8 July 2000 Arms Control Chief Holum Says China, U.S. Agree Proliferation Harmful to Interests Beijing and Washington disagree on many regional security issues, but there are more areas of agreement than disagreement, according to Senior Advisor for Arms Control and International Security John D. Holum. China opposes efforts by the United States to deploy a National Missile Defense (NMD) for protection of the American homeland and any U.S. Theater Missile Defense (TMD) to protect forward-deployed U.S. forces and allies in the Asia-Pacific region, Holum said in a July 8 press conference in Beijing on recent non-proliferation and arms control talks between the two countries. Still, Holum stressed, "there are many more areas of agreement than disagreement between the United States and China, particularly on broad policy directions." The Clinton Administration and the Chinese government agree that "the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery are in neither side's interests, nor in the interest of peace and stability in the region or in the world," Holum said. At the same time, Holum said, U.S. representatives have raised concern over reports that "Chinese entities had provided assistance to missile programs in Pakistan and other countries." "We held detailed, substantive discussions on the missile issue and we made progress. But the issue remains unresolved. We agreed to hold further expert level discussions in the near future," he said. Holum noted that NMD can play a role in strengthening deterrence against regimes that might threaten U.S. allies. Citing North Korea as a hypothetical example, Holum suggested there could be a time when the Pyongyang regime, being equipped with missiles and other weapons of mass destruction, "might miscalculate by thinking that we would not respond to a military activity addressed against South Korea -- against our ally." Having NMD to negate such a North Korean threat to the United States would reinforce both nuclear deterrence and conventional deterrence, Holum said. In such a situation, Holum said, NMD complements conventional deterrence, but is not an alternative for it. Following is a transcript of the July 8 press conference: Senior Advisor for Arms Control and International Security John D. Holum Press Conference U.S. Embassy Beijing, China July 8, 2000 Ambassador Prueher: Good afternoon to all of you and thanks for coming out on a Saturday afternoon when you have alternative things to do as well. Glad you are here. But this week has seen the most significant discussions, I think, and substantive discussions on an important topic since WTO was discussed last November. Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the topics associated with that are really the most difficult and somewhat emotional topics that we discuss in our bilateral Sino-U.S. relationship. We have the good fortunate this week to have the U.S. delegation lead by John Holum, one of the State Department's most able diplomats. He is insightful, he is thoughtful, and he led a very constructive dialogue. Likewise, on the Chinese side Wang Guangya led the Chinese delegation and he has similar characteristics. As a result, we had a very good set of discussions and they aired out quite fully the considerable areas that we have in common -- our common objectives, as well as the particular areas where we disagree and where we have contention. But these were discussed in a very positive climate and it provided some excellent foundations for moving ahead with the non-proliferation dialogue, which we are very delighted to have resumed. I am optimistic that we can move forward, and [that] we can move forward in a constructive way in the interests of both the United States and the interests of China. So it is a pleasure for me to do the heavy lifting this afternoon to introduce John Holum, again, one of most able diplomats from the State Department, and he will talk straight to you also, I am sure. Thank you. John Holum: Thank you, Ambassador. I have just a short opening statement. I am very pleased by the resumption of our non-proliferation and arms control dialogue with China. We had, as the Ambassador said, constructive discussions on a broad range of issues. And this is an important aspect of our overall relationship and it needs to continue. We have many strong and common interests in this area. During these two days of talks, we discussed our views on multi-lateral arms control including many specific issues such as the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and others. We also discussed our policy toward ballistic missile defenses, and as well, China's opposition to US deployments of NMD and TMD in the Asian-Pacific region. The Chinese side raised its strong concerns about our arms sales policy towards Taiwan. We frankly discussed the wide array of security issues between us and addressed areas of mutual interests along with these areas of difference. Let me add it is clear there are many more areas of agreement than disagreement between the United States and China, particularly on broad policy directions. In the non-proliferation area, we agreed that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery are in neither side's interests, nor in the interest of peace and stability in the region or in the world. We also raised our concern over the reports that Chinese entities had provided assistance to missile programs in Pakistan and other countries. We held detailed, substantive discussions on the missile issue and we made progress. But the issue remains unresolved. We agreed to hold further expert level discussions in the near future. With that, I would be happy to turn to your questions. Q: You just mentioned that these detailed and substantive discussions didn't get resolved, U.S. concerns over these charges of Chinese assistance programs to Pakistan. Can you assess for us how likely it is that sanctions might be imposed against China for these activities? And could you also give us a bit more background on the 1992 charges versus the more recent charges of assistance to Pakistan and