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08 August 2000
Pentagon Spokesman Kenneth Bacon briefed.
Following is the transcript:
Defense Department Regular Briefing
Briefer: Kenneth Bacon, Spokesman
Pentagon Briefing Room, Arlington, Virginia
1:30 P.M. EDT Tuesday, August 8, 2000
Bacon:
I've got a couple of announcements before I take your questions
-- the first to bring you up to date on the wildfires in the West. As
you know, President Clinton and Secretary of the Army Caldera are out
today meeting with firefighters, both military and non-military, in
Idaho, I believe.
Right now we have -- we, the Department of Defense, have more than
2,000 service members, active-duty Army and Marines, as well as
National Guardsmen, who have been called to active duty, conducting
operations and getting ready to -- training to fight wildfires. The
number will probably increase relatively soon to 2,500, because this
weekend the Army is preparing to send a second battalion from Fort
Hood, Texas. This would be the 20th Engineering Battalion, the 1st
Cavalry Division, and they will assist firefighters in Montana. As you
know, the Army already has one battalion from Fort Hood working in
Idaho.
The National Guard in 10 states has now activated more than a thousand
Army and Air Guardsmen to help with the firefighting. To date, Air
Force Reserve and Guard C-130s have flown more than 525 hours, made
490 sorties, and dropped more than 11.4 million pounds of
fire-retardant chemicals.
We expect, unfortunately, the fires to continue during August, so the
firefighters will continue during August as well.
Finally, an announcement about the impact of our Gulf War illness
program.
As you know, for -- since 1996, Dr. Bernard Rostker has run the --
he's been the special assistant for Gulf War illness. And that office
has now morphed into a new office, which is the Department of Defense
-- he will be a special assistant to the secretary of Defense for Gulf
War Illnesses, Medical Readiness and Military Deployments.
The idea here was to take some of the lessons we learned from the Gulf
War illness study, to apply them to future force deployments to make
sure that our medical recordkeeping is correct, that we do everything
we can to avoid some of the problems we had during the Gulf War, and
that is a lack of good recordkeeping, sometimes a confusion over what
doses were given and weren't given, who took them, when they took
them, et cetera. So it's an effort to do a better job of making sure
that medical services and vaccines are -- are administered well during
deployments. And Dr. Rostker will take that over and, I'm sure, bring
the same energy and knowledge to it that he brought to Gulf War
illness.
We will continue, obviously, working on Gulf War illness. We have a
number of research projects we've started. We're continuing to deal
with veterans. We have surveys and hotlines set up, and all that will
continue.
With that, I'll take your questions. Bob?
Q:
Ken, I wanted to ask you about the statement that the secretary put
out yesterday on national missile defense.
Bacon:
Sure.
Q:
He said that a number of difficult issues remain to be resolved in
the deployment readiness review, I think he was referring to. Which of
those would be the most significant in terms of meeting the time
schedule that exists at the moment of -- (inaudible)?
Bacon:
Well, one of the questions we're still working on is the new
booster. As you know, the flight tests we've had so far have used an
old rocket or booster made out of the second and third stages of
Minuteman rockets. And we are developing a new booster for the
interceptor, to put the kill vehicle into space. That is running
behind schedule. The question is, how much behind schedule. And so
that's one question right there.
Another question has to do with flight tests. Usually after a failed
flight test, we delay the next flight test. It's highly likely that
the flight test, integrated flight test six scheduled for
October-November will be delayed. We don't know how long a delay it
will be, but it will probably be delayed. And that will have an impact
on other flight tests. So that's another question that has to be
worked out.
There's also a question of numbers of tests.
As you know, the independent review team headed by retired Air Force
Chief of Staff General Larry Welch recommended more tests, and the
question is, should we add more tests and, if so, where in the testing
pattern? So those are among the types of questions that are being
reviewed.
In addition, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and Dr.
