18 September 2000 Walker's Remarks on Iraq Before the Senate Armed Services Committee "Iraq under Saddam Hussein remains dangerous, unreconstructed, and defiant," said Edward S. Walker, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East, before the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Iraq on September 18. "He (Saddam) will not relinquish what remains of his WMD arsenal. He will not live in peace with his neighbors. He will not cease the repression of the Iraqi people," said Walker. Characterizing UN sanctions against Iraq as the most critical element of containment of Saddam's militaristic aggression against his neighbors in the region, Walker said that if sanctions were lifted, an estimated $20 billion this year in oil revenue would be used to reconstitute nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in Iraq. "Given the chance, it is inevitable Saddam would once again threaten the region and continue to ignore the plight of the Iraqi people," Walker said. However, Walker also emphasized that it is essential that the U.S. address the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people while sanctions are in place. "An effective oil-for-food program, which provides the Iraqi people with basic civilian and humanitarian goods while denying the regime access to the most dangerous dual-use goods, serves both humanitarian interests and regional security." Walker also noted that such support reduces the risk of sanctions erosion and alleviates international pressure to ease or lift the mechanisms which keep Iraq's revenue out of Saddam's unfettered control. Following is the text of Walker's remarks: September 19, 2000 Testimony of NEA Assistant Secretary Edward S. Walker Jr. Committee on Armed Services Mr. Chairman: I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss U.S. policy towards Iraq. As Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, I deal directly with overall policy towards Iraq, particularly our over-arching policy of containing the Iraqi regime, alleviating the humanitarian conditions of the Iraqi people, and promoting regime change. Iraq under Saddam Hussein remains dangerous, unreconstructed, and defiant. Saddam's record makes clear that he will remain a threat to regional peace and security as long as he remains in power. He will not relinquish what remains of his WMD arsenal. He will not live in peace with his neighbors. He will not cease the repression of the Iraqi people. The regime of Saddam Hussein can not be rehabilitated or reintegrated as a responsible member of the community of nations. Experience and objective judgment make this manifest. That is why the United States is committed to encouraging and supporting the forces of change in Iraq, and that is why we will contain Saddam Hussein as long as he remains in power. At the same time, we are committed to working to alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people, who are forced to live under a regime they did not choose and do not want. And we are also committed to efforts to hold Saddam Hussein accountable for his crimes against humanity and his war crimes. Let me first review the elements of containment, which remains an effective and successful policy for preserving peace in the region, though containment alone can not end the suffering of the Iraqis nor end the lingering threat Saddam's regime poses to regional stability. We contain Saddam through UN sanctions which severely limit the resources needed to reconstitute weapons of mass destruction and rebuild a conventional arsenal; through maintenance of no-fly zones in the north and south of Iraq; and through a military presence in the region and a readiness to use force as necessary and appropriate. Sanctions are the most critical element of containment and must continue until the current regime complies with all its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions. In the absence of the sanctions regime and a comprehensive international system of controls, Saddam Hussein would have unhindered control over Iraq's oil revenues -- estimated at $20 billion this year alone -- to spend on the priorities of his regime: be they reconstituting his nuclear program, producing chemical and biological weapons, bolstering his oppressive security apparatus, or building opulent palaces. Given the chance, it is inevitable Saddam would once again threaten the region and continue to ignore the plight of the Iraqi people. In fact, we have seen nothing to indicate Iraq's thirst for weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles has slackened. For current evidence of its continuing menace, we need look no further than the signs of activity at sites previously associated with Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missile programs. Only this month, Saddam took the unprecedented step of personally addressing Iraq's nuclear scientists, and only last week the regime rejected French encouragement to pass legislation on the cessation of nuclear activities. These developments are of particular concern given the nearly two-year absence of UN inspectors. The Security Council, in adopting resolution 1284, reaffirmed that Iraq has failed to fulfill its obligations under previous Security Council resolutions to declare and destroy its weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, resolution 1284 strengthened containment. All members of the Security Council -- even the four that abstained from the resolution -- committed to implementing it, pressing Iraq to accept inspectors, and maintaining sanctions until Iraq complies with the terms of the resolution. Resolution 1284 established a new arms-control organization, the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission, or UNMOVIC, to replace UNSCOM. UNMOVIC retains UNSCOM's broad mandate and authorities. It has the right to conduct inspections into Iraq's past WMD programs, as well as to monitor to prevent future development of WMD. It has the right to immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all sites, records, and facilities. An effective disarmament and monitoring regime inside Iraq would strengthen containment by further limiting Iraq's efforts to rearm. In the absence of inspectors on the ground, we must rely on national technical means which cannot provide the same level of assurance as effective monitoring on the ground. Since adopting resolution 1284, the UN Security Council has steadily moved towards its implementation. Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed Hans Blix of Sweden, former Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, and Dr. Blix took up his duties on March 1. We have met repeatedly with Dr. Blix since his appointment, and he has made clear his commitment to putting in place a robust, technically proficient organization which will require nothing less than Iraqi cooperation in all respects. He has had extensive experience with the deceitfulness of Saddam's regime and the lengths to which it goes in order to preserve its WMD programs. In consultation with Dr. Blix and members of the Security Council, Secretary General Annan named a 16-member College of Commissioners for UNMOVIC to provide advice and guidance to Dr. Blix. The commissioners are a qualified group of experts, including Assistant Secretary of State for Non-Proliferation Robert Einhorn. They serve only as an advisory body, and Dr. Blix retains full authority to report his judgments to the Security Council. Dr. Blix is required to convene the commissioners every three months to solicit their advice. He did so in May and August and is scheduled to do so again in November. In April, Dr. Blix submitted to the Security Council his organizational plan for UNMOVIC. Based on that he has now nearly finished hiring approximately 40 core personnel -- including several Americans -- to staff UNMOVIC's New York office. In August, UNMOVIC concluded, with U.S. assistance as the host country, its first training program for personnel. Dr. Blix has also issued his second quarterly report on UNMOVIC's activities to the Security Council. The Security Council is scheduled to discuss the report on September 22. The report is straightforward and factual. It discusses the College of Commissioners, recruitment, training, and on-going activities. Notably, it states that UNMOVIC "could plan and commence" preparatory inspections activities in Iraq now. We believe Dr. Blix has rightly decided against traveling to Iraq until Baghdad accepts UNSCR 1284. In so doing, he has made it clear that his job is not to sell the resolution, but to implement it. We are satisfied Dr. Blix is preparing his organization to discharge its mandate when conditions permit. If weapons inspectors are allowed back into Iraq, the next step is for UNMOVIC and the IAEA to draw up the key remaining disarmament tasks to be completed by Iraq. If Iraq fulfills these tasks, and cooperates with weapons inspectors for 120 days after reinforced monitoring is fully operational, the sanctions temporarily, controls are in place, purposes of the Council's decisions. The embargo on military imports would remain in place, and dual-use items would continue to require prior approval. If Iraqi cooperation ceased, sanctions would be re-imposed automatically. Renewal of the suspension would require a positive Council decision every 120 days. The condition for lifting sanctions on Iraq -- full compliance with UN Security Council resolutions -- remains unchanged. Unfortunately, we do not expect Iraq to meet that standard anytime soon. In fact, we doubt that Iraq will take the sensible steps necessary to obtain the lifting or suspension of sanctions so long as Saddam Hussein remains in power. Only in the last few days, Baghdad barred the Secretary General's experts from making an independent assessment of the humanitarian situation in Iraq. Beyond that, the regime has twice barred entry of experts seeking ways to improve the efficiency and effectiveness to the oil-for-food program. Since the adoption of resolution 1284, the regime has also refused the visit of the Chairman of the Sanctions Committee; denied thousands of its own citizens the opportunity to perform the Hajj; turned back Russian diplomat and UN Special Envoy Yuli Voronstov's efforts to look into the cases of missing persons; hindered efforts to carry out humanitarian demining in northern Iraq; refused to meet with UN Human Rights Rapporteur for Iraq; and -- as already noted -- rejected French suggestions to pass legislation on the cessation of nuclear activities. Most ominously, last week, Baghdad raised the same assertions regarding Kuwait that preceded its 1990 invasion, accusing it of looting Iraqi oil fields and threatening it with unspecified measures. As long as sanctions remain in place, it is essential that we address the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. An effective oil-for-food program, which provides the Iraqi people with basic civilian and humanitarian goods while denying the regime access to the most dangerous dual-use goods, serves both humanitarian interests and regional security. It is morally right for the international community to assist the Iraqi people, who are the pawns of Saddam Hussein. Doing so also reduces the risk of sanctions erosion and alleviates international pressure to ease or lift the mechanisms which keep Iraq's revenue out of Saddam's unfettered control. Iraqi propaganda notwithstanding, UN sanctions have never targeted the Iraqi people and have never limited the import of food and medicine for the Iraqi people. In fact, the United States was an original sponsor of the first oil-for-food program, adopted in 1991. Tragically, Baghdad rejected that program, and it was not until 1996 that Iraq finally accepted oil-for-food. Since the first oil-for-food supplies arrived in Iraq in 1997, the program has brought tremendous improvements in living conditions. Iraqi per capita caloric intake has risen from 1,300 calories before the program began to over 2,000 calories now provided by a UN ration basket which is augmented by Iraqi agriculture. In fact, food imports are now at about pre-war levels. Saddam Hussein, however, has abused the program to the detriment of the Iraqi people in an attempt to have sanctions lifted without compliance. Since the first delivery of oil-for-food supplies in March 1997, the