Iran? Which are your priorities now? Holum: I don't want to go into the specifics of our concerns. There have been a number of leaks and allegations about intelligence matters that I can't go into as a matter of policy and practice, other than to say that when we have received information we investigate thoroughly and we pursue those issues. On the question of sanctions, we have, as you know, in the past imposed sanctions on China's missile relationship with Pakistan. My view is that the objective of our policy and in the fact of sanctions legislation, is not sanctions. The objective is solutions, and that's what we are interested in working on. And as I think I said, we made progress, we have more work to do, we are going to continue to work on this. And the Chinese side has also agreed that we need to continue to work on this. Q: There seems to be some confusion about what exactly are the exact commitments that China has made to the U.S. in the past regarding the Missile Technology Control Regime, I wonder if you can spell out what the United States understands their commitment is? And secondly, whether some of the allegations published last week are true, whether they would have violated those promises? And finally, I understand there is legislation pending in the next few weeks in the Senate that would single China out for further special attention. Did you discuss that? And what is your opinion? Holum: Let me answer the second one first. I think in terms of the China Non-proliferation Act we obviously share the goals of this legislation in terms of results, but it is our view that we have all the authority we need to deal with this question, including existing sanctions and other laws. So we don't think that legislation would serve a useful purpose, or would be helpful to this effort. I am not dismissing the concerns that lead to the legislation, I just think that we are well equipped to proceed based on existing law. In terms of what China's commitments have entailed, in 1994 China made a commitment that, interestingly, actually goes beyond, in some respects, the obligations that members of the Missile Technology Control Regime undertake, and that is, in their case, that they committed not to provide MTCR-class ground-to-ground missiles to any country -- "full-up" MTCR-class missiles. That, in our understanding, based on our information, is a commitment they have upheld. In addition to that, there is a dispute over the extent to which China agreed to limits on technology associated with the Missile Technology Control Regime. As you know, China is not a member of the MTCR. As a part of our discussions in the past, we have encouraged them to consider qualifying for membership in the Regime. And they still have that under review. But they have committed in fairly broad terms, as I said, to specific curtailment of "full-up" missile transactions. What is unclear, and is a matter of some dispute between us and them, is the extent to which that reaches technology. And it is technology that is the area of concern. Q: With regard to China's opposition to TMD that you mentioned that came up in the course of the dialogue, a number of Chinese officials in the past stated that they may not oppose U.S.-Japanese missile defense per se, but that they categorically oppose anything that might encompass Taiwan. Did you get any sense of the Chinese side making that kind of distinction? Holum: I don't want to get into characterizing the Chinese position, other than in very broad terms. It is clear that for the Chinese, TMD in the region is a concern and a dominant concern is the possibility that we would consider TMD for Taiwan, for the obvious reason. We have made clear in this and in other meetings that that is a decision that has not been made. We don't rule out the possibility that at some time in the future Taiwan might have TMD capabilities, that we might assist Taiwan. But we haven't made that decision. The only decision we have made is when the technology becomes available we will use it in defense of our own forces. I might add that this is a technology that is some years in the future, I think that roughly 2007 is a time frame for deployment of the TMD-type system that we are talking about. In that same context, I think it is important to add the over-all Taiwan arms sales question, from our perspective, is based on the three Communiqu�� and the Taiwan Relations Act and involves our supply of defensive capabilities. That and the extent to which we and, in turn Taiwan, consider they need defenses depends on Chinese deployments of offensive capabilities across the Strait. So our interest is in preventing a missile competition, an arms race, across the Strait. We would far rather see restraint on both sides. We would obviously like to see the cross-Strait dialogue resume. Q: Our magazine is running a story this week out of Pakistan which indicates that the U.S. has not been discussing with Pakistan any of these concerns about Chinese arms sales or Chinese technology assistance to Pakistan. Can you explain why it is that this hasn't been an issue in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship? Why has it suddenly been brought up with China? Holum: I stand ready to be corrected on this but I believe Pakistan remains under sanctions on the basis of these transactions in the past and that when Strobe Talbott has had meetings with Pakistani officials, for example, that these issues are routinely brought up. Q: But I guess that in the last Strobe Talbott negotiations which were on security issues, the Pakistanis said that the issue was never brought up --[that] M-11, anything to do with M-11's-- anything to do with China's assistance to Pakistan -- was never brought up in the negotiations? Holum: I'd have to check on that, I wasn't at the meeting. We'll get an answer for you. Q: Did the Chinese acknowledge that they had provided any missile technology to Pakistan in recent years? Holum: I can't get into the substance of the conversations. I'm sorry. Q: Did the timing of this morning's anti-missile test figure in the