Gansler's office -- he's the undersecretary of Defense for
Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics -- have not finished their
review of Integrated Flight Test 5, which took place a month ago
today, July 7th -- July 7th and 8th, I guess, because it took place
over the morning hours. And as you know, that test failed. We believe
it -- we know it failed because the kill vehicle, the last stage that
actually hits the re-entry vehicle, failed to separate from the
booster.
We understand that it failed because data was not properly transmitted
to the kill vehicle to allow it to separate from the booster. We don't
know exactly why that happened, although we're pretty sure why it
happened, but more importantly, we haven't figured out how to respond
to it. And one of the issues is we had what would be called a "single
point of failure" there; in other words, one little system failed and,
as a result, an important event, separation, didn't take place.
So now they're looking at whether to -- what's required to build a
parallel system or a more failsafe system so we don't have the single
point of failure, and that, depending on what they figure out, will
take -- could take some time. There are a couple of options. They
haven't determined which option to take. Depending on which option
they select, it'll take more time or less time.
So those are a number of the issues that are yet to be resolved.
Q:
One more quick question on it. You mentioned the booster right off
the bat.
Bacon:
Right.
Q:
It's been known for some time, I think, that the development has
been delayed approximately eight months. Is there something new, in
addition to that, that raises the question of additional delays, or
why is this --
Bacon:
The delay will end up being longer than eight months. It's --
rather than closing the gap, the gap is getting longer. So more work
on the booster is required.
Now, the part that malfunctioned in the last test was called an
avionics processor controller, which is in another part, the bigger
part, called the upper stage assembly.
The upper stage assembly is a bunch of navigational and electronics
equipment that is on top of the booster, and it's therefore -- it
sends signals from the booster to the kill vehicle. It's on top of the
booster but between the booster and the kill vehicle.
The upper stage assembly that -- part of which malfunctioned -- will
not be part of the final system. When we have a new booster, it will
have a new upper stage assembly with largely new equipment, and there
will be some components that will be common to the current rockets
that we've been testing. But basically it will be a new design. So
we're working on that as well.
Yes?
Q:
Isn't there any concern that the longer it takes for the secretary
to give his recommendation to the president, the shorter time the
president has to make a decision and also it's going to smack right
into the election, the heat of the election season?
Bacon:
Well, we've always said that this is a -- we've said recently
that this is an event-driven program, not a schedule-driven program.
And our goal is to try to get it right and to wait as long as we need
to, to make sure we're on the right track. So we will do that.
I think the secretary's confident that he'll be able to make his
recommendation in a few weeks, several weeks, late this month, early
next month, probably. And that should give the president enough time
to evaluate the secretary's recommendation and to make his own
decision about how to proceed.
I think that there's ample time in the fall, assuming that we -- that
the secretary makes his recommendation sometime in September, I think
there will be ample time for the president to make his decision.
Pam?
Q:
The booster was supposed to be done when? And then we can add eight
months-plus to that?
Bacon:
Well, I'm afraid that -- I know how long the delay is, but I
don't know when it was supposed to be ready. I think they were
supposed to have been able to test it initially this year, but it
won't be tested the first time until probably next spring sometime.
Q:
How much has the delay grown?
Bacon:
Several months. That's still being worked out. Now we're in the
process of a fairly massive review of the program right now. That
isn't complete. That's one of the reasons why the secretary delayed
his decision.
So we're still looking at the time schedule.
Barbara?
Q:
Two things. Is there a reason -- maybe I missed it here -- why the
booster -- why the booster delay? What's going on there? And could you
just go back and explain -- is the fail safe then just for the test
program, since that goes away once you do get the new booster?
Bacon:
The idea is to take the lessons learned at every stage during
the test program and build them into the final product. So what we
identified here was what's called a single source of failure. If one
thing goes wrong, the separation doesn't take place. What we want to
devise is some sort of a parallel or backup system, so that we're not
held captive to a single source of failure. Although the design of the
avionics processor controller will be different, we would still want
to have a parallel or backup systems, so we have a more robust system
than we had this time around.
Q:
And -- thank you. And what is causing this booster delay? What's
the problem that's making this delay grow?