government of Iraq has refused to work with UN authorities to maximize the benefit to the Iraqi population. Only last week, Baghdad barred the Secretary General's experts from making an independent assessment of the living conditions of Iraqis and improving the oil-for-food program by devising a system that would allow Iraq to spend oil-sales money to buy goods locally and stimulate the economy. The needs of the most vulnerable groups, including children and the elderly, have been of particular concern. The Secretary General reported in March that Iraq had still not implemented the supplementary feeding programs, recommended for years by the UN, for malnourished children under five and for school children. These programs have been very successful in the north, where oil-for-food is administered by the UN in full cooperation with Kurdish authorities. By contrast, vaccination levels in Baghdad-controlled areas are worse than they were in 1994. The Iraqi government's ordering of food, medicine, and humanitarian supplies remains slow and erratic, and the distribution of goods after they reach Iraq continues to be a problem. To get the clearest picture of the oil-for-food program and its potential, it is helpful to compare its operation in northern Iraq, where the UN controls distribution, to its operation in southern and central Iraq, where Saddam controls the distribution of goods. A UNICEF study on child mortality in Iraq conducted last year reported a disturbing rise in child mortality rates -- more than double pre-war levels -- in south and central Iraq, the parts of the country controlled by Saddam Hussein. But the report also revealed that child mortality rates in northern Iraq, where the UN controls distribution of the oil- for-food program, had dropped below pre-war levels. These numbers demonstrate that oil-for-food can work to meet the needs of the Iraqi people if the government can be prevented from interfering or can be compelled to manage the program efficiently with the well-being of the Iraqi people in mind. Publicity surrounding the release of this survey last year led Baghdad finally to place orders for nutritional supplements -- something the UN had long advocated. Early last year, the UN Secretary General reported that there were $275 million worth of medicines sitting in Iraqi warehouses undistributed. As a result of the publicity generated by this report, stockpiles were eventually reduced. Even with the successes of the oil-for-food program, more can and should be done. That is why the U.S. supported resolution 1284, which introduced further enhancements of the oil-for-food program. The resolution permits Iraq to sell as much oil as needed to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. As of July 31, the UN reported that 11,500 oil-for-food contracts for humanitarian goods worth over $14 billion had been approved. More than $8 billion in food, medicine, and other supplies have now been delivered, and another $6 billion in humanitarian goods are on the way. Iraq's sales of oil will soon exceed pre-war levels and this year will go up to $20 billion. Resolution 1284 also streamlined the contract approval process to facilitate the supply of legitimate goods and authorized the use of oil-for-food funds to purchase local goods, such as wheat, to provide a boost to Iraq's agricultural sector. Unfortunately, Iraq has blocked the agricultural possibility of local procurement under the oil-for-food program by refusing to allow experts into Iraq to consider options for implementation of this project. For our part, we have been examining our own national procedures for reviewing oil-for-food contracts to ensure that they are optimized to meet our priorities: maximizing assistance to the Iraqi people while denying the regime access to goods it could use to reconstitute its WMD programs. The United States has been criticized for the number of holds we have placed on oil-for-food contracts. We recognize that some of this criticism reflects humanitarian concern, and we continue to review our procedures with this concern in mind. However, we must also be objective, as well as compassionate, in assessing and balancing the threat of the Iraqi regime and the plight of the Iraqi people. The regime of Saddam Hussein has used chemical weapons against the Iraqi people and Iraq's neighbors. It has launched ballistic missiles, developed biological weapons, and had an active nuclear program. It has obstructed weapons inspections for nine years in an effort to conceal these programs. This regime has the expertise and will to produce weapons of mass destruction, and a long track record of repeatedly lying about them. We cannot hand it the goods it needs to turn those intentions into reality -- particularly in the absence of weapons inspectors. Consequently, we will continue to place holds on all prohibited items, including dual-use items which can be used to develop weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, we will do all we can to ensure that the Iraqi people receive the quality and quantity of food and medicine they need to improve their condition. Following sanctions, the second key element of containment is the maintenance of no-fly zones. We have maintained a no-fly zone over northern Iraq since 1991 and over southern Iraq since 1992. These zones were established to prevent Saddam Hussein from using his air force against the civilian populations of these areas, as he has done so brutally in the past. We have been highly successful in this effort. The zones also provide critical buffers to detect any Iraqi troop movements north or south posing a threat to Iraq's citizens, its neighbors, or coalition forces. Iraqi propaganda denounces the no-fly zones as a pretext for ongoing military action against Iraqi forces, a charge which some others have repeated. In fact, the no-fly zones are protective, not offensive, in nature. Since December 1998, following Operation Desert Fox, Saddam to our aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones. Our force are fully prepared and authorized to defend themselves, and we have responded to these challenges with strikes on Iraq's integrated