11 July 2000 Excerpt on NMD Test from Defense Department Regular Briefing Pentagon Deputy Spokesman Rear Admiral Craig Quigley briefed. Following is the excerpt on the NMD test from the Pentagon transcript: DoD News Briefing Tuesday, July 11, 2000 - 1:45 p.m. EDT Presenter: Rear Admiral Craig R. Quigley, USN, DASD PA Question: What's the status of the analysis of the -- last week's missile shot? Adm. Quigley: We are no further in the analysis of our data today than we were in the wee early morning hours of Saturday. We put a little bit more out about noon on Sunday -- at 12:30, I guess it was, on Sunday -- that was actually a little bit more detail -- I'm sorry, Saturday, Saturday, about midday on Saturday. But it was really a clarification of what we had initially looked at immediately after the shot. The stages, if you will, for this are about 48 hours after the shot, then a week, then two weeks, and then about 30 days. So we have said, to have meaningful analysis of the shot, it would still be in the two- to three-week time frame. We still think that looks pretty good. We know what happened. We just don't know -- you know, the exact sequence of events. Yes, sir? Q: Do you know how far down-range the kill vehicle got? And also, is it recoverable, and is it reusable? Adm. Quigley: No, it's not. The answer to the second part is no, it is not. I guess the answer to the first, without getting a precise answer, is not very far. It was launched from Kwajalein, a successful launch sequence. But then in the very early stages of the trajectory -- you remember the chart? Or maybe -- and I don't remember if you were here -- the chart had that yellow colored section. And in that yellow colored section of the shot sequence was where the failure occurred. And that was a fourth, maybe, of the way through the trajectory. So not -- very early in the sequence of the flight. Yes, sir? Q: During the briefing, General Kadish had said that he would be getting updates, about every eight hours or so, about the progress of the work. Is there any raw data that you can share with us on the latest of those eight-hour updates? Anything? Adm. Quigley: Well, there was a four-hour and then an eight-, and then we jumped to a 48-, and then it was a week and two. And so we are past that initial spate of four and eight and 48, and we're into the next. We are not going to be "piece-mealing" the information. We are going to wait now until we have our analysis well in hand and we really do understand what's happened. Q: Does the Secretary still -- Q: So we can expect the next -- Adm. Quigley: Go ahead, Charlie. Q: Does the Secretary still fully intend to make a recommendation to the White House on this before the scheduled shot in October, or is there some question about whether that will be done? Adm. Quigley: No. The Secretary on the trip has said that he intends to make his recommendation to the President within three to four weeks. Tom? Q: We can expect another update next Monday, then? Adm. Quigley: I don't know. They'll share information, as they have confidence in the analysis, but with no particular schedule. Next Monday puts it about 10 days after the shot. We have said two weeks. I won't make any promises on Monday. Q: Now you said -- the first was a few hours and then one week? Adm. Quigley: There was of course that initial -- (snaps fingers) -- you know, minutes after the shot, then about four hours, then eight hours, then 48 hours, and then more analysis in hand at about the one-week, two-week and 30-day point. Q: So why wouldn't we get a briefing at one week? Adm. Quigley: Because we're not going to release half-baked data. We want to make sure that we understand before we make any definitive statements as to cause. Q: Yeah, but, Admiral, you -- I mean, presumably something is going on over this period, there is some analysis going on; right? I mean, it's just that you're not going to tell us? Adm. Quigley: An awful lot of analysis going on. Q: Or you're not getting a report to relay to us? Adm. Quigley: I can only repeat what I said. We'll not release half-baked analysis. We're going to have confidence in the analysis, that we know what it says and that we can explain it to you and others. And I don't anticipate anything to be released before we have confidence in what it is we're seeing. Q: But I just didn't understand the one week. I mean, after one week, you're going to get something but you're not going to tell us? Adm. Quigley: That's correct. There is an internal analysis call and a test-gathering plan by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization on the time gates that I mentioned before. We will not necessarily share those publicly. Much of it is classified data. But we fully understand the desire to understand publicly what went on. We will share that, but only when we have confidence that we've got it right. Q: Craig, you told us last week, at the briefing on Thursday, that you would let us know immediately when you knew that there had been a hit or had not been a hit. Why was there a delay of about 30 minutes on that on -- I mean how was that -- Adm. Quigley: Well, because we expected -- yeah, absolutely. No, I understand your question. Perfectly fair. We expected there to be, as I described several times from here, the video link -- okay? -- of a clear picture, an image. And that would be almost self-evident, Charlie, as to whether or not you would see that bright flash, as you did in two shots prior, when you had an intercept and a collision in space. We did not get the video link, and it was a struggle within the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to understand what was happening. Eventually there was no video link, of course, so you had to go back to a secondary source, which is the radar data, and make sure you understood what was happening to you before we announced that we had indeed failed to do the intercept. Q: So you didn't know immediately that there was not a separation? Adm. Quigley: No. No. And that was a back-up system. You had no video. We were expecting to see video. There was no video, and it was like "what's happening?" And then we had to fully