Bacon:
It's a variety of things, but basically it's just a question of
getting it designed and built, and that's taken longer than
anticipated.
Q:
Just so I make sure I understand -- so this new design for a
redundant system that would, you know, lessen the chance of this kind
of failure is for the new booster that's being designed, not the old
booster that's going to be --
Bacon:
The next two tests will pretty much involve the same avionics
processor controller. So we're looking at a way to avoid what I call
the single source of failure. It could be a software change. It could
be as simple as a software change.
Q:
But that's in the new --
Bacon:
No, no --
Q:
-- you're developing that for the new booster, or are you doing it
for the next test?
Bacon:
There is -- no, this is a system with a lot of concurrency
built into it, and what we want to test -- what we wanted to test in
Integrated Flight Test 5 was the kill vehicle, its ability to seek the
target and to zero in on it and hit it, and to discriminate against --
between the target and a decoy. And we also wanted to test some
communications links, the radar, et cetera.
We are doing that in order to develop the kill vehicle as quickly as
possible with old rockets and some old avionics processor controllers
or upper-stage assemblies that have this electronic equipment in it.
Eventually we will have a new booster and we will have new avionics or
electronics in the top.
So the next two tests will involve pretty much the existing avionics
processor controller. After those tests -- Integrated Flight Tests 6
and 7 -- we will move on to a new one. We want to make fixes in the
old one and design the new one in a way that doesn't have a single
source of failure for the separation mechanism or data transfer that
this one had.
Q:
And so now when is the likely time frame for this next test, number
six? Is that --
Bacon:
I can't tell you when the next test will be.
Q:
Is it likely to be delayed into December or even later --
Bacon:
Well, Secretary Cohen, I believe, testified on the Hill that it
could be delayed into December. So we're looking whether December is
reasonable or whether it could be later. That decision hasn't been
made.
Q:
And then one last big picture question. You've always said that
this is an ambitious test schedule, that the deployment date of 2005
would require a lot of things to go right along the way. It seems
like, you know, whether these are big problems or little problems that
there are lots of little delays that are coming into this. Doesn't
this again call into question the likelihood of being able to make a
2005 deployment date?
Bacon:
Well, I think that's exactly the type of question that the
secretary is considering now, or will be able to consider when he gets
a final review from the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and Dr.
Gansler. He doesn't have all that information yet, but the goal of
gathering this information together. And the reason the gathering
process is taking so long is that he wants the best possible
information, and then he'll have to make a decision based on the --
one, the information; and two, the recommendations he gets from
General Kadish and Dr. Gansler.
So I think it's premature to say right now how this is going to change
the schedule, if at all. You know that General Welch said that 2005
was possible, although high risk. But he felt that it was possible
enough to stick to the 2005 deployment target. And the secretary will
have to make a decision whether he agrees with that statement or
whether he doesn't.
Q:
But just -- is it -- it's not likely at this point that the next
flight test would take place at its previously scheduled time frame of
October/November?
Bacon:
I said it was likely that it will be delayed, and that's what
the secretary has testified.
The question is, How much will it be delayed?
Yes?
Q:
Ken, you all have been very clear that the decision this November
doesn't deploy National Missile Defense. What it does is it begins
construction on the radar site. So what I'm having a hard time
understanding is how these difficulties would really affect that
decision, because if you still buy the 2005 threat that's out there,
you have to get started on the radar next spring, whether or not this
booster, or this mechanism, is working out. I'm having a hard time
seeing the connection between the two, because you can work on the
booster stuff on the side, but you have to get started on the radar,
if you still buy the 2005 deadline.
Bacon:
Well, these are exactly the types of issues that the secretary
is going to be considering, and I can't forecast what he's going to
recommend at this stage, but these are -- these questions of
scheduling are exactly what will be on his plate when he gets around
to making the decision.
Roberto?
