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22 June 2000
Kadish Testifies Missile Defense System
Won't Harm Russian Strategic Deterrent
The director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) says
both the proposed initial National Missile Defense (NMD) program and
its follow-on system "could not harm the Russian deterrent."
Air Force Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish told a House Armed Services
subcommittee June 22 that the NMD system that is being designed for
the 2005 to 2007 time frame "could not defend against a massive attack
involving hundreds of warheads, nor is it intended to defeat more
sophisticated countermeasures."
Kadish also told the House Research and Development Subcommittee that
there are "practical limits" to designing countermeasures, but over
time, as "we approach 2010, we believe we will be able to develop
future capabilities that will handle the more sophisticated
countermeasures we expect to face from states of concern."
"We will not be perfect against every conceivable countermeasure," he
said, "but neither will our adversaries be perfect against our
capabilities."
Kadish said BMDO is currently designing a system to defend all 50
American states "against a few long-range missiles with simple
countermeasures." North Korea, Iran, and Iraq have been identified as
primary states of concern for which the system is being designed.
To address the anticipated threat, BMDO anticipates an NMD system
consisting of 20 missile interceptors that would be ready by fiscal
year 2005. To achieve this, an X-band radar must be installed on
Shemya Island in the Aleutians where extreme weather conditions
dictate a short construction season, according to the BMDO director.
With the next NMD interceptor test scheduled for July 7, Kadish said,
BMDO is facing both "an engineering and integration challenge." While
striving for success with every NMD test, he said, "we do not expect
that we will always achieve it."
There is much to learn from both successes and failures, the BMDO
official said, adding, "We must ensure that the NMD system will work
with a very high level of confidence against the threat we believe
will exist. The testing program is designed to do just that over the
course of the next five years."
He said he is convinced that "we are on a path to prove the
technological feasibility of deploying this country's first ever
national missile defense system."
Following is the text of Kadish's remarks as delivered:
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee.
Thank you for
inviting me to testify today on the U.S. National Missile Defense (or
NMD) program. I would like to use my time this afternoon to explain
the progress we are making. As you know, we are preparing within the
Department to undertake a Deployment Readiness Review (or DRR) this
summer in order to assess the technological readiness and cost of the
planned NMD system. The President will take the Secretary of Defense's
assessment into account when he subsequently considers whether or not
to proceed with NMD system deployment. The President, in making this
decision, will consider four criteria: threat, status of the
technology, affordability, and overall national security, including
arms control. To support the technological assessment at the DRR, we
have scheduled our fifth integrated flight test (IFT-5) on July 7.
There are many decision points ahead of us, and we have a
flight-testing program that extends out over the next five years, the
results of which will be used to inform decision makers and to
validate or improve elements of the NMD system. There has been
extensive program progress in the past year, to include: a successful
intercept, a demonstrated integration of many system elements, and
extensive simulation and ground testing. To be sure, there is a lot of
hard work ahead of us. But as we approach the DRR, I am convinced that
we are on a path to prove the technological feasibility of deploying
this country's first ever national missile defense system.
The goal of the NMD program is modest in scope, but technologically
challenging. It is to develop and, when directed, field a limited,
land-based national missile defense system to counter the emerging
threat to the United States. The Director of Central Intelligence
testified before Congress earlier this year that, "Over the next 15
years, our cities will face ballistic missile threats from a variety
of actors...." And he specifically pointed to North Korea's ability to
test its Taepo Dong II missile this year, a missile that "may be
capable of delivering a nuclear payload to the United States." To meet
this threat, an Initial Operational Capability, consisting of 20
interceptors, can be available by FY 2005. In light of the fact that
some states could acquire a capability to launch more missiles in the
next decade, our acquisition strategy supports growing that initial
system to what we call an "Expanded C-1 architecture" of 100
interceptors. The full 100 interceptors can be deployed by FY 2007.
As I have testified before, the NMD program continues to be high-risk.
The schedule is compressed and a significant setback in one element
can delay the entire program. The unconventional acquisition approach
we have adopted in order to meet the emerging threat requires
developing and testing many of the elements concurrently. Maintaining
schedule and meeting our commitment to deploy an initial operational
capability by 2005 require aggressive management and constant
attention. There is a long road ahead to maintain the balance of cost,
schedule and performance of this system.
This summer's technological assessment is only the first of several
decision points in this multiyear system development and deployment
process. Each subsequent decision will take into account the progress
of the program at that time and will determine whether to give
authority to proceed on key activities. Our most immediate challenge
is the prospect of completing an X-band radar on Shemya Island, Alaska
by 2005. Due to the often extreme weather conditions in the Aleutians
and the short construction season, this is the long-lead item for the
overall system. In Fiscal '01, we would conduct a Defense Acquisition
Board review to reassess the status of the program. Based on program
performance, we would seek approval to purchase long-lead items for
our early warning radars, begin installation of the X-band
ground-based radar and missile site, and start the multiyear process
of integrating the Battle Management/Command, Control, and
Communications system. Authorization of interceptor missile production
is not scheduled until 2003.
