. Even basic information could be essential if that is what the recipient is missing. Simply confirming the capabilities of a weapon could be a technology transfer requiring a license. The "person-to-person" aspect of technology transfer is a key concern for us. Hence, we've at times employed immigration laws to exclude foreign scientists from conferences in the United States, due to their nationality or affiliations. Depending on the circumstances, a foreign national may be barred from conducting research or even being temporarily employed or trained in sensitive fields. Such nationals logically are expected to take the information back to their countries, which is deemed the equivalent of physical or electronic export. Perhaps an even bigger concern has been the proliferation implications of the fall of the Soviet Union. Scientists involved in the weapons of mass destruction programs of the former Soviet Union have sensitive knowledge to sell and a compelling reason to sell it -- to feed their families. We fund a number of scientific endeavors to help alleviate this problem. For example, since 1994 State has funded two Science Centers -- one in Moscow and one in Kiev. These have sponsored over 900 peaceful scientific projects engaging over 30,000 scientists and engineers at nearly 500 institutes in the New Independent States. We spend about $50 million annually on this effort. We've also undertaken an initiative to redirect former Soviet biological weapons expertise to civilian work. We propose to invest $19 million annually for the next few years for this purpose. This program continues to expand, engaging formerly secret facilities involved with the research and production of weapons against humans, animals, and crops in cooperative, transparent activities. The U.S. has fostered other incentives to protect sensitive information. Our labs work with foreign laboratories on peaceful research and development projects. Where we can, we help governments create the necessary laws and regulations to control sensitive technologies. The U.S. has provided training for customs officials and border guards, and installed internal compliance programs at over 200 Russian aerospace, nuclear and other entities of proliferation concern. This is not only a U.S. mission. Over the years, we have multilateralized controls through a variety of voluntary regimes -- the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers' Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement. All of these are beginning to tackle the problem of intangible technology transfers. Conclusion This summer offered us two prominent, contrasting views on the role of scientists in national security. On the one hand, the public debate on national missile defense demonstrated the key role scientists play in security policy. We depend on scientists to illuminate the technical advantages and flaws of key weapon systems, defense systems and verification regimes for arms control, among many other things. Their input is fundamental and often decisive. Where there are national security and arms control issues, there must be scientists. On the other hand, the Wen Ho Lee case has raised questions about the actual impact of an intangible transfer of technology and information. There is no doubt that information was downloaded from Los Alamos computers. Whether that information was intended to be transferred out of the country is unclear. But this painful case cannot be far from our minds in discussing the tradeoffs between scientific communication and national security -- particularly when we are concerned with encouraging and sustaining the scientific and technical leadership upon which our security rests. I congratulate the organizers of this conference for a timely contribution on a vital issue. Public discourse will go a long way in helping determine where the line should be drawn between legitimately tight security and legitimately open science. Government, to say the least, is not nimble. Probably we will never get the balance exactly right, and certainly we will never satisfy everyone. But efforts like this will help us get closer to the mark. I thank you once again for the opportunity to participate in this discussion. (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov) Return to the Washington File