Q:
Until now, the secretary and you, General Kadish and Dr. Gansler
have all been very consistent in -- (inaudible word) -- a point the
panel is making that this program was timed to be deployed by 2005 --
expressed complete confidence, despite the risk, that that was a
feasible target and, indeed, did separate out the question of starting
construction with Shemya as something different because the
development of this was going to continue, you know, on a parallel
track with the initial construction. But what you're saying now and
what the -- in terms of what the secretary is now considering, I just
want to be clear. It sounds like you're saying he is considering 2005
as to whether that is a feasible date, having previously always said
and expressed considerable confidence that 2005 was a feasible date.
Bacon:
I think you are attributing too much solidity to what the
secretary said. When the secretary testified before the Senate Armed
Services Committee last month, he pointed out that General Welch had
said that 2005 was feasible, it was possible, but it was high risk.
We have always admitted that this was a high-risk program, and part of
being high risk is the deployment date; whether we can meet the
deployment date of 2005. We will try our best, we have been trying our
best, and we may meet the deployment date.
I'm not going to forecast what the secretary's going to decide,
because what he has to do is look at all the information. Obviously,
he wants this system deployed sooner rather than later, and -- if he
decides that deployment is necessary. We've been working on a
deployment schedule that would get us to 2005. We have not abandoned
that deployment schedule.
Q:
It is under question?
Bacon:
Pardon?
Q:
It is under question?
Bacon:
I think everybody who has followed this program has realized
that it was a high-risk program. Part of being high-risk is the
schedule. There's nothing new about that. Two thousand five was
highlighted as a high-risk schedule by General Welch. The secretary
has admitted that it was high risk. He's pointed out that General
Welch, in his latest review by the independent review team, said that
although it was high risk, it was possible that we would make it --
there was enough possibility not to change the schedule. The secretary
will decide whether that is still the right course.
Q:
Has the secretary been briefed on the new intelligence estimate on
those -- we were talking about it a lot on the trip to Asia, about
taking a look at --
Bacon:
He has. He has.
Q:
And the results are?
Bacon:
And the results are that it was a classified briefing --
(laughter) -- that he doesn't want to discuss publicly.
Yes?
Q:
Is it fair to say that since the Welch report came out on June 13th
that talked about an eight-month booster slip, that the situation's
gotten worse because the first three booster verification tests have
slipped as much as a year, according to briefing charts floating
around last week, and that's pushed everything back; so, even with
Welch's milestone, it's gotten even riskier? Is that a fair statement?
Bacon:
The first booster test, to answer an earlier question, was
supposed to have taken place in April of this year.
Q:
Right.
Bacon:
Now it looks like it will take place early next year.
Q:
Right.
Bacon:
So it has slipped. The question is, has it slipped by so much
that it changes the schedule of the program? That question has not
been answered.
Q:
The second and third ones have slipped by 10 and 12 months, though,
according to briefing charts that were floating around for --
Bacon:
Well, I don't want to get into the briefing charts that were
floating around. Briefing charts come and go. But there is no question
that the booster is behind schedule; and the question is, what can be
done about it, if anything, and how it affects the general program.
Q:
Is it fair to say the slips in these production models are also
impacting the integrated flight tests that -- the IFT 7, 8 and 9 that
test the production model warhead from Raytheon and the production
model booster from Boeing, and those are being pushed out also?
Bacon:
Well, obviously, if the booster is delayed, integrated tests
involving the booster could also be delayed.
Q:
Could you try to be a little more precise about this delay? I mean,
you've got eight-months-plus.
Bacon:
Right.
Q:
You previously said that you know what the -- I mean, obviously,
people know what the delay is as of now. Can you just be a little more
precise about what the actual -- rather than just say it's somewhere
more than eight months?
Bacon:
I'm not going to announce the delay until we finished -- until
BMDO and Dr. Gansler finish their review, which hasn't been done yet.
So rather than give a figure that may turn out to be incorrect, I
think we'll say that it's -- we knew that it had a delay of eight
months, and the delay may turn out to be longer. But I think that the
review is ongoing and it's just not appropriate to discuss how much
longer the delay may be until the review is complete.