You are all well aware of the challenges we've faced in the
development of our ballistic missile defense systems to counter the
growing threat. There are two central technological problems
confronting us with this type of system -- a system that engages
warheads in their longest phase of flight, what we call the
"midcourse." The first is the discrimination problem: can we find the
warhead? The second is the so-called "hit a bullet with a bullet"
problem: once we find a warhead, can we hit it? Historically, both of
these problems have been very difficult to solve, especially against a
massive raid involving hundreds of warheads and countermeasures --
decoys, radar chaff, and debris.
Until recently, many observers believed the chief technical barrier to
NMD was that hit-to-kill was not technologically feasible -- that we
could not hit a bullet with a bullet. Yet, with the intercept tests
executed in our NMD and Theater Missile Defense programs since March
of 1999, we have demonstrated repeatedly that hit-to-kill can be done.
Today, the primary concerns surrounding the capability of the planned
NMD system have a new focus. Some now maintain that the system cannot
accurately discriminate -- that is, pick out the warhead from the
countermeasures. In fact, they claim that this problem is so hard that
it is impossible to overcome and therefore the NMD system should not
be built. I disagree. To be sure, this is a challenge we cannot ignore
and we are not ignoring it.
In order to understand the discrimination challenge before us, I
believe we have to look at three basic aspects of the NMD program --
first, the countermeasures the NMD system is expected to face; second,
the tools that the NMD system will be using to enhance its ability to
discriminate the warhead in the target cluster; and third, our testing
objectives and approach. Let me take the rest of my time this
afternoon to address these.
As I indicated earlier and in my previous testimony, the operational
requirements of the NMD system are limited. If we proceed with
deployment, we would initially build a system designed to defend all
50 states against a few long-range missiles with simple
countermeasures. So it's very important to understand what the threat
will be in the 2005-2007 timeframe, and this will mean considering
both the source of the missile threat and the number and
sophistication of missiles and warheads we anticipate the states of
concern will have. While many types of countermeasures can be
postulated based purely on scientific principles, we are initially
concerned with countermeasures that, based on intelligence estimates,
a state of concern could make effective as it struggles to make its
basic system work.
The primary states of concern are North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. As a
result, the Expanded C-1 NMD system is not designed to face more than
a few tens of warheads or sophisticated countermeasures that these
states are unlikely to use. I believe the Expanded C-1 system will be
very effective at defeating the most likely threats from these states.
The planned system, involving 100 operational interceptors by 2007, is
not designed to counter much larger and more capable forces of
long-range ballistic missiles. The system we are designing for the
2005-2007 timeframe could not defend against a massive attack
involving hundreds of warheads, nor is it intended to defeat more
sophisticated countermeasures.
We fully expect that the threat of missile attack from states that
threaten international peace and security will evolve over time, and
accordingly, we have a follow-on NMD to meet a larger, more
sophisticated threat. As with the initial system, follow-on deployment
could not harm the Russian deterrent. As the system progresses and we
approach 2010, we believe we will be able to develop future
capabilities that will handle the more sophisticated countermeasures
we expect to face from states of concern. There are practical limits
to engineering a countermeasure capability, just as there are
practical limits to the defensive technology. We will not be perfect
against every conceivable countermeasure, but neither will our
adversaries be perfect against our capabilities. Our sensor
capabilities will improve over time.
The second aspect of the NMD system it is important to understand is
that there are several tools available to us to address the
discrimination challenge. The planned system of systems uses more than
the kill vehicle to weed out countermeasures and select the right
object for destruction. In addition to the infrared and optical
sensors on the kill vehicle, we will use the early warning radars and
X-band radar to decrease the volume of space needed to be searched by
the sensors on the EKV (Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle). The X-band radar
also assists in the discrimination of the target complex. There are
many other discrimination technologies and techniques that I cannot
talk about in this public forum. But the plain fact is that effective
countermeasures would have to defeat more than one aspect of our
discrimination capability. With regard to countermeasures, there is a
lot of redundancy and synergy built into this system, so that very
often the performance we get is greater than the sum total of the
parts. Those who say that it is technologically impossible for the NMD
system to do adequate discrimination do so on the basis of very
limited knowledge and without the benefit of the testing results that
we have generated to date and will generate in the years ahead. In the
future, we will add even more tools to the discrimination toolbox, to
include the infrared sensors on SBIRS-Low (Space-Based Infrared
System) satellites, which will be used to help track the warhead. As
our computing power grows and discrimination sensors improve and
multiply, it will get harder and harder to defeat our maturing NMD
system.