understand what was happening, and then -- that's why the delay. We really expected it to be a visual, instantaneous. It was either going to be a fly-by or an intercept. Q: There wasn't any telemetry? I mean there wasn't any kind of signal coming back? I would think something as routine as a separation in a missile launch you'd have telemetry that would be telling you -- Adm. Quigley: We had radar imagery and we had other means. But the one we were focusing on for the instantaneous feedback was the visual, and that never materialized. So we had to make sure that we knew what we had before we would announce exactly what happened. Q: Craig, I still don't understand, because you wouldn't have a visual unless you had an intercept. If you had a fly-by, you wouldn't have any visual. So you're saying, when you say, "We did not have a video link," that something went down with your video link, or you just didn't have a picture because you didn't have an intercept? Adm. Quigley: We didn't have a picture because we didn't have an intercept. Q: Not to belabor this, but wouldn't you need to recover that in order to get to the root cause of why it didn't separate? Adm. Quigley: Not necessarily. We want to take a look at the data that our sensors and systems on hand would have, first, and see what they tell us. Recovering something that small at that water depth is an extraordinarily difficult and expensive undertaking, and if we can get data that will explain to us clearly why didn't that particular step in the process take place, that's a better way to go. Jamie? Q: Craig, is it possible that the test scheduled for the October-November time frame could be accelerated to, say, the August- September time frame, to squeeze in another test before the President has to make that decision? Adm. Quigley: We are currently making no such plans to do that. Q: Is it just not -- is it just that you don't plan to do it, or is it -- are there technical limitations, that that really can't be done? Adm. Quigley: Both. The kill vehicle, of course, that we have been using for the test is a prototype. There is another one still being assembled to match that October-November date for the next scheduled test, Flight Test 6. And to accelerate that at this point would be an extraordinarily difficult, very high-risk sort of a circumstance, and for those reasons, we are just not looking at it as a feasible alternative. Q: You don't have any other kill vehicles already -- Adm. Quigley: No. No. Each is individually built one shot at a time, Chris, at this point. Q: We were told at the CIA today, this morning, the foreign intelligence -- National Foreign Intelligence Board -- was supposed to meet to review and, presumably, approve the latest classified national intelligence estimate that might include some sort of an update on the missile threat that the United States faces. Can you tell us anything about that and whether Secretary Cohen will be receiving that report, and will he be factoring into to his recommendation? Or can you tell us anything about whether the intelligence estimate of the threat has changed at all? Adm. Quigley: I'm afraid I can't go into that from here, Jamie. The CIA does have the lead, as you indicated, and I think that is still a work in progress, so I'll have to defer to them on that. Q: But you confirmed -- Q: You told us last week that the Secretary's recommendation would be based on cost and technology. You said the threat and other factors wouldn't enter into that. Adm. Quigley: Yeah, well, I don't necessarily link the two questions. I kind of took your question, Jamie, as a stand-alone on the National Intelligence -- Q: (Off mike) -- to Jamie's question, I just said, last week, you said that the Secretary -- Adm. Quigley: No, those would be the criteria that the Secretary will make his recommendation to the President, will be the technical feasibility and the cost. Q: On Jamie's question, do you know that that meeting took place? Adm. Quigley: No, I don't. I'd refer you to ICA. Q: Craig, what actually worked well or performed to standard in the test? What failed was clearly not part of the endemic NMD technology here. There's the radar, the X-band radar, these in-flight update -- (inaudible) -- the warhead. Is there any indication that stuff worked okay? Adm. Quigley: Well, I can't give you a very comprehensive answer on that, Tony. I remember General Kadish or Dr. Gansler -- I think it was Dr. Gansler, immediately after the test, early Saturday morning, said that the initial readings back from the X-band radar system were very encouraging. But again, this was a pretty abbreviated test, after all was said and done. I have not heard any other specifics on that. And again, we didn't get to the point where the most complex elements of the system, where we really wanted to get the data and understand how it would work, we just never got to that point because of this relatively simplistic failure somewhere back downstream. Q: Craig, as you review the data from the flight itself, are you also going over with the manufacturer its quality control measures and how it prepares -- you know, checks everything out up to the launch? Adm.Quigley: That is certainly an ongoing effort. But I think that we'll probably wait until the analysis is at hand so that we can have a little bit clearer understanding of the cause of failure for that portion of the launch. Quality control with the various manufacturers of the components is always an issue, but in the particulars here, I think we're going to be satisfied at this point to take a look at the data, study it very carefully and see where it leads us. Q: And if you do find something you believe may have been related to quality control or something along those lines, you would go back to the manufacturer and say, "Can you explain to us how this situation occurred or who was in charge of checking this out" or something? Adm. Quigley: We'll try to understand it as best we can and follow every path till we can try to understand it as best we can. Q: Thank you. Adm. Quigley: Thank you. (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov) Return to the Washington File