Yeah?
Q:
Ken, isn't there a domino effect here that continues, if you -- for
example, Tony's point about flight tests 7, 8 and 9, in which you
integrate the production model booster with a kill vehicle, are
delayed, that runs up to and beyond the DAB [Defense Acquisition
Board] of '01, which you're supposed to make a decision on long-lead
items for the new booster, which then runs into subsequent -- you
know, the other elements of the schedule beyond 20001?
Bacon:
At some point, obviously, it does. But it was General Welch who
made the observation that the program should be event driven, not
schedule driven. Secretary Cohen embraced that when he actually
changed the program from a three-plus-three to a three-plus-five
program and said the deployment goal was 2005. We will continue --
obviously, no one wants to deploy a system that doesn't work, so we're
looking for ways to bring all elements together as well as possible,
but we need to make sure that every section works.
So at some point, yes, there could be further delays in some of these
out tests, but that hasn't been decided. I mean, you're asking me to
forecast the future in a way that I can't right now because the
reviews are ongoing.
Q:
I'm just trying to ask you the logic of a timetable that would seem
to point pretty clearly towards --
Bacon:
Well, I think people can draw their own conclusions. But I
would advise you against drawing conclusions until the analysis is
complete.
I think that conclusions drawn before the analysis is complete run the
risk of being wrong.
Yes?
Q:
The secretary is on the record several times, you know, saying that
he personally believes in the need for this type of a missile defense
system. So given that that is his basic belief, I mean, what would it
take for him to actually recommend -- make a recommendation against
taking the next step?
Bacon:
Well, the secretary is operating with the four criteria that
the president set, and those are the criteria that shape his analysis.
And those criteria are technical feasibility, threat, cost, and
overall impact on national security, which obviously includes arms
control and relations with the allies. So he will look at all those
criteria in making his recommendation to the president.
I am not going to speculate on what -- on how he's going to make his
decision at this stage, because it's premature. He hasn't -- the whole
reason we're talking about a delay in his recommendation is because
the analysis that he's awaiting has not occurred yet. And he doesn't
want to force an analysis to come to him before it's complete.
So --
Q:
But could you actually envision him making a recommendation against
taking --
Bacon:
I'm not going to forecast what the secretary's going to do.
He's going to wait and get the best information available, and then he
will make a recommendation.
Yes?
Q:
Whose fault is it that the booster is delayed? Is it a contractor
problem or a production problem, or can you classify it in any way?
Bacon:
Well, I'm not enough of an expert on the booster to comment
about it.
Yes?
Q:
The avionics controller processor -- what caused it to fail? Was it
just a bad part, or was it the environment or something else?
Bacon:
Well, basically what happened was that digital information
didn't get from the booster up to the kill vehicle. In other words, it
was supposed to convey a message; when the booster had stopped
boosting, stopped firing, it was supposed to convey a message to the
kill vehicle that it was time to separate. And that didn't happen. Why
that didn't happen -- it could have been a malfunctioning circuit
board. It could have been a short circuit of some sort. It could have
been something caused by vibration. They don't know for sure right
now.
They have a pretty good sense that they will be able to narrow the
options further than they have so far.
Yes?
Q:
Is Boeing seeking any addition funds to help it through this delay,
or are you considering any additional funds to them to help them get
past all of this?
Bacon:
Well, I think that funding, obviously, is one of the questions
that relates to schedule and timing, and it's premature to talk about
cost at this stage, until those -- until decisions are made about
schedule.
Yes?
Q:
This has to do with the U.K. radar question. Now, a report in the
British Parliament -- (inaudible) -- said that they would be opposed
to letting the radar in U.K. be used for the U.S. NMD. And in the
testimony in the Senate, the secretary said that not having that radar
would render the U.S. NMD technically unfeasible. Now, is there any
alternative to that? Is there a -- supposing, in the eventuality that
the U.K. might say, "Well, you cannot use this radar," is there any
alternative being considered to that?