The third aspect of the NMD system that must be understood is that we
need to have confidence in our discrimination capability, which we get
through our testing program. In general terms, the approach we have
chosen is to test individual system components, one by one, and then
gradually link them for partially-integrated and, later,
fully-integrated testing. The results from each test are fed into
subsequent tests, so that incremental improvements may be made to the
elements and the system. We are just now entering the fully integrated
testing phase. The tests we plan will become progressively more
stressful. The increasing complexity of our tests will involve, among
other things, greater discrimination challenges, longer ranges, higher
closing speeds, and day and nighttime shots. The way our current
testing program is planned, we will do a series of tests that become
increasingly operationally realistic by 2004.
The technologies in the NMD system, having been developed and
engineered over several decades, are not revolutionary. We are not
awaiting some technological breakthrough. The technologies are there
because of the significant investments we've made in years past. So
what we really have before us is an engineering and integration
challenge. The test program we have devised is designed to
demonstrate, not only the effectiveness of many of our more advanced
discrimination technologies, but also the integration of numerous
system elements. This is a stiff challenge, but in my professional
judgment, not an insurmountable one.
I want to describe our flight-testing program, but before I do I want
to highlight one very important point. We don't just rely on test data
from intercept night tests. There has been significant ground testing
as well as flight testing against the radars for many years, and we
use the data from these tests to validate the results we derive from
our extensive modeling and simulation exercises. So, while our
integrated flight tests are very important, and while we all wait in
great anticipation for the outcome of IFT-5, they are not the only
basis for developing a recommendation about the technical feasibility
of the system. Our track record is good, and our entire testing
program has given us a lot of good and very valuable data upon which
we can base our decisions.
There's been a great deal of public focus in the press about this
flight testing program, including allegations by some that we are
making the tests too easy. This is simply not the case. Our flight
tests are tough and unprecedented with clear testing objectives,
protocols, and specific sequences. We established early on and are
adhering to a test strategy designed to address specific objectives
with increasing complexity. The flight test plan has always
incorporated three major phases. In the first phase, two initial
flights were designed to identify the different capabilities of the
EKV sensors. In the second phase, the objectives of the flights were
to look at aimpoint selection and also address hit-to-kill. And in the
third, we will then execute intercept tests against increasingly
complex target sets.
The first major phase in our program involved two seeker
characterization flight tests on our interceptor kill vehicle, which
we executed in order to test on equal terms two competing suites of
sensors, one built by Boeing, which flew the EKV during Integrated
Flight Test 1A, and the other built by Raytheon, which flew an EKV in
Integrated Flight Test 2. The testing objectives for these first two
flight tests were very different and much simpler from the testing
objectives of the integrated flight tests that followed because they
tested only how well the two competing sensor suites could see the
dummy warhead and countermeasures. Hit-to-kill was not attempted in
these first two tests.
In effect, in this first phase we threw a giant eye chart up there in
space before each of the EKVs in order to evaluate their vision. We
wanted to test more than just whether each could see the big "E" on
that chart, so we included more objects within the field of view so
that we could determine how refined the vision of each EKV was. These
vision tests also were unassisted -- we made no effort to use
ground-based radars to assist the sensor suites. The EKVs were on
their own, and the NMD team evaluated EKV performance on the basis of
their ability to collect target data to validate our discrimination
capability.
The target clusters released in space for the first two flight tests
contained the reentry vehicle, nine decoys, and the target deployment
mechanism. This significant countermeasures package contained more
objects than the countermeasures packages we employed during IFT-3 and
IFT-4 because we, wanted to see how well the EKVs could discriminate
within the target complex and identify the warhead. We gathered an
immense amount of data that increased our confidence in our ability to
meet the discrimination challenge. IFT-lA and 2 demonstrated a
robustness in discrimination capability that went beyond the baseline
threat for purposes of designing the Expanded C-1 system.
The second major phase of our flight-testing program is designed to
test more than the EKV's vision. This phase began with IFT-3, a
partially integrated intercept test, when we successfully demonstrated
our ability to do on-board discrimination and target selection as well
as hit-to-kill. We dramatically reduced the number of objects in the
target complex because our testing objective changed from one of
simply seeing and discriminating among the objects to seeing the
objects, discriminating among them, evaluating them, and selecting the
warhead instead of the decoy or rocket stage, and colliding into the
warhead's "sweet spot." The challenge here, as you can see, is much
greater.
These early intercept missions are intended primarily to prove and, if
necessary, refine the hit-to-kill technologies. Even here, of course,
the discrimination technologies must work well if we are to be able to
test our ability to collide with the RV (Reentry Vehicle), but we did
not set out in these early tests with the goal of stressing the sensor
suites to their maximum by releasing multiple objects before them.