talks? Holum: Well, it wasn't part of our plan in terms of scheduling the talks, but it was an interesting confluence of events. We didn't plan on having the talks on the day of the test. Q: The Chinese and diplomats and leaders of a lot of countries in the region have criticized NMD by saying that it eliminates the whole nuclear deterrence theory and thus will spark a nuclear arms race in Asia and globally. I imagine the Chinese side raised this view with you in your talks the last couple of days. What was your response to that argument since this does link into the whole issue of non-proliferation, and if the argument is "well, nuclear deterrence goes out the window with NMD" was there any implication in your conversations that the Chinese would be less likely to cooperate on non-proliferation issues because of this perceived insecurity by countries around the region, and that your job could become a lot tougher as a result? Holum: Well, I'll talk about our approach. I'll let the Chinese speak for themselves in terms of how they address the NMD issue, other than to say that they were clear, as they have been publicly, on their position on National Missile Defense -- they don't like the idea. Our view is that the deployment of National Missile Defense can be a supplement to deterrence. It certainly doesn't replace it. We have basically three strategies -- three approaches -- to dealing with missile proliferation. The first, and by far the preferred course, to the extent that it works, is prevention. You have seen the diplomatic efforts that we have made to try to constrain North Korea's missile program, including missile talks that are just resuming, to try to move further with their moratorium on testing long-range ballistic missiles. The Perry process, the North-South dialogue has an important part to play in that. Prevention is our first approach. Second is deterrence. We believe that most countries, and under most circumstances, deterrence still applies. Certainly, any country, however large or small its ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction capability, that contemplates an attack on the United States, must be aware that it would suffer an overwhelming and devastating response. And that remains an essential part of our approach and our policy. Nonetheless, there are circumstances where we believe defense plays a role -- not as an alternative to deterrence -- but as a supplement, or a complement. The specific concern that gives rise to National Missile Defense is the possibility that being equipped with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, countries such as North Korea might miscalculate into thinking that we would not respond to a military activity addressed against South Korea -- against our ally. National Missile Defense, in that sense, reinforces deterrence and reinforces conventional deterrence. So it is a complement. I don't see these as alternatives in any sense. I think both are complementary. Q: Sorry, if I could just ask a quick follow-up. What is your response to what seems to be a wide-spread perception in the Chinese diplomatic and defense community here that NMD, while the U.S. says it really isn't meant to shield against Chinese missiles, a lot of people in China feel that it is in fact directed against China in some way? Holum: That's one of the reasons why I think this dialogue is extremely important, not only to underscore and confirm that we do not see and are not designing this system to be deployed against China, that we are satisfied with a stable deterrence relationship with China, but also to explore ways to further confirm and make clear to them in tangible ways, that in fact, it's not addressed against their forces. And so I think we need to continue the discussion. I think we've made a good start here. I think Strobe Talbot, Deputy Secretary Talbot, made a good start when he was here. We've made clear to China that we take their concerns seriously and we intend to address them. Q: Can you tell me please if you touched upon the issue of Chinese purchases of advanced weapons from Russia? Holum: We didn't get into that. Q: I would like to know if you raised concerns about the North Korean sale of long range missiles to Pakistan? Holum: We did not discuss that issue directly with China. Q: The Chinese have said in the past that they would regard deployment of TMD to Taiwan as having taken place even if missiles such as Patriots are sold by the U.S. to Taiwan. What would be your definition of deployment of TMD to Taiwan? What would be the watershed transfer of technology or sales of equipment? Holum: Well, it's not Patriot [missiles.] We have a number of Theater Missile Defense systems under active development: the Navy theater-wide, the THAAD system, and others, and those would generally be recognized as theater missile defenses. We have not clearly crossed that threshold in the case of Taiwan at this stage, and I think it would be in that kind of a context, with those kind of systems, that we would consider a transfer of TMD technology. And again, I want to emphasize that that's something that hasn't been decided. Q: Apart from possible missile technology transfers to Pakistan, what are the other areas of American concern you will be raising with China? Are there still concerns about Iran, about North Korea? Holum: Again, I don't want to go into the specifics of countries. I mentioned Pakistan and other countries where we have raised concerns. Let me put these concerns in context. I think it's important for Americans to recognize, for us to recognize, that China has, in a very short time, covered an extremely long distance in terms of commitment to, and involvement in, arms control and non-proliferation regimes. Prior to 1992, China was not a member of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. In earlier years than that, it had actively opposed these regimes. Now China is an active and constructive participant in a broad range of non-proliferation treaties and regimes. They joined the NPT in 1992; they joined the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1996, having