Bacon:
Well, I think that might be putting the cart before the horse
right now. The radar in the U.K. is an early warning radar. It's one
of, I think, five early warning radars necessary for this system;
three of those are in the United States, two are not.
We have been working closely with our allies, particularly the U.K.,
on this, and will continue to work closely with them. I think it's too
early to predict a problem there. I wouldn't anticipate there would be
a problem, actually.
Yes?
Q:
Could you just back to what you said in response to the previous
question about costs? You said it was premature to talk about costs --
(inaudible) -- until these issues with the booster are resolved. How,
then, does that relate to the consideration of costs as one of the
factors in terms of the recommendation the secretary is going to make?
I mean, is that also very much an open question now?
Bacon:
I think it's premature to say whether it's a question or not.
Obviously, if schedules get stretched out, costs increase. Costs
increase over time. The quicker you can build something, generally
speaking, the less it's going to cost than if it's stretched out over
a longer period of time.
So this is a question that relates to the schedule, and the schedule
questions have not been answered at this stage.
Q:
Do you expect the schedule questions will be answered sufficiently
to come up with hard cost estimates by the end of August or beginning
of September?
Bacon:
I anticipate that will be the case, yes.
Q:
Including on the booster question?
Bacon:
That's certainly the hope. Whether that happens or not remains
to be seen, but that's certainly the hope, yes.
Q:
Ken, is it fair to say the secretary's been briefed that the
overall cost of the program seems to be going up three to four billion
dollars since your last baseline estimate of about six months ago, and
that's one of the concerns here; it's the boosters, flight tests and
the overall cost of the program?
Bacon:
I think it's fair to say that the secretary is briefed from
time to time on the program, and the briefings sometimes differ, and I
don't think I'll get into the substance of the briefings.
Yes?
Q:
Getting back to the booster schedule briefly, IFT 8 is the first
scheduled test now for the booster. Is that going to stick? In other
words, if the booster is delayed, will IFT 8 be delayed, or is there a
chance that the first booster use would move into IFT 9 and you would
continue other testing using the surrogate booster?
Bacon:
That's a technical question that I'm just not prepared to
answer. I don't have the facility to answer that.
Q:
Ken, what is the current cost estimate?
Bacon:
I think the current cost estimate is about $20 billion.
Q:
What does that include?
Bacon:
That includes, I believe, everything up to the point of
deployment of 100 interceptors in 2005.
Q:
What schedule is that based on?
Bacon:
2005.
Q:
A hundred interceptors, or 20?
Bacon:
I'm sorry. This could be -- it may be the first 20
interceptors. So it would be the first 20 that would give us the IOC
in 2005. You're right. (sic) [Cost estimates state $20 billion for 100
interceptors through 2007, based on the current estimated schedule.]
Yes?
Q:
On another subject, what about --
Bacon:
Well, are we through with this?
Q:
One more on --
Bacon:
Sure.
Q:
What was the original target date for the secretary to receive the
readiness review from BMDO and Gansler? And what is the current target
date?
Bacon:
He was hoping to receive it by the end of July. And I think he
is likely to receive it shortly, but I can't put a precise day on it.
Q:
Does shortly mean -- can you be slightly more precise in calendar
terms? I mean, like a week, month, two weeks, end of August?
Bacon:
All those would fall into "shortly." (Laughter.) In my book.
Q:
(Off mike) -- back to the delay one more time. You've had a failure
this time, as I understand it, with established technology, something
that's been around for a while. Is it fair to say that as you move
into new technology and a new booster, that the likelihood of future
failures and, thus, future delays increases?
Bacon:
I don't think that follows logically.
Q:
Could you tell me why?
Bacon:
Well, I think that the newer the technology, the greater the
attention on testing and retesting, on thinking what could go wrong
and backstopping. The older the technology, probably the greater faith
that the system is going to work. Now, this is -- was an old part,
about 10 years old.
It had been tested and retested a number of times.
But I think that the history of our space programs and our military
programs wouldn't prove -- would not substantiate your idea that new
technology or new developments are more likely to fail than old ones.