This will come later. These smaller target sets are not only
consistent with our early test flight objectives, they also are
representative of some of the threats emerging missile states can
pose.
So far, we have had two intercept flight tests to support the DRR
decision process. The October 2nd, 1999 test demonstrated the ability
of the kill vehicle to locate -- that is, discriminate the warhead
from the simple countermeasure we employed and the target booster's
final stage -- and engage and destroy a reentry vehicle above the
atmosphere. IFT-3 demonstrated we could overcome the technical
complexity of colliding directly with a missile warhead traveling in
space at a closing velocity of more than 15,000 miles per hour.
Because of this test, we now know our interceptor concept works, a
fact that has helped to build our confidence that it is possible to
maintain our aggressive schedule.
In that regard, I'd like to emphasize that we did not hit the target
in IFT-3 by accident. Although there were anomalies in that test, the
discrimination capability of the EKV performed essentially as
intended. The decoy was the biggest object in the EKV's field of view
when the seeker opened its eyes. But the EKV rejected the decoy as the
improbable target, resumed its search, and identified the right target
before diverting towards and slamming into it.
IFT-4, which occurred in January of this year, was partially
successful. Although we did not hit the warhead, we did test and
demonstrate the integrated functionality of the major NMD system
elements, the operation and performance of the ground sensors,
operation and functionality of the Battle Management/Command, Control,
and Communications, and EKV performance up to the last seconds in its
flight. We also used a simple target complex during this flight test,
which, but for the EKV anomaly, showed every sign of being a fully
successful test. This test was important because it demonstrated that
the X-band radar and upgraded early warning radars we would deploy as
part of the system could make their expected contribution to solving
the countermeasures problem.
Next month, IFT-5 will be another full system test of the prototype
NMD system, using all of the elements representing a future
operational system. The discrimination challenge will involve the
dummy warhead, a decoy, and the discarded rocket stage. A new
in-flight communications capability providing real-time data to the
EKV will be tested. At least 16 more intercept tests are planned by
2005, with eight intercept tests scheduled to take place prior to any
commitment to purchase interceptors in 2003. Subsequent flight tests
will become progressively more difficult. Retired Air Force General
Larry Welch supported this event-driven approach. It is worth noting
that there was one piece of advice offered to us by General Welch that
we did not follow. This independent panel recommended, in the interest
of keeping the tests simple, that we conduct these early intercept
tests without countermeasures in order to test more thoroughly the
hit-to-kill technique. We thought it was important to add a little
more complexity into IFT-3, 4, and 5. We believe that this testing
strategy, thus far, has paid off in better discrimination data.
The NMD Joint Program Office is following a rigorous system
engineering approach and executing a multi-year testing plan for
developing the country's first operational ballistic missile defense
system. Given the complexity of the NMD system and the fact that we
are now just in the early phases of development, it would be
irresponsible, both from a programmatic and financial standpoint, to
rush into a testing program that sought to prove the system's
effectiveness against the most stressful targets. A test failure,
under these conditions, would make it very difficult to identify the
points of weakness, and I would be less certain that I could get
results useful for subsequent tests. One of our testing goals is to
learn about and refine different parts of the system as we are
developing it. Our test evaluators cannot learn by overloading system
components and testing them too early under highly adversarial
conditions. We cannot learn if we cannot isolate results. We cannot
acquire the data we need, in other words, unless we use a more
scientific, incremental approach.
The NMD program is unique for the amount of attention and intense
scrutiny it receives daily. Hundreds of dedicated program and data
analysts in government (within both the Congress and Executive
branch), in industry (to include the manufacturers of the NMD system
elements, the lead system integrator and its subcontractor team), and
independent review panels (most notably the panel headed by General
Welch) routinely and aggressively analyze and catalogue our testing
results and investigate the validity, utility, and authenticity of the
data generated by every test executed by the NMD Joint Program Office.
Simply put, Mr. Chairman, this program has been turned inside out and
placed under a microscope. A problem for one is a problem for all --
there are many parties who have a lot invested in the development of
an effective NMD system and who will flag any problems in the program
or inaccuracies in our reporting.
We will continue to test our NMD system based upon the disciplined,
proven, and scientific methods learned over more than four decades of
missile development, deployment, and operations. While we strive for
success on every test, we do not expect that we will always achieve
it. Very often problems occur and elements of our tests fail. Yet we
learn a lot from our testing, both successes and failures. We must
ensure that the NMD system will work with a very high level of
confidence against the threat we believe will exist -- the testing
program is designed to do just that over the course of the next five
years.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. I would be pleased to address
the Committee's questions.
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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