air defense system. Saddam Hussein will not deter us from our commitment to maintaining these zones as an important element of protection for the Iraqi people. The third key element to our containment policy is the presence of U.S. military in the region. We currently maintain a credible force in the region and are prepared to act at an appropriate time and place of our choosing if Iraq reconstitutes its weapons of mass destruction programs, threatens its neighbors or U.S. forces, or moves against the Kurds. The presence of this force is a constant deterrent to Iraqi aggression and intimidation and a continuing assurance of our commitment to the region and the Iraqi people. Its withdrawal would rekindle Baghdad's ambitions and give it a freer hand to directly threaten and coerce countries throughout the region. Our rigorous and responsible approach to sanctions and the oil-for-food program, our maintenance of the no-fly zones, and our military presence have earned the support of countries inside and outside the region. Our efforts have elicited criticism and complaint from others who have chosen to turn a politically or commercially blinded eye to Iraq's hostile ambitions and continuing threat. Some of these countries have been motivated by Iraq's cynical manipulation of the oil-for-food program to bribe and coerce cooperation. They orchestrate contributions to Iraq's efforts to politicize, flout, and undermine the sanctions regime. Their actions do nothing to help the Iraqi people, but only encourage the Iraqi regime to continue its attack on the requirements of the Security Council and the international community. As we work to strengthen containment and alleviate the condition of the Iraqi people, we also continue to support Iraqis who seek the removal of the current Baghdad regime and its replacement by a new government under which Iraq can resume its rightful place in the Arab and international communities. An important element of our regime change effort is our ongoing program of assistance to the external Iraqi opposition. We continually tell the Iraqis that they can and must determine the future of Iraq. We will assist them as we can, but we will not, indeed should not, be the ones to decide who will be the next leader of Iraq. Since I last testified, the Iraqi National Congress has begun building the organization and staffing needed to take full advantage of the training and material support provided for under the Iraq Liberation Act. As you know, the first four INC members were invited under the ILA to participate in a military training course in November 1999 at Hurlburt Air Force Base. Since then, over 40 more opposition members have received or are receiving training, of something approaching 200 candidates in the pipeline. The Defense Department has prepared an extensive list of training options for free Iraqis and, in cooperation with the INC, has begun filling the pipeline to provide the same training to free Iraqis that is enjoyed by other allied and friendly officers. Since the beginning of summer, INC members have received training in security assistance, emergency medical technician/hospital corpsmanship, cargo and warehouse management, civil-military relationships, and public affairs. Other courses are scheduled throughout the fall and winter. We also have signed our first grant agreement to provide direct funding to the INC. This funding has enabled the INC to renew its efforts to reach out to constituents and to establish the infrastructure necessary to accomplish its objectives and to take advantage of U.S. programs. Another fundamental function the INC will focus on is providing humanitarian assistance to Iraqis inside Iraq. This important responsibility dovetails with our own national goals of alleviating the suffering of the Iraqi people. The INC will develop an infrastructure to deliver critically needed humanitarian goods to segments of the Iraqi population that Saddam Hussein has ignored. We look forward to assisting them in taking this and other steps toward building a humane and democratic government and civil society in Iraq. As a government, we are also stepping up our efforts to hold accountable the top Iraqi leadership for crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. This effort has three components. First, we are gathering evidence from U.S. Government files and declassifying and releasing as much as we can. Second, we are supporting the work of NGOs that make important contributions to holding the Iraqi regime accountable. We have already provided $2 million to four separate but related activities: making captured Iraqi documents available on the Internet; gathering videotape and imagery of Iraqi crimes; gathering witness statements to justify prosecution of top Iraqi officials and helping to focus the international public on the crimes committed by the Baghdad regime. We also expect the Iraqi opposition to make a major contribution to the campaign to bring the Baghdad regime to justice, and many groups and individuals have already begun to do so. Third, we have increased our diplomatic activity on the issue, discussing the possibilities of a UN tribunal or committee of experts with other UN Security Council members. We are also encouraging those governments who can bring appropriate cases under international conventions like the UN Convention Against Torture to do so within their laws. This heightened attention by NGO's to the crimes of the Iraqi leadership has already borne fruit. Over the last year a number of Iraqi officials have been compelled to become far more fearful of where they travel, lest they find themselves in the arms of the law. No one can predict when this criminal regime will end or what will follow. But by supporting sanctions, maintaining the no-fly zones, remaining prepared to use force, promoting regime change, and seeking accountability for top Iraqi leaders, we increase the pressure on the regime. We contain the threat it poses to the region and the Iraqi people. And we hasten the day when Iraq will resume its place among the family of free nations. (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov) Return to the Washington File