Q:
I have a question.
Bacon:
Yeah?
Q:
I'm sorry, Toby. Are there any other single points of failure? Is
anybody doing a look at the entire system to see? Are there any other
single points of failure that we need to back up before we have
another one of these?
Bacon:
Well, every time you have a problem, you go back and look at
all parts of the system. I'm sure that people are. I can't give you
specifics on what they're looking at.
Q:
Yeah. Just to go back one more time over a slightly theological
point, is it -- given that the procedures have been laid out for the
secretary's recommendation to the president, he is -- is the decision
-- is his recommendation on the feasibility of the system and the
technical feasibility of it separate from the simple question of
whether or not to let contracts to start building in Shemya? I mean,
are these -- is this one single package of recommendations that the
former -- the technical feasibility relates directly to the contracts,
or are these two separate issues that he's going to have to present
his views on to the president?
Bacon:
I guess the easy answer is that I see that as a distinction
without a difference. I mean, he has to make a recommendation on the
program, and he has to make a recommendation on what he thinks the
best course of action is on the program and then give the president
the information he needs to decide whether to accept or reject the
recommendation. So I'm having a hard time separating the two.
What his interest is, is making sure that if we go ahead and build
this system, that it's built as quickly and reliably as possible.
That's his interest. And he wants a system that works.
So his decision will be based on -- if he recommends going ahead, will
be based on a schedule best designed to build a successful system, a
workable system, reliable system.
I can't separate the two. I mean, I think they're connected.
Any more questions on this? Yes?
Q:
Going back to what you were just talking about, having the old
equipment used for the test, now the same equipment is going to be
used for the next two IFTs, basically. So is -- I know that in the
last one the decoy balloon, for instance, just didn't inflate.
So is it wise to continue on using this old stuff if the anomalies can
affect it again, something unexpected?
Bacon:
Well, to a certain extent we're -- you know, I think
conceptually you face, in the broadest terms, two choices. You could
say we're going to develop this concurrently, knowing that we have to
develop radar, we have to develop a kill vehicle, we have to develop a
new booster, we have to develop a battlefield management system; we
could say we're going to develop them concurrently, working as quickly
as we can in each element of the new system. And that will involve
using some old equipment in order to test the new kill vehicle, we
will use old boosters we don't have a new booster yet. That's the path
we've taken.
I suppose conceptually you could say we'll wait until we have
everything designed, a totally new system, and not test it until we
have something that is brand new from top to bottom. Obviously, that
would take a lot longer and it would include a lot more risk. It would
be akin to saying we're going to put a man on the Moon; we won't do
any test shots of having people orbit the Earth in one-man capsules or
two-man capsules until we develop the whole lunar module, and then
we'll just fire it up there and assume it's going to work the first
time. That clearly is not the path we've taken. I don't think any
reasonable person would take that path.
So we've taken a step by step, sequential approach. And I think that's
the right approach; it's the only sensible approach to -- you know,
every time you do one of these tests, you discover little blemishes, I
suppose, that don't really have an impact on the test at all. There
were little blemishes in this test, and one of them -- I think I would
put the balloon failing to blow up, expand, as one of those blemishes.
It actually would have made the test harder because the seeker would
have been looking for a smaller object in space.
There was another little blemish on the target, which was one of the
reasons for the test delay the night it took place; that is the
batteries. There were some questions about the batteries operating at
full power. They decided that the batteries were powerful enough to do
what they had to do, and it didn't seem to be a problem.
When they did -- on the interceptor side there were other little
blemishes that developed; one had to do with the pressurization of
helium in the kill vehicle. The helium was pressurized sooner than it
was supposed to be. They determined that this had no impact on the
basic failure, and they also determined that it would not have had an
impact on the ability of the kill vehicle to operate effectively, if
it had been launched.
And there was another little blemish about telemetry, which actually
is information that's sent back from the rocket to ground stations.