been engaged in the negotiation. In 1996, they agreed not to transfer peaceful nuclear assistance to unsafeguarded facilities anywhere. In 1997, they agreed to no nuclear cooperation with Iran. They negotiated with us -- completed in 1996 -- a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. They've played a constructive role in the missile issue with North Korea and in the nuclear issue. They've been very positive participants in the NPT review conferences, including the 1995 conference at which the treaty was made permanent; in the 2000 conference, which was a successful conference notwithstanding a lot of the concerns that it was doomed to failure. They played an important role in South Asia and other areas. This is a case where China has become a major participant in global non-proliferation regimes and in a number of bilateral and regional efforts. On policy grounds, as I emphasized earlier, we have a broad range of common positions, common views. We have differences in application of policy, and in specific cases where we have things to resolve. I would stress that this, by and large, is a very positive trend, a positive aspect of our relations that we need to keep building on. So when we look at specific cases we need to see them in that broader context. It's been a remarkable trend in the last eight or ten years. Q: One area the Chinese might be ahead of the U.S. in arms control is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It has been passed to the National People's Congress for ratification and the Foreign Minister has said it will be ratified this year. Did you receive any pressure from the Chinese side for Washington to get its act together and ratify this treaty as well? Holum: We did get a report on the status of Chinese ratification efforts. We were heartened by that. We encouraged China to proceed. China has been sympathetic and supportive to our efforts to ratify the Treaty. This has not been raised in the context of the U.S. lagging behind. They understand the complications we've had. I would say in that respect, and as we've reported here, we have a very serious effort underway led by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvilli to listen to Senators, to engage, to hear their concerns, to explore possible ways of addressing those, and fleshing out the all-too-abbreviated debate that was held last October. I think we have a good process in place. The treaty is very unlikely to be considered again during President Clinton's term. There are very few months of the congressional session left. But I think that given the General's very strong efforts, that we'll hand this treaty on to the next administration in much better shape for a more deliberate and careful look at it, and for possible ratification. And it helps that process, it seems to me, the extent to which other major countries -- China and Russia as well, and now I think all of the NATO allies -- ratify the treaty and move forward. Q: It's actually a general question, but just for the sake of all of us here. I was just wondering -- you were putting in context these charges involving China and assistance to Pakistan and other countries. Keeping in that spirit of putting things in context, I was just wondering if you could tell us if China has done what it is charged with doing -- actually breaking any commitments made to the United States, or is it more, in fact, the international community? Is this a case of breaking a commitment it's made, or is this a case where the U.S. is just not happy about what happened and is looking to get new Chinese commitments on missile exports or on membership in the MTCR, agreeing not to export certain things in MTCR annexes? If you could give us some context on that. Holum: Let me answer it this way. It goes back to an earlier question about what was agreed in 1994. There's a dispute about the specifics of that. I think, again to put it in a broader context, we have a common interest in preventing proliferation. Neither country sees it as being in their interest and we're trying to approach it from that standpoint to make this a cooperative, constructive effort in which we share information and try to resolve problems. Both sides are committed to pursuing that. That's a good sign. It's not over yet. These issues aren't resolved, but we've made progress. There's no law, there's no international treaty that says that you can't supply missile technology. The Missile Technology Control Regime does contain specific fairly detailed descriptions of what technology members and adherents should not provide and there's a gradation within the agreement: different levels of technology, presumption of denial, case-by-case decision-making. At this stage, when we're dealing with specific issues, we don't want to argue legalities or whether this does or does not fit within their or our perception of the Missile Technology Control Regime, but rather, let's deal with the problem. Let's solve the difficulty. Q: [Inaudible - about export controls.] Holum: Export controls are an important part. Absolutely. Q: [Inaudible] Holum: Yes, export controls routinely come up in this context. It's something that we're pursuing very broadly, not only with China. [We're pursuing] with Russia, with a whole range of countries. Let's step back from this for a minute. One of the difficulties -- the dangers of missile technology -- missile proliferation flows from the fact that technology after the Cold War is both advancing and is much more widely available. That means that countries that have these advanced technologies have a responsibility to adopt and enforce effective export controls. And there's a wide variety in range of detailed effectiveness in export controls among countries all over the world, among many countries in the former Eastern block or in the former Soviet Union. We're working with a full range of countries to advance export controls. China is among them, but it's a broad problem. Thank you. (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov) Return to the Washington File