One of the ground stations didn't receive all the telemetry it was
supposed to, but there's so much duplication built into the telemetry
reception network that we were able to get all of the telemetry from
other ground stations or ships at sea. So those were two little
blemishes, things that didn't work 100 percent, but we don't think
they had any impact on this test.
So, you know, all in all, you'd like everything to work 100 percent,
and that's the goal.
Q:
Going back to IFT-6, have you determined pretty much what the
target configuration is going to be for that, if it happens in
December or whenever it will occur?
Bacon:
Well, I'm sure that BMDO has determined where it will be, but I
don't know where it will be at this stage.
More questions on this?
Q:
Is there any -- are you guys doing anything in Sierra Leone?
Bacon:
We are doing nothing in Sierra Leone. We are doing something in
Nigeria. We have, I would say, a survey team or a curriculum
development team in Nigeria right now, and we also have some people in
Ghana. Let me explain why.
Several months ago, when the U.N. troops were going into Sierra Leone
and when some of the troops were taken captive by the RUF, the rebel
forces in Sierra Leone, the administration, President Clinton, said
that we would spend $20 million to strengthen the U.N. peacekeeping
effort in Sierra Leone. That money will probably be spent in large
part helping to equip some Nigerian battalions. And we now have a team
in Nigeria -- and part of the team is also in Ghana because we may do
the same with a Ghanaian battalion -- reviewing what their equipment
needs are and what their training needs are for using that equipment.
We're looking at three battalions in Nigeria, one battalion in Ghana.
That team is there; it's been there since the end of July. It's
several dozen people, including some Special Forces people, some
people from the Air Force in Europe and the Army in Europe. And they
are, as I said, looking at a curriculum, what curriculum needs to be
developed to help the Nigerian forces use equipment that they may get
from us.
They will be through with their work, I think, relatively soon -- a
week or so -- and then they'll make a recommendation, and then we'll
decide how to act on that recommendation.
But this is all designed to train Nigerian or Ghanaian peacekeepers
who then might be deployed to Sierra Leone.
Q:
There's been no decision on sending equipment, per se?
Bacon:
Well, part of what they're looking at is the equipment needs,
and then I would assume that some equipment -- communications
equipment, for instance -- will be part of this $20 million package.
There could be some vehicles, there would be trucks, small trucks that
would be part of the $20 million package, and some other equipment as
well.
Q:
The package is still being developed, I take it?
Bacon:
Well, the package is being developed; that's one of the things
that the team is doing there now, deciding on what the equipment
package will be and then what the training add-on will be to the
equipment.
Yes?
Q:
Change the topic a bit. Could you give us some details on the visit
of the president of Croatia?
Bacon:
Sure. President Mesic was here, his first visit to the Pentagon
as president, certainly. Croatia, as you know, has taken a big step
forward to democracy, which we're encouraging. They have recently
joined the Partnership for Peace, so he and the secretary talked about
the Partnership for Peace. They talked about an assessment that the
U.S. is doing of the Croatian military, how we can help advise them in
a military reform plan that they want to undertake, and they also
talked about Croatia's steps towards civilian control of the military,
something that we're encouraging. Those are basically the issues that
were discussed.
Q:
What's the amount of U.S. military aid towards Croatia?
Bacon:
Well, it's going up. In the current fiscal year, we are
providing $40,000 for funding in the Partnership for Peace, and that
will go up to $117,000 next year. We are providing some money to
finance about 10 to 20 people going to the Marshall Center, which is
in Europe, to teach newly democratic countries how to run militaries
under civilian control. That will increase to 20 or 30 people next
year. There is some funding for international military education and
training, called IMET.
That amount was 425,000 in 1999, and it will rise to 600,000 in fiscal
-- this year, fiscal 2000, and then to 650,000 in fiscal '01. And
we're also providing some -- this year, for the first time, $108,000
for foreign military funding of equipment. So it gives you an idea.
It's in the -- I guess that adds up, probably, to less than a million
dollars, but it's on the way up. And it's up from basically zero the
year before.
Q:
Thank you.
Bacon:
You're welcome.
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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